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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is twofold. First, to put forward a societal explanation to the 
concept of ‘taking the perspective of the other’. Secondly, and based on the first, to 
investigate the difficulties of Israeli children to take the perspective of the Palestinians. I 
argue that perspective taking is mediated by social representations, power interests and 
ideologies, by minds shaped by particular socio-historical circumstances, to reproduce 
or challenge, sustain or resist the diverse realities of the conflict. Aiming to break away 
from previous individualistic conceptualisations of perspective taking, the theoretical 
perspective developed through this thesis is grounded in G.H. Mead social and ethical 
psychology, and eclectically draws on contemporary ideas such as dialogical 
epistemology, narrative, social representations, and rhetoric. While not disputing the 
relevance of emergent cognitive skills to the child’s ability to role take, the view put 
forward in this thesis proposes that taking the perspective of the other is something 
whose nature is social and whose origin lie, in some good measure, in the interpersonal 
and social-ideological matrix of which the child is part. The concept of perspective 
taking is operationalised along two interrelated dimensions: (a) the ideological 
construction of the other and (b) perspective negotiating. The research comprises three 
empirical studies: (i) ethnography description of the Israeli (collective) self (ii) 
children’s drawing of the other and (iii) children role-play narrative compositions. This 
study has shown that ‘entering’ the perspective of the Palestinians is impeded by the 
ideological comprehensions of the conflict as experienced by the Israeli children. That 
is to say, the ability to construct the Palestinian viewpoint is constrained by the 
boundaries of the Israeli representational field and discourse in relation to the conflict, 
and the dynamics of knowledge, affect and practices that maintain them.
2
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank the people without whose contribution and help this thesis 
would not be possible:
First, I like to thank Sandra Jovchelovitch my supervisor and teacher. Your 
thoughtful consideration proved to be invaluable in directing me to where I needed to 
go.
I am also grateful to the wonderful children who participated in this study and helped 
make it possible. To you and all the children in the Middle East I wish a better future.
I am deeply indebted to everyone in the department: Daniel, Steve G., Steve B. and 
Tom for all their assistance.
Much appreciation and hugs to all colleagues around me: Kavita, Claudine, Ama, 
Alicia, Alex and Greg - 1 wish you all good luck and endless happiness.
Special thanks to my in-laws, Linda and Gadi, for their everlasting support and 
encouragement.
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my dear family -  Ima, Aba, Tammy 
and Dafna without whose brace and love this journey would not have been possible. 
This work is dedicated to you.
Finally, to my Sheira who offered nothing less then unconditional support and an 
abundance of love; I love you more than words can say.
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT 2
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 3
INTRODUCTION 7
B a c k g r o u n d  t o  t h e  r e s e a r c h  p r o b l e m  9
T h e o r e t ic a l  a n d  e m p ir ic a l  g a ps  9
Lev els  o f  a n a l y sis : th e  a bsence  of societa l  ex pla n a tio n  11
U n ju st ifie d  g en er a lisa tio n s  -  eq ua ting  sig h t  w ith  u n d er sta n d in g  13
Fa il u r e  to  d istin g u ish  ability  from  pro pen sity  an d  per fo rm a n c e  14
D e -co n te x t u a l ise d  research  15
E p is t e m o l o g ic a l  a s p e c t s  o f  d o in g  r e s e a r c h  w it h  c h il d r e n  17
T o w a r d s  a  d ia l o g ic a l  u n d e r st a n d in g  o f  p e r s p e c t iv e  t a k in g  20
P la n  of  d isser ta tio n  22
1. G. H MEAD’S CONCEPT OF TAKING THE ROLE OF THE OTHER 28
T h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  h u m a n  m in d : R o l e  t a k in g  in  e v o l u t io n  30
T h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  s o c ia l  s e l f : o n t o g e n e s is  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  r o l e  t a k in g  33 
Pla y  34
G a m e  36
R o l e  t a k in g  o n  t h e  m a c r o  l e v e l  39
R o le  ta k in g  as  t h e  m ech a n ism  fo r  th e  co n stru ctio n  of  sha red  w o rld s  39
R o l e  ta k in g  as t h e  m ech a n ism  of  socia l  o r g a n isa tio n  41
R o l e  t a k in g  a s  a  m e t h o d  f o r  s o l v in g  m o r a l  p r o b l e m s  45
Su m m a r y  50
2. ORGANISED OTHER/S, LACK OF COMMUNICATION AND THE NARROWING 
OF THE MORAL SELF: LINKING MEAD TO NARRATIVE. 52
I n t r o d u c t io n  52
T h e  idea l  so c iety  53
T h e  g en er a lised  o t h e r : a  go od  o r  a  ba d  t h in g ? 53
T h e  restrictiv e  n a tu r e  of  th e  g en era lised  o th er  56
4
Fro m  ‘g en er a lised  o t h e r ’ to  ‘org a nised  others ’ 57
T h r e e  ph a ses  o f  m o ra l  co n d u c t  5 8
P e r s p e c t iv e  t a k in g : f r o m  c o g n it iv e  a b il it y  t o  (l a c k  o f ) c o m m u n ic a t iv e  a c t iv it y  62 
F r o m  p e r s p e c t iv e  t a k in g  t o  t h e  n a r r o w in g  o f  t h e  m o r a l  s e l f  66
F r o m  p e r s p e c t iv e  t a k in g  t o  a c k n o w l e d g in g  t h e  o t h e r ’s n a r r a t iv e  69
W h a t  is n a r r a t iv e? 69
Oppo sin g  rea lities  as o ppo sin g  n a rra tives  71
N a rr o w  self  as  bo u n ded  n a rra tiv e  72
Su m m a r y  75
3. METHODOLOGY 78
D e f in in g  t h e  m e t h o d o l o g ic a l  a p p r o a c h  78
G e n e r a l  m e t h o d o l o g y : D ia l o g ic a l  e p is t e m o l o g y  79
R e s e a r c h  s t r a t e g y  83
F rom  a b ility  t o  a c tiv ity : o per a tio n a lisin g  per spectiv e  t a k in g  83
So cia l  g ro u ps  as o rg a n ised  others 85
Da ta  c o ll e c t io n : 88
T a k in g  th e  per spec tiv e  of  th e  o th er  in tw o  m o d es  of  co m m u n ica tio n  8 8
D ra w in g s  89
Pr o c ed u r e  90
N a r r a tiv e  co m po sitio n s : ro le-pla y in g  as per spectiv e  ta k in g  90
Pro c ed u re  92
R e s e a r c h  t e c h n iq u e s : o u t l in e  o f  a n a l y sis  92
Et h n o g r a ph y : M y  sto ry  of  th e  Israeli “v ic tim ised -o c c u pier  self” 92
Se l f  an d  s o c ie t y  in  p e r s p e c t iv e  t a k in g  96
SOCIOLOGNETIC ANALYSIS -  THE POLYPHONY OF THE ISRAELI SELF 97
In d iv id u a l  a n aly sis  -  th e  po ly ph o n y  of  t h e  per so n a l  100
O u t l in e  o f  e m p ir ic a l  c h a p t e r s : 102
4. THE “VICTIMISED-OCCUPIER” SELF 103
T h e  e a r l y  y e a r s - t h e  h o m o g e n o u s  p h a s e  104
N o  ALTERNATIVE & PURITY OF ARMS 109
T h e  Pa lestin ia n  o th er  112
T h e  d is c r e p a n c y  ph a s e  114
P ea ce  & Secu rity  120
5
B a c k  t o  h e g e m o n y ? 
Su m m a r y
123
128
5. THE IMAGE OF THE OTHER: PERSPECTIVE TAKING IN DRAWINGS 131
I n t r o d u c t io n  131
T h e  so c io lo g ic a l  perspectiv e  on  ch ild r en ’s dra w in g s  132
T h e  im a g e  o f  t h e  ‘o t h e r ’ as reflected  in  Hu m a n  F igu re  D ra w in g  133
An a l y s is  1: C o n t e n t  a n a l y sis  o f  d r a w in g s  136
T h e  d ra w n  c h a r a c te r  a n d  th e  a ctivity  136
Sy m bo ls  of  c o n fl ic t  139
Sy m bo ls  of  t h e  ster eo ty pica l  Pa lestin ia n  143
A n a l y s is  2: I n t e r p r e t a t iv e  a n a ly sis  146
T h e  ter r o r ist  / d espised  Pa lestin ia n  146
E q u a lity /pea c e  149
D ism a l  rea lity  152
T h e  ster eo ty pic a l  Palestin ia n  155
Un id e n t ifie d  P a lestin ia n  157
Su m m a r y  163
6. NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE OTHER: SOCIOGENESIS ANALYSIS 169
An a ly t ic a l  pro ced u r e  170
P a l e s t in ia n  a c t io n s : a g g r e s s io n  o r  l ib e r a t io n ? 172
D eleg itim isa tio n  -  RECONSTRUCTING th e  savage  o th er  173
L eg itim isa tio n  - co n str u c tin g  a  co u n ter  im a ge  of  th e  P a lestin ia n s  181
T h e  I s r a e l i a c t io n s : o p p r e s s io n  o r  s e l f -d e f e n c e ? 189
G u il t  & respo n sibility  189
Ju stifica tio n  -  rec o n stru ctin g  secu rity  a nd  ‘n o  a l ter n a t iv e ’ ethos  193
I s r a e l is  -  v ic t im is a t io n  o r  s u p r e m a c y ? 199
Isra eli v ic tim isa tio n  a n d  deep sense  of  vu ln era bility  199
Isra eli su pr em a c y  200
P e a c e - im m e n s e l y  d e s ir e d  b u t  im p o s s ib l e  t o  a c h ie v e  205
Y ea rn in g  f o r  pea c e  205
D isb elief  in  th e  po ssibility  of  pea c e  211
Su m m a ry  214
6
7. TAKING THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE OTHER: INDIVIDUAL ANALYSIS 217
1. G i r l - S e t t l e m e n t . 220
2. B o y  - Se t t l e m e n t  227
3. B o y  - C it y  233
4. G ir l  - K ib b u t z  238
5. B o y  - C it y  244
6. B o y - S e t t l e m e n t  250
7. G ir l -C it y  255
8. G ir l  - K ib b u t z  261
9. G ir l  - k ib b u t z  266
8. DISCUSSION: BEHIND THE NARRATIVE BARS 272
M e a d ia n  r o l e  t a k in g  272
T o w a r d s  a  d ia l o g ic a l  u n d e r st a n d in g  o f  p e r s p e c t iv e  t a k in g  277
Per spec tiv e  taking  is pred ica ted  on  socia l  ex perien ce  277
Fro m  c o g n itiv e  a bility  to  socio -co m m u n ica tiv e  activity  281
Per spe c tiv e  taking  is n o t  eith er-o r , a ll -o r -n o th in g  a b il it y . 284
T h e  l im it e d  p o w e r  o f  c o m p r e h e n s io n : b e h in d  t h e  n a r r a t iv e  b a r s  287
Pe r v e r siv e  o bsta c les : “th ey  un d er sta n d  o n ly  fo r ce” ■ 288
Refl ec t iv e  o bsta c les : "fo r ev er  v ic tim s , fo rev er  m oral” 292
Co m m u n ic a tiv e  o b st a c l es : “Beh in d  th e  n a rra tiv e  ba rs” 294
Poin ts  of co n v erg ence  298
A m b iv a len c e  301
P r o s p e c t  f o r  f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h  303
F in a l  w o r d s  307
BIBLIOGRAPHY 309
APPENDIX I 325
7
INTRODUCTION
Twenty-eight years ago, the late Egyptian President Anuar Sadat, in his historical 
visit to Jerusalem declared that the greatest obstacle to overcome in the process of 
establishing peace between Israel and the Arab world was of a psychological nature. 
Addressing the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset), he stated:
“Yet, there remain[s] another wall. This wall constitutes a 
psychological barrier between us. A barrier of suspicion. A barrier 
of rejection. A barrier of fear of deception. A barrier of 
hallucinations around any action, deed or decision. A barrier of 
cautious and erroneous interpretations of all and every event or 
statement. It is this psychological barrier which I described in 
official statements as representing 70 percent of the whole 
problem.”
More than a quarter of a century later, the suspicion, rejection and 
misinterpretations only seem to have deepened and intensified. This thesis aims to 
contribute to the understanding of the workings of these ‘psychological barriers’ by 
investigating how young Israeli children are constructing the Palestinian perspective 
and narrative of the conflict. The raison d ’etre of this thesis is to identify and modify 
the major socio-psychological cause-and-effect of inter-group conflict, that is, 
distorted communication and the lack of understanding of the other’s perspective. It is 
difficult to think of a more significant topic in the context of social psychology of 
intergroup relations than the ways in which the rivals come to understand each other’s 
beliefs, intentions, feelings, values and goals. If we had a better grasp on how Israeli 
children construct the Palestinian version of the conflict, and what the social 
processes, power interests and ideologies that mediate the symbolic construction of 
the other’s viewpoint, which is habitually distorted by the very nature of the conflict, 
we might be able to influence these constructions towards more inclusive orientations, 
in order to come to full recognition and reconciliation, not only with the Palestinians 
but within their own society as well. In thoroughly exploring the ways in which Israeli 
children construct meaning of the Palestinian perspective we perhaps would be able to 
find creative channels for intervention and building a basis for dialogue between
8
Israeli and Palestinian children in order to move from mutual denial through 
recognition to peaceful orientations and reconciliation.
Background to the research problem
This endeavour was initiated during previous research in which I sought to 
explore how Jewish-Israeli children construct meaning of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Children, aged 8 to 9, drawn from three social groups or milieus differing in 
their cultural and geographical background (kibbutz, settlement and city) took part in 
the research. While talking to these children, I was particularly surprised by the 
immense difficulties they experienced in taking the perspective of the Palestinians, or, 
put differently, in acknowledging the Palestinian narrative. The different ways of 
understanding the Palestinians’ perspective of the conflict across the three milieus, as 
well as individual differences, have intuitively lead me to believe that the ability to 
take the role of the other or to acknowledge other narratives is not determined solely 
by the development of cognitive ability. It is also a knowledge-based capacity, and as 
such, the ability, propensity and rendering of taking the perspective of the other are 
determined by socio-ideological and contextual factors. This observation paved the 
way for the current investigation. For this reason, I have become interested in the 
concept of 'taking the perspective of the other’.
Theoretical and empirical gaps
After extensive reading of previous developmental, social psychological and 
sociological research on perspective taking, in the hope that these studies would aid 
my understanding, I became aware of the conceptual shortfalls in this field of 
research. The concept, which attracted great deal of attention between the mid-1950s 
and mid-1970s, seems to suffer from diversification and a mushrooming of 
independent, interrelated mini-theories and sub-models that eventually contributed to 
the decline in interest. It simply wasn’t leading anywhere interesting. The literature 
associated with this stream of research is extensive, consisting of many confusing 
near-synonymous propositions, such as role playing, role taking, role enactment, 
empathy and so forth. The explanations provided by these theories and models of role, 
or perspective taking, left me with the impression of strangeness. It had little
9
relevance to what I had experienced while talking to Israeli children about the 
Palestinians and the conflict. Put differently, they were simply insufficient in 
accounting for the difficulties of Israeli children in taking the perspective of the 
Palestinians1. The vast majority of these studies, which typically come from 
psychological paradigms such as cognitive-developmental and information 
processing, have entrenched the individual child at the centre of their explanatory and 
methodological frameworks. Contextual, social, cultural, ideological and historical 
aspects were almost completely ignored. Even when they were taken into 
consideration, (predominantly in the sociological studies) they were faintly 
acknowledged as factors impinging on the individual, thus remaining for the most part 
external impositions, in no way internally related to individual functioning, and hence 
outside the purview of psychological explanation.
For example, according to the prominent structural-developmental model of 
Selman (1971a, 1976, 1980), the children in my research have purportedly reached 
the fourth stage of role taking development, labelled ‘social and conventional system 
role taking’ (also labelled ‘society or in-depth perspective). According to this model, 
at about 12-15 years of age, manifold perspectives are perceived as forming a network 
or system of necessary social conventions that are understood by all members of 
society regardless of their position, role, or experience. There is, in addition, an 
understanding that the mutuality of persons and perspectives exists not only at 
superficial levels of shared expectations but also at deeper levels of unverbalised 
feelings and values (Shantz, 1983). Now, how can one draw any meaningful 
conclusions from this formulation? How can this model aid our understanding 
regarding the difficulties of Israeli children in taking the perspective of the 
Palestinians? The same feeling of strangeness arose when I turned to theories of moral 
development such as Piaget and Kohlberg’s. The only theory that had something 
meaningful to say in regard to my research problem was Sherif s Realistic-Group- 
Conflict-Theory, yet the notion of taking the perspective of the other is only indirectly
1 It is important to note here that I have no intention to lay blame on these scholars for failing to 
answer questions they had no ambition to answer in the first place. However by ignoring some 
important dimensions in regard to role taking scholars have left, many questions unasked and therefore 
unanswered.
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inferred, leaving the theoretical gap open. The problems with previous theories and 
research on perspective taking can be summarised in four points:
Levels of analysis: the absence of societal explanation
The problem with levels of assessment and types of explanation is a well- 
known debate in social psychology (e.g. Doise, 1986; Zajonc, 1989). As in most 
mainstream cognitive psychology research, the vast majority of role taking studies 
seem to be overwhelmingly individualistic, dominated by the information processing 
approach. Based on Doise’s (1986) four levels of analysis, previous research falls 
mainly within the first category, namely the psychological or intra-individual 
processes, which accounts for the manner in which the individual organises his or her 
cognitive resources for role taking. Holding the view that role taking is based solely 
upon internal mechanisms, researchers tend to focus their investigation on the logical- 
formal aspect of perspective taking, conceptualising it as universal sequence of stages 
(e.g. Feffer, 1959,1970; Flavell et al, 1968; Kurdek, 1977).
Role taking is strictly conceptualised as an individualistic ability, that is, the 
solitary individual, child or adult who faces perspective-coordination tasks and needs 
to activate his cognitive resources in order to exhibit role taking. These scholars 
reduced ‘cognition’ to the minimal level of inner-mental activity regardless of 
interaction and communication. However, our cognitions are chiefly the products of 
communication with others, and many of these cognitions are eventually 
communicated to others. As Zajonc (1989) rightly notes “the constraints on 
communication and the transmission of mental content between minds, the 
transformation of these contents, and the resulting change in the participants, are 
rarely studied in mainstream social psychology”(p. 357).
Sociological research applies mainly to the second level of analysis, namely, 
the inter-individual and intra-situational, where the focus is on the relationship 
between psychological dynamics and specific characteristics of the interaction 
between individuals (e.g. Turner, 1956; Lauer and Boardman, 1971). With minor 
exceptions sociologists have regarded all normal adults as equally competent role
11
takers, a fault that has led to another problematic tendency: similarly to the 
psychologists, role taking in most sociological research is usually conceptualised as a 
one-dimensional cognitive ability.
Cognition in both traditions of research was reduced from thinking to 
information processing or problem solving, where the study of the contents of 
cognition (what people think about or know of social contexts) has been replaced by 
the study of how information processing functions without social contents (Flick, 
1988). An example at this level can be seen in Blumer’s (1954) definition of role 
taking as “interpersonal process consists of one person imagining another person’s 
probable line of activity” (p. 190), or Sherohman, (1977) who describes role taking as 
a “cognitive process in which an individual constructs the roles of the other persons 
engaged with him in a transaction, for the purpose of coordinating other’s lines of 
activity with his own”(p.l21). Few studies have fallen within the third level of 
analysis, that is looking at positions or social status as intervening factors to account 
for variations in adult role taking ability (e.g. Thomas et al 1972, Stryker, 1962), yet 
this overall approach is narrow and focused on accuracy as the only acknowledged 
variable in the study of role taking.
The essentially individualistic point of view describes the lone individual 
struggling single-handedly to coordinate perspectives. Moreover, most of the 
psychological research does not even distinguish between social and physical objects, 
thereby losing the extremely important dialectical unity between self, other and the 
context. It was reduced from taking the perspective of the other to a person’s 
perception and attributions. My criticism here is very much in line with Farr and 
Anderson’s (1983) critique on Jones and Nisbett’s (1971) ‘divergence in perspectives 
between actor and observer’. Apart from a few sociological studies that deal with self­
conception and others, (Couch, 1958; Reeder et al, 1960; Maehr et al 1962) in all 
other studies the phenomenology of both self and other has disappeared and instead of 
an existential contrast between self and other, we have a cognitive one. As Farr and 
Anderson put it: “we are here in the realm of mind rather than in the realm of 
cognition per se...we are dealing with states of awareness, and not merely with 
cognitions” (p. 49).
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In light of the current research problem, it seems that a highly crucial 
perspective is missing, namely, the societal explanation, which takes into account the 
general conceptions of social relations, systems of beliefs, ideologies, and the political 
structure of situations. Previous analyses clearly address the intra-individual level in 
cognitive and perceptual terms (e.g. Openheimer 1982) and to some extent the inter­
individual level in the form of social influence (e.g. Couch, 1958; Reeder et al, 1960; 
Selman, 1980) but they have nothing to say about the motivational, positional, or 
ideological, and the complex relations between these levels.
Unjustified generalisations -  equating sight with understanding
In a recent critical assessment of the psychological research associated with 
perspective taking, Chandler (2001) provides an initial indication on the deficiency of 
the common approach. He tries to understand how the narrow study of spatial 
perspective taking initiated by Piaget and Inhelder’s (1949) renowned ‘three mountain 
task’ experiment, managed to become the detonator for the explosion of research in 
every possible domain of perspective taking. Scholars have extended Piaget’s classic 
study to increasingly complex domains of inquiry while, naturally, importing models 
and endorsing diffusions of conceptual frameworks and methods of research . The 
fundamental inaccuracy that Chandler indicates is based on erroneous epistemological 
assumptions. This issue has been discussed at length by Markova (1982). She points 
out the importance of constantly acknowledging and reflecting upon the basic 
presuppositions from which scientific enquiry stems. Lack of awareness of the 
foundations of one’s scientific domain “is associated with several potential dangers” 
(p.3). First, it leads to intellectual fixation, that is, maintaining practices without 
considering alternatives. Additionally, it increases the potential of “unjustified 
generalisations across different subjects” (p.3). The generalisation of spatial
2
These are often referred to as spatial (visual) perspective taking; cognitive (conceptual) perspective 
taking; and affective (emotional) perspective taking. Interrelating role taking with other domains of 
inquiry has lead to further differentiation between social inferences about other people, visual 
perception, feelings, intentions, thinking, and person perception in general (i.e. what is the other person 
like?)
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perspective taking to whichever domain of social perspective taking is a fine 
illustration of the dangers to which Markova refers. This inappropriate tendency 
seems to be legitimately owed to what Gallup and Cameron (1992) describe as our 
“peculiar predisposition to equate sight with understanding” (p.97) and as a result, to 
logically associate visual perspective taking with the rich and complex nature of 
knowing and understanding processes. The consequence of the ‘unjustified 
generalisations’ discussed by Markova, or the common confusion of “making a single 
conceptual piece out of the otherwise disparate matters of visual and social 
perspective taking” (Chandler, 2001 p.49) is a poor theoretical elaboration of the 
social aspects and determinants of perspective taking.
Failure to distinguish ability from propensity and performance
The content-less formalisation of role taking theory and research has lead to an 
additional problem. There is oversimplification of the concept as a one-dimensional 
cognitive ability with accuracy as the only acknowledgeable variable and the 
disengagement from real life problems. Researchers in the field are therefore inclined 
to ignore the significant distinction between the ability to role take, the willingness or 
tendency to role take, and the variations in role taking performance or activity. 
Although Turner (1956) mentions this deficiency by arguing that “the tendency to 
empathise, in whatever sense this is meant, is at least as important a variable as the 
ability to empathise (p.326, italic in original), this notion remained disregarded until 
Schwalbe (1988) brought it back into light.
Researchers treated inadequacy in role taking only in regard to ability, which 
was measured in terms of accuracy. Accurate role taking has been operationally 
defined as the correct prediction of the response of others (Stryker, 1962). It refers to 
the degree of similarity between the estimates of another’s plan of action by the role 
taker and that other’s actual plan or role. The only distinction that was made was 
between role taking ability and role taking accuracy. In this regard, Sherohman (1977) 
argues that whereas role taking accuracy is a situational, interpersonal construct, role 
taking ability is a trans-situational, psychological construct.
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Even if we are to agree that perspective taking is determined solely on internal 
mechanisms, a substantial problem immediately arises: is role taking just an ‘either- 
or’ ability? As Schwalbe (1988) rightly observes “role taking has been seen as all-or- 
nothing proposition, something people either do or don’t do” (p.412). Unfortunately, 
no means were provided by the content-less, knowledge-free approach to help us 
understand how or why individuals employ a system of internal mechanisms for 
generating concrete perspectival thinking. By restricting their attention to structure 
and neglecting the content, or by examining nothing but the notion of accuracy, both 
psychologists and sociologists have failed to provide an explanatory conception for 
the causes that will eventually determine whether or not the individual will engage in 
role taking and how and with what strategies he will do it. In real-life situations what 
finally moves the people to consider and reflect upon perspectives other than their 
own? Or what inhibits them from doing so? Apart from Schwalbe (1988, 1990) who 
made a significant contribution to the theoretical distinction between ability and 
propensity, those who tried to tackle this issue endorsed the notion of motivation. It 
was perceived as yet another cognitive variable that needed to be taken into 
consideration (see for example Selman, 1980). This notion was elsewhere 
systematically problematised by Gergen (1989). In critically discussing the complex 
relations between cognition and motivation in social cognition research, he shows 
how cognitivists got entangled with deprived conceptualisation of cognition and 
motives: “yet, if we grant to the motivational source these kind of capabilities, it 
rapidly become clear that we have created yet a second domain of cognition. That is, 
we have endowed motives with the ability to recognise and retain information. We 
now have not one cognitive system within the individual but two. The theoretical 
edifice begins to buckle under the strain of its own weight.. .”(p.471).
De-contextualised research
The most serious problem with previous analyses of role taking is that it 
totally lacks ecological validity since it operates in a socio-cultural void. It is 
thoroughly academic in orientation and divorced from real life social issues occurring 
in the world at large. It views perspective taking as a secluded aptitude which is 
therefore inapplicable to significant social problems. With minor exceptions in the
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more recent sociological research (Franks, 1985; Scully, 1988; Schwalbe, 1988), there 
is little discussion in most role taking research of the social interactive, and the 
cultural or political context within which perspectives are being negotiated and 
coordinated. Holding the view that perspective taking is based solely upon internal 
mechanisms, researchers' tend to focus their investigation on the logical-formal aspect 
of perspective taking, conceptualising it as a universal sequence of stages in the 
psychological research, or, role taking accuracy in the sociological. Thus, social 
influence is only recognised as facilitating logical operations within problem-solving 
strategies for perspective taking tasks. There is no past, no collective memory, no 
social representations, no interests and no ideology.
Additionally, perspective taking is considered as a knowledge-free assignment 
whose solution is subject solely to the maturation of cognitive structures. This is well 
presented in studies based upon Flavell’s model (privileged information task) where 
perspectival thinking seems to concern problem-solving instruments, which operate 
in the absence of any knowledge about the world except from what is immediately 
presented by the experimenter. As Emler and Ohana (1990) explicitly criticise, 
“problem solvers do not bring with them to new cases any beliefs, implicit or explicit, 
about the nature of society or its occupants; they bring only a set of mental operations 
to be applied to the fact of each case” (p.53).
This point is crucial and needs farther clarification. Hardly any of the studies 
investigated the children or adults in ‘real-life’ situations. It was neglected that 
participation in social life means that the individual is presented with problems to be 
solved as well as the various solutions and array of arguments prevalent in his society 
(Billig, 1987). While studying role taking two highly important questions have not 
been asked: what other? And, which context? Most crucially to the present case, there 
is not a single contemplation of a state of affairs where the individuals concerned in 
the research are deeply involved with the context (real ‘real-life’ context) and 
therefore face and need to comprehend opposing perspectives. Not just contrasting 
perspectives that derive from interpersonal relations but rather emotionally loaded 
conflicting versions of reality with protracted socio-historical origins. In real life 
situations, role taking, like various other cognitive activities is always dependent on 
underlying worldviews. Taking the perspective of the other is not a value free,
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unmotivated, purely cognitive, ‘either-or’ ability as it has been conceptualised. 
Rather, as this thesis argues, it is a social-communicative practice mediated by social 
and ideological representations.
Epistemological aspects of doing research with children
In traditional cognitive-developmental theory and research on perspective 
taking, which predominantly rely on Piagetian views3, we are afforded the image of 
the child as a rational inquirer, endowed with an inherent repertoire of skills by which 
the child methodically makes his way about in the world. Perspective taking is 
implicated as the proximate source of the age related changes that have been observed 
in the structure and content of children’s self (and other) understanding. According to 
these theories and models, the child undergoes a predictable developmental 
transformation in a direction consonant with increasing logical mathematical 
competence. In other words, the nature of a child’s role taking competence reflects the 
nature of his emergent and intrinsic cognitive abilities. As the social bears no 
constitutive significance for the workings of the child mind, it is not surprising that 
the concrete, content-filled perspectives and discourses that the child hears, 
reconstructs and imbibes are not on the cognitive-developmental view, which gives 
rise to particular forms of reasoning. These other voices and perspectives remain 
subordinate to the univocal, content-less voice of reason. It is the universal, structural, 
logico-mathematical language of development, and not the socially and culturally 
specific representational field of the child’s everyday existence, that constitute the 
ability to take the perspective of the other. The aim of my thesis is to turn this 
formulation over and to affirm the formative role of the social in the individual’s 
functioning of the mind.
3
Role taking has a number of theoretical ancestors. As a significant construct in developmental and 
social psychology, the theoretical concept goes back to George Herbert Mead’s (1934) notion of 
‘taking the role of the other’, and Jean Piaget’s (1926, 1963) ‘egocentrism’ and ‘decentration of 
thoughts’. As this thesis proposes a revised Meadian perspective, it is beyond its scope to relate to 
Piaget’s ideas as well. Nevertheless, my criticism on the Piagetian approach stems from the fact that in 
developing their models, researchers have done great injustice to Piaget’s original ideas, especially in 
regard to downplaying the significance of what children learn from their social communicative dealings 
with others.
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Although the subjects of my research are children, this is not a developmental 
research. Rather, it a social psychological research with children. The approach to 
children in the current study is influenced by the relatively new paradigm of sociology 
or social psychology of childhood. Attributable to a growing dissatisfaction with well- 
established orthodoxy in understanding human maturation mainly from 
developmental psychology but also from theories of socialisations, scholars in this 
emerging field promote the view that children should be seen as ‘human beings’ 
rather than ‘human becomings’ (Qvorturp, 1994). In line with this paradigm, the 
current study is distinctive in promoting the view that children should be understood 
as social actors, shaping as well as shaped by their circumstances, and their voices 
should be heard and studied in their own right.
Developmental psychology has traditionally projected a standardised image of 
childhood, which has for so long become part of the conventional understanding of 
the child, determining scientific research as well as common sense and everyday 
understanding. As James and Prout (1990) illustrate, ‘developmentalism’ has been a 
key concept shaping the ways children and childhood have been studied. The concept 
of development embodies three themes predominate in relation to it: ‘rationality’, 
‘naturalness’ and ‘universality’, all derived from a post-Darwinian and post- 
Enlightenment comprehension of development as a natural, positive and progressive 
process. As Morss argues “Perhaps the most fundamental assumption concerning an 
overall picture of individual development is that of progress. Derived from or at least 
legitimated by biological sources, the notion that the individual gets better and better 
as time passes has been central to developmental thinking” (1990, p. 173). The view of 
the child as an ‘incomplete’ creature4 is the underlying assumption that generated the 
deep-seated positivism and strict empiricism so dominant within the developmental 
framework. Modem child psychology inherited a universalistic legacy, that all 
humans are part of nature and as such are subject to general laws and thus can be 
encompassed within positivistic scientific principles (Jahoda, 1992; Woodhead,
4 The problem with developmentalism is two-fold. The problematic view of the child as ‘incomplete’ 
stems from the fallacious view of the adult as ‘complete’. Both children and adults are not static, 
unchanging beings. Rather, we are social, psychological and physiological processes that unfold 
ceaselessly into each new instant of experience.
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1999). This view is strongly reflected in the developmental models of perspective 
taking
I do not wish to convey the view, often implied within the studies of sociology 
of childhood, that developmental psychology is a bad thing. On the contrary, it is 
impossible to overstate the contribution of this discipline to our knowledge of 
children. Moreover, it is impossible to imagine how this vast and extremely important 
discipline could conduct research in a radically different way. Yet its limitations, 
especially in regard to the current study, must be acknowledged.
From the other side of the social sciences, namely sociology, the concept of 
socialisation as the main interpretative device to the socially developing child, shares 
certain chronological and incremental characteristics with the naturally developing 
child outlined above. The implied binarism (child/adult; immature/mature; 
irrational/rational) of developmental psychology is well circulated among the 
theoretical underpinnings of socialisation theories. As stems from the over-socialised 
conception in classical sociology (e.g. Parsons, 1951), children are perceived as 
defective forms of adults and the study of their movement towards a completed adult 
state is taken to provide a means for explaining the reproduction of the social order 
(Jenks, 1982; Lee 1998). In this sense, “the socially developing model is not therefore 
attached to what the child is naturally is so much as to what society naturally demands 
of the child” (James et al, 1998, p. 23).
Hence, socialisation was employed to describe the path and methods of 
whichever successful transmission or reproduction of the social order came to pass. In 
this sense, sociological theorising begins with a more or less formally established 
concept of society and works back to the necessary means by which its order, norms 
and rules are being inscribed into the consciousness of its potential participants. As 
Lee argues, “not only does ‘socialisation’ relegate children to being of only passing 
theoretical interest, but it also understands them as voiceless, passive objects” (1998, 
p.461).
The children in the current study, all aged between 12-13 years, are regarded 
as the subjects rather than the objects of the research. I see them as social, political 
and moral actors in their own right and ontologically, as ‘beings’ rather than
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‘becomings’. Children form a social group that never disappears even if its members 
change continuously. They are part of the very constitution of social life and should 
therefore be understood as an integral form within every social system. This implies 
that their perspectives, opinions and feelings are accepted as genuine valid evidence, 
not entirely separated, yet independent from the perspectives and concerns of adults. 
They are actively involved in the construction and reconstruction of their own social 
life, the lives of those around them and the societies in which they live. I want to 
make their own voices and views audible and recognise them as participants in the 
reality of the conflict.
That research with children should not take the child/adult distinction for 
granted is already a popular mantra in the sociology of childhood. None the less in the 
current study, I found this position gaining redoubled force in my data. When I 
presented some of the transcriptions to Israeli acquaintances without indicating the 
children’s age they all reacted with the same bewilderment: are these children using 
very mature arguments in relation to the conflict or.. .are adults in Israel using a very 
immature arguments in relation to the conflict? The question remains open to the 
reader’s interpretation. Finally, I believe that children can be of a great mirror to 
society. They present their views in a very unique and honest way, presumably since 
they are not yet confined by the rules of political correctness. In that sense, social 
psychological research with children can be taken as ‘looking at our children and 
seeing ourselves.
Towards a dialogical understanding of perspective taking
On reflection, the evolution of my thesis from my initial observation to the 
final product is by no means a linear progression but rather a complex, painstaking 
and occasionally gruelling learning process of trying to make sense of theory, data 
and the relations between the two. The theoretical perspective put forward in this 
study regarding the Israeli children’s difficulties in understanding the Palestinian 
perspective and the social, historical and ideological factors that determine these 
difficulties evolved and changed significantly as I engaged with the writings of G.H 
Mead, as well as long hours of trying to make sense of the empirical data. It started
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with a crude intuition that the social environment influences, that is, impedes, or 
enhances otherwise naturally emergent cognitive processes, but it does not, as Urwin 
notes, “actually enter into the structuring of cognition itself (1986, p.261). Indeed, my 
initial idea on the ‘social’ was that while necessary for completion of structures of 
knowledge, it is not at the source of these structures. It was only after prolonged 
engagement with the writings of both Mead and Bakhtin, social representations theory 
and theories of narrative, as well as the children’s works, that I arrived to the final 
comprehension of the dialogical understanding of perspective taking.
This dissertation, thus seeks to unfold a conception of perspective taking 
which affirms the formative role of the social in taking the perspective of the other. It 
espouses a view that social communicative factors are foundational for the emergence 
of distinctively human psychological processes. The achievement of mutual 
understanding is a matter of improved communication. That is to say, perspective 
taking should be considered as communicative activity rather than cognitive ability 
and its enactment or restraint should be explored under particular social relational 
context. In the absence of symbolic mediation, higher thought could not be developed, 
nor could the ability to take the perspective of the other.
According to the Meadian view, individual psychological functioning is 
inherently or constitutively social. In that sense, this study represents an effort to 
move beyond concepts that seem to be articulated primarily in terms of the ‘single­
subject’, unmediated ‘present-at-hand’ mode of engagement with the world and with 
others, and to put forward a view that the individual and the social are the two polls of 
the same process. Both the Meadian and the dialogical epistemology approaches put 
forward in the present study deny the dichotomy of self and society and see an 
ontological and epistemological continuity and mutual interdependence between the 
individual and the social. That is to say, while acknowledging the activeness and 
agency-ness of the individual subject in his or her formation of the perspective of the 
other, it recognises the equally active, formative role of the social in the life and 
cognition of the individual self.
This thesis therefore has two interrelated ambitions. The first is to elaborate a 
societal theoretical perspective that emphasises the notion of symbolic mediation in 
the study of taking the perspective of the other. Secondly, to explore in-depth the
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origins and dynamics of the mediational means that generate the difficulties of Israeli 
children in taking the perspective of the Palestinians. The idea of ‘looking at our 
children and seeing ourselves’ acquires a meaning beyond the apparent, a meaning 
that is strongly reflected in the overall theoretical approach and the research design. 
This thesis is not just about Israeli children, but rather it is about the Israeli society, or 
as formulated across, it is about the Israeli (collective) self and the narratives that this 
self is comprised of. I will argue accordingly that the construction and experience of 
the perspectives of self and other are both dialogical achievements. Both our sense 
and knowledge of self and our awareness and knowledge of others are delineated and 
embodied in our dialogical encounters with different others in our social environment. 
My contention is that the origin of individual, as well as group variations in role 
taking ability, propensity and actual performance lies in the experiences associated 
with different locations in the social and political domains. Given that, I argue that 
constructing the perspective of the Palestinians is mediated by the ideological 
comprehensions of the conflict as experienced by the Israelis. That is to say, the 
ability to construct the Palestinian viewpoint is both enabled and constrained by the 
boundaries of the Israeli representational field and discourse in relation to the conflict, 
and the dynamics of knowledge, affect and practices that maintain them.
In the reminder of this introduction, I provide an overview of the dissertation’s 
general itinerary and a broad sketch of the major themes and conclusions that are 
treated in greater detail in the ensuing chapters.
Plan of dissertation
Chapter 1: G.H. Mead’s concept of taking the perspective of the other 
Much of the above reviewed research has cited G.H. Mead as providing conceptual 
and theoretical grounding, yet in fact Mead’s ideas are almost always (especially in 
psychological research) misinterpreted and even diametrically opposed. Since 
nowhere could I find a satisfactory assessment of Mead’s notion of ‘Taking the 
Perspective of the Other’, I decided to dedicate a chapter to exploring in depth his 
various applications of the concept. Mead has used the ‘role taking’ concept in 
various applications (such as the inner dialogue of human thought, the participation in
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a world of shared objects and the distinctive human social organisation to name but a 
few) in the course of explaining certain aspects of human social conduct at quite 
diverse stages of its development. In the current examination of Mead’s concept of 
taking the perspective of the other, I suggest a systematic analysis based on four 
separate yet interrelated levels of assessment.
Chapter 2: Organised other/s. lack of communication and the narrowing of the moral 
self: linking Mead to narrative
While the previous chapter introduced the variety of applications of G.H. Mead’s 
concept of taking the role of the other, this chapter explicates in more detail the 
theoretical framework which I employ. The chapter commences with a critical 
examination of Mead’s cornerstone concept of the ‘generalised other’. Based on 
occasional indications in Mead’s theorising I offer an extension to the concept in 
order to better acknowledge both the enablement and constraints of the generalised 
other and its relevance to inter-group conflict. Following that, I elaborate on two 
relevant applications of the role taking concept identified in the former chapter as 
explanatory concepts to the research problem. The first regards communication and 
role taking as the mechanism for the production of shared social worlds. The second 
concept, which associates role taking with morality, discusses the narrowing of the 
moral self. In the third and final section of this chapter I combine the two Median 
formulations with the notion of narrative. I advocate a ‘strong’ version that views 
narrative as an essential means of human cognition and communication that speaks 
both to epistemology and ontology.
Chapter 3: Methodology
I draw on Bulmer’s (1977) distinction between general methodology, research 
strategy and research techniques for the purpose of articulating the methodological 
approach and the research design. In accordance with the theoretical postulation, the 
general methodology is based on the dialogical epistemology of both Mead and 
Bakhtin. In the research strategy section I delineate the operationalisation of 
perspective taking and formulate the research targets: (i) to explore the ideological 
construction of self and other and, (ii) to explore the system of ideas, images and 
beliefs that mediate perspective taking. Additionally, in this section I discuss the 
rationale for the three social milieus and the methods of data collection. The research
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strategy chosen to investigate the research questions is based on exploring perspective 
taking in two modes of communication, i.e. drawings and narrative compositions with 
children from three social groups, i.e. city, kibbutz and settlement. Finally, in the 
section titled research techniques, I delineate the outline of analysis. I provide the 
rationale for exploring self and society in perspective taking and explain the chosen 
methods of analysis. I discuss my choices of ethnography, sociogenesis and 
individual analyses.
Chapter 4: The Israeli ‘victimised-occupier’ self
In this chapter I offer an ethnographic exposition of what I call the Israeli ‘victimised- 
occupier’ (collective) self, as a special case of generalised other. This self, I argue, is 
the locus for the assortment of beliefs, ideologies, moral contradictions and prejudices 
from which the Israeli children derive their interpretations, evaluations and 
judgements regarding the conflict and hence their perspective of the Palestinians. 
Structured around three successive phases, I draw on popular, discursive channels of 
narrative dissemination in order to provide a glance on the assortment of voices and 
ideologies comprising the Israeli self in relation to the conflict. The Israeli victimised- 
occupier self comprises of contradictory elements. It is constitutive of a strong sense 
of victimhood and vulnerability even when it clashes markedly with Israel’s military 
might, while maintaining an illegal and unscrupulous occupation against the rule of 
international law. It is trapped between an ethos of self-control and restraint while 
willing to exercise its military might in unrestrained manner. It is both aware of the 
injustice it inflicts upon the Palestinians and completely disregards their sufferings.
Chapter 5: The image of the other -  perspective taking in drawings.
The chapter begins with a detailed account of the rationale for choosing 
drawings as a research method in the current study. Loosing sight of individual works, 
the analysis is done in two phases. First, I draw eclectically upon techniques from 
Hummel et al (1995) and Teichman (2001), for content analysis of the drawings. I 
look at the drawn actor/s, the attributed actions and the decoration, that is, the 
assortment of symbols, images and other icons within the data for composing the 
coding frame. Applying basic SPSS functions, I discuss patterns within and between 
the groups. The second phase is more qualitative-interpretative. I look at the 
drawings as whole units in trying to capture the exact meaning within the range of
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ideas and perspectives exhibited in the drawings. Patterns indeed emerged, leading me 
to construct five different genres of children’s engagements with the ‘other’ through 
their drawings. Here, again I discuss themes with relation to the three social milieus. 
The analysis has shown an organised set of responses regarding the Palestinians 
underlying the content of the drawings. These responses represent the range of voices, 
or ideologies that reverberate within Israeli society in relation to the Palestinians, of 
which the children actively reconstruct in their works. Images of Palestinians as 
violent and fundamentally evil, rejoicing in aggression and deadly deeds dominate the 
drawings, especially those by children from the city and settlement. Yet, there are also 
alternative voices that view the Palestinians as partners for peace and even as victims. 
These responses are predominantly seen in the kibbutz children’s drawings.
Chapter 6: Narrative construction of the other
Drawing upon notions of rhetoric and ideological dilemmas (Billig, 1987, 
1991) and the theory of social representations (Moscovici, 1984, 1988), while using 
knowledge of the verbal-ideological contexts surrounding the children’s textual 
productions, I develop an interpretive process that helped me excavate, sort out, and 
analyze many of the voices speaking through their written texts. Four ideological 
dilemmas or evaluative dimensions were found. The first regards the Palestinian 
character and actions. Here, two distinct voices reverberate. First, there is the 
dominant voice of delegitimisation that depicts the Palestinians in the most negative 
manner. In contrast, there is a counter voice, the voice of legitimisation that depicts 
the Palestinian resistance as rightful and as a means to reclaim their occupied land. 
Additionally there are representations of the Palestinians as economically deprived 
and even as victims of the Israeli aggression. The second polemic arises in the 
analysis regards the Israeli actions. Here again, I found two competing rhetorics. On 
the one hand, there is a tendency to construe the Israeli actions as aggressive and 
iniquitous. On the other hand, there is the opposite tendency that rhetorically justifies 
the Israeli deeds as inevitable self-defence against the Palestinian aggression. Thirdly 
there is an intriguing polemic between self-perception as defenceless victims and a 
rhetorical tendency that maintains the Israeli supremacy, mainly military but morally 
and economically as well. Lastly, found in the narratives was an ambivalent approach 
to the notion of peace. Peace is represented as the ultimate opposite to the current 
situation and regarded as highly desired concept. In contrast to the comprehensive
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peace rhetoric, a counter voice resonates in relation to peace that is both contradictory 
and complementary and that can be described as a strong disbelief in the possibility of 
peace. I argue that the content boundaries of the narrative compositions, from the 
harsh to the empathic, are reflections of the boundaries of the Israeli self, of which the 
children through their construction of the Palestinian narrative strived to protect.
Chapter 7: Taking the perspective of the other: individual analysis
In the last results chapter, I bring the individual back to the centre of attention. 
Building upon the findings and discussion from the previous chapters, I present the 
analyses of nine individual works. The question I ask in this chapter is: how are the 
competing voices discerned both in the ethnographic and sociological analyses, being 
actively orchestrated as the children construct an objectified and finalised perspective 
of the Palestinians? Specifically, I aim to address the complexity of individual’s texts 
(both drawing and narrative), that is, the layers of voices and ideologies embedded 
within the composed Palestinian perspective, to identify how particular rhetorical 
connections are forged and, more importantly to understand the investment that has 
been made in them. I examine how different, sometimes contradictory perspectives 
and ideologies are being negotiated, challenged, resisted, or accepted in the work of 
single individuals and how they mediate the construction of the other’s perspective.
Chapter 8: Discussion-behind the narrative bars
In the final chapter I summarise the findings and discuss the two aims of the thesis. I 
link the theory and the data used in this research to suggest the following: first, in 
relation to the social dimension of perspective taking I argue that (i) perspective 
taking is predicated on social experience; (ii) perspective taking should be regarded as 
communicative activity rather than cognitive ability; and (iii) perspective taking is not 
either-or, all-or-nothing ability. Secondly, regarding the difficulties of Israeli children 
to take the perspective of the Palestinians, I suggest looking at three interrelated 
clusters of obstacles. The first, of which I called perversive obstacles, regards the 
perceptions o f the other and the workings of extremely negative stereotypes of the 
other, which lead to the devaluation, and even dehumanisation of the Palestinians. 
The second, reflexive obstacles, relates to perceptions o f self and the problems of 
missing self-reflection, suppression of divergent thinking and dissent, and diminished 
sense of responsibility for the effects of one’s actions on others. The third cluster
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regards the (lack of) interaction between self and other. It reflects the institutionally 
rooted segregation and the lack of opportunities for encountering with the other and 
his national and historical narrative. These three clusters mingle and coalesce, 
therefore feeding and maintaining each other in a negative feedback to perpetuate the 
different realities of the conflict. The chapter is sealed with some suggestion for future 
research and final reflections.
27
1. G. H M E A D ’S CONCEPT OF TAKING THE ROLE OF THE
OTHER
Introduction
Mead’s key philosophical venture concerned the social dimension of 
consciousness and human conduct. His endeavour is to show that the mind and the 
self are without residue social emergents. Set against the prevailing Cartesian 
assumption of the time, that the nature of consciousness is personal and private, 
Mead’s ambition was to trace the mechanisms by which the mind and the self emerge 
out of relationships between individuals and their (social) environment. He wished to 
“emphasise the temporal and logical pre-existence of the social process to the self- 
conscious individual that arises within it” (1934; p. 186). Strongly influenced by 
Darwin’s evolutionary approach, Mead sought to depict the development of social 
beings out of their antecedents in animal behaviour. In this regard, (unlike many 
behaviourists that seek to emphasise what man shares with other animals), Mead’s 
main concern was the decisive features that differentiate man from other species, such 
as self-consciousness, reflexiveness, and the use of language.
These unique features are all principally associated with the fundamental 
concept of ‘taking the role of the other’. His critical scrutiny of the social aspect of 
human conduct is founded on, and rooted in the mechanism of ‘taking the role of the 
other’, which serves as a key explanatory concept for all of his further inquiries, from 
the emergence of self conception, to ethics and the ordered society. As will be shown 
in this chapter, the significance of the concept of ‘taking the role of the other’ is to be 
found in almost every aspect of Mead’s writings, be that his philosophy, social 
psychology or ethical theory. However a central concept in Mead’s social 
psychological theory, Meadian role taking has suffered great confusion of meaning 
(See Lauer and Boardman, 1971; Coutu, 1951; Cook, 1993). As Cook (1993) notes, 
“despite the prominence of this concept in his writings and lectures, however, he 
nowhere offers a sustained and systematic analysis of the behavioural mechanisms to 
which it refers” (p.78). Shalin (1989) rightly argues that bewilderment over Mead’s 
usage of role taking is due to his tendency to move back and forth between
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phylogenetic and ontogenetic perspectives in his account of such phenomena as 
language, reflexiveness, and thought.
Certainly, Mead’s commitment to unifying all facets of his theory -  biology, 
psychology, sociology and even the history of ideas- in terms of one internally 
consistent set of general laws (Baldwin 1986), contributed to the perplexity in 
comprehending the ‘role taking’ concept. Mead has used the concept in various 
applications (such as the inner dialogue of human thought, the participation in a world 
of shared objects and the distinctive human social organisation to name but a few) in 
the course of explaining certain aspects of human social conduct at quite diverse 
stages of its development. In the current examination of Mead’s concept of taking the 
perspective of the other, I suggest a critical systematic analysis based on four separate 
yet interrelated levels of assessment.
Firstly, role taking on the phylogenetic level accounts for the evolutionary 
origins of the human mind and self-consciousness. Secondly, the better-known 
ontogenetic level of analysis which is comprised of Mead’s social psychological 
theorising mainly from Mind, Self and Society (1934). Here, role taking accounts for 
the development of the social self, that is, the growth of the human individual into a 
fully-fledged member of society. Thirdly, the macro-social perspective relates to the 
macro level of society. Role taking is conceptualised as both the consequence, and 
the enablement mechanism, of living in the same socially produced worlds as well as 
a mechanism of social control that constitutes and maintains the unique form of 
human social organisation. The fourth level of assessment is ethics and morality, in 
which Mead considers the function of role taking as facilitating the capacity to occupy 
and compare in thoughts different spatio-temporal perspectives and hence, as a vital 
instrument for solving moral problems.
It is my attempt to connect his social philosophy, social psychology and 
ethical theory in order to get a better grasp on his approach and to provide a critical 
assessment of the various applications of ‘taking the role of the other’. By that, I hope 
to establish and highlight the social dimension of ‘perspective taking’ and to found 
the theoretical base for understanding difficulties in perspective taking in the context 
of intergroup conflict.
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The development of the human mind: Role taking in evolution
The initial utilization of the concept of ‘taking the role of the other” in Mead’s 
theory is based upon phylogenetic observation. His position seems to be that only the 
human organism has the neurological makeup necessary for the emergence of 
consciousness. Mead’s initial discussion on communication and intelligence, where 
he commences the concept of ‘taking the role of the other’, refers not to a particular 
individual but rather to all mankind. “Reflective thought, in this early view, was seen 
as an element of phylogenetic differentiation that held certain implications for man’s 
effort at social reform and control” (Petars 1973, p. 150).
Mead’s evolutionary approach to communication and intelligence is 
inaugurated with the analysis of the ‘social act’5. For Mead “the unit of existence is 
the act...”(1938, p.65). The social (communicative) act is a collective act involving 
the participation of two or more organisms. This basic unit of analysis serves Mead in 
depicting the vast range of human’s social relations, from simple to complex. These 
acts result in a process of developmental adaptation, termed ‘evolution’ which, in 
Mead’s view, is a functional adaptation of the parts of the act in terms of the 
perspective of completing the act. Completion of an act will be, to some extent, novel 
and the participating organisms will be transformed. These consequences are termed 
‘emergence’, a key theme in Mead’s general philosophy.
Mead distinguishes three levels of emergence which have appeared in the 
history of evolution. These are the physical, the biological, and the reflexive. 
Reflexive behaviour emerges out of the biological and the biological out of the 
physical. The reflexive level, that of the self-conscious social individual, emerges 
when the organism not only responds to its own organic states, but also responds to its 
own responses; this is “made possible physiologically through the mechanism of the 
central nervous system, and socially through the mechanism of language” (1934 
p.254, n.7).
5 Mead’s theory of the act begins with the analysis of the ‘act-as-such’ that is the ‘individual biological 
activity’ as the initial development of the relation between the individual and his environment. 
However, since Mead’s presupposes the pre-existence of the social, and relates to the individual as a 
member of a social organism from birth, his acts must be viewed in the context of social act. (See 
Cronk 1987, p. 17-27; Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, 1936, p.3-25)
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That is to say, the mechanism of taking the role of the other can be explained 
in terms of the physiologically required condition of the central nervous system, and 
the socially required condition of symbols. In order to comprehend the evolutionary 
process that led to human reflexive intelligence and communication ability, Mead 
begins his inquiry with the basic, instinctual forms of communication seen in lower 
species, i.e. the ‘conversation of gestures’. He argues for their being the first overt 
phases, that is, “the earliest link in the chains of behaviours that constitute social act” 
(Baldwin, 1986, p.71). His renowned illustration of the confrontation between two 
hostile dogs (1912, 1934) serves to emphasise gestures as the primary means of 
communications in animals and as such, they have imperative social functions. Hence, 
gestures must be seen in a larger context as “part of the organisation of the social act, 
and highly important elements in that organisation” (Mead, 1934, p.44). The meaning 
of a gesture, according to Mead, lies in the information it carries. The communicative 
act is based on a triadic structure consisting of a gesture, response, and result. Mead 
notes that “this threefold or triadic relation...is the basis of meaning...For the 
existence of meaning depends upon the fact that the adjustive response of the second 
organism is directed toward the resultant of the given social act as initiated and 
indicated by the gesture of the first organism”(1934, p.80)6.
Principally interested in ‘vocal gestures’, Mead pointed to the most crucial 
phylogenetic disparity between humans and animals. In the animal world, gestures do 
not elicit in the producer of the stimulus the same reaction that arouses in the other. It 
is a uniquely human facility that gestures affect the individual who accomplishes them 
the same response as it elicits in others7. “The human animal can stimulate himself as 
he stimulates others and can respond to his stimulations as he responds to the 
stimulations of others” (Mead, 1912/1964, p.139). Thus, a higher animal may be 
aware or conscious of meanings in the act but not to its own meanings in relation to
6 Even though gestures have meaning, awareness of the meaning is not necessary for animals to 
respond to the predictive information in gestures. Meaning can exist without awareness of meaning. 
From an evolutionary standpoint, Mead suggests, meaning is present in different ways at different 
levels of the phylogenetic scale but emerges in terms of symbolisation only in the conduct of human 
organisms.
7 Mead does not imply that all human communication is reflexive. He uses the phrase “unconscious 
conversation of gestures” to describe elementary forms of communication where individuals respond to 
each others gestures but they are not reflectively aware of their meanings. (Mead, 1934).
31
the act. On the human reflexive level, meanings are symbolised and therefore may be 
held self-consciously.
Role taking in this regard originated as a biologic competence, an impulse, and 
developed through the course of evolution to attain a reflexive level. At that level, 
there emerges “the unique characteristic of the human individual; that he can place 
himself in different perspectives”(1938 p. 182). Mead strongly emphasises the 
importance of the vocal gestures, which sequentially evolved to significant symbols 
and language. When a gesture calls up the same meanings in both the speaker and the 
listener, Mead defined it as a ‘significant symbol’. These gestures whose meanings 
are shared, “implicitly arouse in an individual making them the same responses which 
they explicitly arouse, or are supposed to arouse, in other individuals, the individuals 
to whom they are addressed.. .’’(Mead 1934, p.47). Thus, the vocal gesture “is the 
actual fountainhead of language proper and all derivative forms of symbolism; and so 
of mind” (Morris, 1967, p.xxii).
The importance of language, for Mead, rests first and foremost in its function 
as a differentiating element in the phylogenetic continuum, and only subsequently in 
its function as a medium of communication. Through the course of evolution, humans 
became reflectively aware of the (social) meaning of their own gestures, and were 
able to carry on their interactions and the overall social acts in the light of this 
awareness. Hence, Mead asserts “the fundamental importance of gesture lies in the 
development of the consciousness of meaning - in reflective consciousness” 
(1910/1964, p.110).
Mead’s evolutionary approach aims at explaining the advancement of the 
individual’s mind within human communities. In this theoretical domain, the 
emphasis is on the natural history of the human mind. As Roberts (1977) notes, Mead 
depicted human evolution, which “takes place through a relation between human life 
and the environment” as well as evolutions in the relationship between people -  “an 
evolution in social relations” (p. 154). Rudimentary forms or impulses of role taking 
have founded the human capacity to effectively communicate by means of significant 
symbols. A person’s use of abstract symbols enables him to impose himself and his 
ideas on the environment in such a way as to control and manipulate it. As humans
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have reached the reflexive level and are able to act self-consciously by way of 
perspectives taking, they can deliberately form the ‘trial and error* process of 
evolutionary adaptation into a conscious method of progress. This process, according 
to Mead, is the scientific method which is “the evolutionary process grown self 
conscious”(1936, p.364).
Mead makes a robust link between role taking, communication and reflective 
intelligence. The evolution of language and human intelligence, are natural 
emergences of the interaction between the organic individuals throughout communal 
life. Once the aforementioned requisite physiological condition is present, the 
accumulated number and breadth of symbolised meanings available will determine 
the scope and effectiveness of human behaviour. Thus, role taking, symbolisation and 
communication of meaning are central concepts in Mead’s social-psychological 
theorising.
The development of the social self: ontogenesis application of role taking
In the previous section, role taking was considered as a rudimentary 
competence that does not presuppose language, self-consciousness and thought, but 
rather played a significant part in the genesis of these phenomena. In what follows, 
Mead’s concept of ‘role taking’ will be examined on a different level of assessment. 
Although based on similar assumptions, role taking will account for the emergence of 
the mind and self of a particular individual, i.e. the development of the individual’s 
(social) self in the course of ontogenesis.
Mead is concerned with the development of self-consciousness, that is, the ways 
in which the individual appears to experience a sense of self as a separate object. For 
Mead, the ‘self is not innately present at birth. Rather it emerges through interaction 
with others. We are not bom selves, rather, we become selves. The developmental 
assumption is that the child first takes the role of the other before it is conscious of 
itself. It becomes conscious of itself by looking at its behaviour from the standpoint of 
the other. He writes: “The child fashions his own self on the model of other selves.
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This is not an attitude of imitations, but the self that appears in consciousness must 
function in conjunction with other selves. The child’s consciousness of his own self is 
quite largely the reflection of others toward him” (1910/1964, p. 154). Owing to the 
pre-existence of the social process, Mead stresses that it is only in the course of social 
interactions that selves, as distinct from biological organisms, can arise; selves as 
beings that have become conscious of themselves. The self-as-object in Mead’s 
perspective is a basic structure of human experience that arises in response to other 
selves in an organic social symbolic world of intersubjective relations. The self is 
always in the process of development. Following Mead’s behaviouristic approach it 
might be accurate to regard the self not as an entity, but rather, as a coherent pattern 
of reflective behaviours generated, sustained and transformed by the mechanism of 
role taking. This concept becomes clearer through his interpretation of two crucial 
stages in the emergence of the self, namely ‘play’ and ‘game’.
Play
Early childhood play, according to Mead, is a crucial stage in the genesis of 
the self8. It is a fundamental process that allows for the development of all social 
behaviour. The child’s play emerges from a stimulus that calls out a detached act. 
This response, in turn forms the basis for the emergence of all aspects of the mind, i.e. 
reflexive-intelligence, self-awareness and communication skills.
Play seems to be a necessary outgrowth of the physical and social nature of 
humans (Ritchie and Koller, 1964). From birth, the infant gradually engages in 
impulse directed activities, which aim at exploring and manipulating his immediate 
environment. Although in the early stages the child is merely passive in his conduct 
with his caretakers, play experiences multiply rapidly, and the child is increasingly 
able to respond to his environment. Mead demonstrates that the earliest observation of 
role taking mechanism in early childhood, is when the infant is crying, and then 
“uttering the soothing sound which belongs to the parental attitude of protection”
8 Mead’s concept of play as a stage in the genesis of the self is the best known, and often the only 
known, aspect of this concept. However, his conceptualisation of ‘play’ is much more sophisticated and 
is expanded with broader implications such as education, art, and woman in community to name but a 
few. For a full assessment of this concept, see G.H. Mead (1999), Play, School and Society. Edited and 
introduced by M. J. Deegan.
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1934, p.364). This elementary conduct is rapidly extended to the “countless forms of 
play in which the child assumes the roles of the adults around him”(ibid). As the 
child increasingly acquires significant symbols and language through interactions 
with various individuals, he correspondingly expands his solitary-play repertoire. He 
now turns inward to the ‘imaginary companions’ -  “Play in this sense...is a play at 
something. A child plays at being a mother, at being a teacher, at being policeman - 
that is, it is taking different roles, as we say” (Mead, 1934, p. 150). These 
conversations and the assuming of alternate roles provide a means of reflecting back 
upon the self as an object.
In his thorough analysis, Cook (1993) identifies three distinct functions of the 
role taking mechanism. The first, anticipatory, is particularly related to the pre-play 
phase. The child’s self-stimulation calls forth anticipatory responses, which can be 
modified in the course of the child’s social experience. Past experience of the conduct 
of others, such as his caretakers, may play an important part in modifying the child’s 
social responses so that they more accurately anticipate and more successfully adjust 
to the action that the other’s gesture portends. Role taking in this regard is successful 
“to the extent that the child adequately reconstructs these actual responses of the other 
in the anticipatory attitudes they call out in themselves with their own gestures” 
(Cook, 1993, p.92). Additionally, role taking conduct is said to be carrying out a 
reflexive function. This function is emphasised by Mead as highly significant, 
enabling individuals to attend to themselves and to grasp the social meaning of their 
own conduct. In Mead’s words, “reflexiveness is the essential condition, within the 
social process, for the development of mind” (1934, p. 134). The child’s tendency to 
role-play sensitises him to his own gestures in a reflexive manner. This process, 
which is also characterized as the internalisation of the conversation of gestures, is for 
Mead ‘the essence of thinking’. The third function of role taking, the appropriative, 
will be discussed shortly in relation to the ‘game’ stage.
To sum up this point, the child’s (role)-play is a crucial context for the 
development of the self. It is the development of the individual’s mind in relation to 
the existing social environment. Role-play in this regard underlies the acquisition of 
significant symbols, which in sequence makes possible the inner dialogue of the 
individual’s thought. These achievements ultimately lead to the accomplishment of
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self-consciousness and reflexive intelligence. Through interactions with others, the 
child hears and engages with other subjectivities and ‘voices’. He actively 
appropriates or internalises them, that is, makes them his own, and in the process 
achieves a sense of self that has a determinate (yet ever-changing) form.
Game
The game stage for Mead is the child’s early experience in a more complex 
social matrix. The games are microgenetic occurrences through which the child 
exercises collective and cooperative behaviour, as well as a process through which the 
child acquires a more complex understanding of the self. Differentiation between 
play and game is made on the basis of the number of participants and the existence or 
absence of rules. Multiple person games imply a more advanced and sophisticated 
role taking conduct than seen in role-play. As Meads explains,” If we contrast play 
with the situation in an organised game, we note the essential difference that the child 
who plays in a game must be ready to take the attitude of everyone else involved in 
that game, and that these different roles must have a definite relationship to each 
other”(1934, p.151).
With the help of the rules that govern the game, the child develops the ability 
to take the place of all other players and to anticipate and comprehend their responses. 
The genuine significance of the game stage, as conceptualised by Mead does not lie in 
the child’s capacity to comprehend complex rules or multiple roles. Rather, Mead sees 
the game as metaphorically representing the dynamics of the overall social process 
and communal living. As Natanson puts it, the rules of the game “mark the transition 
from simple role taking to participation in roles of a special standardised order. 
Through rules, the child is introduced to societal compulsion and the abrasive texture 
of a more nearly adult reality” (1973, p.59). The variance between play and game 
corresponds with the distinction between the ‘other/s’ with which Mead is concerned 
in each stage. Whereas in play it is only a particular other i.e. the person (real or 
imagined) actually present in the interaction, in the game stage, the child assumes to 
integrate a myriad of attitudes that represent the common norms, rules, social 
expectations and values to which Mead refers as the “generalised other”.
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The generalised other for Mead is “the organised community or social group 
which gives to the individual his unity of self’ (1934 p. 151). It is in this stage that the 
appropriative function of role taking is fully realised. The generalised other is not a 
configuration of people but a powerful system of selectors, a frame of reference in the 
form of assembled conditioned judgements on the propriety of a given behaviour in a 
given situation. By taking the attitude of the generalised other, the reality and ethos of 
the group or the community is internalised in the individual consciousness. When the 
child expresses himself, he is now aware both of the attitudes of particular others and 
of the organised (generalised) other, and is able to monitor his behaviour accordingly. 
He now becomes self-aware in the full sense, i.e. he becomes an object to himself.
Mead strongly argues that there can be no self apart from society. This 
assertion should be understood in a twofold manner. On the one hand, the individual 
for Mead is in a pre-given relationship to others. Here comes to light the reflexive 
function of role taking as a mechanism for the genesis of self-consciousness. In this 
sense, the individual “could never reach the goal of becoming an object to himself as 
a whole until it could enter a larger system within which it could play various 
roles...it is this development that a society whose life process is mediated by 
communication has made possible” (Mead, 1932, p.85). On the other hand, Mead 
stresses the appropriative function of role taking as a mechanism for the development 
of the social structure of the self. Therefore, “only in so far as he takes the attitudes of 
the organised social group to which he belongs towards the organised, cooperative 
social activity or set of such activities in which the group as such is engaged, does he 
develop a complete self’ (1934, p. 155). Thus, it is through role taking conduct that 
the individual acquires the basic structure of his self or personality by importing into 
his conduct the organised roles displayed in the conduct of others.
The game, from an ontogenetic point of view is the stage at which the 
individual attains selfhood. Taking the role of the other leads to the acquisition of 
those organised response tendencies that provide the social structure of an 
individual’s self or personality. By exercising the appropriative function of role taking 
the child is able to operate and participate in the ongoing social process and develop 
awareness to the socially shared values, obligations, rights and goals of his 
community. For Mead, ‘self involves norms as anchors or points from which to view
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and evaluate events. In Coutu’s (1949) words, “The norms of one’s group are the 
flesh of one’s generalised other”(p.336).
Before proceeding to the macro level, an additional notion of Mead’s 
conceptualisation of the social self must be grasped. According to Mead the 
development of the social self is the process of the internalisation of the social process 
through the mechanism of role taking. The concept of the generalised other involves 
the individual’s adoption of a set of social roles, rules and conventions for group’s 
conduct. One could argue that this can only lead to the emergence of conformist, 
homogeneous human beings undifferentiated from one another. But for Mead the self 
is not merely a passive reflection of the generalised other. Instead, each self is a 
unique configuration, which results from a dialectical relationship existing between 
two aspects of the self: the ‘I* and the ‘Me’.
In its constitutive nature, the self is composed of two behaviouristic phases. 
These are the internalised perspective of the (generalised) other, the ‘me’, and the 
novel response to that perspective, the ‘I’. Both the I and the me necessarily relate to 
social experience. But whereas the I is the response of the organism to the attitudes of 
the others, the me is the organised set of attitudes of others that are internalised 
through the course of ontogenesis. A point worthy of note in this regard is that Mead’s 
distinction between the I and the me is functional rather than ontological. The me for 
Mead is the social incorporated into the personal. It is the “representation of society 
through the organisation of attitudes, expectations, and meanings derived from the 
group” (Roberts 1977, p. 165). It is the number and scope of perspectives which one 
can appreciate and hence gives the self its reflective and responsible character. Mead 
defines the me as a “conventional, habitual individual” and the I as the “novel reply” 
of the individual to the generalised other. (1934, p. 197)
Theses two poles of the self make it an ‘open’ self. The self as a whole, as it 
appears in social experience, is a compound of the stabilised reflections of the 
generalised other in the object me and the incalculable spontaneity of the subject I. 
The me is essentially present in memory and any action preformed by the I will 
eventually be incorporated within the me alongside with the other sets of social 
attitudes already assumed by the me. To sum up this point, for Mead, the subject I is
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the agent and source of freedom, i.e. the indeterminate component of the self, which 
enables human beings to reconstruct their environment and depart from the 
constrictions of the “generalised other” they have internalised in the form of the me. 
To be self-reflexive, therefore, is to take the role of the other with respect to the self. 
It is only due to the inner dialogue between the I and the me that the individual can be 
both subject and object and consequently, to effectively engage in human interaction.
Role taking on the macro level
The third level of assessment that Mead employs for the role taking concept is 
the macro level, where he conceptualises the social organisation of the ordered 
society. On this level of assessment there is a synthesis of his philosophical ideas and 
his social psychological theory.
I suggest articulating this synthesis from two separate yet interrelated points of 
view. In the first, the more philosophical perspective, role taking should be considered 
as an elementary mechanism for the production of shared realities. The second, a 
social psychological perspective, accentuates the complementary pole of the 
ontogenetic process from the previous section. Since self and society are for Mead 
dialectical poles of a single process, the importance of the role taking mechanism for 
the macro level of society will be emphasised.
Role taking as the mechanism for the construction of shared worlds
It is significant to relate Mead’s theory of meaning to his conception of subject 
and society in order to apprehend the social function of taking the role of the other 
from the standpoint of society. Common experience is, for Mead, the bedrock upon 
which meaning and perspectives are predicated. As previously indicated, it is within 
the communicative (social) act that meaning arises. To share a meaning with an other 
is to take the role of the other and vice versa. This two-way process becomes possible 
through the emergence and use of significant symbols. Gestures appear to have a 
universal meaning, and are thus communicable to others. The individual not only
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takes the role of the others actually involved in the social act in which he is using his 
gestures, but also the role of the “generalised other”, that is “the total linguistic 
community in which the gesture is utilised and responded to”(List, 1973: 114).
According to Mead’s philosophy, the world as it exists for anyone, arises out 
of that person’s responses to that world. Therefore, the content or meaning of physical 
as well as social objects one experiences, is derived from their role in one’s conduct 
and action. Our responses to the world, according to Mead, come from the past, have 
been socially structured and are inscribed on our central nervous system. People thus 
build up meaning between themselves and things around them through ongoing 
interactions. Significant communication among individuals creates a world of 
common (symbolic) meaning within which further and deliberate social acts are 
possible. Therefore, it is by way of the social act that persons in society create their 
reality. For Mead, different ‘perceptions’ of the world are not set off against a reality 
‘out there’. Rather there are ‘multiple realities’ which ascribe to the process of social 
interactions.
This implies that if a number of individuals or groups respond in different 
ways to a ‘stimulus’, the ‘stimulus’ means different things to them. The process of 
symbolic interpretation cannot be, as the cognitive theories imply, an individual or 
“subjective” one. Significant symbols are not processes going on in a mind as such. 
Rather, we must imagine this process to be taking place within a whole community of 
‘gestural users’. It is in that community that individuals carry out and participate in a 
common social process of experience and behaviour and it is here that their gestures 
have “the same or common meanings for all members of that group”(Mead, 1934, p. 
90). Intersubjectivity achieved through sharing a common outlook is the enabling 
ground of dialogue. Individuals respond to significant symbols in terms of shared 
meanings or “universals”, and it is the mechanism of role taking that enables them to 
participate in a world of public or shared objects.
From that stems a crucial assumption for the context of the present research: in 
so far as different individuals or groups have built up different responses to the world,
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so they do in fact live in different worlds9. The concept of taking the perspective of 
the other is not a mere cognitive act in the sense that the cognitive psychologists 
ascribed. Experiencing the world as ‘other’ experiences is an inevitable and effortless 
consequence of living in the same socially produced reality. Language is the agency 
or the medium through which interactions, meanings, relationships and structures are 
formed and reformed and taking the role of the other is the communicative 
mechanism whereby such interactions and meanings are accomplished. Put 
differently, role taking is the spine of all communication practices between 
individuals and groups and the mechanism that enables the existence of the human 
social fabric10.
Role taking as the mechanism of social organisation
Mead points out that “in the same socio-physiological way that human 
individual becomes conscious of himself he also becomes conscious of other 
individuals; and his consciousness both of himself and of other individuals is equally 
important for his own self development and for the development of the organised 
society or the social group to which he belongs” (1934, p. 253). Thus, the division, in 
the current scrutiny between the individual self and the macro level of society, relates 
only to the ontogenetic perspective aimed at explaining the process of socialisation of 
individuals into their social and cultural environments, which enables them to take 
part as active participants within these environments. At the macro level of analysis 
comes to light the relations of mutual dependence between self and society.
For Mead, self and society is an ontological unit. They are dialectical poles of 
a single process. He presupposes the interdependence between the individual and 
society and argues for the co-development of the individual and society as a mutual 
adjustment and readjustment (Dodds et al, 1997; Markova, 2000). Each self for Mead 
represents a unique organisation of perspectives, and since the individual participates
9 Non-symbolic animals, according to Mead, do not live in the same worlds. It is only (symbolic) 
humans that can share worlds and this ascribed to the use of language.
10 Given that, I argue that regarding the conflict, Israelis and Palestinians are living in two different 
worlds. This idea will be farther elaborated in the next chapter.
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in the social acts out of the perspectives of this self, each individual contributes to the 
expansion and amendment of the community of symbolised meanings.
Hence, role taking is on the one hand a fundamental process for the emergence 
of the individual’s mind and self. On the other hand, “the very organisation of the self 
conscious community is dependent upon individuals taking the attitudes of the other 
individuals”(Mead 1934, p.256). Communication involving participation in the 
‘other’ is a basic principle to human social organisation, as it makes possible the 
progressive ‘universality’ of our understanding. The various parts of society function 
in relation to each other by means of communication of symbolic language. 
Individuals taking the role of other individuals, as well as the generalised other, form 
the unique configuration of human communities.
For Mead, there can be no self apart from society as the essence of selfhood is 
embedded in society by way of taking the common attitude of the whole group. In 
turn, society must be understood as a dynamic form that emerges through the ongoing 
transactions between individuals who are mutually oriented towards each other.
Human social activities are predominantly dependent upon social cooperation, 
which according to Mead, “results from the taking by individuals of social attitudes 
toward one another” (1934 p.300). Through reciprocated interdependence arise what 
Mead terms common or organised responses, which are reflected and actualised in the 
community’s institutions (e.g. law, education, religion etc.). For Mead, it is the 
process of communication with the experience of other people that facilitates the 
peculiar distinguishing character of both human intelligence and its distinctive social 
organisation. “We enter in that way into the attitudes of others, and in that way we 
make our very complex societies possible”(1936, p.375).
The immediate effect of the role taking mechanism, when viewed from the 
standpoint of society and the overall social process, lies in the organisation and 
control which individuals are able to exercise over their own responses. Individuals 
are able to talk to themselves in terms of the community to which they belong and 
take upon themselves the responsibilities of the community. Therefore, the 
internalisation or importation of the social into the personal is for Mead a great value
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to the organised society as it facilitates “the superior coordination” of “society as a 
whole”, and the “increased efficiency of the individual as a member of the 
group”(1934, p. 178-179). Control in this sense is not something administrated 
externally, but rather the group exerts control over its members by becoming an 
internal part of their selves. Feelings and sentiments, which are directed towards 
oneself, such as guilt, embarrassment, pride, shame and vanity cannot occur without 
putting oneself in another’s position or, taking the perspective of the other to oneself. 
The common denominator of these feelings is the consideration of how one’s self 
appears to others, in the sense that these emotions stem from seeing ourselves as 
others see us. As such, they make us amenable to social control. The fact that these 
sentiments can be evoked without the presences of concrete others implies that they 
are also mechanisms of self-criticism and self-control (Shott, 1979).
The idea of a socialised conscience as an integral part of the individual’s 
character is central to Mead’s biological adjustment model of action, which viewed 
individual behaviour as based upon impulses which could be channelled into socially 
constructive behaviours. For the socialised conscious not only introduces the 
community process into the inner life of the individual but is also the source of 
rationality11. As Roberts asserts, “the socialised conscious is, in effect, society’s 
representative to a debate within the personality: the self is the forum for an inner 
parliament” (Roberts 1977, p. 159).
Communities are for Mead whole organisms and are viewed not only in terms 
of mutual dependence with the individuals that constitute them but also as naturally 
continuous and even analogous to them, with ongoing feedback and change processes 
between individuals and the social. Whereas the individual has character or 
personality, the group or society has institutions, and Mead perceives these 
institutions as natural extensions of the human organism. He writes: “the institutions 
of society, [the libraries, systems of transportation, the complex interrelationship of 
individuals reached in political organisations], are nothing but ways of throwing on 
the social screen in enlarged fashion the complexities existing inside of the central 
nervous system, and they must express functionally the operation of this system”
11 This idea will be problematised in chapter 2.
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(1934 p.242). Social institutions thus can be seen as both analogous to and 
continuations of individual selves, and constantly in tension of co-development and 
change.
In search for the largest common denominator, Mead identifies two of the 
greatest universals: economic and religious conduct, both seen as the largest social 
foundations of co-development of self and society throughout history. These 
institutions, the economic and the religious systems of values, are, for Mead, the most 
fundamental of all shared principles in a sense that they are cross-national, cross- 
cultural and are embedded in the very fibre of human’s social relations. They 
“represent the most highly universal, and for the time being, most highly abstract 
society” (1934, p.259). Both universals are evidently anchored in humans' ability to 
take the role of the other. The universal process of exchange is founded on 
participation in the attitude of need where “each putting himself in the attitude of the 
other in the recognition of the mutual value which the exchange has for both” (1934, 
p.258). The universal religious system has imprinted on human beings “such 
fundamental attitudes toward each other as kindliness, helpfulness and 
assistance”(/6/cf) 12. The process of communication, i.e. taking the perspective of the 
other is the process that facilitates the above cooperative universals. It is “the medium 
through which these cooperative activities can be carried on in the self-conscious 
society” (ibid).
Mead considers his scrutiny on self and society as the guiding principles with 
which to elaborate his ethical theory. He argues that morality is constituted where a 
person has in his own conduct the universals that govern the whole community. The 
internalisation of the social process and the generalised other into one’s self generates 
conduct controlled by principles, and for Mead “a person who has such an organised 
group of responses is a man whom we say has a character, in the moral sense” (1934, 
p. 163). Mead is very straightforward in associating the social and the moral. His 
ethical theory is directly derived from his social psychology theory in which he 
explores the moral order and conventions through the reciprocal influence of
12 Mead indeed has the tendency to emphasis the harmonious nature of society and in this sense he 
chooses to ignore the horrible deeds executed by humans in the name of religion. This problem is dealt 
in length in the next chapter.
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individuals being mutually dependant elements within a society. The social aspect of 
human society, Mead proclaims, “with its concomitant feelings on the parts of all 
these individuals of co-operation and social interdependence, is the basis for the 
development and existence of ethical ideals in that society” (1934 p.321).
Role taking as a method for solving moral problems
In an early essay titled “The Social Self’ (1913) Mead provides the first link 
between his social view of the self and moral conduct. He writes: “there is one 
further implication of this nature of the self to which I wish to call attention. It is the 
manner of its reconstruction. I wish especially to refer to it, because the point is of 
importance in the psychology of ethics” (p. 147). For Mead, all nature, but especially 
the living organism, addresses, reconstructs and solves problems. He views life as a 
process of continuous reconstruction providing solutions to problems that occur in the 
overall act when there is a lack of adjustment between the organism and the 
environment. As long as conduct proceeds smoothly there is no need for reflective 
thoughts and reconstruction. It is only when we are confronted with situations whose 
undetermined and therefore challenging character calls forth conflicting tendencies to 
respond that reflection and reassessment are required. Put differently, problems arise 
when habits are no longer adequate guides to action and there is a need to reassess 
alternatives.
Due to the human ability to reflectively interrupt the flow of conduct and to 
expand the situation by attaching new meanings and evaluations to the situation, 
conscious intellectual and moral reconstruction is possible. Intellectual reconstruction 
implies solving a problem by way of finding a method to set conduct in motion for the 
accomplishment of its goal. Mead insists that the moral dimension in human conduct 
is not an isolated domain but rather an integral part of the overall social dimension 
(Mead, 1913/1964; 1934). Every social act or conduct is accompanied by a moral 
dimension and the potential to turn into a moral problem - there is no sharp break 
between social and moral problems. Neither a situation nor a behaviour is inherently 
morally problematic, nevertheless they have the potential to become so. The natural 
validation of ethics for Mead is based on the idea that evolution has produced an
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organism capable of reflective intelligence, namely, capable of responding to its own 
responses by means of a social perspective.
Humans’ reflexive capacity and the achievement of control over the 
environment necessitated responsibility in relation to that control. Responsibility in 
that sense is a counterpart to morality. To understand properly the moral dimension 
of the human experience, we must regard moral meanings as values that arise within 
the ongoing relationship of mutual determination between individuals and their 
environments (Cook, 1993). Values arise when the impulses of organisms become 
attached to objects in the social act and therefore express the interests and patterns of 
conduct that relates to self and other. In accordance with his theory of meaning Mead 
asserted: “the problem itself defines the value”(1934, p.388). The value of an act is 
one of that act’s meanings. Since meanings arise only in the act, value can have no 
meaning apart from the act. Hence, values arise and reside in the relation between 
subject and object where people assign values arbitrarily to natural objects and 
various other symbols. It is the symbolisation of values that make it possible for 
humans to share these meanings with one another and to act upon them.
A moral problem is “a significant conflict of ends-relations in a human social 
act which blocks the completion of the act”(Broyer, 1973; p. 173). Moral situations 
must imply important consequences for the individual or for the social group. As 
already discussed, Mead described the character or personality of the individual as a 
“mere organisation of habit”. These “habits” are the gamut of traits that the self is not 
conscious or reflectively aware of. However, when an essential problem appears, 
“there is some disintegration in this organisation, and different tendencies appear in 
reflective thought as different voices in conflict with each other” (1913, p. 147). The 
same occurs on the macro level when the problem calls different voices in conflict 
within the community’s institutions or groups. Moral problems, thus involve social 
relations which are not arbitrary or conventional but rather essential to the furtherance 
of the social process.
From his naturalistic point of view, Mead regarded ethical problems as 
essentially problems of social adjustment and adaptation to the interests and conduct 
of other individuals or groups. They involve competing tendencies in the social
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organisation of the self. According to Mead they are always internalisations and 
reflections of conflicting values arising in the community and are indispensable to the 
continuation of the community process. For this reason, moral problems are always 
social problems.
Mead explicitly ruled out the existence of a fixed, ideal moral order 
independent of the natural world. The emphasis that categorical ethics places on 
abstract moral principles is utterly wrong. By ignoring the inescapable particularity of 
moral agents, categorical (e.g. Kantian) ethics disregards what according to Mead is 
the real source of ethical value and meaning. He contends that meanings and values 
are socially constructed and are always prone to revaluation and change: “You cannot 
lay down in advance fixed rules as to just what should be done. You can find out what 
are the values involved in the actual problem and act rationally with reference to 
them...that is the only method that an ethics can present”(1934, p.388). Morality 
therefore, is not categorical or transcendental, but local and specific, concrete and 
particular that lives in particular subjects and particular contexts.
It is just the lack of a fixed moral order that allows incessant space for 
intelligent reconstruction and reflective morality to take place. He argues that moral 
advance “consists not in adapting individual natures to the fixed realities of a moral 
universe, but in constantly reconstructing and recreating the world as the individuals 
evolve” (1908/1964 p.90). Following this view, moral conduct is not about aiming as 
close as possible to a fixed ideal order. Rather, as Cook (1993) notes “it involves a 
dialectical process in which creative selves repeatedly devise new moral syntheses in 
the face of recurring moral conflicts”(p.l20). Stemming from Mead’s theory of the 
self, minded behaviour is the reflective use of significant symbols by self-conscious 
individuals in the solution of a problem. Living in a symbolically mediated reality, a 
person is able to formulate, preserve and communicate his past experience and his 
future schemes. It is the accumulation of past experiences and variety of future 
preferences which make possible a reflective present, and hence a reflective mind.
Mead’s conception of ethics is thus characterised by resistance to all fixed 
systems of values, and as such, is similar to the scientific methods of examination and 
enquiry. As Joas (1985) notes “science and ethics are as much intertwined with one
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another as are the search for the appropriate means to attain ends and reflection on the 
suitableness of the ends themselves in practical situations”^ .  129). The appropriate 
method to approach a moral problem is as follows: “All of those interests which are 
involved in conflict must be considered. .. .Now, if we ask what is the best hypothesis, 
the only answer we can make is that it must take into account all of the interests that 
are involved”(1934, p.387). Yet, Mead counselled: “Our temptation is to ignore 
certain interests that run contrary to our own interest, and emphasise those with which 
we have been identified”(ibid). Solving moral problems requires creative intellectual 
effort and consideration of all values relevant to the given situation.
The formulation of a moral hypothesis is no different than any other type of 
reflective hypothesis. It must include an examination of all the conflicting values and 
perspectives that are represented in the problematic situation and an attempt to discern 
precisely how they conflict and how they converge. In other words, solving moral 
problem necessitates role taking. The implementation of ‘taking the role of the other” 
in the context of moral problems is effectively different from, yet closely related to, 
the previous utilization. In the previous discussion on self and society, role taking was 
conceptualised as both the inevitable and effortless consequence of individuals living 
in the same socially produced reality and as a natural conduct, through which the 
emergence of selfhood and social organisation occur. In the context of moral 
problems and moral problem solving Mead regards role taking as a vital method, 
which must be employed in an active-reflective manner. It is an imaginary exercise, 
which has the practical effect of reducing conflict through the better understanding of 
the other and its needs. Role taking in this regard implies exploring, realising, 
appreciating and testing the diverse perspectives involved in the moral problem in 
order to attain the preferred solution which best represents and respects all the values 
and interests relevant to the problem. As Mead noted “the hard task is the realisation 
of the common value in the experience of conflicting groups and 
individuals”(l 929/1964, p.365).
Indeed it is a hard task and the cognitivists conceptualise this as a logical 
puzzle to which formal rules are applied to arrive at a correct solution (See especially 
Kholberg, 1969; Rest 1986). Here again I argue against the over-cognitivisation of 
role taking and moral problem solving. The problem of appreciating all of the diverse
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perspectives involved in a moral situation is not a cognitive one but rather, it is a 
problem of communication. The subject matter of ethics is the establishment of paths 
of communication amongst rival parties, not in a procedural manner, but rather to 
create significant interaction in a sense that each party is able to see the act and itself 
from the perspective of the other. Thus, the ultimate objective is to bring the two 
parties to a mutual acceptance of standards of fairness and broad equity by realising 
each other’s worldviews and discovering creative ways to conflate them. As Broyer 
(1973) notes, “If a moral hypothesis is adequate in direct proportion to the range of 
relevant perspectives that it encompasses, then ethics is essentially a matter of 
communication” (p. 175).
In regard to the cognitive developmentalists conception of logical puzzles, 
Schwalbe (1991) rightly argues: “If there are puzzles of any kind, they are 
communicative ones whose solution arises out of negotiating new meanings and 
social relationships, not out of de-contextualised philosophising” (p.287). Moral 
reconstruction is not a matter of cataloguing de-contextualised right and wrong 
values, but is a matter of “re-defining the situation in such a way that the maximum 
number of values can be realised harmoniously” (Broyer, 1973 p. 182).
Significant communication among individuals creates a world of common 
(symbolic) meanings within which further and deliberate social acts are possible. As 
previously argued, to share a meaning with the other is to take the role of the other 
and vice versa. Whether effortless or demanding, communication between two 
individuals or groups can come to pass effectively only through shared meanings and 
significant symbols. It is worth emphasising in this regard that the only universality 
that Mead endorsed in relation to ethics is methodological, that is, a statement of the 
formal required conditions which must be present in order to discover a morally 
adequate solution. Ironically, Mead returned to the ancient Hebrews in his quest for 
universal standards to guide the making of a pragmatic morality. The Hebrews 
according to Mead tell us that “ you are to regard other person’s interests as your own; 
the Golden Rule stated in the most extreme form.... [They had] the assumption that 
what is in the interests of others is in your interest, and that you could have society 
formed on this basis” (1927, p.79).
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There are, therefore, two necessary conditions for moral reconstruction: 
communication and reason. The first necessary element is significant communication, 
in order to discover and comprehend the various conflicting values present to each of 
the organisms participating in the act. The second is the adoption of the rational 
perspective of the generalised other. Once we have reached a significant
understanding of the perspectives of the other participants in the act, we must,
according to Mead, adopt a rational attitude towards those perspectives.
Reason, therefore, functions in a moral inquiry to discover hypotheses, which 
will harmonise and maximise the greatest possible number of these value
perspectives. Moral problems are resolved by getting all the value facts, and than by 
acting rationally towards all of them. These two conditions are inextricably 
intertwined with the mechanism of role taking. The relation between role taking and 
significant communication is already established. On the relation between role taking 
and rationality Mead asserted: “if the individual can take the attitudes of the others 
and control his action by these attitudes, and control their action through his own, then 
we have what we can term ‘rationality’ ”(1934, p.334). Ethical universality thus, “is 
possible only through the universality of human capacity of role
taking...comprehensive communication with one’s partners in a moral situation and 
orientation to the realisation of this ideal society are, then, two rules for the solution 
of a moral problems” (Joas 1985, p. 135-137).
Summary
In this chapter I aimed to demonstrate that Mead’s ‘taking the perspective of the 
other’ is a multifaceted concept that is employed across various theoretical domains. I 
suggested four different yet interrelated applications of the concept as it stems from 
Mead’s writings. The first concerns phylogenetic theorising where Mead asserted that 
it is the human being, alone among the animals, that is able to elicit in himself the 
same response he elicits in others. It is this ability to react to our own vocal gestures 
in the same manner as the other reacts that has facilitated the evolution of language 
and self-consciousness.
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The next domain in which Mead employed the concept of role taking is 
ontogenesis. When a child is able to assume different roles in his play, he becomes 
aware of himself and of others in the mutual relations of social interaction. In that 
sense, as Mead argued, we must be others if we are to be ourselves. From the many 
roles assumed, there gradually arises the social self, a self that develops in the process 
of communication and participation as the individual takes the role of the ‘generalised 
other’ and enters the perspective of the community.
Thirdly, I explicated the function of role taking on the macro level of society. 
Here two ideas were discussed. First, role taking is considered as an elementary 
mechanism for the production of shared realities. Living in a socially constructed 
reality necessitates participation in shared communication practices, and role taking is 
the core and essence of the communicative act. The second idea on the macro level 
relates to self- and social control. Individuals taking the role of other individuals as 
well as the generalised other, form the unique configuration of human communities, 
since the alliance between self and community emerges by way of role taking. Role 
taking thus is necessary to coordinate joint action and to sustain community life.
The last theoretical domain in which Mead incorporated the notion of taking the 
perspective of the other is ethics and morality. It is employed as a means to resolve 
conflicts by way of realising the conflicting values in the act. In order to arrive at a 
moral hypothesis, one must try to imaginatively experience the other objective and 
subjective worlds for a better understanding of the dilemma at hand.
In the next chapter I will try to bring these ideas closer to the research problem. I 
will further problematise the concept of taking the perspective of the generalised other 
and discuss the relevance of two of the above applications to the current research 
problem: role taking as the mechanism for the production of shared worlds, and role 
taking in ethics. Linking these concepts to the notion of narrative I am hoping to 
provide the theoretical grounds for the research problem.
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2. ORGANISED OTHER/S, LACK OF COMMUNICATION AND THE 
NARROWING OF THE MORAL SELF: LINKING MEAD TO
NARRATIVE.
Introduction
While the previous chapter introduced the various applications of G.H. Mead’s 
concept of taking the role of the other, this chapter explicates in more detail the 
theoretical framework which I employ to account for the research problem. By 
drawing on Mead’s social psychology and ethical pragmatism I offer a social- 
psychological account for why one group - Israeli children - exhibit consistent 
difficulties in taking the perspective of another group - Palestinian children.
This chapter is organised in four main sections. The first offers a critical 
examination of Mead’s concept of the generalised other. I draw upon both his social 
psychology and ethical theory in order to examine the constraints of the ‘generalised 
other’ and its function in generating and disseminating conflicts.
I will then elaborate on two interrelated Meadian approaches to perspective 
taking, discussed in the previous chapter in relation to the current research problem. 
The first will emphasise the notion of communication. Taking the perspective of the 
other is equated with living in the same socially shared world with the other. I argue 
that Israeli and Palestinian children live in very different social realities in relation to 
the conflict and are thus principally constrained from taking the perspective of the 
other.
The second discusses the concept of the narrow moral self. An 
underdeveloped concept in Mead’s ethical pragmatism, it suggests that the difficulties 
Israeli children have in taking the perspective of the Palestinians is embedded in the 
Israeli (collective) self in relation to the conflict. The narrowing of the moral self 
signifies a self that is underdeveloped in its ability and motivation to take the 
perspective of the other.
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In the last section I offer to coalesce the two Meadian propositions under the 
theoretical umbrella of narrative. The concept of narrative speaks both to 
epistemology and ontology, as it is through narratives that we know and understand 
the social reality and ourselves. My contention is that the Israeli and Palestinian 
narratives, which contradict in almost every aspect, constitute different and opposing 
realities. Drawing upon Ricoeur’s theory of narrative and its ethical function, my 
contention is that the narratives which constitute the Israeli collective self mark the 
moral boundaries of this self and therefore determine the Israeli children’s ability and 
motivation to take the perspective of the other.
The ideal society
Mead has a vision of the ideal human society that he envisages as the ultimate 
goal of human social progress. The ideal of human society “is one which does bring 
people so closely together in their interrelationships, so fully develops the necessary 
system of communication, that the individuals who exercise their own peculiar 
functions can take the attitude of those who they affect” (1934, p.327). In this utopian 
society, social reciprocity and cooperation will govern; opposing classes will 
appreciate each other’s needs in order to be able to find a new social practice that is 
acceptable to all and beneficial to a reconstructed social order. In this human ideal 
society, “all human individuals would posses a perfected social intelligence, such that 
all social meaning would each be similarly reflected in their respective individual 
consciousnesses -  such that the meanings of any one individual's acts or gestures 
would be the same for any other individual whatever who responded to them” (ibid, 
p310). However, in reality, human beings neither share worldviews in complete 
accord nor do they attach the same meaning values to social objects. Rather, they are 
divided one against another in all sorts of groups, subgroups, races, social classes, and 
nations, to name but a few, competing in a battlefield of symbols, each striving for 
power and domination.
The generalised other: a good or a bad thing?
As previously discussed, the generalised other is “the internalised audience 
with which the thinker converses; a focalised and abstracted organisation of attitudes
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of those implicated in the social field of behaviour and experience” (Mills, 1939 
p.627). The significance of the generalised other lies, from the ontogenetic standpoint 
of the individual, in the acquisition and preservation of selfhood and personality (the 
‘me’) since “the individual possesses a self only in relation to the self of the other 
members of his social group and the structure of his self expresses or reflects the 
general behaviour pattern of this social group to which he belongs” (1934 p. 164). 
Society in its turn is conceptualised as an organism that emerges through an ongoing 
process of communicative social acts, through transactions between persons oriented 
towards each other. Furthermore, the community benefits from the control which the 
internalisation of the responses of the generalised other inflicts upon its members and 
the resultant social order. By taking the role of the generalised other thus emerges the 
affinity of the individuals to the community’s venture and, sequentially, the 
responsibility and commitment they sense towards the community’s goals.
Mead tended to lay emphasis on the overall benefits of taking the attitude of 
the generalised other. Although it seems that he is aware of the boundaries and limits 
that are imposed upon us by the generalised other, this implication is somewhat 
overlooked. Both on the interpersonal and the social levels, most of his writings gave 
prominence to a view of natural harmony. Concerning interpersonal relationships, 
Mead paid little attention to the existence of discrepancies in interpretations of 
behaviour and patterns of miscommunication. Put differently, just as in the current 
case, Mead rarely considered social situations where one may be required to put 
oneself in place of another who occupies a different interpretive horizon than one’s 
own. As Gurevitch (1990) rightly observes, role taking is always seen as an ever­
present possibility for Mead, something rarely fraught with problems and difficulties 
and the potential for misunderstanding. Ichheiser’s (1949) critique is also explicit: 
“Even a man like George H. Mead, who in principle adheres to a radically 
sociological theory of personality, never analysed and described the various specific 
and concrete mechanisms which shape and misshape the perceptions and conceptions 
we have about others and about ourselves”(p.lO).
However, Ichheiser is only half right in his critique. Mead's theory is indeed 
inherently social and in this sense he does appreciate the mechanisms by which we 
come to learn the world around us as well as the societal apparatus in the form of the
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generalised other that constitute our conceptions of others and ourselves. Yet these are 
merely universal principles of communication by significant symbols, interaction and 
role taking. Hence, inappropriately to my view, Ichheiser accuses Mead for failing to 
answer ‘various specific and concrete’ questions he has no ambition to answer in the 
first place. The one sense in which Ichheiser is correct is that Mead's theorising has a 
propensity to an 'ideal type' and therefore by and large neglects the frequent patterns 
of miscommunication, the existence of discrepancies in interpretations of reality and 
the associated conflicts.
Regarding the macro level of analysis, again, the centre of attention is on the 
assenting and harmonious nature of society. When a person is said to be taking the 
perspective of the generalised other and internalises the norms and values of his entire 
community or social group, it might fiimish the erroneous impression that there exists 
enough harmony and consistency between the various sub-groups to which one 
belongs for one to derive a general 'attitude' out of the often conflicting relationships 
actually prevailing.
Furthermore, Mead strongly associated the generalised other with rationality. 
He stresses that “Man is a rational being only because he is a social being” (1934, 
p.379) and hence “if the individual can take the attitudes of the others and control his 
action by these attitudes, and control their action through his own, then we have what 
we can term rationality”(1934, p.334). Yet time and again reality proves this theory 
problematic and hence, the tensions, significant fragmentations and contradictions 
between various social groups or classes are somewhat downplayed.
Social organisation is a symbolically manifested form of life that emerges as a 
common response to common aims and goals, and therefore, it is by and large 
rational, since “common ends are ipso facto rational ends”(Mead, 1938, quoted in 
Hinkle, p.329). By associating social conformity and rationality on the theoretical 
level of an abstract society, Mead left too little room in his theorising for 
understanding multiple rationalities which might elicit protracted and irreconcilable 
conflicts. As critics have pointed out (e.g. Feffer 1990; Hinkle 1992), his theory only 
explained a limited set of social relations, those in which parties agree beforehand that 
rational and amicable resolutions of conflict shall be reached. For that reason his
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expectations for cooperative reconstruction seems, to some extent, unrealistic, both 
psychologically and politically. Clearly, Mead distinguished between the specific and 
generalised other, but he does not expand upon the problems in contrasting different 
sorts of generalised others and hence overlooks possible relations of intergroup 
conflict as well as the prospect of multiple rationalities of modem society. In what 
follows I aim to elaborate on the idea of multiple generalised others in a more definite 
form. Based on occasional intimations by Mead, I wish to further elucidate the 
problematic nature of the generalised other13.
The restrictive nature of the generalised other
Although he does not discuss this in length, Mead recognised the potential 
restrictive nature of the generalised other. He notes: “We are individuals bom into a 
certain nationality, located at a certain spot geographically, with such and such family 
relations and such and such political relations”(1934, p. 182). On another occasion he 
writes: “Any self is a social self, but it is restricted to the social group whose role it 
assumes, and it will never abandon this self until it finds itself entering into the larger 
society and maintaining itself there”( 1924-1925/1964, p.292). Mead implied that the 
self is always a reflection of specific social relations which themselves are founded on 
a specific mode of activity of the group to which it belongs. We have to bear in mind 
that any mode of activity, or ‘way of life’ of a certain group always have specific 
social and historical foundations and symbolise the interests and values of that group. 
Communities define themselves by a common voice, the voice of the generalised 
other which is always embedded in historical, cultural and political foundations. 
Given that, human communities live through their defining limits of the generalised 
other, which operate as a fence, keeping members in and non-members out. 
"Conscious, imperious and ubiquitous, the generalised other marks the limits of our 
environment” (Coutu, 1949 p.343).
13 The idea of multiple rationalities and ‘generalised others’ in modem society is an extremely 
important issue yet somewhat outside the scope of this thesis. The current discussion will focus on that 
issue from the narrow perspective of inter-group conflict.
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From ‘generalised other’ to ‘organised others’
As previously discussed, Mead’s theory of the self suggests two stages, the 
play and the game, in the emergent development of the mind and the social self, each 
stage and the correspondent sort of ‘other’ with whom the individual interacts and 
role take. At the play stage, the other is a particular individual, whereas at the game 
stage the child (or adult) is said to be taking the role of the ‘generalised other’, that is 
a set of knowledge, norms and expectations shared by a community and which 
represents the concerns of the whole community.
On various occasions regarding ethics and morality Mead offered an extension 
of this model where he distinguishes between the constraints of the group’s viewpoint 
and a wider perspective. He writes:
“The human individual who possesses a self is always a member of a larger 
social community, a more extensive social group than that in which he 
immediately and directly belongs. In other words, the general pattern of 
social or group behaviour which is reflected in the respective organised 
attitudes -  the respective integrated structures of the selves -  of the 
individuals involved, always has a wider reference, for those individuals, 
than that of its direct relation to them, namely a reference beyond itself to a 
wider social environment or context of social relationships which includes it, 
and of which it is only a more or less limited part” (1934, p. 234).
Drawing upon the above observation, Mead delineated two types of 
communities in the modem civilised society (Cronk 1987), both conceptualised 
through taking the attitude of the generalised other. The first type refers to the 
immediate and concrete social groups to which we belong such as nations, political 
parties or social classes, “which are all actually functional social units, in terms of 
which their individual members are directly related to one another” (Mead 1934, 
p. 157). The second type indicates those abstract communities where members are 
related indirectly but nevertheless “afford or represent unlimited possibilities for the 
widening and ramifying and enriching of the social relations among all the individual 
members of the given society as an organised and unified whole” (ibid). Such abstract
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social groups, Mead asserted, facilitate a radical extension of the definite social 
relations which constitute the individual’s sense of self and which structure his 
conduct. Mead actually called for individuals to widen their conception of the 
generalised other by associating themselves with a larger community than the actual 
group to which they belong. The most abstract universal illustration that Mead 
provided is what he termed the ‘universe of discourse’. This utopian concept 
transcends the boundaries of different races, nationalities and languages. It is a space 
of indefinite opportunities for a variety of social relations where individuals belonging 
to any given social group or community are invited to become conscious of a wider 
social context, the context of humanity.
Three phases of moral conduct
The aforementioned distinction between the immediate group to a larger and 
abstract one was made explicit by Mead in his unpublished ethical writings (1927, see 
also Broyer, 1973), where he maintained that moral conduct, which evidently involves 
perspective taking, might occur at three levels:
Individualised/personal- the concrete other
The first is the instinctive or personal level which corresponds to the ‘Play’ 
stage. At this level, the moral self is able to take the perspective and realise the values 
of other individuals. The self engages in interaction with other individuals and tries to 
take over the perspective of particular other/s. The ‘others’ with which the individual 
communicates are particular and concrete individuals and from that interaction he 
learns to differentiate himself from these ‘others’ as he comes to see himself as an 
object from the perspective of others. At this phase the moral self appreciates the 
present discovered values of other individuals and hence takes the role of the present 
moral perspective of other selected individuals. Mead (1932) termed this stage the 
‘individualised’ or the ‘specific’ other.
Socially determined- the organised other
The second is the ‘socially determined’ level, which corresponds to the ‘game’ 
stage. Here the moral self is determined by the organised set of values of the 
immediate group to which he belongs - national, religious, political etc. From an
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ontogenetic perspective, during this stage the child develops beyond individual 
relationships to participate in group relationships. The development of this process is 
“dependent upon getting the attitude of the group as distinct from that of separate 
individuals “(1934, p. 168).
It is the ‘me’ component of the self that develops during this stage in the form 
of the symbolic representative of the group, gradually taken over from society as the 
individual grows up. The ‘me’ as a set of behavioural expectations of one’s social 
surrounding that have migrated into the person, places limits from the intersubjective 
perspective of a social ‘we’ on the impulsiveness of the ‘I’. In this phase the 
individual takes the role of the present moral perspective of his or her society. That is 
to say, the individual carries his group with him as part of his environment in the form 
of concepts which make up the generalised other. However, for the current 
formulation, it is more accurate to define it as the 'organised other’, a term which 
Mead used interchangeably with the generalised other.
By distinguishing between the ‘organised other/s’ and the ‘generalised other’, 
we acknowledge the confining nature of the group over the individual’s perspective, 
since the self is always a reflection of specific social relations founded on the 
particular ideals of the group. That is, our social perception is in its very structure 
conditioned by the fact that we belong to certain social groups whose moral order we 
espouse. The set of responses, which the individual internalises and reconstructs as an 
integral part of his personality, are those of the ‘organised other/s’. At this level the 
individual takes only the perspective of the group to try to determine which specific 
behaviour will be approved or disapproved, and thus his conduct is characterised as 
‘ritual conformity’ (Schwalbe, 1991).
The immediate or primary group in the form of the internalised ‘organised 
other’, provides the individuals with an assortment of culturally transformed 
standards, ideals, prejudices, fears, goals, truths, obligations, rights, duties and so 
forth. The ‘organised other’ provides the perceptual frames and the normative 
judgement boundaries around situations and events within which thinking, arguing 
and rationalising take place. In short, at this level, moral conduct comes under the 
authority of the institutionalised common ideals of the society of which the individual
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is a member and their normative constraints must always be acknowledged. As will 
be elaborated below, in a situation of intergroup conflict each group is operating 
morally within the boundaries of its historically constructed standards and shared 
definitions of the situation. Israeli children (and adults) are operating morally from 
the level of the socially determined moral conduct, and by the very nature of the 
conflict, the perspective of the Palestinians is both opposed to, and excluded from, 
their shared understanding and definitions of the conflict.
Rational universality- the generalised other
The third level of moral conduct is the level of ‘rational-universality’. Here the 
individual is assumed to be associating himself with a wider community, reflecting 
back upon his ‘organised other/s’ and challenging its values and ideals. The moral self 
takes the abstract universal perspective of the epistemological form of the social act 
itself, that is, the perspective of one who wishes to step outside of his immediate 
community, to reassess existing values, discover new and reconstruct the order of 
society. Standing outside his community, he can evaluate and reconstruct this 
community. As Mead described:
“A person may reach a point of going against the whole world about him; 
he may stand out by himself over against it... But to do that he has to 
comprehend the voices of the past and of the future.... that is the only way 
which the self can get a voice which is more than the voice of the 
community. We must not forget this other capacity, that of replying to the 
community and insisting on the gestures of the community changing. We 
can reform the order of things; we can insist of making the community 
standards better standards. We are not simply bound by the 
community“(1934, p. 168).
Therefore, it is only when reaching the third level that the individual is able to 
“question whether the standard of society is the right thing” (1927, p.237). The 
concept of the generalised other is restricted to the higher level of universality, a 
symbol that stands for sociality and humanity. The moral perspective in this phase 
goes beyond the possible egocentric and sociocentric perspectives of the former 
phases. The individual perceives himself as part of a larger community than his
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immediate group, a community that comprises of various subgroups and organised 
others. The individual, by ascribing himself to a wider generalised other is able to 
perceive reality beyond the socially determined definitions of the group and to act 
morally beyond ritual conformity. The inclusiveness and hence also the unity of the 
self becomes increasingly established as one incorporates a wider and wider array of 
complexly organised self-other relationships. Mead indeed believed in the value of 
such inclusiveness and therefore defines ethical progress precisely in terms of the 
formation of universalistic selves.
To sum up, Mead’s model of the three phases of moral conduct is grounded on 
his social psychology and the premise of participation in the other. They are 
distinguished by the scope and complexity of the role taking they entail. The stages in 
the formation of the self are correspondently stages in moral development from the 
‘particular other’ of different individuals, through the ‘organised other’ of the 
immediate group, to the rational universal of the ‘generalised other’ which take him 
beyond the group and beyond conflicts among different organised others.
Following this model, we can now begin to apprehend the difficulties that 
Israeli children exhibit in taking the perspective of the Palestinians. Mead would say 
that Israeli children, and indeed the majority of adults, are operating morally from the 
second stage, that of the ‘socially determined’. Their interpretation of the reality of 
the conflict, and hence their moral judgements are inevitably limited by the ideals, 
values and interests of their immediate group, which reflects the history of the group.
This can be further explained through two complementary Median notions of 
perspective taking that were indicated in the former chapter, and have a particular 
relevance to the present research endeavour. The first regards the notion of 
communication between individuals living in a shared social reality. The second 
associate role taking with morality and difficulties are regarded as narrowing of the 
moral self.
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Perspective taking: from cognitive ability to (lack of) communicative 
activity
As discussed in the previous chapter perspective taking is regarded as an 
ineluctable and effortless communicative consequence of individuals living in the 
same socially formed reality. Taking the perspective of the other in this regard 
constitutes such an elementary and pervading feature of ordinary social interaction 
that it remains entirely inaccessible to the reflective consciousness (Rommetveit, 
1979). As long as individuals are operating in a shared social reality, i.e. a common 
here-and-now, a successful and flow dialogue can take place. Common experience is 
for Mead the bedrock upon which meaning and perspectives are predicated, hence, it 
is within the communicative (social) act that meaning and intersubjectivity arise14.
Perspective taking of this type is what we ‘do’ habitually in any 
communicative or interactive setting as we wave our hands, nod our heads, speak, 
listen, write, read -  from a wordless sigh to a rejoinder in dialogue, to a multi-volume 
philosophical investigation - in short, in any verbal or non-verbal communicative 
practice that involves self and other. As long as individuals are interacting within the 
same socially shared set of responses, i.e. in a commonly defined environment, they 
are persistently, (however unconsciously) taking the perspective of each other, as this 
mechanism is the core and essence of the communicative act.
Stemming from that is the assumption that individuals, who live in different 
socially produced realities, do not have common experiences and therefore have 
established different responses to the world, will inevitably face communicative 
complications. In such a case, perspective taking will be hindered by different 
perceptions and interpretations of the world and communication will not take place or 
will be brought to a halt until the situation of conflict in communication is resolved. 
This point is nicely illustrated in a simple communicative efficiency experiment 
(Blakar, 1973) where one subject explaining a route through a map to the other 
subject, who also has a copy of the map with the exception that the latter’s map has an
14 Intersubjectivity for Mead is based upon a basic prerequisite of subjects acting towards the same 
object.
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additional street. This seemingly minor detail has the power to produce a conflict in 
communication since it violates the elementary precondition for a successful 
communication - participants operating within a common social environment.
Perspectives, according to Mead, represent particular ways of structuring the 
world. Ultimately he used the concept of “perspective” in order to describe “the world 
in its relationship to the individual and the individual in his relationship to the world” 
(1938, p.l 15). He argued: “perspectives have objective existence” {ibid, p. 114). 
Rather than defining reality arbitrarily, we are bound to define reality on the basis of 
previous experience with the environment and its intersubjective expression in 
language. Thus, what humans take to be objective knowledge and truth is actually the 
result of perspective. None the less, the world that individuals and groups create and 
recreate in the process of social exchange is a reality sui generis. As Schwalbe (1988) 
points out, rather than asserting that people have perspectives, it is conceptually more 
accurate to stress that individuals and groups are in perspectives. Given that, “taking 
the perspective of the other should thus be understood to mean entering the 
perspective of an other” (p. 415).
For Mead, the world as it exists arises out of a person’s responses to the world. 
The relations to which the environment stands to our own responses are its 
meanings15. It follows from the first assumption that in so far as different individuals 
or groups have built up different responses to the world, so they do in fact live in 
different worlds. Different perceptions of the world are not set off against a reality 
‘out there’ and thus attributed to an error ‘in there’. Instead, Mead takes the difference 
to mean that people do in fact live in different worlds. Backing this point with (to 
some extent) a hyperbolic example, Mead argued that “you cannot build up a society 
out of elements that lie outside of the individual’s life process...you cannot start to 
communicate with people in Mars and set up a society where you have no antecedent 
relationship... a community that lies entirely outside of your own community, that has
15 This means for example that when you look at the world around you, you see it in terms of how you 
can react to it. You see the pen because it means writing, and the chair because it means sitting. The 
responses to these objects come from the past, have been socially structured and are inscribed on our 
central nervous systems.
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no common interest, no cooperative activity, is one with which you could not 
communicate” (1934, p.257-8).
Perspectives and worldviews emerge, reconstituted and maintained through 
participation in common communication channels such as the media, rituals, school 
curricula, folk songs and ordinary conversations to name but a few. Variations in 
outlook arise through institutionalised segregation, and differential contacts and 
associations. Furthermore, maintenance of social distance through conflict and 
segregation leads to the formation of distinct and contrasting perspectives. Each 
‘world’ is an organised outlook, built up by people in their interaction with one 
another, hence, each communication channel gives rise to a separate world, or as we 
can now define it - a separate organised other.
If we are to follow Mead’s view, it is possible to assert that regarding the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israeli and Palestinian children live in completely different 
worlds. They participate in disconnected communication channels and hence live in 
two different social worlds of their respected communities or organised others. Each 
world has a boundary created not only by territory or formal membership but also by 
the limits of effective communication. Based on that, my contention is, to paraphrase 
Ichheiser (1949) that the inability or failure to take the perspective o f the other in the 
context o f inter-group conflict is the norm and the ability or success to do so is the 
exception.
This idea needs further elaboration. Taking the perspective of the other is not a 
cognitive magic but rather it is both an inevitable consequence of, and the enablement 
mechanism of communicative practice. It means sharing perceptions and definitions 
of reality. Hence, as long as there are similar or universal objects (significant 
symbols) between self and other, there is a communicative platform and both subjects 
should ‘be able’ to take the perspective of the other. They can view the same objects 
in the world around them and share the meaning of these objects. In this sense one 
could think of various objects that both Israeli and Palestinian children share in their 
realms and thus are able to communicate about. It is precisely because of the assumed 
parallel worlds shared by Israeli and Palestinian children beyond and even within the 
conflict that make it conceptually inaccurate to discuss perspective taking as either/or
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ability. In this sense we cannot simply say that Israeli children can or cannot take the 
perspective of the Palestinian children and vice versa.
It is precisely because perspective taking is not a cognitive capacity that it 
varies with the context and the subject matters considered. To bring it closer to the 
current study, if instead of asking the children about Palestinians and the conflict, we 
would ask them about other children (who happened to be Palestinians) and their 
favourite food, toys or what they like to do after school hours, I suspect that the 
‘ability’ to take the perspective of the other in these domains would be much 
‘improved’. It seems to me that a cognitive model would have trouble dealing with 
such variation as it is related to content. From a Meadian perspective, however, this is 
to be expected. The explanation is that in regard to food, toys and school, Israeli and 
Palestinian children (although participating in different communication channels) live 
in a roughly shared world. The difficulties of the children to take the perspective of 
the other vis-a-vis the conflict relates to the children living in two different worlds in 
relation to the conflict.
To illustrate this consider a Palestinian militant and an Israeli soldier walking 
up to an Israeli and a Palestinian child. How will each child react? The Palestinian 
child may react with fear and palpitations and a sense of foreboding as the soldier 
approaches, while he may feel a sense of comfort and pride when the militant 
approaches. For the Israeli child the situation would be the reverse. Again we can ask, 
is this difference due to different processing of the same stimulus? Or is the stimulus 
in fact different in both cases? Mead would argue that since stimulus does not 
naturally ‘enter’ the brain, how could the stimulus be the same? The response of the 
body determines the stimuli (the meaning of an object is in its use), and because the 
responses are different in both of these cases, so the children are in fact not even 
presented with the same stimuli. The point then is that there is no cognitive magic in 
taking the perspective of the other. It is as straightforward as responding to the world 
around you, except that in this case it happens to be a shared world. The problem then 
is not how we take or not take the perspective of the other, but rather how do we come 
to live in the same socially shared world?
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Approaching the research problem from a Meadian perspective will entail 
asking how these different realities of the conflict are sustained. Where are they 
sustained? Which power interests and ideologies are mediating this construction? 
What social processes are organising the responses that the children form in relation 
to the key objects of the conflict? What are the systems of ideas or social 
representations that organise the Israeli children’s worlds or responses in relation to 
themselves, the Palestinians and the conflict and thus confine the ability and 
motivation to take the perspective of the other?
From perspective taking to the narrowing of the moral self
The answers to these questions are embedded within the Israeli (collective) self, 
or as we can now depict it -  the Israeli organised other/s in relation to the conflict. 
The organised other of groups in conflict is always formed and reproduced in 
opposition to the organised other of the enemy. In the context of inter-group conflict 
or ‘war-time’ as described by Mead, societies derive their sense of solidarity and unity 
from the virtual or actual existence of an ‘enemy’. This label not only implies 
attribution of negative characteristics to the opponent, but also describes the 
confrontational and hostile relations between the two groups.
“In time of war, for example, the self-protective impulse in all the 
individual members of the state is unitedly directed against their common 
enemy and ceases, for the time being, to be directed among themselves.
The attitude of rivalry and competition which that impulse ordinarily 
generates between the different smaller, socially functional groups and 
those individuals within the state are temporarily broken down; the usual 
social barriers between these groups are likewise removed; and the state 
presents a united front to the given common danger, or is fused into a 
single unity in terms of the common end shared by, or reflected in, the 
respective consciousnesses of all its individual members. It is upon these 
war-time expressions of the self-protective impulse in all the individual 
members of the state or nation that the general efficacy of national appeals 
to patriotism is chiefly based” (1934, p.306)
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Whereas the former utilisation of perspective taking was equated with 
communication and sharing definitions of reality, the one I wish to elaborate now can 
be, from a pragmatic point of view, associated with moral capacity. Perspective taking 
remains unconscious as long as communication proceeds uninterrupted. As long as 
conduct proceeds smoothly there is no need for reflective thoughts and reconstruction. 
It is only when we are confronted with situations whose undetermined, and therefore 
challenging, character calls forth conflicting tendencies to respond that one needs to 
reflect and re-evaluate the situation.
Moral problem as discussed in the previous chapter is a significant conflict of 
ends-relations in a human social act, which arises whenever incompatible goals and 
interests are sought simultaneously, and thus prevents the completion of the act. In the 
context of moral problem solving, Mead regarded role taking as an essential means, 
which must be employed in an attentive-reflective manner. It is only through role 
taking that one discovers where conflict truly lies and what the moral problem really 
is. In that sense, it is an imaginary exercise, which has a practical effect of reducing 
conflict through better understanding of the other and the conflicting tendencies or 
values involved. The first step towards reconciliation of a conflict is the 
disentanglement and realisation, in a largely analytic way, of the incompatible values 
attached to objects in the act, namely, role taking.
My contention is that since there is little or no communication between Israelis 
and Palestinians, what remains is communication within the group. That is to say, 
interactions, and hence exposure, to the contents and interpretations of the conflictual 
reality are confined to the communication channels of the Israeli society. 
Consequently, Israeli children’s (and the adult’s) ‘ability* to take the perspective of 
the other is shaped by the ‘socially determined’ phase of moral conduct, i.e. from the 
standpoint of their organised other, and are thus constrained by the ideological 
definitions of the paramount social reality as based exclusively on the experiences of 
the Israelis. In other words, taking the perspective of the Palestinians is undermined 
by the ideological organisation of symbols in the Israeli society, the rules that govern 
their manipulation, and the ways they are used to organise perspectives regarding the 
conflict. The Israeli children approach the world of the conflict, or, in the current 
specific case, they approach the perspective of the Palestinians, from the perspective
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of the Israeli self, or organised other in relation to the conflict. They think, perceive, 
rationalise and form judgements according to the frame of reference of the Israeli self.
Organised others, which both bind and define communities are relational in 
their character. That means that there exists an organised other in relation to or in 
opposition to a Palestinian organised other, which is outside the boundaries of the 
Israeli self in terms of its communicative channels as discussed in the previous 
section. Such sets of responses function to organise and dictate what is taken for 
granted about the attributes of various objects and events regarding the conflict. 
Special meanings and symbols regarding the conflict further accentuate differences 
and increase social distance from the Palestinians.
Moral judgement and action are never simply matters of abstract reasoning by 
solitary individuals. They are processes of negotiation between individuals and groups 
whose actions are based on socially constituted understandings of themselves, others 
and the world. In real life contexts communicative practice is often distorted due to a 
variety of reasons including unequal relations of power, misinterpretations and 
clashing values. In order to better understand why in a concrete moral situation, 
individuals or groups exhibit consistent failing vis-a-vis other individuals or groups 
there is a need to explore in depth their socially constructed understanding of 
themselves, others and the situation. There is a need to take into account the 
historically defined understandings of the self in relation to the community and 
society. By critically examining the co-development of self and the community to 
which he belongs the underlying characteristics of the community’s histories become 
evident.
I draw on Schwalbe16 (1992) to argue that historical, material and ideological 
factors narrow the moral selves o f Israelis in relation to the Palestinians. The concept 
of the ‘narrow moral self is derived from and complementary to Mead’s notion of 
‘self-enlargement’ by way of moral reconstruction. According to this concept, the 
individual’s self develops through moral inquiry into the consideration of the values 
and interests of others. When perspective taking takes place as a means to formulate a
16 Schwalbe utters a similar argument that socio-historical factors narrow the moral self of men in 
relation to women.
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successful moral hypothesis, Mead asserted that “the old self has disintegrated and out 
of the moral process a new self arises” (1913/1964 p. 147). Accordingly, the concept 
of the narrow moral self refers to a self that is underdeveloped in its ability and 
motivation to take the perspective of the other and thus decreases the probability of 
moral problem solving. Following this I argue that the very context of the conflict 
and its history narrow the Israeli self in relation to the Palestinians. This means that 
the perspective of the Palestinians is, by and large opposed to, and therefore excluded 
from the shared understanding and definitions of the conflict.
This self, which I call the ‘victimised-occupier self and describe at length in 
Chapter Four as a special case of overlapping organised others, is, as I hope to 
demonstrate, the locus for the assortment of beliefs, ideologies, moral contradictions 
and prejudices from which the Israeli children derive their interpretations, evaluations 
and judgements regarding the Palestinian perspective. It is a knowledge structure that 
determines those aspects of the environment taking into account, how they are 
interpreted and how they are situated in relation to the dictated moral order. This self 
is a product of historical development of collectively constructed representations of a 
society that has lived in a protracted conflict ever since its establishment. In that 
sense it is due to this socially reconstructed ‘victimised-occupier’ self that the children 
are systematically inhibited from taking the perspective of the Palestinians.
The problem now is how to reconcile the two interrelated Meadian 
postulations of opposing realities, and the narrowing of the moral self and their 
relations to perspective taking in a way that will be theoretically meaningful and 
empirically testable? These concepts, I suggest, are highly compatible with the notion 
of narrative.
From perspective taking to acknowledging the other’s narrative
What is narrative?
.. .[NJarrative is present in every age, in every place, in every society; it 
begins with the very history of mankind and there nowhere is nor has been 
a people without narrative. Narrative is international, transhistorical, 
transcultural: it is simply there, like life itself.” (Barthes, 1987 p. 79).
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Narrative is an essential means of human cognition and communication across 
languages and cultures. A group’s stories create a shared history. The particular 
stories that a society cultivates in various contexts can provide an important clue to 
the ideological motivations and cultural images that inform processes of self and other 
identity formation and social legitimisation. As Bamberg and McCabe (1998) note, 
“With narrative, people strive to configure space and time, deploy cohesive devices, 
reveal identity of actors and relatedness of actions across scenes. They create themes, 
plots, and drama. In so doing, narrators make sense of themselves, social situations, 
and history”(p.3).
Narrative is gradually coming to be comprehended as the ground on which, 
the relations through which and the vehicle by which humans develop knowledge of 
themselves and the world they inhabit. It can be seen that human agency, 
intentionality, actions, perceptions, and experiences are conceived, understood and 
mediated by social, cultural and personal narratives, and that the struggle for 
recognition is played out between individuals and groups in the narrative field. 
Through a process of ongoing creation and recreation, a continual dialectical 
movement between memory and anticipation, and the relations between humans that 
it facilitates, narrative brings forth the human processes of knowledge, ideology, 
culture, tradition, truth, reality, consciousness and identity.
Recently, a new theory developed which began to make more substantial 
claims about narrative. The argument around which these more recent writings unify 
is that “social life itself storied and that narrative is an ontological condition o f social 
life” (Somers and Gibson, 1994 p.38, Italic in original). Thus, narratives speak to 
social epistemology and social ontology. It is through narratives that we know the 
social reality and ourselves, and it is through stories that we make sense of the world 
and construct our identities. “What we take as the reality of our world is a function of 
the story we evolve to create it, and o f the very same story we act into” (Penman, 
1988, p. 406, Italic added). By telling or speaking a story we construct the world as 
we know it and the world that we act into. It is not just an explanatory device, but is 
actually constitutive of the way we experience things. Promoting the ontological view
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Iof narrative Carr argues that “narrative is not a dress which covers something else but 
the structure inherent in human experience and action” (Carr 1997, p. 42-43).
Thus, it is through narratives that we know social reality and ourselves. 
Individuals and groups, in other words, live storied lives (Reissmann, 1993) and it is 
through stories that we make sense of the world and construct our identities. We tell 
stories about our experiences and the meanings that these experiences have for our 
lives. It is by means of these stories that our experience is shaped, ordered, interpreted 
and stored. And it is by means of these stories that differences in ways of thinking and 
perspectives are brought to light as we all view the world (and consequently shape, 
order and interpret that experience) through the symbolic system of our culture. All 
cultures and societies possess their own stories or narratives about their past and their 
present, and sometimes about their view of the future. It is exactly this interplay 
between the social and the individual that makes narrative a valuable concept for the 
current research that wishes to shed a socio-historical light on the notion of 
perspective taking.
Opposing realities as opposing narratives
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, viewed from that perspective is a tragic story 
of two clashing national narratives. Since the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has served as an enduring source of political and 
ideological discourse influencing personal and national identity, collective memory, 
social beliefs, myths and language (Bar-Tal, 1998a,b). The Israeli and Palestinian 
narratives of the conflict are contradictory in almost every aspect and detail. The 
theoretical proposition regarding Israeli and Palestinians living in split and rival 
realities can be translated to mean (both epistemologically and ontologically) that they 
essentially live in split and contradictory narratives. My concern with the ability (or 
disability) of Israeli children to take the perspective of the Palestinians is in effect 
their ability to acknowledge the Palestinian narrative of the conflict.
The most obvious example for my contention that Israeli and Palestinians are 
living in opposing and contradictory narratives is regarding the very same moment in
tlihistory, 14 of May 1948. A story of independence and redemption to the Israeli 
people, it is the story of the “Nakba” (the catastrophe) to the Palestinians. The Israeli
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narrative regards this day as the climax of Jewish aspirations to have a state or to fulfil 
a long dream of returning to a homeland after what they regarded as 2000 years of 
exile. In the Palestinian narrative, this day remains as the time when their land and 
freedom were stolen and since which have yet to be returned. Moving to a more 
contemporary example, the Palestinians armed uprising is, according to the Israeli 
narrative an outbreak of murderous terrorism while through the eyes of the 
Palestinians, it is a justified and legitimate resistance against a prolonged brutal 
occupation.
Thus perspectives and narratives are interchangeable and the shift to narrative 
represents the theoretical and conceptual shift in my understanding of perspective 
taking. From the narrow and reduced one-dimensional, either/or cognitive ability I 
propose a much broader and holistic conception with strong interest in notions like 
content, meaning construction, ideology and history and the ways in which they 
mediate our cognition. Perspective taking in the context of intergroup conflict 
involves the realisation and use of symbols, representations and imagery, by 
individual minds shaped by socio-historical processes, in order to either challenge or 
reproduce the group’s history and ethos embedded in that group’s narrative.
Narrow self as bounded narrative
The concept of narrative is also compatible with Mead’s notion of the 
“narrowing of the moral self’. As previously argued, the difficulties of Israeli children 
to take the perspective of the Palestinians or, as we can now formulate it, to 
acknowledge the Palestinian narrative, are embedded in the Israeli (collective) self.
According to the ‘strong’ narrativist claim the self is constituted by narratives. 
Individuals and groups construct identities (however multiple and changing) by 
locating themselves or being located within a repertoire of emplotted stories. Self as 
narrative considers the human capacity to evaluate, modify, and move between a 
plurality of communal and communicative contexts in the creation of meaningful 
narratives of selfhood. Collective self is no different as self-narratives are constitutive 
for the identity of individuals as well as groups.
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Narratives specify a society or group’s founding and values, its critical events, 
and its aspirations. As Somers argues, “we, as individuals and collectives, come to be 
who we are by being located and locating ourselves ...in social narratives” (1994, 
p.606). The formation of national identity is particularly dependent on the narrative 
form of myth, past-oriented stories that recount formative moments of the group’s 
history, “moments in which enduring tensions that divide rival groups were 
dramatically at issue” (Lincoln, 1989 p.21). These narratives are particularly 
important in maintaining group identity, cohesion and continuity. In that sense 
narrative construction and reconstruction is an integral mechanism of identity 
formation and reformation. They are the transmission belt through which a collective 
identity is reproduced and constantly made known to the individuals.
This point is further accentuated in the writing of Ricoeur (1984, 1985) who 
perhaps produced the most extensive philosophical exploration into the notion of 
narratives. He stresses the point that narratives, which play a prominent role in the 
respective tradition, mediate the self-understanding of groups as well as individuals. 
Narrative identity constitutes the identity of a group, making a plurality of individuals 
and subgroups one collective. He writes:
“Our own existence cannot be separated from the account we can 
give of ourselves. It is in telling our own stories that we give ourselves an 
identity. We recognize ourselves in the stories that we tell about 
ourselves. It makes very little difference whether these stories are true or 
false, fiction as well as verifiable history provides us with an identity” 
(1985, p214).
Bringing this concept closer to the ‘narrow moral self we need to consider the 
relations between narrative identity and ethics. Ricoeur’s contention is that narrative 
identity highlights the ethical dimension of individual and group life. Put differently, 
self-narratives have an ethical function. From an ethical perspective, narratives 
articulate the goals, values and loyalties of the self. As Ricoeur puts it, self-narrative 
is the platform where conscience plays an essential role. Self-narratives can create a 
form of interior accountability of the agent and give shape to the individual moral 
self. The same can be said about group morality. Through self-narratives the group
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explores, re-enacts, reproduces and occasionally challenges its values and moral 
principles.
Ricoeur brightly illustrates this line of reasoning as he takes the Jewish people 
as a paradigm case. Aiming to discern the constitutive elements of the Jewish 
collective identity beyond genealogical relations or living together in a common 
territory, he argues that the Jewish collective identity is constituted by a common 
tradition in which two forms of remembrance mediated by narrative representations 
are of prime importance. First there is the memory of the foundation of their 
community by its relation to God as it is articulated in The Bible. This is the 
constitutive element of the Jewish people’s religious practice. Although the Ten 
Commandments (the core of the Jewish religion) are given in imperative rather than 
narrative form, The Bible, Ricoeur argues, transmits the Commandments by telling 
the story of their revelation on Mount Sinai. The prescriptive and normative element 
is indissolubly linked to the narration of Moses and the people of Israel. Additionally, 
the remembrance of the Nazi genocide constitutes an experience which unites the 
Jewish people as a collective and which in all its unforgettable negativity marks the 
lives even of those whose self-understanding is not determined by a religious 
orientation. Here, narrative identity is introduced in a moral, social and political 
dimension. The common history is represented in manifold attempts at narrative 
mediation. Actions, decisions and attitudes of the individuals and the groups as such 
are dependent on the self-concepts shaped by history and narrative tradition (Teichert, 
2004).
In this vein, the Israeli collective self is constituted by an assortment of 
narratives that shape and determine the moral boundaries of Israeli society. It is 
important to note that the Israeli self is not coherent and stable but rather an arena of 
contesting moral obligations and loyalties and it is open to re-interpretation and 
modification insofar as the orientations of the Israeli society are modified and its 
situation is changed. It includes a multitude of narratives and identities (organised 
others), the borders of which are never clear-cut as they can overlap as much as they 
can contradict. It is never final or complete but is continuously constructed through a 
juxtaposition of competing views and voices. It is a site of multiple communities in a 
constant struggle over the authorship and exclusivity of the master narrative and the 
definitions of reality. Nevertheless, it is plausible to assert the existence of an
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overarching “group ethos” existing within Israeli society. That is to say, even if 
different communities and subgroups within Israeli society possess and disseminate 
disparate narratives, it seems safe to assume that in a society that is constituted by a 
long-lasting conflict, some form of “collective narrative” is held by the vast majority 
of the individuals within society.
My contention is that the Israeli common narrative of the conflict, its content 
and organization, narrows the Israeli self in relation to the Palestinians. It constitutes 
and determines the ability and propensity of Israeli children to take the perspective of 
the other. They think, perceive, rationalise and form judgements according to the 
frame of reference of the Israeli narrative of the conflict. Within the boundaries of that 
overarching collective narrative are concealed the boundaries of the Israeli children’s 
ability to take the perspective of the Palestinians or to acknowledge their narrative. 
Put differently, perspective taking is enabled, shaped and constrained by the 
ideological comprehensions of the Israeli narrative, hence the title of my thesis- 
Behind the Narrative Bars.
Summary
The theoretical propositions of the current research can be summarised in four points:
■ Taking the perspective of the other is a complex notion that is closely linked to 
specific situations and cannot be understood fully in decontextualised terms. 
Applying a Meadian perspective to the research problem I started by 
expanding the concept of the generalised other to argue that it is the immediate 
or primary group in the form of the internalised ‘organised other/s' that 
functions to give coherence to perceptions of events, objects and people in the 
world. The ‘organised other’ provides the perceptual frames and the normative 
judgement boundaries around situations and events within which thinking, 
arguing and rationalising take place. The organised other promotes the 
worldviews of the reference group and thus moral thinking is both generated, 
and restricted by the symbolic boundaries of the group.
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■ Taking the perspective of the other means communicating with the other and 
vice versa. This conception is based on mutual participation of self and other 
in a shared environment. Hence, it is possible to assert with confidence that 
regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israeli and Palestinian children 
participate in almost completely disconnected communication channels and 
hence live in two different social worlds. These two separated worlds have a 
boundary created not only by territory or formal membership but also by the 
limits of effective communication. In this sense the inability to take the 
perspective of an other who is outside the boundaries of the self s reality is the 
norm, whereas the possibility to be able to share understanding, or in Mead’s 
terminology to attach the same meaning to an object, as the other is the 
exception. Furthermore, I argue that the problem then is not how we take or 
don’t take the perspective of the other but rather how the different realities of 
the conflict are sustained and which power relations and ideologies mediate 
the reproduction of these opposing realities.
■ Stemming from the above postulations, I argue that taking the perspective of 
the other is mediated or even dictated by the group custom, which can now be 
defined as the Israeli self. The reality of the conflict as defined and perceived 
by the Israelis, which in many ways contradicts the reality of the conflict as 
perceived by the Palestinians, is embedded in the Israeli (collective) self. In 
Mead’s terminology the very context of the conflict narrows the Israeli moral 
self in relation to the Palestinians. That is to say, historical and socio- 
ideological processes have shaped an Israeli self that is underdeveloped in its 
ability and motivation to take the perspective of the Palestinians. My 
contention is that historical and ideological processes have organised the 
responses that the Israeli children form in relation to the conflict. These very 
processes sustain the opposing realities of the conflict and thus hinder Israeli 
children from taking the perspective of the Palestinians.
■ The above postulations can be all conflated under the notion of narrative and 
narrative identity. Since narrative speaks both to epistemology and ontology, 
my contention is that the Meadian notion of individuals and groups living in 
different worlds can be translated to mean that they live not only in different
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but also confronting narratives. I argue that, ontologically speaking, Israeli 
and Palestinians are living in two split and opposing narratives and the 
inability of Israeli children to take the perspective of the Palestinians means 
their inability to acknowledge the Palestinian narrative of the conflict. 
Moreover, collective or national identity is constituted of symbols and 
symbolic codes, connected through discourse and narratives, which become 
articulated in public and social action and interaction. These very narratives 
are the vehicles through which an individual, community or a nation comes to 
understand and recognise itself as such. These narratives as Ricoeur points 
out, constitute the ethical frame of reference of a society. They provide the 
moral foundation and practice by which a group develops a sense, defines the 
boundaries and constructs and defines the ‘other/s’- those outside the 
community, or nation. In order to provide a sociological account of 
perspective taking in the context of inter-group conflict, we must carefully 
examine the relevant narratives that constitute and determine the form and 
content of moral selves and what their capacities for perspective taking will 
be.
How Israeli children reconstruct this collective self/narrative, as well as being 
constructed by the societal and historical narratives within this self, and how this 
affects both their competence and inclination to take the perspective of the 
Palestinians is the key problem of this study.
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3. METHODOLOGY
We can, and I think must, look upon human life as chiefly a vast 
interpretative process in which people, singly and collectively, guide 
themselves by defining the objects, events and situations which they 
encounter ...any scheme designed to analyse human group life in its 
general character has to fit this process of interpretation.
(Blumer, 1956, p.686)
Defining the methodological approach
I draw on Bulmer’s (1977) distinction between general methodology, research 
strategy and research techniques for the purpose of articulating the methodological 
approach of the research.
By general methodology, Bulmer has in mind “the systematic and logical study 
of the general principles guiding sociological investigation, concerned with the 
broadest sense with questions of how the sociologist establishes social knowledge and 
how he can convince others that his knowledge is correct”(p.4). This broad definition 
incorporates the basic belief system or worldview that guides the investigator, that is, 
the ways in which the researcher conceptualises the social reality and the 
epistemological principles which underlie those conceptions. These 
conceptualisations are, in turn, linked to the theoretical standpoint adopted by the 
researcher and hence theory and general methodology are interrelated. I adopt the 
dialogical epistemology as my general methodology. Knowledge of the world 
according to this approach emerges in dialogic interaction, in the dynamic interplay of 
voices and perspectives. As will be explicated below the dialogical epistemology is 
vastly compatible with the theoretical propositions of my thesis.
General methodology, in turn, tends to determine research strategy. This 
category denotes the practical approach and research design of a particular empirical
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study. It includes the formulation of the specific research questions and decisions 
regarding sampling, operationalisations and methods of data collection. The research 
strategy of the current study comprises of data collected from Israeli children from 
three social milieus- city, kibbutz and settlement.
Finally, research techniques are the specific methods of data collection and 
analyses to be employed in the empirical study. Drawings of the other and narrative 
compositions were collected and analysed in an inherently interpretative manner.
General methodology: Dialogical epistemology
General methodology according to Bulmer comprises the ways in which the 
researcher conceptualises the social reality and the epistemological tenets forming the 
foundations for that conception. General methodology is therefore linked to, and 
reflects the theoretical assumptions underlying the study as well as determines the 
empirical strategy. In the previous chapter, I explicated in detail how Mead’s ideas of 
socially shared realities and the narrowing of the moral self, elaborated and linked 
with the notion of narrative, can aid our understanding of difficulties in perspective 
taking in the context of intergroup conflict. I advocated a ‘strong’ version of narrative 
that views narrative as an essential means of human cognition and communication 
that speaks both to epistemology and ontology. Narrative is the ground on which, the 
relations through which and the vehicle by which humans develop knowledge of 
themselves and the world they inhabit.
But how is this knowledge generated? How are these narratives (realities, 
organised others-interchangeably) generated, reproduced, transformed or sustained? 
The knowledge of the world arises out of the dialogical relations between individuals 
and groups in society and their mutual effect on one another; hence knowledge and 
meaning are largely communicatively constructed in both interpersonal dialogues and 
socio-historical practices. The dialogical approach denies the opposition of 
subjectivity and objectivity and overcomes it by fully accepting the dialogical 
interrelatedness of the knowing subject and the object of his/her knowledge. 
According to the dialogical epistemology, knowledge is an inescapably social
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phenomenon, something that transpires between people and that does not reside 
exclusively within the confines of an individual mind.
The dialogical epistemology assumes that meaning is constructed within 
dialogues, whether these are seen as ‘external’ or as ‘internal’ to individuals, and that 
therefore meaning requires more than one ‘voice’ or perspective. “Human thought”, 
writes Bakhtin “becomes genuine thought...only under conditions of living contact 
with another and alien thought, a thought embodied in someone else’s voice, that is in 
someone else’s consciousness expressed in discourse. At that point of contact between 
voice consciousnesses the idea is bom and lives” (1984, pp. 87-88)
The implication of this approach to social-psychological investigation is to 
interpret the complex world from the point of view of the communication between 
social actors- individuals, communities and cultures. That is, we strive to elucidate the 
process of meaning construction and make clear how meanings, embodied in the 
dialogical encounters, are historically and culturally situated. We study human 
consciousness as a subject (whether individually or collectively) of a material world 
within which it constructs a social intersubjective world by the interweaving of what 
Bakhtin would call ‘texts’, that is, all the activities by which human beings are 
“readable”. Our goal as social researchers is to ‘read’ these texts of human activity 
through a diversity of disciplines and approaches. Thus, our task is “establishing, 
transmitting and interpreting the words of others” (Bakhtin 1981, p.351). Looking at 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a dialogical perspective we should start with the 
designation of the overall triad:
CONFLICT
(OBJECT)
PALESTINE
(SELF/OTHER)
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ISRAEL
(SELF/OTHER)
This triad represents the overall dialogical situation within which the Israelis, 
the Palestinians and the conflict are internally related and mutually constituted. In this 
model self and other are interchangeable (see Bauer and Gaskell, 1999) and represents 
the dynamic unit of social knowledge and the relations within that unit are both 
simultaneously and sequentially dynamic (Markova, 2003). That is to say, opponents 
in conflict define each other in mutual relations of negative interdependence - there is 
no enemy-other without defensive-self, there is no occupier without the occupied and 
there are no victims without perpetrators.
However, this cannot be the case with Mead since the object from a Meadian 
stance is the object for the self and thus in a situation of conflict the object is different 
for each of the components. Israelis and Palestinians are living in different realities in 
relation to the conflict and according to Mead it is logically impossible to put both 
realities in one triangle. Looking closer at the microgenetic level, we should not be 
too hasty to equate the theories. A fundamental difference is that Bauer and Gaskell 
assume that the object is the same for both self and other (i.e., the object is shared) 
while for Mead the object remains divergent for self and other, but that self and other 
share that divergence (i.e., the object is constructed in two perspectives and both self 
and other can take both of these perspectives - this is what is meant by a significant 
symbol). Thus instead of a shared object Mead has a shared divergence. Whether or 
not one is able to draw such a shared divergence in a triangle I am not sure.
Bakhtin can aid us in this problem. According to his dialogical epistemology, 
at every point in cultural-historical development there exists an inescapable plurality 
of perspectives from which to conceive any given aspect of the world. Rather than 
searching for a single, unified, timeless and universal truth (or meaning of object), 
Bakhtin is grounding our ways of perceiving and making sense of the world in the 
context of particular human communities. He celebrates diversity and plurality by 
emphasising the inevitable partiality and cultural-ideological specificity of one’s 
beliefs and opinions, indeed of truth itself. Diversity, he argues, is a constitutive and 
ineradicable feature of the social world. The triad than, has multiple selves, multiple 
others and hence the object as well is multiple. The triad according to Bakhtin should 
look like this:
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The target o f the current research is the difficulties of Israeli children to take 
the perspective of Palestinians or to acknowledge their narrative. In accordance with 
the theoretical propositions, Mead and Bakhtin in effect have suggested that in order 
to understand the ability or disability of Israeli children to take the perspective of the 
other we have to investigate the dialogical relations within the Israeli society. That is 
to say, we have to ‘zoom in’ on the Israeli component of the above triad and 
interpret the complex world of the conflict from the point of view of the 
communication between individuals and groups within the Israeli society and the 
social processes that sustain the divergent realities o f the Israelis and the Palestinians. 
We have to explore the perspectival nature of self and society by discerning the 
plurality and diversity o f perspectives and worldviews that circulate in the Israeli 
society in relation to the conflict and the ways in which they mediate the construction 
o f the Palestinian perspective. In order to get a better understanding of the ways in 
which Israeli children construct and understand the Palestinian perspective we have to 
explore the epistemological pluralism in relation to the conflict and the ways in which 
this comes to play in the construction of the other. The target of the current research, 
that is, the specific dialogical situation can be presented in the following triad:
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Research strategy
From ability to activity: operationalising perspective taking
As argued in the introductory chapter, previous research was mostly 
concerned with perspective taking as a one-dimensional cognitive ability and thus 
overlooks significant societal and ideological explanations. It was Schwalbe (1988, 
1992) who first pointed out that researchers in the field were inclined to ignore the 
significant distinction between the ability to role take and the willingness or tendency 
to role take and thus developed a clear distinction between ability and propensity and 
their relations to the social structure. I wish to take this distinction a step forward and 
to define the current research target as a perspective taking activity.
Rather than treating perspective taking as either/or ability, it is better 
conceptualised as a communicative practice; a practice of contemplating, negotiating, 
reproducing, defending and challenging different versions of reality and history. 
Hence, rather than asking whether Israeli and Palestinian children are able or unable 
to take the perspective of the Palestinians I am interested in how they are doing so, 
and, when possible, to account for why they are doing it in these particular ways.
Approaching the research question from a Meadian perspective entails asking: 
What social processes are organising the responses that the children form in relation
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to the key objects of the conflict? Which power interests and ideologies are mediating 
the construction of the other and its narrative? What are the systems of ideas or social 
representations that organise the Israeli children’s worlds or responses in relation to 
themselves, the Palestinians and the conflict and thus confine the ability and 
motivation to take the perspective of the other, or, in other words, what are the 
historical and ideological factors that narrow the moral self of the Israelis in relation 
to the Palestinians?
With that in mind I formulate the research targets as follows:
■ To explore the ideological construction of self and other.
■ To explore the systems of ideas, images and beliefs that mediate perspective 
taking as well as the power interests and ideologies that shape these symbolic 
constructions.
The concept of perspective taking activity is operationalised along two interrelated 
dimensions: the construction of self and other and perspective negotiating. The 
first dimension aims to answer the very basic question that was overlooked in 
previous research on taking the role of the other, namely, what other? Exploring the 
ways one apprehends the other is highly significant and can reveal a great deal of 
information regarding his/her ability and propensity to take the perspective of that 
other and hence, will determine the actual construction of the other’s perspective. The 
second dimension is the actual exercise of perspective taking. It regards the symbolic 
construction of the perspective of the other. I find it more apposite to conceptualise 
perspective taking as perspectives negotiating and to pay particular attention to the 
content and rhetoric of the arguments that are being forged and negotiated.
This point needs further clarification. First, we are dealing here with taking the 
perspective of an abstract rather than concrete other. Namely, there is a key 
difference between face-to-face situational interactions with a concrete other with a 
distinct perspective on the one hand, and, on the other hand, encountering the other
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(whom we do not share the social world with) through indirect communication 
channels such as the mass media, stories, school curricula and so forth. This approach 
makes the notion of accuracy in perspective taking irrelevant in the context of the 
current research. There is no single, representative “Palestinian perspective” that can 
be crystallised and which the Israeli children can supposedly construct in various 
degrees of assessable accuracy. Certainly, there might be general dispositions 
regarding the Palestinian point of view in relation to the conflict such as self- 
determination or the Israeli occupation. Nevertheless the Palestinian (collective) self 
is as complex and multifaceted as any other collective self and hence, my interest is in 
the different ways Israeli children construct their representations of the Palestinians 
and their perspectives of the conflict.
Social groups as organised others
Theoretical and empirical rationale for the selection of the social groups, upon 
which the current study rests, will now be provided. Perspectives and worldviews are 
particular subject-subject-object relations tied to social milieu. Social milieus are the 
carrier systems and the functional reference of representations (Bauer and Gaskell, 
1999). Early reference group theories (e.g. Shibutani, 1955; Sherif 1953) advocate the 
notion that the reference group’s organised perspectives, whose norms are used as 
anchoring points in structuring the perceptual field of the individuals, constitute the 
frame of reference of the actors. This is very similar to Mead’s view of the 
organised/generalised other as discussed in the theoretical chapters. However a very 
important distinction should be made: from the dialogical epistemology perspective, 
self and society is an ontological unit; they are dialectical poles of a single process.
The dialogical approach presupposes the interdependence between the 
individual and society and argues for the co-development of both participants and 
their mutual effect on one another. All the same, it is an essential postulation of 
perspectives that norms, images and values are shared, and as such, are properties of 
social groups. Emler and Ohana (1993) note that “it is important to recognise the 
kinds of social groups to which children belong, the relation between these groups and 
others, and the ways in which groups and relations, between them, shape 
representations’’^ .  85).
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The participants in the current study are children from three distinct social 
milieus (Table 1). Kibbutz, settlement and city are consistent with Bauer and 
Gaskell*s (1999) definition of natural groups as “self referential and characterised by 
a common project and an awareness of the group’s history, i.e. a collective 
memory”(p.l75). These groups are by no means unadulterated representatives of the 
diversified Israeli society and one could come up with different choices such as ethnic 
groups (Sephardim vs. Ashkenazim) or native-born children vs. immigrants, to name 
but a few alternatives. Nevertheless, my research deals with highly debated political 
issues and hence, the choice of the groups aims at representing different political 
environments within Israeli society. I use the results of the last general elections in 
Israel to further characterise each of the milieus.
Table 1. Study Participants
Gender Total
Social group Male Female
City 19 22 41
Settlement 19 20 39
Kibbutz 21 22 43
Total 59 64 123
Children from the kibbutz
The kibbutz is a unique communal form of living in Israel, frequently 
described as a “socialist cell”. The ideal type of kibbutz is an organised society, based 
on the principles of full cooperation in production and consumption, in work and in 
life, based on the utmost provision of mutual help and on the mutual responsibility of 
all members in all spheres of life. This commune strives to realise the principle of the 
equal value of all people and the equal value of work while providing for the personal 
independence and spiritual freedom of every individual. From the very beginning of 
the kibbutzim (plural) in Israel, this movement was utterly identified with the political
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left wing and it was always closely associated with the left parties in Israel1. In 
analysing interest groups within the Israeli society, Drezon-Tepler (1990) noted that 
the kibbutz “represents a complete social, economic and political ffamework”(p. 103). 
Considering its social interests and values as well as its political and ideological 
agenda, the kibbutz is indeed a natural milieu. Examination of the results of the two 
last general elections (2003) illustrates the political orientation of this group: 72% of 
votes went to Labour party (centre-left) and 15% votes to Meretz (left). The kibbutz 
children in the present research attend a local elementary school located in the centre 
of Israel. Its population includes children from the surrounding kibbutzim in the 
district area. As shown in Table 1, 43 children from the kibbutz participated in the 
study.
Children from the settlements
The ‘settlements’ is a general name attached to the Jewish settlements 
established in the occupied territories after the 1967 war. The settlements that are 
located on lands purchased or confiscated from Palestinians are frequently established 
on the tops of hills overlooking Palestinian villages or in areas previously farmed by 
Palestinians. The settlements are at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both 
parties assert historical possession of the land. Although the settlers are habitually 
identified as radical right-wingers, motivated by religious and national ideals, the 
sample of the settlers’ children in the present research does not precisely correspond 
to the prototypical image of settlers. First, due to technical and methodological 
considerations, all the children within this group are secular, studying in a state 
elementary school . Secondly, the school I visited is located in the largest town 
amongst the settlements, a town that has an industrial zone, shopping mall and even a 
small university. Thus, although it is formally a settlement, in regard to the social and 
political atmosphere it should be considered as a ‘soft core’ version of settlement. In 
that sense its children’s characteristics are similar to those from the city. The school is 
occupied by children from that town (70%) and children from the smaller settlements 
in the district area (30%). Examination of the election results here illustrates that 53 %
1 Left-Right political orientation in Israel, roughly corresponds to those who support the Oslo-based 
peace process and those who opposed it, respectively.
2 The orthodox communities in Israel have a separate education system where boys and girls’ study in 
separate classrooms, and the education programme includes extra religious classes.
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of the votes went to the Likud party (centre-right) and 28% of the votes went to the 
National Unity (far-right) party. 39 children from the settlement participated in the 
study.
Children from the city
This group is the least distinctive milieu. Since urban children are the majority 
in Israel, their self-referential identity is of a weaker form. Whereas the former social 
milieus by their very existence connote homogeneous political and ideological 
agendas, the city population is diverse and heterogeneous. This is well illustrated 
through the election results. The vote’s distribution is more diverse than the former 
milieus yet it shows general orientation towards the centre-right. The city in the 
present research is located in the centre of Israel, 22 km south of Tel-Aviv. 41 
children from the city participated in the study.
Data collection:
Taking the perspective of the other in two modes of communication
Triangulation is now a ubiquitous concept in qualitative research textbooks yet 
the meaning of triangulation has been transformed since it was introduced by Denzin 
(1970). Bauer et al, (2000) argue that “adequate coverage of social events requires a 
multitude of methods and data: methodological pluralism arises as a methodological 
necessity”(p.4). In the current study triangulation has been employed both for 
methods of data collection and for data analysis. Drawing upon the complementary 
model of triangulation, according to which triangulation is a means toward obtaining 
a larger, more complete picture of the phenomenon under study, the research 
comprises three empirical studies: ethnography, drawings and narrative compositions. 
Complementary triangulation serves as a means for in-depth understanding of the 
complex phenomena under investigation and should be applied “carefully and 
purposefully with the intention of adding breadth or depth to our analysis but not for 
the purpose of pursuing ‘objective truth’” (Fielding and Fielding, 1986, p.33).
In a very early stage of the research, after reviewing the rather mechanistic 
experimentations of previous studies, it was clear to me that what is required in the
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current study is to get the children involved in the most explicit and straightforward 
manner in a perspective taking activity. A qualitative research approach thus appears 
to be most appropriate for the study of ideological construction, meaning making and 
symbolic coping in the context of protracted conflict. In accord with the theoretical 
consideration that views perspective taking as a communicative activity, I sought to 
get the children to express their knowledge of the Palestinian perspective in two 
different modes of communication, namely figurative (drawings) and text 
(compositions).
Table 2. Methods of data collection
Methods of data collection
Social milieu
N
Perspective taking I 
Drawings N
Perspective taking II 
Role-play narratives
City 41 Picture o f a Palestinian 
child
39 “77ie story o f the conflict 
through the eyes o f a 
Palestinian child”
Settlement 39 38
Kibbutz 43 39
Total 123 116
Drawings17
Drawing is a great means for children to communicate a specific idea or 
understanding. Through drawings, children can clearly express both their inner and 
social worlds, as they are free to include and/or place emphasis on ideas that are 
significant to them or central to their understandings. Pictures drawn by a child can 
reveal how he or she perceives an object. Therefore, when expressing their knowledge 
about self and other in drawings, children draw images and symbols which are 
reconstructions of their (social) knowledge and experience, and can provide a great 
deal of information about their understandings of the other. This method is intended 
primarily to explore the construction of the other in a figurative mode of 
communication; nevertheless the drawings are not just simple human figure drawing.
17 A comprehensive review of the method will be provided in the results chapter.
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Rather, almost every picture tells a story of the ‘other’ through the activities 
undertaken by the drawn character and by positioning the drawn Palestinian in a 
specific setting. As such they reveal albeit in an inferred manner the perspective of the 
other (perspective negotiating). Put differently, the perspective of self on the other 
can reveal what self understands to be the perspective o/the other.
Procedure
The children, in a regular classroom lesson, were asked to draw a Palestinian 
boy or girl of their age. The task was presented as offering the children some structure 
in what they draw but at the same time giving them maximum latitude in choosing the 
kinds of things they wanted to share. They were told: “Please draw a Palestinian boy 
or girl of your age”. There were no restrictions given, and in response to requests for 
explanation, the children were told that all types of drawings were permitted and two 
examples mentioned: (a) a drawing of the Palestinian in his or her neighbourhood, and 
(b) a drawing of the Palestinian in his or her everyday life. It is important to allow 
children to express their ideas openly and independently. To ensure independent 
work, the teachers were present in the class during the drawing session. Anonymity 
was assured by asking the children to indicate only their gender and the name of their 
school on their drawings.
Narrative compositions: role-playing as perspective taking
In this task, the children were asked to write a short composition entitled “The 
story o f the conflict through the eyes o f a Palestinian child” (for full transcription of 
the narratives see appendix 1). I invited them to write a short narrative on the conflict 
in the first-person as if they were a Palestinian child. This method aimed overtly to 
explore the notion of negotiating perspectives and by so doing there is an inevitable 
process of construction of the other. Children are used to writing activities; they are 
considered the second most widespread mode of communication after verbal 
communication.
There are two aspects to be taken into consideration: role playing and 
narrative. To start with the latter, the choice of narrative compositions clearly reflects 
the theoretical proposition of the thesis. We both organize and constitute our 
experience of the world through narratives and children are used to telling/hearing
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stories, real or fiction from when they were toddlers, and writing/reading stories since 
they acquired literacy skills. Narrative accounts are symbolic actions, a means to 
frame and situate the self and others in common social practices. Children’s narrative 
activity as a vehicle of meaning and perspective is a form of symbolic action linking 
the construction of reality with the formation of identity (Nicolopoulou, 1997). 
Secondly, by asking the children to narrate the conflict as if they were Palestinians, I 
sought to invite the children in the most explicit and straightforward way to get 
involved with the Palestinian other and to take his/her perspective, that is, to enter the 
perspective of the other. I thought that this enactment could tell me a good deal about 
the ways in which Israeli children perceive and construct the Palestinian perspective. 
Moreover, I thought that playing at a Palestinian would generate among other things a 
certain amount of reflexivity and engender internal conflict between the children’s 
own story of the conflict and the ways they believed the Palestinian child’s story 
would be. The results of that conflict, as seen in the children narratives, incorporate 
rich data to explore both the construction of the other and perspective negotiating.
In sum, there are two important attributes of narrative that are closely related 
to the research endeavour. The first is the relation between narrative and perspectives 
and the second concerns the social and personal aspects of narrative. Narrative 
requires the narrator to take a perspective; it cannot be voiceless. It is more than mere 
reporting; it suggests how the individual makes sense of both the commonplace and 
the extraordinary and is therefore critical in the meaning making of narrators. 
Moreover, how narrators accomplish their stories conveys a great deal about the 
presentation of self and other, since self and other are located at the centre of the 
narrative as active agents, passive participants, tools of destiny, victims, aggressors 
and so forth. In the most straightforward manner, narrating is a way of establishing a 
perspective or point-of-view.
As far as I have been able to ascertain this is a novel method. Although 
children’s narratives have been widely used in various studies, it was mostly from a 
developmental point of view and focused on children’s language use and development 
of narrative competency. In the current study, I wanted the children to express 
themselves freely in the form of narrative while posing for them the problematic 
construction of the other and his/her perspective in the most straightforward manner.
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In contrast to the drawings where the children are forced to work with one 
perspective, that is, to adopt and convey a single image of a Palestinian (i.e. you 
cannot draw a Palestinian that is both a suicide bomber and a victim of collective 
punishment), the writing task allows them to work in a broader space of symbolic 
construction. Text is a medium of communication that allows the children to develop 
multiple ideas at once, whereupon they may contradict themselves, resist or accept the 
dominant ideologies while establishing the perspective of the other.
Procedure
Following the drawing task18, I asked the children to write me a short (1-2 
pages) composition entitled “The story of the conflict through the eyes of a 
Palestinian child”. I then added “I want you to think that you are a Palestinian child 
that is being asked to tell the story of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Please write as if 
you were a Palestinian child”. There were no restrictions given, and in response to 
requests for explanation, I told them: “ You can start the composition with the words: 
Hello, my name is... (I let the children reply with typical Arabic name, such as 
Ahmed, Fatima etc.), I am 12 years old, I live in.. .(again, I let the children reply with 
familiar Palestinian towns, such as Gaza, Jenin etc.) and I want to tell you the story of 
the conflict”. I emphasized that they can write “whatever they want” and last, I added, 
“ I want you to try and tell me the story of the conflict as if you were a Palestinians. 
Try to think how they feel, what they know, what they do in their everyday life, how 
they see the conflict, what they want etc.”.
Research techniques: outline of analysis
Ethnography: My story of the Israeli “victimised-occupier self’
My initial engagement with the children’s works took place chronologically 
during the time I crystallised the theoretical propositions and intermingled Mead’s 
ideas of opposing realities and the narrowing of the moral self with the notion of 
narrative. During this process, which can, in effect, be regarded as a loose version of
18 Before the final procedure a pilot study was undertaken in order to determine the importance of the 
sequence of the tasks, i.e. draw & write or write & draw. 14 children participated in the pilot, 7 in each 
group. It turned out that the order of the tasks is insignificant and doesn’t affect the content of the 
children’s works. For practical reasons, such as the greater enthusiasm and cooperation o f the children 
in drawings made it easier to get them involved with the compositions.
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grounded theory, I begun to realise that the Israeli children, while taking the 
perspective of the Palestinians are, to a large extent, reproducing the perspective of 
the Israelis. I realised that while constructing the Palestinian image and narrative they 
are, in fact, reconstructing the Israeli narrative of the conflict; while producing a 
Palestinian self, they are, in effect, reproducing the Israeli self. In other words, 
Mead’s notion of the narrow moral self was screaming from the children’s works.
This insight triggered me to add another chapter, or another story to the 
empirical part of the thesis. Following my contention that the Israeli self both enables 
and restricts perspective taking and that the difficulties or failings in taking the 
perspective of the Palestinians are embedded in the Israeli self, I found it necessary to 
provide an analysis of this self apart from the data gathered from the children. For that 
reason, I have applied an ethnographic lens to Israeli society, structured around three 
successive phases while drawing upon historical and contemporary motifs in order to 
provide a glance into the depths of the Israeli collective psyche with both its 
homogenous and heterogeneous voices and faces. It is therefore an ethnographic 
narrative of the Israeli (collective) self in relation to the conflict, a self which I have 
called the “victimised occupier self’ to emphasise two, both complementary and 
contradictive, characteristics. It is a self that is both the victim and the defeater; a self 
that comprises conflicting values and ideologies from which the children draw their 
worldviews, interpret the reality they live in, and reconstruct the perspective of the 
Palestinians.
After years of debate it is now common to be an ethnographer in one’s own 
culture and the difference between “natives” and “outsiders” in ethnographic study is 
now well established. A native would be someone bom, raised and educated in the 
culture they study. An outsider would be someone who came from another culture and 
who possibly had to learn the language of the people he came to study. As a native 
participant observer there always exists the tension between subjectivity and 
objectivity, or more generally, between involvement and detachment. Certainly, the 
native ethnographer is able to gain the perspective and understanding that comes from 
being an “insider” to the culture. Yet while participating in the activities of the 
culture, it is also imperative for the ethnographer to maintain a critical and 
“observational” attitude. He must attempt to experience the culture as both insider and
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outsider and to allow his own observations and experiences to also be informed by the 
other participants in that culture. The native ethnographer experiences a twofold 
dilemma. On one hand he needs to be close enough to his subject(s) in order to know 
them and to ‘understand their understandings’. On the other, there needs to be some 
distance between the two, some space for analytical consideration, some ‘strangeness’ 
on the part of the subject for the author, so that he can see them more clearly.
The dilemma I faced throughout the analyses, both the ethnographic and while 
analysing the children’s works, was somewhat different and goes beyond the common 
problem of how to set up a critical distance between myself and the Israeli society 
after being a member of that society for the past thirty-one years, namely, how to 
maintain a critical distance from my subjects. The hardest dilemma for me was rather 
how to maintain a critical distance from myself and my worldviews regarding the 
conflict. It is a tangible dilemma that is best described as the tension between 
estrangement and engagement. Edward Said perhaps best epitomised this dilemma:
“  [S]o ideologically saturated is the question of Palestine, so manifestly
present is it to most people who come to deal with it, that even a 
superficial or cursory apprehension of it involves a position taken, an 
interest defended, a claim or a right asserted. There is no indifference, no 
objectivity, no neutrality because there is simply no room for them in a 
space that is as crowded and over-determined as this one” (1986, p.30).
This dilemma inevitably stirs a short discussion on quality criteria in 
qualitative research and the researcher’s reflexivity throughout the research process. 
Gaskell and Bauer (2000) offer the categories of confidence and relevance as quality 
criteria for qualitative research. Confidence indicators are measures to insure that the 
analysis presented is well grounded (rather than being the figment of the researcher’s 
imagination), transparent, persuasive and open to critique. Relevance measures should 
be taken in order to ensure the utility and importance of the research project. In the 
current thesis, I hope to achieve these criteria through various measures. First, 
triangulation and reflexivity as indicators of confidence are evident in my thesis. I 
triangulated both methods of data collection (ethnography, drawings, compositions) 
and methods of analysis (see below). Second, I offer procedural clarity and
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transparency throughout my analysis. Lastly, thick description as a measure for both 
confidence and relevance is practiced throughout, for every claim I make is backed 
with a range of verbatim.
There has been an extensive and often quite confusing discussion in the 
qualitative research literature around the importance of researcher reflexivity (e.g. 
Steier, 1991). It is accepted that the researcher, and the worldviews, motives and 
reasons that he or she brings to the research task make a significant contribution to the 
ultimate construction of meaning that is offered to the readers. My emotional and 
moral responses to the research topic and the children’s works are inevitably evident 
throughout the thesis as (my)self is always present in any observation, writing, and 
analysis. The point here is that the thesis shows an awareness of its own constructed 
and contingent nature, that it is able to critically reflect upon itself, and that it 
understands its own framing as one of many possible interpretations.
It has become a fashionable practice especially in the context of PhD 
dissertations that the author provides a thorough autobiographical account, a practice I 
principally reject and therefore will avoid; the focus, I believe, should be the research 
and not the researcher. I will only add that throughout the process I identified with 
Mead’s pragmatic formulation of the third stage of moral conduct:
“We must not forget this other capacity, that of replying to the community 
and insisting on the gestures of the community changing. We can reform 
the order of things; we can insist of making the community standards 
better standards. We are not simply bound by the community“(1934,
p. 168).
I regard my thesis as a small contribution towards making my community’s 
standards better ones. The moral criteria I bring to the analysis are based on justice, 
human rights and international law. I have a pragmatic ideological commitment to a 
viable and just peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians that is based on mutual 
respect and recognition, self-determination, justice and equality. As much as I 
completely reject any sort of warrant regarding the Palestinian suicide bombers, I also 
completely reject any warrant regarding the Israeli occupation. I believe that the
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Palestinians have the moral right and duty to resist the occupation as much as I 
believe that Israel has the right and duty to defend itself against the extremists’ vile 
terrorism. Yet I strongly believe that Israel, as the undoubtedly stronger side of this 
asymmetric conflict can and should do a lot more than it has done so far in order to 
bring this tragedy to an end.
Due to the nature of the topic and in light of Said’s words I will not usually have 
the space to discuss the good, and warm, and compassionate aspects of the Israeli 
society. Yet I hope that my sympathetic empathy with the Israeli society to which I 
belong will provide a steady mitigating influence against what may otherwise be 
viewed as a critical attitude.
Self and society in perspective taking
The primary goal of my thesis is to provide a societal explanation to the 
concept of perspective taking. Social psychological research has, for long time now, 
been split by two contrasting traditions (see Farr, 1996 for a thorough review), 
namely, psychological and sociological forms of social psychology. The argument 
against the psychological social psychology, that it has limited itself to issues of the 
mind as it functions within the individual, and thus has become strikingly asocial, is a 
recurring mantra and I restated it in relation to previous research on perspective 
taking.
Nevertheless, research from the sociological social psychology paradigm, with 
its preoccupation to escape the ‘methodological individualism’ or the ‘Cartesian’s 
spirits’, tends to lose sight of the ‘individual subject’. Research from this tradition has 
a propensity to focus on the dynamics of knowledge production and meaning making 
as properties of the social domain from trans-individual or group-based perspectives. 
Indeed, conducting this kind of research has been my initial objective. The cognitive -  
developmental approaches to perspective taking, which speak to phenomena that can 
be predicated only of individual minds, incited me to explore the socio-historical 
factors that mediate perspective taking. Yet while analysing the children’s works I 
realised that by focusing on contents, themes and cultural meanings, this kind of 
research is inclined to relate these themes with the agents of their reconstruction. I
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still believe that the individual subject can hardly be presented as the ultimate source 
and origin of meaning, however the uniqueness of individual works reminds me that 
each individual constitutes a specific and irreplaceable centre of awareness.
The dialogical epistemology stresses that self and society are closely related 
and both function as polyphony of consonant and dissonant voices. Given that, I make 
an operational rather that ontological distinction between societal and individual 
levels of analyses19. My aim is first, on the collective level, to explore the polyphony 
of the Israeli (collective) self and the multivoiced perspectives on self, other and the 
conflict as revealed from the children’s drawings and compositions. The next step is 
to bring back the individual into focus and to convey the multivoiced nature of the 
individual self as well.
Sociolognetic analysis -  the polyphony of the Israeli self
At this level of analysis I focus on the social milieus (i.e. city, settlement, 
kibbutz) in search of the various topics, concerns, themes and images, which comprise 
the representational field of the Israeli children when facing the task of taking the 
perspective of the Palestinians. The research approach adopted here is hermeneutic- 
interpretive in orientation. The theoretical presuppositions supply a horizon of 
understanding from which the data can begin to be understood. However, the goal is 
to achieve a "fusion of horizons" (Gadamer, 1975), in which the data is not merely 
assimilated into a pre-existing interpretive framework, but through which this pre­
existing framework is itself changed through authentic engagement with the drawings 
and text. I simply ask: what themes emerge when Israeli children are taking the 
perspective of Palestinian children through drawings and narrative compositions? 
What are the ideological processes underlying these themes? And when possible, 
where are these ideas, images and representations coming from? Mapping out the 
content of the drawings and the compositions is done in order to identify the processes 
by which the social reality of the conflict is reproduced, sustained or challenged. The 
idea is to explore the traces of the ‘victimised occupier’ self and its “multi­
voicedness” in the children’s works. Here, the group (Israeli self) is the empirical
191 thank Alex Gilesspie for this valuable insight.
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entity under investigation and the subgroups are the operationalisation of 
perspectives, voices and organised others.
Sociogenetic analysis o f drawings
I regarded the drawings as little stories, that is, as graphic narratives regarding 
the other, self and the context in which they were drawn. The analysis was done in 
two phases. First, drawing eclectically upon techniques from Hummel et al, (1995) 
and Teichman (2001), I examined the drawn actorZs, the attributed actions and the 
decoration, namely the assortment of symbols, and other icons within the data for 
composing the coding frame. A relatively simple coding frame was elaborated with 
the aim of reducing the complexity of each drawing by breaking it up into its 
component parts in order to reveal what I called the ideologically driven iconic 
repertoire. I looked at the drawn character, its gender, his/her activity, and appearance 
of additional figures in the drawing. Finally, I examined symbols of conflict and 
peace as well as symbols of a stereotypical Palestinian. For the purpose of quantitative 
evaluation of the material, I used simple SPSS functions to determine the frequencies 
with which these appeared between and within the three milieus in order to map out 
patterns of homogeneity and heterogeneity.
The second phase was more hermeneutic. I looked at the drawings as whole 
units in trying to capture the exact meaning within the range of ideas and perspectives 
exhibited in the drawings. I asked: what are the personal, social and political 
comments conveyed by these drawings and what are their implications for the 
propensity and practice of taking the perspective of the other? Patterns indeed 
emerged, leading me to construct five different genres of children’s engagements with 
the ‘other’ through their drawings.
Sociogenetic analysis o f narratives
Using the program Atlas/ti as a workbench, a careful thematic analysis was 
conducted in order to draw meaningful patterns from the texts. All the narrative
*yr\
compositions were translated from Hebrew to English and were imported to the
20 I carefully translated the compositions paying attention to the socio-lingual nuances in order to stick 
to the original language use and tone of the texts. Following that I sent a sample of 20 translations to a 
professional translator for proof reading.
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Atlas/ti. On that level of analysis I completely lost sight of individual works and 
treated the compositions as one big data set, with attention to the three milieus. The 
unit of analysis was a single utterance, or sentence. The analysis was exploratory in 
nature. I asked: when Israeli children are engaged with taking the perspective of the 
Palestinians, what is the outcome? And what are the socio-ideological processes that 
mediate and shape that outcome?
The analyses comprise three stages. First, since they were written in the first- 
person I regarded the composition at face value as if they were indeed produced by 
Palestinian children. Since the narratives are predominantly about ‘us’ and ‘them’, I 
started with a raw coding based on three primary categories:
■ Self about self (the Palestinian)
■ Self about other (the Israelis)
■ Self about the conflict (general)
Following this initial mapping, based on the new data segmentation I continued to 
delve deeply into a second stage of coding, which can be described as rhetorical 
coding. Here, I looked at each utterance and asked: what is the communicative goal of 
this utterance? Why did the Israeli author ‘put’ these words into the Palestinian 
child’s mouth? What is it doing in the composition? What is the message conveyed in 
this utterance? From which part of the “victimised occupier” self was this voice taken 
and what does it aim to reproduce?
Following several painstaking coding ‘rounds’ upon which categories were 
reduced, abstracted, generalised or eliminated, I realised that all the coded utterances 
were falling within four pairs of contested rhetoric or ideological dilemmas. Finally, 
after the last coding round I had all the utterances coded under these eight categories, 
still divided to social milieus, I conducted the last stage of analysis in order to map 
out the various symbols, images and representations that are used in the service of 
each communicative goal. Based on the new segmentation of the data I looked for the 
prevalent themes for each communicative objective. For example, the discourse on 
terrorism and suicide bombing was a key notion in both the service of de-legitimising 
the Palestinians and positing the Israeli sense of victimisation. In that last stage of
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analysis I tried to trace the origin of the utterance. I asked: Whose voice is it? Where 
does it come from? Where possible, I offered an account of the origin of the utterance, 
for example, the mass media, school curricula or The Bible.
Due to the interrelatedness of various utterances and the rhetorical objectives (for 
example, the discourse on house demolition could be both in the service of 
establishing an image of a victim Palestinian and/or to establish guilt and 
responsibility on behalf of the Israelis) many utterances were coded twice. This 
rendered statistical manipulation of the data impracticable. Nevertheless where 
possible, I indicate patterns and frequencies, mainly in relation to the social milieus.
Individual analysis -  the polyphony of the personal
Once the dilemmatic nature, or the multi-voicedness of the social has been mapped 
out, it is time to bring back the individual to the centre of attention. As stems from 
both Mead and Bakhtin, the dialogical self works as a society with oppositions, 
conflicts and negotiations between perspectives. As Hermans (2002) noted, the /  has 
the possibility to move from one spatial position to another in accordance with 
changes in situation and time. “The I  fluctuates among different and even opposed 
positions and has the capacity imaginatively to endow each position with a voice so 
that dialogical relations between positions can be established” (p. 148).
The dual character of the self according to Mead, is that the I-me/s relations are, 
from a Bakhtinian perspective, to be found in personal ‘texts’ or narratives in the form 
of multi-voiced utterances that originate from the individual’s reconstruction of past 
experience of real or imagined dialogues and interactions in the social world. 
Individual speakers are not simply talking as individuals, but in their utterances the 
voices of groups and institutions are heard (Wersch, 1990). Individuals, in producing 
utterances always converse in what Bakhtin called ‘social languages’ which frame or 
shape the personal speech:
“The expression of an utterance always responds to a greater and lesser
degree, that is, it expresses the speaker’s attitude toward others’ utterances
100
and not just his attitude toward the object of his utterance.. .the utterance is 
filled with dialogical overtones and they must be taken into account in order 
to understand fully the style of the utterance. After all our thought itself is 
bom and shape in the process of interaction and struggle with others’ 
thought, and this cannot be reflected in the forms that verbally express our 
thought as well.” (1986, p.92)
When a child writes the story of the conflict (from his/her or a Palestinian 
perspective) he or she enters into an arena that reverberates with other voices. The 
child’s words, as Bakhtin would say, are intertwined with polyphony of other’s 
perspectives, nuances, and intentions and it is by orchestrating - not mere repeating, 
but reconstructing, resisting and transforming - that polyphony, that the author makes 
meaning heard. And since these words were bom and shaped in dialogical encounters 
through interaction with other voices in the past, the author ‘product’ is never 
monologic (apart from its compositional form) but always a multi-voiced 
amalgamation.
The strategy of this analysis is inherently interpretative and is aimed at exploring 
the ways in which the “victimised occupier” self is reproduced, or sustained on the 
individual level. I chose three drawings and compositions from each group and with 
the knowledge acquired from both the ethnographic and the social level of analysis I 
discern the distinct voices and their dialogic relationship in the personal works.
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4. THE “VICTIMISED-OCCUPIER” SELF
“I think the idea that it is possible to continue keeping 3.5 million 
Palestinians under occupation - yes it is occupation, you might not like the 
word, but what is happening is occupation - is bad for Israel, and bad for 
the Palestinians, and bad for the Israeli economy. Controlling 3.5 million 
Palestinians cannot go on forever. You want to remain in Jenin, Nablus, 
Ramallah and Bethlehem?”
(Ariel Sharon, Israel’s Prime Minister, May 26, 2003)
Introduction
This chapter addresses the question of what comprises the Israeli self and its 
constituent narratives in the realm of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Based on my 
contention that socio-historical and ideological factors narrow the moral selves of 
Israelis in relation to the Palestinians, my aim is to provide a glance to the depths of 
the Israeli collective psyche with both its homogenous and heterogeneous voices and 
faces and to demarcate, in detail, those socio-ideological processes that narrow the 
moral selves of Israelis in relation to the Palestinians.
While in Chapter Three I established the theoretical relations between self, 
narratives and morality, the route to determining a particular case of narrow moral self 
with any certainty seems to be best approached inductively with a sensitivity to 
specific events and situations constitutive to that self and an understanding of how 
different voices, symbols, representations and ideologies are formed and transformed, 
enacted, nurtured, circulated and propagated to shape the realities of the self under 
question. Uncovering the substantive contents of a group’s multifaceted identity 
requires the researcher to become immersed in the socio-political and cultural nuances 
of that group’s life. That is, in order to identify the power interests and ideologies that 
shape a group’s life one must have substantial knowledge of the group’s shared 
history, its major actors and the motives that determines their actions. For that, I apply
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an ethnographic lens to my society, the Israeli society, structured around three 
successive phases while drawing upon historical and contemporary motifs as well as 
popular, journalistic and academic sources, that when viewed together represents a 
self I am terming a ‘victimised-occupier’ self21.
This self is a product of the historical development of collectively constructed 
representations of a society that has lived in a protracted conflict ever since its 
establishment. It is the locus for the assortment of beliefs, ideologies, moral 
contradictions and prejudices from which the Israeli children derive their 
interpretations, evaluations and judgements regarding the Palestinian perspective. It is 
a knowledge structure that determines those aspects of the environment taken into 
account, how they are interpreted and how they are situated in relation to the shared 
moral order.
The early years- the homogenous phase
... “In every generation they rise against us and seek our destruction ”...
This maxim, taken from the Passover Haggadah22 condenses and symbolises 
one of the most enduring socio-historical convictions instilled in the Israeli-Jewish 
collective psyche. Constant states of defensiveness and victimhood are fundamental 
determinants both in the long history of the Jewish people and the short past of the 
state of Israel. Throughout history, the Jewish people have experienced persecutions, 
pogroms and expulsions in almost every place they have lived. The Holocaust, the 
most ferocious of the Jewish persecutions is undoubtedly the most constitutive
21 This chapter was written in early 2004 and has gone through some relevant editorial amendments. 
Due to the pace of events in the Middle East, this chapter, by definition cannot be up-to-date. For 
example, Israel’s decision to build a controversial separation wall, Sharon’s ‘unilateral 
disentanglement’ plan, Arafat’s death and the repercussions o f these events are not covered. 
Nevertheless, the chapter meant to capture both the constitutive socio-historical events of the Israeli 
self and the events which provide the direct context of this study. In that sense it is meant to depict both 
essential elements and accurately reflect the atmosphere in Israel during the time of data collection.
22 The text that guides the performance of ritual acts and prayers o f the ‘Seder’ dinner celebrating Passover. It 
tells the story of the Israelite exodus from Egypt.
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episode in the recent history of the Jewish Israeli collective psychic. The Holocaust, 
which took the lives of about six million Jews, provided tremendous moral and 
political force to the Zionist claim, leading, eventually, to the establishment of the 
state of Israel. The motif of the Holocaust continued to play a central role in the 
conceptions and rhetoric of the mass media and political leaders, markedly in relation 
to the Israeli -  Arab conflict, thus magnifying the significance of the Palestinian threat 
and keeping the flame of what Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992) described as the ‘siege- 
mentality’ of the Israeli society, constantly burning. According to its ontological 
narrative, Israel is fighting a never-ending battle for its survival against irrational 
forces that seek its total extermination. The themes of destruction, of physical 
annihilation and of non-existence play a central role in the Israeli national self-image.
Traditional and religious motives drew the Zionist movement to Palestine (Eretz 
Israel in Hebrew) and the decision was made to establish the Jewish state in this land, 
the "Promised Land" for Jews, in Palestine. According to the Israeli narrative, the 
Israelis have rights to the land because of their religious, historical and cultural 
legacy. It is written in Genesis (15:18):
"... [T]he Lord made a covenant with Abraham, saying, 'To your 
descendants I give this land, from the river of Egypt to the great river, the 
river Euphrates...
The core of the Zionist idea and its attachment to the land appears in the Declaration 
of the Establishment of the State of Israel (14 May 1948), which states that:
"The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their 
spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first 
attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal 
significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books.
After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it 
throughout their ^ dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their 
return to it and for the restoration in it of their political freedom."
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In the early days of the Zionist movement the maxim was “a land without a 
people for a people without land”. If there were no indigenous population to displace, 
the argument goes, then the idea of expropriating the land area of Palestine to help 
victims of anti-Semitism seemed not only benign but humane as well.
For years, Zionists have based their claim to Palestine partly on the account 
that it was an empty, barren wasteland that they have peopled, watered and ‘made the 
desert bloom’. According to this eminent myth, the land was not only empty but had 
been left untended and unexploited ever since the Jews were evicted two thousand 
years before. This myth not only reinforced the notion of the untouched land but also 
the continuity of the Zionist enterprise of “re-establishing” Jewish life in Palestine. 
The myth of the “land without a people” was not restricted to the political discourse 
but rather diffused to, and was circulated within popular communication channels as 
well, thus strengthening the Zionist doctrine of the virgin or empty land.
The following segment is taken from a children’s fiction book written in the early 
years of the state of Israel:
“Joseph and some of his men thus crossed the land on foot, until they 
reached the Galilee. They climbed mountains, beautiful but empty 
mountains, where nobody lived ...Joseph said, ‘we want to establish this 
kibbutz and conquer this emptiness...the land is empty; its children have 
deserted it.... they are dispersed and no longer tend it. No one protects or 
tends the land now’”.23
Palestine however, was not a land without a people. Indigenous Arabs 
inhabited it for centuries. In 1914 there were 570,000 Palestinian Arabs in Palestine 
and 80,000 Palestinian Jews, most of whom had entered Palestine after I86024. 
According to contemporary discourse in Israel, the ‘land without a people’ axiom
23 Gurevitz, Y. and Navon ,S, eds. What Story Will I Tell My Children? Tel-Aviv: Amihah 1953 (in 
Hebrew).
24 C. Smith, Palestine and the Arab Israeli Conflict, 1988
106
served to relieving Israeli Jews of guilt feelings for what befell the Arab inhabitants of 
Palestine: if the land was indeed empty, there was no wrongdoing. A less 
compromising stance argues that this axiom was not only conceived in ignorance, but 
also reflected the general arrogance towards the Arab inhabitants of Palestine. From 
the very beginning, the Zionists approach to the Palestinians inhabitants was 
ambivalent, and, using psychoanalysis terminology, contained elements of both denial 
and repression regarding the existence of the Palestinians in Palestine.
In later years, when the ‘land without a people’ myth lost its strength since it 
gradually became apparent that the land was not empty as had been claimed, diverse 
arguments were required to cope with the ‘Palestinian problem’ evidently created 
before and during the establishment of the state of Israel.
Taken from a fictional book that was on my compulsory reading list when I 
was at primary school, the next segment provides a fascinating illustration of the 
moral dilemma generated with the beginning of the Jewish immigration to Palestine 
that still persists today. In the following story, Juma is a young Palestinian evicted 
from his hometown during the clashes between the Arabs and the Jews before the 
establishment of the state of Israel. A few years later, when Juma tried to return to 
his home, he was arrested and taken to the police station. He asked the policemen to 
call Baruch, a Jewish man who lived with his family nearby Juma’s home, to attest his 
innocence. Baruch arrived to the police station and recognised Juma who told him 
why he had attempted to return to his home and then,
“Juma fell silent. And I couldn’t say a thing. He was right and so 
were we. We did not throw them out, and yet they had been evicted. What 
could I tell him? Should I tell him of the Holocaust of our Diaspora? 
Should I tell him of the Jews who would come, shrouded in the darkness 
of the night, across treacherous seas to this land? Should I tell him of the 
concentration camps? Of the millions Jewish refugees?
25 Halevy, B. Uri and Ra’anan. Tel-Aviv: Yaveh 1971
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Whereas in the early days of the Zionist enterprise the existence of the 
Palestinians was denied or ignored, in later years a rhetorical effort was made towards 
disregarding the existence of the Palestinians as a collective entity. For most of the 
first twenty-five years of Israeli history, official rhetoric portrayed Palestinians as 
Arabs lacking any distinct national identity. As Bar-On (1997) argues, in order to 
reduce the cognitive dissonance generated by the Jewish aspiration to inherit the land 
at the expense and detriment of other people living in the territory, the Palestinians 
were perceived as part of the greater Arab nation, but not as a distinct national group 
with national aspirations of their ojyn. This attitude is best illustrated by the notorious 
quotation from an interview given to the Sunday Times in 1969 by the Israeli Prime 
Minster Golda Meir who claimed that:
"There is no such thing as a Palestinian people... It is not as if we 
came and threw them out and took their country. They didn't exist."
Yet, there are enough records today to show that early leaders of both the 
Yishuv (the body of Jewish settlements before the establishment of Israel) and of the 
state of Israel recognised that the Arab resistance was a natural, inevitable reaction of 
a native people defending their country against foreign invaders. In an oration at the 
funeral of an Israeli commander killed by a Palestinian in April 1956 Moshe Dayan, 
then Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) expressed a keen understanding 
of the hatred of the Arabs towards the Israeli settlers when he stated:
“ . . . Let us not today fling1* accusation at the murderers. What causes 
have we to complain about their fierce hatred to us? For eight years 
now, they sit in their refugee camps in Gaza, and before their eyes we 
turn into our homestead the land and villages in which they and their 
forefathers have lived”.
Nonetheless, the conclusion he drew from this realistic observation best epitomises 
the common attitude of these days:
“... Let us make our reckoning today. We are a generation of settlers, 
and without the steel helmet and gun barrel, we shall not be able to 
plant a tree or build a house . . . .  Let us not be afraid to see the hatred
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that accompanies and consumes the lives of hundreds of thousands of 
[Palestinian] Arabs who sit all around us and wait for the moment 
when their hands will be able to reach our blood.”
Thus, Israelis experience themselves as being bom out of centuries of Diaspora 
persecutions into the arms of Arab intransigence. The national self image includes all 
the layers of the past, starting with the ancient Hebrews, through the suffering Jews in 
the Diaspora, the victims of the Holocaust and the revived modem Jew in the Zionist 
renaissance, forced to fight for its existence against millions of Arabs bent upon its 
destruction. The Zionists were convinced that the Arab resistance to the Zionist 
enterprise, which was intended to save the Jews from the flames of Europe, was 
simply the consequence of the murderous nature of the Arabs and of Islam. This 
implies that from its beginnings, the Israeli society cultivated a self, based on 
existential self-defence and the need for the requisite military capabilities to achieve 
this.
For Israelis, the founding of Israel symbolizes the grand narrative of 2000 
years of exile, characterised by centuries of persecutions, and culminating in a rebirth 
of Jewish sovereignty replete with military might. Consequently, the Israeli self had 
(and still has) extensive motifs of both defensiveness (victimhood) and warrior-ness 
(supremacy) incorporated, reconstructed and maintained within its structure and 
content.
No alternative & purity of arms
The Israeli exercise of power was, from its early days, consistent with the 
ethos of “self-defence”, the attitude according to which “military force was used 
merely in order to protect a threatened community fighting for its survival and 
liberation” (Shapira, 1992, p. 124). Before explicating the military ethos, and its 
declared attitude towards the use of force, a point worthy of note is the ubiquity of the 
military in Israeli society and culture. From its early days Israeli society was formed
26 Moshe Dayan-A Brief Biography & Quotes: http://www.palestineremembered.com
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as what Ben-Eliezer (1998) coined a ‘nation in uniform’. It is a society where 
boundaries between individual and society, between family and state, between 
community and nation and between the civic and the militaristic were completely 
blurred. It is a society saturated with militaristic culture that is diffused to every 
aspect of its life. From its early years, the army was a glorified institution, perceived 
as the ‘melting point’ of immigrant society in the process of nation building.
Rather than being a state with an army, Israel is almost an army with a state. 
Due to compulsory military service, subsequent to high school, almost all teenagers 
join the army. After three compulsory years most men are required to serve in the 
military reserved forces approximately four weeks every year until their mid-life. As 
they retire their service, senior officers are habitually parachuted to occupy central 
positions in politics and civic society commercial and economical institutions.
Crucial to this militaristic society and culture are two interrelated notions. The 
first is 'no alternative' or ‘no c h o ic e namely fighting only inevitable wars - wars in 
which Israel is defending itself against the threat of annihilation. The Israeli army is 
designated as the Israeli Defence Force and the wars which Israel has fought have all
9 7been defined as defensive wars . Many Israeli military actions which could have 
been and are now interpreted as provocations or as clearly offensive operations did 
not raise undue doubts regarding their justification since Arab leaders and states, by 
their actions and statements, lent ample support to the threat mentality: Israel faced 
continuous hostile infiltrations, violent border incidents, a refusal to recognise its 
existence and rabid statements of intent to obliterate it (cf. Ben -Eleizer 1998; Golani, 
2002; Weissbrod, 2002).
The second key notion is the maxim of ‘purity o f arms'. According to the IDF 
mission statement, purity of arms refers to the idea that:
“The IDF servicemen and women will use their weapons and force only 
for the purpose of their mission, only to the necessary extent and will
27 The concept of ‘no alternative’ was the label Israelis gave to every war fought by the Jewish state 
from its War of Independence in 1948, until the 1982 controversial Lebanon War broke the national 
consensus.
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maintain their humanity even during combat. IDF will not use their 
weapon or force to harm human beings who are not combatants or 
prisoners of war, and will do all in their power to avoid causing harm to
<>Q
their lives, bodies, dignity and property” .
In short, the notion of purity of arms means fighting in self-defence and only 
against belligerents, excluding innocent civilians. It is a commandment of self-control 
in the use of armed force.
Based on the ethos of self-defence and self-control, the Israeli collective self 
has the tendency to conceive and justify the uses of violence as a means of coping 
with external threats to independence and security. The actual effect of force and its 
consequences for the victims are usually seen as necessary, inevitable results of 
pursuing these noble goals. My contention is that the defensive ethos enables the 
Israeli self to attribute unanticipated consequences to external circumstances rather 
than taking responsibility for them. The common manifestation of the ‘purity of 
arms’ approach is the widespread mantra that the Israeli army is ‘the most moral army 
in the world’. In the eyes of most Israelis, the IDF is pure, stainless and the most 
restrained military force in the world. The following extract is taken from a web 
forum- it is a reply by an Israeli to a Palestinian accusations regarding the Israeli 
military operations in the Gaza strip during the recent cycle of violence:
“Shireen, as an Israeli I feel bad for your people's suffering. What do you 
expect ?! Hammas, Jihad and PFLP terrorists use you and fellow innocent 
civilians to launch their terror attacks. So blame the terrorists for Palestinian 
deaths, not the Israelis. When we entered Rafa and Jenin the overwhelming 
majority of Palestinian casualties were terrorists. The IDF is the most moral 
army in the world. We could easily carpet bomb your cities to destroy your 
terrorist infrastructure (like many other countries do), but instead we 
sacrifice our own soldiers to save you and your people. You should be 
thankful that Israel is so moral: Palestinian terrorists attempt to inflict as 
many casualties as possible on Israeli civilians while the IDF attempts not to
28 The IDF website, www.idf.il/english/doctrine/doctrine.stm
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harm you. When you want someone to blame for your peril, you don't need 
to look far- the extremists in your society are causing you all of your 
anguish. May we have peace in our times”29.
The Palestinian other
The collective self of groups during times of conflict is always formed and 
reproduced as an opposition to the enemy-other. A large part of the Israeli national 
identity has been developed as opposition towards the enemy. Hence, the Israeli self, 
was always constructed in relation or in contrast to the Arab/Palestinian other, which 
can be defined as the “savage-warrior”(Sucharov, 1999).
Israelis and Palestinians were bom into this conflict, and their identity is 
formulated, to no small extent, in terms of hostility and fear, survival and death. 
Sometimes it seems as if Israelis and Palestinians have no clear identities without the 
conflict, without the "enemy", whose existence is necessary, perhaps vital, to their 
sense of self and community. As Bar-On (2001 in press) queries: “Who are we if we 
are not determined through our negation of the other and the hatred of the other 
towards us?
The negative portrayal of the Arabs/Palestinians by the Israeli-Jews was 
scrutinised by several writers in light of Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism as a 
cultural outgrowth of the west30. The depictions of "the Arab" as irrational, menacing, 
untrustworthy, anti-Western and dishonest, are ideas into which Orientalist 
scholarship has evolved. Said later applied the concept of Orientalism to the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict, to argue that as a colonial movement, Zionism realised the 
importance of portraying the Arab character in a negative light and of depreciating 
Arab rights in order to justify Zionist actions in Palestine (1979). Shohat (1991) has 
applied the same idea when she analysed early Hebrew-Zionist films. She exposes 
that the Arab is depicted as a bmtal and cultureless creature whose objection to 
Zionism lacks rational grounding.
29 http://www.israelforum.com/board/archive/index.php/t-2051 .html
30 According to this thesis, an elite group trying to block the advance of an upcoming minority group 
by dubbing it “oriental”, meaning devoid of “real” culture and hence not worthy of equal treatment.
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The long-prevailing perception of the Arab-other as being bent on Israel’s 
destruction, validated with the prolonged Arab animosity through wars, terrorism and 
consistent expression of hatred, led to a strengthening of the victimised self. There is 
a large bulk of research regarding the presentations of Arabs and Palestinians in 
Israeli society across various domains and communication channels such as the 
media, public discourse, school curricula, films and so forth. Because of space 
restrictions, I will provide two examples taken from studies that explored 
representations of Arabs in (a) Israeli geography textbooks and (b) commercial 
Hebrew children’s literature. The findings serve as a condensed illustration of the 
content of the Arab-other as formed and reconstructed by the Israeli self31:
“Unenlightened, inferior, fatalistic, unproductive, apathetic, with the need for a strong 
paternalism. In addition it was said that their customs are different as well as their 
accommodations, occupations and their ways of life. They are divided, tribal, exotic, 
people of the backward East, poor, sick, dirty, noisy, and coloured. Arabs are not 
progressive; they multiply fast, ungrateful, not part of us, non-Jews. They commit 
arson and murder, they destroy, are easily inflamed and vengeful” (Bar-Gal, 1993, 
p.18932).
In a qualitative study analysing commercial Hebrew children’s books from the 
1960’s, El-Asmar (1986) found that the Arab appears “as a criminal who relishes 
murder for its own sake. Thus one should never ‘turn’s ones back’ on an Arab. An 
Arab also kills for the least reason and appears to have no appreciation for the value 
of human life. An Arab is a thief; he steals because theft is part of his nature, 
especially theft from Jews because of his ‘envy’. An Arab is a swindler who would 
cheat even his own family. He is base, ready to sell himself, his honour, and his 
people cheaply. An Arab is a vagabond for whom material things have no value. He 
is a coward who cannot fight and who, therefore is cunning. He is a liar whose word
31 It is important to stress that both studies analysed materials from earlier period (60’s to 70’s) rather 
than contemporary commercial and textbooks. Since early nineties there was a revision of textbooks 
and negative stereotyping of the Arabs has significantly declined.
32 Quoted in Bar-Tal & Teichman 2005 -  see this book for comprehensive review on the 
representations of the Arab in Israeli public sphere.
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cannot be trusted and whose promises should not be taken seriously. An Arab is dirty 
in mind as well as body; he does not wash, and the teacher always warns the children 
not to come too close to an Arab lest they catch some dreadful disease”. (1986, p.85)
Following the beginning of the Oslo peace process, a change for the better 
took place in peace education in Israel. In January 2000 the education minister had 
given instruction to purge from the textbooks any hint of anti-Arab stereotypes and to 
initiate a free discussion of less positive events in Israeli history. However, as recently 
revealed in a thorough study of both Israeli and Palestinian textbooks by Israeli and 
Palestinian academics, since the outbreak of the recent cycle of violence there is a 
tendency of retreat to the traditional, nationalist educational values, marginalisation of 
peace education and lack of attempt to understand the Palestinian perspective of the 
conflict . In the same vein, Bar-Tal (2004, in press) has found that whereas the 
presentations of Arabs in dehumanising terms, has declined since the 1980s and 
1990s, there has been no change in the use of negative stereotypes that present Arabs 
as ‘primitives’, ‘passive, ‘cruel’ and ‘riffraff. Additionally, in accord with Firer and 
Adwan’s (2004) findings, he also observes that the dehumanising representations 
began to seep back into the education system after the outbreak of the Palestinian 
Intifada. Highly relevant to the current study, the researchers found that both Israeli 
and Palestinian textbooks do not reveal any tendency to tell the pupils the story of the 
conflict through from the enemy’s point of view, both skip over the details of the 
human suffering of the other side while giving a reckoning of its victims alone.
The discrepancy phase
Scholars tend to attribute (in retrospect) the Six Days War of 1967 to the 
nascent split in the relatively homogenous character of the Israeli self. However, it is 
only after the appalling experience of the Yom Kippur war in 1973, the Lebanon war 
in 1982 and the Palestinian uprising in 1987 that significant conflicting orientations 
within the Israeli dominant narrative begun to emerge. To go back to Mead’s
33 Firer and Adwan (2004), in press.
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terminology, the Israeli self, which was once restricted to a moderately single ethos, 
now incorporated a multiplicity of organised others.
The Israeli self s ethics and morality was relied upon to confine fighting to 
defensive actions against armed forces. Therefore the occupation of densely populated 
areas, notably the Gaza Strip and the West bank, which had victimised a large number 
of civilians, generated moral and ethical discrepancies within Israeli society and a 
growing number of contesting voices. The earlier common voice of the Israeli self- 
defence narrative slowly turned into a dualistic and ambivalent orientation towards 
the exercise of its power. The pre Six Days War feeling of insecurity was transformed 
into euphoria after Israel's 'miraculous' victory. It was so sudden and so dramatic that 
it was an ideological and psychological earthquake. As Ezrahi brightly observes, 
following the tremendous victory in the Six Days War,
“...suddenly the narrative of victimhood and the defensive 
conception of the use of force ceased to make sense...it was at this 
moment that the Jewish Israeli experience of the tragic aspect of applying 
lethal military force to one adversaries - the kind of trauma that can be 
experienced by those who shoot rather than those who are shot at - began 
to penetrate the Israeli mind.... victory enabled Israeli Jews to revise their 
perceptions of war and power from fear of a great hostile to the tragedy of 
the war as such.. .the knowledge, ambiguities and doubts that came with 
the actual experience of fighting began to erode a view of force that until 
then seemed self-evident and compelling”(1997, p. 188-189).
The occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, which meant that Israel now held 
100% of mandatory Palestine, generated a substantial division in the relatively 
cohesive Israeli self, a rip that lasts to date. Alongside the hegemonic view of “no 
alternative” and “purity of arms”, a critical voice surfaced, warning the Israeli society 
not to take action outsides the bounds of absolute necessity, or fighting aggressive 
wars for the sake of expansionism and domination. The territorial consequences of the 
Six Days War provoked two narratives; two opposing responses, two distinct 
approaches to land, power and identity, both have been competing for hegemony ever 
since.
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The one, based on nationalistic, religious and messianic foundations, 
interpreted the post war reality as a turning point in Jewish history, a new and fateful 
era, and a validation of the “Holy History” of the undefeatable Jewish people. This 
voice, which consists mainly (but not solely) of right-wing-orthodox-Jewish- 
nationalists, favoured the annexation of the occupied territories to a ‘Greater Eretz 
Israel’ acclaiming the same value reference to every spot on the resurrected Jewish 
kingdom’s map. The State of Israel, they say, is not like other countries. It is the 
beginning of the growth of our redemption, a miraculous revelation, in whose birth 
God himself was involved. A manifold miracle occurred in 1967, when we returned to 
the cities of our God.
According to this narrative, the ‘chosen people’ have returned to their sacred 
land whereas the indigenous Palestinians (whether tacitly or outwardly) are inferior, 
have no privileges in this land and devoid of human and civic rights. It is a narrative 
according to which Zionism is a permanent revolution, a part of a godly plan to bring 
about redemption to the Israeli people. This outlook, which doesn’t recognise the 
problem of occupation, since one cannot illegally, or amorally occupy one’s own land 
that was given to him by God. Embedded in this story is the perception of the land as 
the liberated territories rather than the occupied territories.
In its ‘lighter’, more secular version of this narrative, there was “Enlightened 
Occupation”, a policy introduced by the then Defence Minister Moshe Dayan and 
became the key message of the Israeli public relations in the 1970s. It meant that the 
Israeli occupation was “liberal” and that it brought prosperity and modernity to the 
natives by allowing for open bridges between the West Bank and Jordan, job permits 
in proper Israel and a considerable degree of self-government on the municipal level. 
All the same, it justifies discriminations bordering with racism against the Palestinian 
‘enemies’ from curfews through road blockage to Jewish-only roads. The occupation 
and the subsequent settlement enterprise in the occupied territories have created a de- 
facto reality of apartheid.
The other voice loathed the messianic and redemptive outlook and warned 
against the moral and political slippery slope they envisaged in the occupation.
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Secular and liberal values prevented the proponents of that voice from scaling the 
emotional and spiritual heights of the return to the ancient heritage. For those, 
winning the war and protecting the state of Israel is one thing, but holding onto 
territorial conquests was ethically unjustified. Having relinquished ‘Jewishness’ on 
the favour of “Israeliness” the secular-labour Zionists could have no claim to land, 
which was part of the Jewish heritage, but outside Israel borders (Weissbrod 2002).
The Western oriented humanistic-leftist Zionism viewpoint acknowledged the 
shortfalls and even the injustices inherent in the Zionist enterprise and its failure to 
anticipate and justly resolve the conflict with the indigenous Arab population. Ever 
since the 1967 victory there has always been a minority voice of political activists and 
humanists that have fiercely protested against the occupation and warned the Israeli 
society of the moral dangers embodied in the situation of controlling millions of 
people. Among them, for example, was professor Yeshaayahu Leibowitz, a prominent 
humanist and philosopher, best known for his vehement opposition to the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, which would, he warned, impair the character 
of the Jewish state and corrupt the moral fibre of its people.
Regrettably, the redemptive narrative, on different levels of awareness and 
denial had a dominant status in the Israeli society. The Israeli self, to a large extent 
chose to ignore the problem of controlling other people and denying their rights and 
liberty. As long as the life in the occupied territories passed off quietly under a 
military regime combined with self-government on the municipal level, Israeli society 
appreciably repressed the Palestinian problem. As an ordinary Israeli child, without 
any distinct political orientation from home, I simply didn’t know about the Israeli 
military occupation until the outbreak of the Intifada when I was at 9th grade. The 
Palestinians were simply Arabs, living in Arab places like Gaza or Nablus, whom I 
saw regularly as the ‘Arab labourers’ in my father’s shop, or on the scaffolding of 
construction sites, building our houses. Even then, at the early stages of the 
Palestinian uprising, the only thing I can remember is that ‘the Arabs had gone wild 
for some reason, completely distracting law and order and the army was sent to 
repress the riots’.
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It was only due to the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising that the Israeli self 
has woken up from its moral slumber and a substantial debate concerning the 
Palestinian problem got underway. As Uri Savir noted, “Perhaps because we were the 
first occupier in history who felt as if they were the occupied, our self-image as a 
humane society and as an eternal victim of history, coupled with the Arab 
antagonism, blinded us to what was happening in the territories”34. Since 1967 the 
Israeli occupation has been responsible for systematic and deliberate violations of the 
fundamental rights of the Palestinians as defined by international humanitarian law. 
These violations have involved the transfers of populations and annexation of land, 
house demolitions, torture, killing of innocent people, curfews, road blockage and 
various forms of collective punishment that severely impinges on the livelihood and 
well being of the majority of ordinary Palestinians.
Slowly but gradually, as a consequence of the 1967, 1973, and 1982 wars, and 
the 1987 Palestinian uprising, a progressive erosion of social consensus in Israeli 
society took place. The relatively unified Israeli self turned into an arena of multiple, 
contested voices struggling with one another to position Israeli-Jews within 
conflicting frameworks grounded in differing conceptions of community, history, 
culture and identity.
At one end of the socio-political discourse was a small group of Israeli 
scholars, known as the ‘new historians’ or ‘post-Zionists’, which during the 1970s and 
1980s formulated an alternative perspective to Israeli history and culture which placed 
Israel’s political and military conduct under an uncompromising lens. Their writings 
brought to the surface and highlighted questions that had previously been neglected 
and thus gained a hearing for voices previously muted or excluded from the dominant 
Israeli discourse35. Although fairly marginal and even seen as outcasts, this group 
nevertheless managed to undermine what they regarded as the ‘myths’ grounded in 
the Israeli-Zionist narrative.
34 Israeli chief negotiator in the Oslo process (1998, p.236)
35 For an extended discussion on post-Zionism see Silberstein 1999
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For example, one of the most prominent myths along with the previously 
discussed “land without people” fable is the widespread account of the causes of the 
1948 Palestinian refugee problem. When I was at primary school, I was taught that 
during the incidents of the 1948 war more than 600,000 Palestinians fled their homes 
and villages, encouraged by the promises of their leaders that they would return as 
victors. However, Morris (1987), an Israeli historian who carefully and extensively 
studied the issue, concluded that the policies and decisions of the Israeli political and 
military leadership and the actions of the Israeli military forces played a decisive role 
in precipitating the flight. Put differently, the Palestinian population was to a large 
extent expelled, rather than deciding to flee, thus creating what ever since has been 
regarded as the Palestinian refugee problem.
Further refuted myths were the pervasive claims that while the Israelis have 
done everything possible to bring about peace since 1948, the Arabs continually 
refused all initiatives. This supported the portrayal of the Israeli-Arab conflict as a 
war between a relatively defenceless and weak (Jewish) David and a relatively strong 
(Arab) Goliath (Elon, 1971; Segev, 1984; Pappe, 1992).
The first Palestinian Intifada (uprising) in 1987 provoked unprecedented 
moral, legal, political and ideological debates in Israel. Yet again, the dominant voice, 
the leading story, was ‘the Arabs are, once more, rising against us’, although the 
uprising and combat was restricted to the occupied territories, leaving life inside Israel 
proper, to a large extent, uninterrupted. The Israeli army was called to crash the 
resistance and soon became an armed police force for dealing with suppression and 
police actions whose primary purpose is the futile pursuit of children who throw 
stones.
The Palestinian uprising and the following peace process which was initiated 
(officially) in 1993 evoked an assortment of contested ideologies in the Israeli public 
sphere, each voice deriving from diverse symbolic resources, extending further the 
boundaries and content of the Israeli self. It was a constitutive event in the re­
formation of the Israeli self since it dramatised the ambiguities between the role of the 
Israeli military force as an instrument of defence and as means of domination (Ezrahi, 
1997). A substantial dissonance transpired in the Israeli collective psyche since the
119
Palestinian popular uprising against the Israeli occupation appreciably undermined the 
Israeli ‘siege mentality’ and the ‘David and Goliath’ myth, which maintained the 
common self-image of the Israelis for long years.
The Palestinian Intifada was a turning point in the Israeli narrative. It forced 
the Israeli self to a re-examination of its image and re-editing of its past, present and 
future plot. The spectrum of stories or, the representational field concerning the 
conflict, its origins, causes and solutions include religious-historical, colonialism, 
universal human rights, principle of distributive justice, demography, nationalism, 
security, guilt and responsibility, to name but a few.
For some, it was the beginning of the enterprise of normalizing Zionism - 
turning Judaism from a religion into a nation, from a group of wanderers into a 
territorial ingathering, from a network of communities into a political nation. Others 
have seen this process as a pure ethical retreat. For them, seeing the liberated 
territories as an occupation, and the decision to withdraw from them represents a 
moral bankrupcy and limpness worthy of contempt. The compromising and 
reconciliatory voices of a democratic society that wants a normal life for itself rather 
than some vague ‘redemption’, are defined as traitors. Nevertheless, the Israeli self 
was ‘forced’ to incorporate, although to a limited extent, the Palestinian narrative of 
self-determination and liberation that slowly and painfully defused and undermined 
the dominant Zionist narrative.
Peace & Security
Tied in with the defensive-warrior ethos and its diverse manifestations, is the 
idea of peace as an absolute value. Underlying the ubiquity of the word “peace” in 
Israeli culture is the assumption that Israel has always had an arm outstretched with an 
olive branch, only to be rebuffed by the intransigent Arab states. The Israeli self is 
exceedingly peace-advocating, at least in its self-image. I cautiously assert that every 
person in Israel sees peace as the ultimate desire and very few doubt the sincerity of 
the life long yearning for peace in the Israeli society. Since the establishment of Israel 
there has been extensive peace rhetoric in every possible communication channel.
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People in Israel speak about peace, about yearning for peace and about the aspiration 
to live peacefully side-by-side our Arab neighbours. Innumerable songs were written 
about peace, the political rhetoric is engorged with peace related themes, and the mass 
media is saturated with unremitting barrage regarding the issue of peace. It must be 
said that beliefs about peace are functional in the sense that they present the members 
of society as peace lovers and peace seekers both to themselves and to the outside 
world. Additionally, perceiving oneself as a peace-pursuer enhances positive self­
esteem and fulfils the function of providing hope and optimism (Bar-Tal, 1998). 
Indeed, it seems that peace rhetoric is, for the time being, further reaching than the 
actual intentions of the Israeli self. So far, although Israeli leaders have stated their 
willingness for ‘painful concessions’, no serious offer has been made. Put differently, 
although the peace rhetoric in Israel speaks of the need to end the occupation, of ‘far 
reaching concessions’, and to live peacefully side-by-side with the Palestinians 
neighbours, the facts on the ground reveal the opposite - more settlements, more 
annexation of land and deepening of the occupation.
For example, in a recent survey that gauged trends in Israeli public opinion 
regarding the notion of peace and the contemporary political processes , the 
researchers found that although the widespread view is that the disengagement
^7plan —which enjoys majority support and is given high chances of being 
implemented—is not the end of the story. However it is viewed only as a first step 
toward an extensive evacuation of Jewish settlements in the West Bank in the 
framework of the permanent agreement with the Palestinians. A clear majority of the 
Israeli Jewish public currently supports the government’s plan to build 3,500 housing 
units between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem so as to create territorial continuity 
between them, even in the knowledge that such building will reduce the chances of 
reaching a peace settlement with the Palestinians.
The notion of peace in Israeli society is robustly attached to the notion of 
security. Security is one of the most central concepts in the Israeli self and hence it is
36 Israel Peace Index March 2005: The Tami Steinmetz Centre for Peace Research. 
http://spirit.tau.ac.il/socant/peace.
37 Prime Minister Sharon plan to unilaterally evacuate the Israeli settlements in the Gaza strip and the 
northern West Bank. See footnote 21 page 104.
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used by almost everyone, left-wingers and right-wingers, compromisers and 
expansionists. More than fifty years after the establishment of the state of Israel, the 
goal of achieving peace and security still remains the main focus of the public agenda, 
where every party claims to have the exclusive formula to attain this goal. For 
example, in the last four general elections, the parties slogans (both left and right) 
expressed a catchy peace and security motto such as ‘secured peace’, 'this peace is 
killing us’, ‘peace with security’ and alike.
The memory of the past one hundred years of violent clashes with the Arabs 
has engendered an existential fear among many Israelis that in delivering justice to the 
Palestinians they may be signing their own death warrant. Therefore, the content of 
the concept of security refers to the preservation of the Israeli state in view of the 
dangers deriving from Arab perceived intentions. Both peace and security, as key 
themes within the Israeli self have highly contested meaning where political 
ideologies have an effect on formed contents regarding these concepts. The wide- 
ranging consent over the militaristic political culture of Israel, in which commitment 
to the security of the state and its citizens often has supremacy over humanitarian 
values, has been produced and sustained by the Israeli self ever since its early days. 
This commitment and its consequences are demonstrated daily in the current military 
campaign against the Palestinian resistance. In the name of security, Israel’s deeds 
and policies occasionally pulverised the most basic rights of the Palestinians.
The Israeli self, regarding the conflict became ambiguous, ambivalent and 
included factual discrepancies, manifold contested interpretations of reality and moral 
contradictions. The nadir of these ideological disagreements resulted in the 
assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by a single right-wing assassin. Rabin’s 
determination to persist with the peace process engendered a wave of fierce objection 
from the national-right camp finding expression in incensed protests where voices 
calling Rabin a ‘traitor’ and ‘collaborator with the Arabs’ were heard. In one protest 
prior to his assassination, his picture was shown wearing a Nazi uniform. 
Nevertheless, the rocky road toward peace continued with talks and negotiations side 
by side, in the environment of sporadic terrorist attacks on the one hand and the 
furtherance of occupation practices, and the settlement enterprise in the occupied 
territories, on the other.
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In the summer of 2000, Prime Minister Barak, Chairman Arafat and President 
Clinton started in Camp David what should have been the final round of negotiations 
towards a peace agreement. Barak left Israel, leaving behind him a tom coalition and 
a fierce public voice proclaiming negative responses to the talks with the Palestinians. 
After two weeks of intensive talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians, the 
parties failed to reach an agreement, blaming each other for the breakdown of the 
talks. The collapse of the negotiations initiated a sequence of events which eventually 
resulted in the outbreak of the second Intifada.
Back to hegemony?
The beginning of the peace process brought a gust of hope and optimism to the 
majority of the Israeli society. Since the commencement of the Oslo accord and the 
historical hand shake of Rabin and Arafat at the White House garden in September 
1993, albeit enduring difficulties, potholes and the fierce opposition from the right, 
the peace camp has slowly yet optimistically extended its boundaries. However, the 
refusal of the Palestinians to accept Barak’s ostensible ‘generous offers’ and the 
outbreak of the violent uprising, shattered the fantasy of ‘peace is around the comer’ 
and generated a deep devastation and sense of disillusionment among the peace camp 
in Israel. The clashes, which followed the breakdown of the summit in Camp David 
have generated an overwhelming disappointment and mistrust and caused a deep 
crisis amongst the Israeli ‘peace-block’. There is a broad national consensus behind 
the assertion regarding the ‘most generous offers’ that Ehud Barak, the Israeli prime 
minister is said to have made to Arafat at Camp David, only to be confronted with a 
flat rejection and a return to violence.
The eruption of violence exposed the fragility of the apparent conciliation 
between the parties. The Palestinians decided to react to the collapse of the 
negotiations with violence and terror, while the Israelis decided to control the uprising 
and terror with massive force and before long the area deteriorated to a shattering 
cycle of blood.
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Following the acts of violence, both peoples aligned themselves with their 
respective right wings in response to ‘the other’s’ violence, and out of the need to 
justify their own violence. The war has become the existential situation of the Israelis 
and the Palestinians. No one is talking about an end to the confrontations, certainly 
not about resolution of the conflict, only about mutual ‘exacting of a price’. As David 
Grossman, an Israeli eminent novelist observed:
“Since there is no hope, Israelis and Palestinians go back to doing 
what they know how to do - to shed the blood of the other side. Each day 
more and more people join the ranks of the dead and wounded, of the 
haters and the despondent. Each day the appetite for revenge grows. Little 
by little, Israelis and Palestinians are moving further and further from 
peace. Without noticing it, Palestinians and Israelis are reverting to the 
pattern of an ancient tribal war, eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth” .
The Israelis interpreted the Palestinians rejection of the peace deal and the 
return to violence as proof of insincerity of the Palestinians to put an end to the 
conflict. Many perceived the failure of the Camp David talks and the subsequent 
violent outburst as a sign of the Palestinians insistence on principles that endanger 
the very existence of the State of Israel. Soon, the catchphrase ‘there is no partner for 
peace’ transformed into an undisputed truth and turned to be the official policy of 
Israel. The Israeli military and ministries asserted that chairman Arafat and the 
Palestinian Authority were contaminated with terrorism and cut all diplomat relations.
The political left glided to the right and the cycle of violence was widely 
depicted as yet another case of fighting a ‘no alternative’ war. The Palestinian 
resistance in all its forms, from the extremists’ vile terrorism to the popular struggle 
for liberation, is portrayed as a lurking danger and a threat to the entire Jewish people. 
As a result, the Israeli self is now reunited around the campfire of war. The Israeli self 
is now slipping back into the psychological stance of its earlier days- the stance of the 
victim, of the persecuted Jew where almost every threat to it is perceived as an 
absolute peril justifying the harshest response. As Yizhak Laor, author and playwright
38 Guardian, May 14,2001.
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states: “Israelis look to punish anyone who undermines our image of ourselves as 
victims. Nobody is allowed to take this image from us, especially not in the context of 
the war with the Palestinians, who are waging a war on ‘our home’ -  that is, their 
‘non-home’”39. We, apparently are allowed everything, for we are "the ultimate 
victims," even when we are the occupiers and we have the power.
Even Benny Morris, whom I referred to previously as one of the trailblazers of 
the “new historiography” had surprised many of his colleagues in the academia and 
the far-left of the political map when he claimed in an interview to ‘Yediot Ahronot’ 
(the most popular Israeli daily):
“It is the Palestinian leadership's rejection of the Barak-Clinton 
peace proposals of July-December 2000, the launching of the Intifada, and 
the demand ever since that Israel accept the "right of return" that has 
persuaded me that the Palestinians, at least in this generation, do not 
intend peace: they do not want, merely, an end to the occupation - that is 
what was offered back in July-December 2000, and they rejected the deal.
They want all of Palestine and as few Jews in it as possible. The right of 
return is the wedge with which to prise open the Jewish state. 
Demography - the far higher Arab birth rate - will, over time, do the rest, 
if Iranian or Iraqi nuclear weapons don't do the trick first”40.
The manifold voices of the Israeli self, the various narratives constituting this 
self, cycled back into a single voice of suspicion, insecurity and victimisation. The 
long Jewish history of living with persecutions is being deployed again in the daily 
discourse where the Palestinian violence has been sometimes presented as yet another 
pogrom and a potential new Holocaust. The results of these symbolic manipulations 
along with factual wave of brutal attacks (the suicide bombers) on buses, restaurants 
and shopping malls, which are interpreted according to this logic, have produced a 
tremendous fear among the Israelis and a demand to react with full-scale force against 
the threat.
39 Yediot Aharonot, April 22, 2002
40 Guardian, February 21,2002.
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It is impossible to overstate the impact of the suicide bombers on Israeli 
society. The sheer number of suicide attacks has dulled the Israeli self. In the past 
three years the Israelis have been living in a reality where people are tom apart, and 
complete families are slaughtered in cafes and buses. The public sphere in Israel 
today is a fortified sphere with armed guards standing everywhere. Every 
supermarket, bank, theatre and cafe now employs private guards whose duty is to 
search customers as they enter the building. Whenever people enter a restaurant or a 
bus they think hard about where to sit, whether it is better to be near the entrance or 
deeper inside. Hence, the central theme of the Israeli self cycled back to become the 
alert defensive Jew against the savage Arab and a subjective feeling of pain and 
trauma has become disseminated and strengthened. The view of the Palestinians as 
part of the surrounding millions of Arabs who all have one intention -to ‘drive the 
Jews into the sea’- has become again hegemonic in Israeli society.
Additional hegemony began to take root in Israel-Jewish society: that the 
conflict with the Palestinians may be unsolvable. This new hegemony is characterised 
by a mix of political ethnocentrism and self-deception exacerbated by the sense of 
existential threat and the conviction that the state is permanently embroiled in a 
predicament stemming from the perceived insolubility of the conflict with the 
Palestinians. The following extract, taken from a right-wing columnist in Ha’aretz 
(Israel quality daily) best epitomises the current outlook:
.. .’’Basically, the signs that the Arabs will never give up the fight have been 
apparent ever since the start of the modem return to Zion. However, fairly 
few people, in each generation, were willing to admit it: Our war of 
existence will not, evidently, ever end, even in the distant future... The 
objective of the Arabs’ wars, from the war rejecting the partition borders in 
1947 to the war rejecting the Camp David and Taba talks boundaries, is to 
prove that no sovereign Jewish presence, in any boundary whatsoever, was, 
is or will be accepted by the Muslim world, and certainly not by the Arab 
world... Suicide terrorism is not only battling against Jewish independence, 
but against the fact of our mere presence here. ... the Jewish people in its
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homeland is the only people in the world whose enemies aspire to drive it 
out of its own country”41.
Nevertheless, for some time now, alternative voices begin to penetrate the public 
discourse. After three bleeding years, through the fences of anger, fear, self­
victimisation, and massive demonisation of the Palestinians, a complementary picture 
is slowly permeating parts of the Israeli self. This voice, this counter-narrative, was 
almost completely muted for a long time but it seems as if it is diffusing again to the 
Israeli collective consciousness in the form of a minority influence. For example, 
recently a group of 27 elite military pilots publicly announced that they would refuse 
to take part in the targeted assassinations of Palestinian militants because of the 
inevitable result of the killing of innocent civilians. This comes not so long after the 
launch of ‘The Courage to Refuse’, a civilian social movement comprised of reserve 
soldiers and officers, who signed a petition declaring they “shall not continue to fight 
beyond the 1967 borders in order to dominate, expel, starve and humiliate an entire 
people”42.
These announcements stunned the Israeli public and the majority attacked and 
denounced the seemingly rebellious act. Yet, the Israeli self is hesitantly looking 
again in the mirror and seeing long years of occupation, house demolitions, curfews, 
humiliations, checkpoints, violations of human rights, searches, arrests, killings - all 
of which are part of the daily life of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. 
Put differently, the Israeli self is gradually opening up again through various 
communication channels to recognise the counter-narrative of the Palestinians.
The Israeli self today is trapped in an insurmountable moral and ethical 
dilemma where on the one hand it is forced to fight a war of no choice, a difficult, 
complex war - a war against terror. On the other hand, and, at the same time, the IDF 
is still an occupation force that violates the most basic human rights of millions of 
people. It is a self paralysed by fear, embracing policies of extrajudicial assassination, 
illegal settlement and in denial about the brutality it commits daily. Existentially
41 Haaretz: August 2004
42 From the ‘Refusniks’ website- www.seruv.org.il/defaulteng.asp.
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victimised according to its self-image, the Israeli self, in various degrees of awareness 
has turned its history of persecutions into a political asset. The memory of the 
holocaust is used for warding off any international criticism regarding the Israeli 
immoral policies and actions in the occupied territories.
In retrospect we might recognise that the suicide bombings, the Israeli vision 
of the military as a defensive force and the extensive rhetoric, which aims to portray 
the Palestinians as the absolute evil, blinded the Israeli self to its very own injustices 
and abuses, namely narrowing of the moral self. An Israeli narrow self that exhibits 
constant failing vis-a-vis the Palestinians is due to its dominant voice’s denial of the 
Palestinian humanity and refusal to acknowledge counter-narratives of occupation and 
subordination. It is a self that struggles to overcome the unbearable moral 
contradictions embedded in the tragic story of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Summary
In this chapter I tried to delineate the Israeli collective self in the context of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict of which I called the ‘victimised-occupier self. From its 
early, more homogeneous days, Israeli society sees itself as being bom out of 
centuries of Diaspora persecutions into the arms of Arab intransigence. The 
Holocaust, which was the key driving force to the Zionist movement’s decision to 
establish a Jewish state in Palestine, still plays a major role in the Israeli collective 
psyche. The protracted conflict with its Arab neighbours, that is perceived as yet 
another episode in the history of the prosecuted Jewish people has generated and 
sustained substantial feelings of mistrust and suspicions of Arabs, and constant (both 
psychological and actual) state of defensiveness. Equally, the Israeli self has 
cultivated a strong sense of heroism and military might. It is perfectly aware of its 
being a military and economic superpower. Having won all the wars against the 
Arabs, the Israeli self nurtured a strong sense of supremacy, both military and morally 
over the Arab enemies.
The 1967 war’s tremendous victory and its territorial consequences has been 
an ideological and psychological tremor for the Israeli self, which marked the
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beginning of a protracted rip in its relatively cohesive structure. It was a point in 
which the hegemony of the ‘few against many’ ethos has been weakened and the 
master narrative of the Israeli society has split. According to one version, the 
consequence of the Six-Days-War was part of a godly plan of liberating the sacred 
land and settle the ‘chosen people’ in their resurrecting kingdom.
For others, the redemptive outlook was detested and the occupation of the land 
and the Palestinian people was experienced as a moral retreat and as excessive, illegal 
damnifying expansionism. Ever since that day, the Israeli self is constantly in the 
midst of internal struggle between competing sets of values and representations, 
indeed between versions of reality. Various events, noticeably the 1973 and 1982 
wars, the 1987 first Palestinian popular uprising and the peace process it incited, have 
extended the cleavage in the Israeli self, which was by then a multifaceted arena of 
competing voices and ideologies.
Effectively, the expansionist outlook prevails. Israel still holds the occupied 
territories and is engaged in a massive controversial settlement enterprise. 3.5 million 
Palestinians have been living for thirty-eight years now under military occupation 
deprived of fundamental human and civic rights. Nevertheless, the Israeli self is 
resounding advocate for peace. The fervent desire to live peacefully side by side its 
Arab neighbours is a key constituent of the Israeli collective psyche and perhaps its 
sole consensual element. The majority of the Israelis genuinely believe that Israel has 
always had its arm outstretched with an olive branch only to be rejected time and 
again by the obstinate Arabs.
This shared belief gained redoubled strength with the collapse of the Camp 
David talks and the outbreak of the Palestinian armed uprising. The perceived threat 
generated by the Palestinian suicide bombing campaign has stirred an exceptional 
unity of mistrust and victimhood. After many years of fierce internal struggle over its 
identity, the Israeli self was reunited around the campfire of war. Despite the 
fundamental asymmetry of power relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, 
Israelis see themselves as the primary victims. The Israeli self is now constituted of 
strong feelings of a defenceless victim even when it clashes markedly with Israel’s 
military might. The horrible images in the mass media and the political rhetoric have
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amplified the fear and generated a psychological equation between personal and 
national threat and lack of security. Embodied in pictures of blasted, tom buses is an 
existential threat to the state of Israel. It generated a complete imperviousness to the 
suffering of the Palestinians. The Israeli self was eager to respond with full-scale 
force and the Israeli army launched massive military operations, which inevitably, by 
the nature of confrontations between an occupying army and civilian population 
fighting to end the occupation, slides over into acts of abuse, unnecessary shooting, 
massive demolition of houses, the killing of hundreds of innocent people and the daily 
intimidation of thousands at checkpoints.
In sum, the Israeli victimised-occupier self is comprised of contradictory 
elements. It is constitutive of strong sense of victimhood and vulnerability while 
maintaining an illegal and unscrupulous occupation against the mle of international 
law. While it explicitly states its willingness to end the occupation it is in effect 
deepening its hold in the territories and expanding the settlements. It is trapped 
between an ethos of self-control and restraint while willing to exercise its military 
might in unrestrained manner. It is both aware of the injustice it inflicts upon the 
Palestinians and completely disregards their sufferings. And lastly, it yearns for peace 
but is not really willing to pay the price for achieving this eternal dream, especially 
when it holds feelings of disdain and contempt, hatred and fear towards the 
Palestinians with whom peace should be made. In the following chapters, I will try to 
show the workings of these processes as they come to play and shape the children’s 
responses in relation to the Palestinian perspective.
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5. THE IMAGE OF THE OTHER: PERSPECTIVE TAKING IN
DRAWINGS
Figure 1 Girl - Settlement
Introduction
For much of human history, images and symbols have preserved and 
communicated meaning. From the early days to the present, images and symbols have 
shown the richness and complexity of human life and have always been considered a 
form of communication and self-expression. According to Burton (1991), the driving 
force behind image making is “the human need and desire to make sense of the world 
and the self in the world” (p.6). In visual material one can find a collection of symbols 
that are representations of objects and expressions of ideas, feelings and emotions. 
The use of images and symbols is so much a part of human cognition that it allows us 
to make statements saturated with sociological meaning, which sometimes cannot be 
made with words. Taken cumulatively, images are signifiers of culture and thus can 
be used empirically to investigate social organization, cultural meaning and 
psychological processes.
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Drawing is considered a natural mode of expression for children. Much of 
children’s (and adults’) thinking involves images and therefore their drawings are 
artistic expressions by means of symbols. As Gardner (1982) notes “in the period 
from age two to seven, the child comes to know and begins to master the various 
symbols in his culture.... In addition to knowing the world directly, he can capture and 
communicate his knowledge of things and people through any number of symbolic 
forms”(p.87). Coming from the clinical-projective approach to children’s drawings, 
Bums (1987) claims that images appearing in children’s drawings “are but ferries 
carrying us to the shore of experience beyond verbal thought; a shore where one 
picture is worth a thousand words”(p.l77).
The sociological perspective on children’s drawings
Apart from the three dominant approaches to children’s drawings, namely, the 
cognitive-developmental approach, the clinic-projective approach, and the artistic- 
expressive approach, each with its own underlying assumption and objectives, there is 
a growing body of research which demonstrates the advantages of children’s drawings 
for sociological inquiry as well. In what follows I will try to show that children’s 
drawings offer both theoretical and empirical advantages in making certain aspects of 
the social world visible. The following examples reflect the capacity of drawings to 
examine children’s (inter)subjectively held ideas about the larger social world in 
which they participate.
In his book ‘Group Values Through Children’s Drawings’ (1966), Dennis first 
introduces the sociological perspective in the study of children’s drawings. He 
examines how differences in cultural patterns and values are reflected in children’s 
visual expressions. Relying on this pioneer work, Vasquez-Nuttall et al (1988), use 
children’s drawings to bring to the fore representations of the family in different 
cultures. The data collected enables the researchers to note great differences in the 
way families were represented, and to conclude that the drawings do actually reflect 
the social and cultural values of different groups. For example, representations of 
collectivism were expressed by the Chinese children through the tendency to include
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the members of the extended family, while in contrast, the American children seemed 
to express strong feelings of individualism and independence towards the family.
In a similar study, Hummel et al (1995) have used quantitative analysis of 
children’s drawings of grandparents from six different countries. Their research 
clearly demonstrates great differences in the children’s representations of the elders. 
For example, whereas the Swiss children represented their grandparents as people 
living alone, on the fringe of society, as if they no longer have any social role apart 
from self-care activities, the elders in the Indian children’s drawings are portrayed as 
strongly integrated into society yet almost exclusively in the role of caregivers. The 
researchers conclude that drawings can “well be used as complex, but reliable, 
instruments in the field of sociological investigation” (p. 169).
Other studies have examined ideas about healthy behaviours (Wetton and 
McWhirtier 1988), how drawings of the environment (buildings) vary by cultural 
context (Krampen, 1991), children’s representations of the world of drugs (Hadley 
and Stockdale, 1996) and children’s representations and concerns about 
environmental crisis (King, 1995). De Rosa (1987) describes significant aspects of 
social representations of mental illness, with the use of children’s drawings. She notes 
that images “are an essential vehicle for the study of social representations, especially 
when utilized to project externally latent symbolic structures”(.p 56).
The image of the ‘other’ as reflected in Human Figure Drawing
Although initially developed as an intelligence or personality test, the Human 
Figure Drawing (HFD) can also serve as a highly instructive tool for sociological 
inquiry. As already noted Dennis (1966) uses the HFD in his research in order to 
investigate social learning and culture. He claims that preferences and choices, 
guided by social values, are reflected in children’s drawings of other people. 
Additionally, he demonstrates how different attitudes and values towards in-group 
and out-group are manifested in the drawings. Following Dennis, Chambers (1983) 
invented the "Draw-A-Scientist Test”. She attempted to study students’ perceptions 
of scientists, especially among students at ages young enough that they might not be
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able to express themselves very well through writing. Since Chambers, numerous 
studies of students’ drawings note conspicuous patterns surrounding gender and 
particular activities undertaken by a variety of different types of social actors. 
Overwhelmingly, students depict scientists as male (Fort and Varney 1989; Huber and 
Burton 1995), although this gender bias is not limited to scientists. Other applications 
find similar types of results among drawings of pilgrims, settlers, and hippies 
(Fournier and Wineberg 1997), while students almost universally draw teachers as 
female (Weber and Mitchell 1995). Moreover, drawings depicting male characters 
also tend to show them engaged in scientific endeavours or other activities, while 
female characters appear inert (Fournier and Wineberg 1997; Huber and Burton 1995; 
Weber and Mitchell 1995). These studies show that the HFD can be a valuable tool 
for exploring not only the products of perceptual exploration and information 
processing but also as reconstructions of knowledge circulating in the social 
environment the children live in.
The most advanced attempt to systematise the HFD as a method for the 
appraisal of stereotypical and attitudinal aspects towards self and other, has been 
made by Teichman and Bar-Tal (Teichman. 2001; Teichman and Zaffir, 2003; Bar- 
Tal and Teichman 2005). Drawn upon dominant cognitive-developmental and 
experimental social-psychological theories regarding children’s drawing, stereotypes 
and prejudice, they developed a multi-parameter analytic tool. They asked Israeli 
children in different age groups to draw a typical Jewish and/or Arab man. Following 
each drawing the children were asked to answer an open-ended questionnaire about 
the person they had just drawn. Their findings are too extensive and complex to be 
reviewed in full, yet overall the image of the Arab is portrayed as having significantly 
lower status, more negative feelings and more aggressive behaviour. The children 
depict the Arab as significantly more aggressive than the Jew, and the attitudes and 
intentions toward him were significantly more negative.
As suggested earlier, a social-psychological enquiry to the notion of taking the 
perspective of the other should commence with the question - what other? That is to 
say, in order to get a better grasp on failings or difficulties of individuals and groups 
to take the perspective of other individuals or groups, one should start by looking at 
the symbolic construction and understandings of the ‘other’ in question. In that sense
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children’s drawings, as figurative expressions of symbolically mediated reality 
between the child and the social world can convey rich details on the ideological 
construction of the other in question.
The rationale for studying children’s drawings of the ‘other’ in the current study is 
essentially three-fold:
•
■ In accordance with my contention that perspective taking is a communicative 
practice, drawings are a figurative mode of communication and can reflect 
values, attitude and stereotypes towards self and other. Given the intensity of 
the political climate in Israel, it is assumed that the situation influences the 
children’s drawings by calling upon their socio-political knowledge and 
responses. The drawing task thus intended to elicit intersubjective responses 
and might reveal how these ideas become integrated and communicated 
graphically. At a theoretical level, drawings may ‘make visible’ the various 
representations that mediate perspective taking. The children’s involvement 
and interests as actors in the social world is assumed to underlie the nature of 
their representational work where the intentions, behaviours and values of the 
‘other’ are explored and incorporated in their drawings. Moreover, children’s 
drawings can give insight into the objectifications of the children. As 
Moscovici (1984) notes, “to objectify is to discover the iconic quality of an 
imprecise idea or being, to reproduce a concept in an image” (p. 49).
■ When asked to draw a Palestinian, the children must usually draw some form 
of human depiction. In this sense, drawing is an embedded practice. While this 
may be a limitation of drawings, it can also be an asset as it delimits certain 
parameters. Drawing requires children to make their intentions clear through 
shared denotations and common symbols that stand for recognized ideas. By 
implicitly asking for an embodied representation, it is assumed that the 
drawings will prompt the children to make decisions and evaluations about the 
characteristics of the Palestinian, the kinds of activities they will likely 
undertake, and the contexts in which they appear. In this regard, the drawings
135
can be treated as graphic narratives in which the children are required to 
position the ‘other’ (and self) as a way to establish perspective.
■ And lastly, on a more practical level, I have found that drawings provide a 
relatively quick and easy way to gather social information from and about 
children. I found that children are not only willing but also eager to participate 
in drawing sessions.
Findings
Analysis 1: Content analysis of drawings
In a variety of ways, the analysis of the drawings reveals the operation of 
ideologically informed iconic repertoire. The drawings are replete with an assortment 
of political messages of which the most dominant is the violent behaviour attributed 
to the Palestinian drawn characters. As will be presented, whereas the city and 
settlement drawings are very similar in their patterns, the content of the drawings of 
the Kibbutz children differs quite significantly.
Table 3. Subject sample
Gender Total
Social group Male Female
City 19 22 41
Settlement 19 20 39
Kibbutz 21 22 43
Total 59 64 123
The drawn character and the activity
The results show that the majority of the characters, Palestinian boy or girl, are 
represented alone (47.2%). The rest drew the Palestinian with an Israeli character
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(28.5%), or with peers (17.9%). Very few children drew the Palestinian with family 
(4.1%) or with various characters, i.e. peers, and/or family with Israeli (2.4%).
As to the activity, there are two dominant patterns. In 44.7% of the drawings 
the Palestinian was represented as involved in violent actions (i.e. throwing stones, 
shooting, placing a bomb). In 42.3% of the drawings, the Palestinian is inactive. 
Some children drew the Palestinian involved in non-violent, but conflict related 
activities such as raising a flag (9.8%) and being attacked (3.3%).
Figure 2 Girl - Kibbutz
Group patterns
In the drawings from the Kibbutz, more than half of the characters are inactive 
(55.8%). Only 9.1% of the Kibbutz children drew the Palestinian as involved in a 
violent act, yet Palestinian involved in non-violent conflict related activity is a 
category exclusive to the Kibbutz drawings and was presented in 27.9% of the groups
137
drawings. This category was comprised of drawings in which the Palestinian figure is 
shown to convey a non-violent political message such as raising the Palestinian flag 
or a peaceful message such as ‘let’s be friends’ or ‘we are all the same’. In two 
drawings, the Palestinian is drawn as being attacked by the Israelis.
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The Activity: Behaviour Attributed to the Figure
In the settlers’ drawings, the majority of the Palestinians are involved in 
violent activity (61.5%). The rest are either inactive (35.9%), with one drawing that 
shows the Palestinian as being attacked yet it was clear from other evidence that 
‘being attacked’ represented what should be done to the Palestinian rather than 
depicting the Palestinian as a victim.
Regarding these variables, the city children’s drawings are very similar to 
those from the settlement. The Palestinian activity patterns show 47.3% are involved 
in violent acts, 26.9% inactive and one drawing depicts the Palestinian as being 
attacked as a desirable treatment rather than expressing empathy.
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Symbols of conflict
The violent nature of the conflict is vastly represented in the children’s 
drawings. Stones, guns, knives, ambulances, blood and bombs, (hereinafter-warfare 
symbols) were widely used. The latter, being the most prominent symbol, was found 
in 35% of the drawings (see table 2). It is important to note here that since in many of 
the drawings there was more than one symbol of conflict, this variable was scored as a 
multiple response in order to gain qualitative data on the features and usage of these 
symbols as well as quantitative information on the amount of symbols usage among 
the groups.
Table 4: Symbols of conflict (count).
Symbols of conflict
Social group
City Settlement Kibbutz Total
Stone/s 12 12 24
Gun/s 14 8 12 34
Bomb/s 23 20 4 48
Knife/s 6 10 2 18
Tank 3 2 4 9
Ambulance 12 8 3 23
Blood 1 6 2 9
flag 2 9 15 26
Fence 7 7
Map 4 4
Dove with olive branch 3 3
Group patterns
Analysis of the various symbols drawn by the children reveals clear patterns of 
the groups’ segmentation43. As seen in the table, bomb/s were mostly depicted as 
being worn by the Palestinian individual to symbolise the suicide bombers. They are 
significantly the most frequent symbol of conflict used in the children’s drawings (See
43 I will suggest some interpretations of these symbols and the explanations for their 
depiction, yet the reading of the quantitative data regarding the frequent usage of this or that symbol 
within the groups needs always to be considered with caution since the drawing task was undertaken in 
a setting of a classroom of 35-40 children and some degree of peers’ mutual influence is inevitable.
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figure 3, 4, 5, 6). The reference to the suicide bomber is made in more than 50% of 
both the city and the settlement drawings whereas in the kibbutz drawings only four 
(10%) children made reference to the suicide bombers.
Figure 3 Boy - Settlement Figure 4 Boy - City
The sign of gun/s (see figures 3, 4, 9) reveals another remarkable difference 
among the groups. The table shows that this symbol is represented just about evenly 
across the groups (14, 8, 12 in the city, settlement and kibbutz respectively) a 
somewhat surprising finding considering the less acute nature of the kibbutz drawings 
in general and the fact that when looking back at the ‘activity’ of the drawn character 
in the kibbutz drawings, there are only five children who depicted the Palestinian as 
being involved in violent activity. A closer look at the data shows that in the 
remainder of the drawings, which contain the gun/s symbol, there are either Israeli 
figures that hold a gun against the Palestinian or that the sign of gun/s accompanied 
by additional representations are meant to indicate and condemn the dismal and 
violent reality of the conflict.
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Figure 6 Boy - Kibbutz Figure 7 Girl - Settlement
In addition to the vast appearance of the suicide bombers who represent the 
terrorist nature of the Palestinian and the conflict, the symbol of stone/s is assumed to 
represent the more popular nature of the Palestinian uprising. Being the symbol of the 
first Intifada, stones remain a significant symbol of conflict to both the city and the 
settlement and were found in approximately 30% of their drawings. No such symbols 
were found in the kibbutz drawings.
♦
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There were also two different kinds of vehicles depicted in the children’s 
drawings as prominent representations of the conflict. The first, the tank (heavily 
armoured combat vehicle that is armed with cannons and machine guns and moves on 
continuous tracks) was found in nine drawings. This symbol is used in reference to 
two different perspectives. On the one hand, it might represent the Israeli military 
superiority since the Palestinians have no such vehicle. The children who use the tank 
in this context depicted a battlefield where the Palestinians use bombs, guns or stones 
while the Israelis fight back with tanks. An alternative and rare usage, found in the 
kibbutz, was to convey the idea of a burdensome presence of the Israeli army in the 
Palestinian neighbourhoods.
Figure 8 Girl - Settlement
The second vehicle, the ambulance, was depicted in 18.6% of the drawings, 
mostly in the city (12) and the settlement (8) drawings (see figure 1,13, 22). The sight 
(and sound) of an ambulance has become an integral part of the daily lives of both 
Israelis and Palestinians yet it was drawn in reference to the suicide bombings in 
Israel.
Another symbol, which significantly distinguishes the groups, is the 
Palestinian flag. This symbol is very frequent in the kibbutz drawings being found in 
36% of the drawings and is occasionally accompanied with the Israeli flag,
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supposedly to represent equality and self determination. Additionally, there were two 
non-violent conflict related symbols, namely a fence and a map. It is difficult to 
determine the specific meaning of the fence since at the time of the data collection the 
fence (separation wall) was not yet a key symbol as it is now, yet the children drew a 
fence to depict different means of separation, such as between us and them or between 
the present and future. The map of Israel/Palestine was drawn as a signifier of the 
context of the conflict. It is both the problem since it is a fight over land, and the 
solution in the form of agreeable partition. These political symbols, in addition to the 
dove with olive branch, a prominent symbol of peace, were exclusive to the Kibbutz 
drawings.
Figure 9 Girl - Settlement
Symbols of the stereotypical Palestinian
A significant variable indicating intergroup divergence is the way children 
represented the drawn character in terms of stereotypical depiction. The data suggests 
both qualitative and quantitative differences among the groups. To begin with the 
quantitative information (see Table 5): whereas in 60.5% of the kibbutz drawings
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there is no stereotypical depiction of the Palestinian, in only 22% and 20.5% of the 
city and settlement (respectively) drawings there are no symbols of stereotypes. 
Moreover, in the rest of the kibbutz drawings (39.5%) there is one stereotypical 
depiction, while in 41.4% of the city drawings there are 2 or more stereotypes 
attached to the Palestinian figure. The settlement drawings were the most 
stereotypical with 59% drawings with 2 or more stereotypical symbols.
>
Figure 10 Boy - City
Table 5. Symbols of stereotype quantitative * social group Cross tabulation
Social group
City Settlement Kibbutz Total
Symbols of 
stereotype 
quantitative
.00 Count
% within social 
group
9
22.0%
8
20.5%
26
60.5%
43
35.0%
1.00 Count 15 8 17 40
% within social
group
Count
36.6% 20.5% 39.5% 32.5%
2.00 14 18 0 32
3.00
% within social
group
Count
34.1%
3
46.2%
5
.0%
0
26.0%
8
Total
% within social
group
Count
7.3%
41
12.8%
39
.0%
43
6.5%
123
% within social 
group 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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The most frequent symbols were the Arab men’s ‘kafiah’ headdress and the 
Arab women’s veil drawn in 36.5% of the drawings (see figures 11, 26, 27, 28, 29, 
31). Facial stubble attached to the male character is the second most frequent symbol 
(this symbol was attached to a few of the female Palestinian figures as well e.g. figure 
9). These are fine examples of social typecasting and negative stereotyping, since the 
explicit task was to draw a Palestinian child at their age. However, children at that age 
do not wear the kafiah or veil and obviously have no facial hair. It is assumed that the 
presence of stubble and the kafiah indicate the powerful image of the Palestinian 
leader, Arafat, placed in the minds of the children (see figure 11, 15, 26, 27). This 
assumption is strengthened by the supplementary data sources.
In addition to the kafiah and veil, which are traditional-cultural forms of 
clothing, when depicting the Palestinian figure the representation is that of poverty 
and unkempt external appearance (see figure 23, 41). Indicators of poverty, such as 
tom clothes feature in 10% of the drawings. Finally, signs of scars on the Palestinian 
face are to be found in about 30% of the drawings from the city and settlement 
(figures 37, 38, 39). In comparison there are no indicators of scars in the kibbutz 
drawings. This symbol seems to be a complementary sign in the service of 
representing a scary image of the Palestinian.
Table 6. Symbols of Stereotypes (count)
Stereotypes
Social group
City Settlement Kibbutz
kafia/veil 15 21 9
Stubble 18 18 4
Scars 13 12 0
Poverty/scruffy 5 5 3
Other 0 0 2
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Analysis 2: Interpretative analysis
In addition to the content/quantitative approach, I analysed each of the drawings 
in a more hermeneutic manner with an attempt to discern perspectives and themes that 
emerge from the pictures. As seen in the above analysis, in the vast majority of the 
drawings the children made their intentions visually clear by using straightforward 
symbols that stand for recognized ideas regarding the kinds of activities Palestinians 
undertake, and the contexts in which they appear. In the current analysis I look at each 
of the drawings as a whole unit (rather than looking at separate details within the 
drawing as was done in the previous analysis) in trying to discern the story being told 
through the drawing. I asked: what is the single, most important message conveyed in 
each drawing? What is the impression the Israeli child wished to communicate to the 
viewer? What is the underlying perspective conveyed? And what are the implications 
for the propensity and practice of taking the perspective of the other? After several 
recordings, I found that all of the 123 drawings could be fall into one of the following 
five perspectives of the ‘other’ conveyed by the children:
The terrorist /despised Palestinian
This was by far the most frequent category (45% of all drawings), these 
drawings contain an assortment of warfare symbols, violence and destruction that 
meant to leave the viewer with tangible sense of alarm and foreboding. These, in 
collaboration with the negative-stereotypical image of the Palestinian and his or her 
violent behaviour, represent the Palestinian in an utterly diabolical manner. Alone, or 
accompanied by peers, Israelis or both, the Palestinian figure is depicted as fully 
armed and either attacking, or expressing explicit intentions to do so. The drawings 
vary according to levels of dehumanisation of the Palestinian and the intensity of the 
represented violence. They range from ordinary figures armed with some sort of 
weapon to horrifying images of creepy Palestinian figures surrounded by fantastic 
symbols of death and destruction. Also included in this category are images of 
fantastic or ridicule Palestinian. In these drawings, the Palestinian boy or girl, even if 
not armed, is still represented in extremely negative manner.
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Figure 11 Boy - City Figure 12 Boy - Settlement
Pictures of the Palestinian as a suicide bomber were a recurrent image. 
For example in a drawing of a boy from the city (figure 11), a huge, scarred 
image with a verbal expression attached reading “I will murder the Jews, Jew 
hater” on one side, and on the other “I have at home M-16, Kasam missiles, 
guns and bombs and more and more!” The figure is pointing towards a small 
figure of an Israeli drawn with its hands up and the Israeli flag. Bullet-like 
symbols are coming out of the Palestinian hand towards the Israeli, who in a 
verbal expression attached sings the national anthem and cries “Ah, Ah, Ah I 
was shot.... Stinky Arab”. In another drawing from the settlement (Figure 13), a 
stubble-face Palestinian with a knife is encircled by red zigzag lines and the 
word BOOM!! representing an explosion meant to portrait a suicide bomber. 
Near him, left lying, are four dead bodies and an ambulance.
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Figure 13 Girl - Settlement
These examples communicate the unambiguous message that the 
intentions and will of the other are hostile and destructive and suggest that the 
Palestinian ‘other’ is nothing but a threat to the Israeli ‘se lf. They are meant to 
promote a message of delegitimisation of the Palestinian on the one hand, and a 
strong sense of Israeli victimization on the other. It seems as if the ‘perspective’ 
of the other in these drawings is completely denied and is replaced with a 
conclusive view of the other as a sheer threat. Put differently, when the other is 
perceived as a threat and as inhuman, there is no space for other interpretations 
or versions of reality. The voice of the other is completely muted and denied.
Figure 14 Boy -  City Figure 15 Boy -Settlement
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Equality/peace
These drawings are imbued with an aura of comradeship and reconciliation. 
The Palestinian child, whether drawn as a stick figure or as a fine human figure is 
accompanied with an Israeli figure. The figures are usually indicated by names 
(Arabic or Hebrew names) or by political symbols such as the national flag attached 
to the figures. Flowers, the sun, a rainbow, green trees and vivid colours conjure up 
the idealised image of both self and other at peace and harmony. For example, a girl 
from the kibbutz (Figure 16) drew two happy looking girls who look very much 
alike, differentiated only by their clothes, which are ‘tailored’ with the national flags, 
standing on a bed of flowers and leaves. The heading of the picture says ‘lets be 
friends’ and a verbal expression attached to the girls reads ‘we’re happy together’. 
Symbols of conflict or warfare are completely absent from these drawings and the 
deliberately communicated perspective is that of mutual tolerance, fellowship and 
evenness supported with headings such as ‘we are all the same’ and ‘peace in the 
world’.
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Figure 16 Girl - Kibbutz
These pictures, drawn by 10.5% of the children pose a challenge for 
interpretation. Can they be seen as some sort of psychological avoidance or 
fanciful escape from the overwhelming stressful reality? Perhaps, but there are
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reasons to doubt such a conclusion. Another reading - going beyond the 
apparent, yet consistent with the content of the drawings - suggests that these 
idyllic scenes might represent a challenge to the dominant ideologies and the 
expected enemy-image and strive to convey an alternative desirable perspective.
Figure 17 Boy - Kibbutz
They might even raise issues of children’s empowerment and political 
engagement. Indeed these children demonstrate political commitment and 
concern in their drawings of self and other. But another, more complex quality 
emerges when drawings in this category are taken as a whole. Revealed in the 
repetitiveness of content and tone- the rainbows and flowers, the sameness of the 
slogans- a sense arises that in no lesser degree than the ‘terrorist’ category, these 
drawings avoid any reflexive engagement with the perspective of the other but 
rather, the children who drew these pictures ‘project’ or reconstruct their own 
group’s ideology, in this case peace ideology, onto the Palestinian other.
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Figure 18 Girl- Kibbutz
That is to say, although there is indeed protest against ‘reality’, there is, to some 
extent, a trivialisation in the reproduction of counter-rhetoric. Engagement with the 
perspective of the other in this genre is reduced to reproduction of idealised images of 
self and other in desired reality.
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Figure 19 Boy - Kibbutz
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Dismal reality
A distinct qualitative shift occurs in the content and mood of these drawings. 
This category (11.3% of all drawings) comprises of visual and verbal representations 
of grievous reality. Images of warfare, atrocities and death are present, yet they do not 
overwhelmingly dominate the drawings and the Palestinian character is depicted as 
either protesting against or expressing deep despondency towards the gloomy 
situation. In most of the drawings from this category, the despair refers to both the 
Palestinians and the Israelis. The happy looking children from the equality/peace 
category are transformed here to images of dejection.
It is possible to divide these drawings between those who communicate a sense 
of powerlessness and pessimism with no specific causal factor and those who 
communicate a message of mutual responsibility and blame. In the former group, 
most of the drawings emphasise the children as victims of the tragic reality whereas 
in the latter the children accentuate self and other agency and accountability.
Figure 20 Boy - Kibbutz
For example, in one drawing of a boy from the kibbutz (figure 20), the 
page is divided into two frames; on one side is the Palestinian figure, on the other 
the Israeli. Apart from the textual indication of who is who, the figures look 
much the same. On the Palestinian side there are the words, blood, terrorists, 
Arafat and atrocity. On the Israeli side there are the words, murder, poverty,
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soldiers, blood and Ariel Sharon. Above, in the middle presented, perhaps 
cynically, the word PEACE.
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Figure 21 Girl - Settlement
In a different drawing by a girl from the settlement (figure 21), both the 
Palestinian and the Israeli girls, who are separated by a fence, are crying with 
tears. The Palestinian girl says, “My home was demolished” and the Israeli girl 
says, “My brother died in a terrorist attack”. Drawings from this category may 
also present the atrocious present against a hopeful future. Another, divides the 
page into two frames with Israeli and Palestinian figures encircled by symbols of 
conflict such as bombs and an ambulance with the heading ‘Today’. This is 
drawn in opposition to encouraging future depicted by images of peace and 
reconciliation under the title ‘In the future’ (Figure 22).
Figure 22 Girl - Kibbutz
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However there are also drawings that intend to focus solely on or 
emphasise the gloomy and discouraging condition of the Palestinians. These 
include a rare example of an image of an Israeli soldier mistreating the 
Palestinian (figure 23). In another drawing from the kibbutz (Figure 24) a 
portrait of a cheerless Palestinian girl is encircled by dark clouds, images of 
warfare and black withered flowers, set against a cheerful Israeli girl standing 
under the sun and surrounded by flowers.
Figure 23 Boy -  Kibbutz
Figure 24 Girl - Kibbutz
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Generalisations from these drawings need to be carefully qualified, given the 
small number of drawings and the variation among them. Nevertheless, the drawings 
in this category present a reflexive engagement with the perspective of the other and 
the dismal consequences of the conflict for both the Israelis and Palestinians. The 
Palestinians in these drawings neither pose a threat nor are they located in a pastoral 
camaraderie. Rather, the pictures communicate acknowledgement of the 
consequences of the conflict and the sufferings of both self and other.
The stereotypical Palestinian
This category, which comprises 17% of all drawings, posed a difficulty for 
interpretation. There are no violent symbols or behaviour in these drawings, yet the 
depiction of the Palestinians within this category is no less stereotypical. The 
seemingly positive depictions in this category tend to focus on cultural-traditional- 
tribal representations. The Palestinians, boy, girl or family are depicted wearing their 
traditional clothing and headdress (Kafia for men and the veil for women) in the 
context of everyday life such as a family gathering, working the field or playing with 
peers (Figures 25, 28, 29, 30, 31). For example, a girl from the settlement drew a 
traditionally dressed Palestinian mother with her five children standing in their 
apparent living room with no furniture but a colourful rug on the floor (figure 25).
Figure 26 Boy - KibbutzFigure 25 Girl -  Settlement
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Another recurrent theme found in this category is poverty and neglect. The 
Palestinians in these drawings are depicted with a shabby and unkempt appearance 
symbolised by tom or dirty clothes. Additionally, there are also images of the 
Palestinian, which, as I mentioned earlier, are clearly influenced by the image of 
Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian omnipresent leader. The moustache, stubble and the 
headdress (figure 27) are recurrent images within these drawings.
Figure 28 Girl -CityFigure 27 Boy -  Kibbutz
Thus, apart from the absence of violence themes, the drawings in this genre 
represent the Palestinian in a highly stereotypical manner. While they don’t seem to 
have a clear intention of delegitimisation these drawings still emphasis otherness. 
The ‘tribal-traditional’ drawings, although ostensibly positive in the impression they 
communicate, (perhaps complement the authentic or the exotic) still embody a 
perception of backwardness, underdevelopment and inferiority.
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Figure 29 Boy -K ibbutz Figure 30 Girl - Settlement
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Unidentified Palestinian
Figure 31 Girl -City
The last category (15.5% of all drawings) comprises of all the drawings in 
which there is not a single symbol which can specifically refer to or signify the
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Palestinian (see figures 32, 33, 35, 36, 42). Depicting neither war nor peace, the 
drawings look like pictures of ordinary human figures, boys or girls, in various 
contexts of everyday life. Looking at these, one cannot tell if the children
Figure 32 Boy -  City Figure 33 Girl - Kibbutz
were asked to draw themselves, their friends or just boys or girls, as they all appear 
positive or at least neutral. It is difficult to determine the intended perspective in some 
of these drawings. However the verbal expressions attached to the figure or the 
heading of the drawing reveal the latent representational work. One drawing of a girl 
(figure 34) that looks most ordinary is complete with the heading: NOT ALL THE 
ARABS ARE SUICIDE BOMBERS. Additional drawings read: ‘We all look the 
same’ or ‘ I am just like you’. Thus, these children are apparently challenging what 
they either think is expected from them in the task, or, the content stems from their 
friends’ drawings. They reflexively reject the dominant or prevailing ideologies and 
stereotypes that present the Palestinians in a negative manner and as a threat to self. 
They negotiate enhanced representations for the other by highlighting the sameness of 
self and other. Still, in these drawings similar to the equality/peace category, it is 
difficult to determine whether these depictions should be regarded as a reproduction 
of desirable or appropriate ideas or as a real interest or engagement with the 
perspective of the other.
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SFigure 34 Girl - Settlement
Figure 35 Girl - Kibbutz
Statistical analysis of the above categories, using SPSS Answer Tree (see page 
xxx) suggests interesting patterns between and within the groups. The analysis shows 
that, social group as a variable, is a good predictor to the categories of the drawings 
(Chi-square=47.32, df=4 p<0.005) and indeed is a better predictor than gender. The 
city and settlement show no significant difference in the frequency of the categories. 
The majority (63.75%) of the drawings from these groups correspond to the ‘terrorist 
Palestinian’ category. The next largest categories in these groups are the ‘stereotypical 
Palestinian’ and ‘unidentified Palestinian’, showing 16.25% and 15% respectively.
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There are only 3 drawings of ‘dismal reality’ in both the groups and one drawing of 
‘equality/peace’.
These findings, in accord with the previous analysis, suggest that the children 
from the city and the settlement mainly perceive the perspective of the other as 
destructive and as threat to self. In contrast to that, the children who did not portray 
the Palestinians as aggressors chose to bring forward either different stereotypical 
aspects or to consciously reject a negative portrayal of the Palestinian. Indeed, a 
closer look at the general impression of the drawn character within these categories- 
stereotypical and unidentified- reveal that only three drawings from both categories 
present the Palestinian in a negative manner. In other words, 31 % of the children from 
both the city and the settlement consciously omit the violent aspect of the conflict and 
conveyed a rather positive picture of the other. However, hardly any child from these 
groups referred to either dismal or idealised (peace/equality) perspective regarding the 
Palestinian other.
Figure 36 Girl -  City Figure 37 Boy - Settlement
The kibbutz children show significantly different patterns. Their drawings are 
much more diverse with ‘equality/peace’ as the largest category (27.9%). The ‘dismal 
reality’ category shows very similar frequency with 25.6%. In contrast to the city and 
the settlement the ‘terrorist’ category is the less frequent with only 5 drawings
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(11.6%). The rest of the drawings are either ‘unidentified’ (16.3%) or ‘stereotypical’ 
(18.6%).
Although social group is a better predictor it is interesting to note the gender 
differences in relation to the categories between and within the groups. To start with 
the kibbutz drawings, the ‘equality/peace’ category dominates the girls’ drawings 
(40.9%) whereas only one girl from that group depicted the Palestinian as a terrorist. 
(A closer look at that drawing reveals that she drew both male and female figures and 
it was the male figure that was the aggressor.) Dismal reality was drawn by 27.2% of 
the girls from the kibbutz and the unidentified category was found in 18.1%. Two 
girls from the kibbutz have generated the value ‘other’ in the symbols of stereotypical 
when they drew the Palestinian girl as a belly dancer.
As seen in the table the kibbutz boys’ drawings are divided comparably across 
the categories. There were malevolent representations of the Palestinian as well as 
ordinary and positive representations. Comparing the two antithetic categories, i.e. the 
‘dismal reality’ and the ‘terrorist’ prove similar occurrence with 5 and 4 drawings 
respectively.
Gender differences are more significant in the settlement and city groups (Chi- 
square 17.35, df=4, p<0.001). A boy from these groups is very unlikely to adopt the 
theme of either equality/peace or dismal reality. On the contrary it is very likely that 
he will portray the Palestinian as a terrorist, with 86.8% of the boys from both the city 
and settlement endorsing that perspective. The girls from these groups are more 
diverse in their responses but still in favour of the terrorist hypothesis (42.8%). On 
the contrary, there were only 1 and 3 girls whose drawings fell into the equality/peace 
and dismal reality categories respectively.
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T hen* of th e  draw ing
NodeO
Category % n
■ equatyfceace 1057 13
■ unidentifed Palestinian 15.45 19
■ The terrcrlst/aggessive /despised Palest iraan 4553 56
■ The stereotypical (unarmed) Palestinian 1707 21
■ dismal realty 1138 14
Total (100 00)123
[..............................
social group 
Adj. P-va(ue=0.0000, Chi-square-47.3232, df«4
Settlement.Clty
Node 1
Category % rt
■ equality/peace 27.91 12
■ unidentified Palestine 16.2B 7
■ The terroristteggressive /despised Palestinian 11.63 5
■ The stereotypical (unarmed) Palestinian 18.80 8
■ dismal redly 25.58 11
Total (34.96) 43
I d
Gender
Acj. P-value=0.1351, Chi-squwe=7.0143, df=4
Node 2
Categcry % n
■ equality/peace 125 1
■ unidentified Palestinian 1500 12
■ The terrorist/aggressive /despised Palestinian 63.75 51
■ The stereotypical (unarmed) Palestinian 16.25 13
■ dismal reality 3.75 3
Total (65.04) 80
___________H i ___________
Gender
Ad- P-value*0.0016, Cimsquare-17.3577, df=4
E
Node 3
Cetegory % n
■ equality/peace 40.91 9 1
■ unidentified Palestinian 18.18 4
■ The terrorist/aggessive /despised Palestinian 4.55 1
■ The stereotypical (unarmed) Palestinian 9.09 2
■ dismal reality 2727 6
Total (17.89) 22
Node 4
Ceteaory % n
■ ecpiaRyfceace 14.29 3
■ unidentified Palestinian 14.29 3
■ The terrorist/agg-essive /despised Palestinian 19X15 4
■ The stereotypical (unarmed) Palestinian 28.57 B|
■ dismal realty 2381 5
Total I 21
Node 5
Category % n
■ equatty*>eace 238 1
■ unidentified Palestinian 23.81 10
■ The terrorist/agresslve /despised Palestinian 4286 181
■ The stereotypical (unarmed) Palestinian 2381 10
■ dsmal realty 7.14 3
Total (34.15) 42
Node 6
Category % n
■ equality/peace 0.00 0
■ unidentified Palestinian 5.26 2
■ The terrorist/agg-essive /despised Palestinian 86.84 331
■ The stereotypical (unarmed) Palestinian 7.89 3
■ dismal realty 0.X 0
Total (30.89) 38
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Summary
Considering the content of the drawings, they proved to be a fascinating and 
valuable tool for the current investigation. They revealed what I called socio- 
ideologically driven iconic repertoire, namely, they ‘made visible’ some of the culturally 
available symbols and stereotypes circulating in Israeli society in relation to the 
Palestinians. The vast majority of the drawings thus proved to be a political commentary 
on the situation in Israel and the children exhibited through their drawings various 
perspectives regarding self and other and their positions within the depicted reality. These 
various approaches represent the range of responses embedded in the Israeli self in 
relation to the Palestinians. These allowed significant differences in the way the 
Palestinians were represented across the social groups.
The various depictions highlight the power of social stereotyping and negative 
generalisation. The children were asked to draw a Palestinian boy or a girl of their age in 
an everyday context. Yet many of the children positioned the Palestinian child in a 
certain political context and a certain moral order. Very few attempts were made to refer 
to any aspect of the personal life of the drawn character. Rather, whether as a suicide 
bomber or peace activist, the Palestinian child is depicted in a specific context that meant 
to convey a specific perspective regarding self, other and the conflict. Palestinian children 
at the age of 12 are neither active fighters (or suicide bombers) nor do they wear the 
traditional headdress or grow moustaches. Nevertheless these contents abound in the 
drawings and show the function and power of stereotypes in negative generalization 
about the Palestinians. The most noticeable example is found in many drawings of the 
Palestinian child as a near version of Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader with his 
famous headdress and stubble.
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Figure 38 Girl- Settlement
The data discussed in this chapter suggests that the construction of the ‘other’ and 
the tendency or motivation to engage with his/her perspective is mediated by 
ideologically informed systems of meaning that vary across the groups. Thomas and Silk 
(1990) commented that the information presented in children’s drawings is determined by 
three factors: “children’s knowledge of the drawing topic itself, their interpretations of 
what aspects of that information are important to present and their capacity to produce a 
drawing showing that information” (p. 106). In that sense the most prominent example is 
the focus on the violent nature of the conflict in general and particularly the phenomena 
of the suicide bombers. These contents seem to occupy an immense symbolic space
within the children’s socio-political worlds and lead to inferences of threat from the 
Palestinian.
Figure 39 Girl - City
The statistical analysis has indicated the predominant patterns, and facilitated 
identification of categories and themes amongst the different groups. Almost half of the 
drawings collected from the children depict the Palestinian other in an unambiguously 
negative manner. Yet, the children from the city or the settlement are significantly more 
likely to draw upon these contents than the children from the kibbutz. Looking at the 
following chart, which cross-tabulates the social group with the overall impression from
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the drawings, best epitomises the opposite tendencies of the city/settlement and the 
kibbutz drawings:
25  —
2 0 -
~  15 — 
c3OO
1 0  —
The city/settlements drawings, apart from the much higher frequency of the 
terrorist category, are also invested with significantly elevated dehumanisation of the 
Palestinians. Their pictures are replete with fantastic representations of the Palestinians as 
a sheer threat with an eagerness for destruction. This perception obviously restricts 
perspective taking. Simply stated, where there is fear and hatred, there is no space for 
engaging with the other’s perspective. Where the humanity of the other is in question the 
propensity for reflection and empathy is completely hindered.
In contrast, the children from the kibbutz are more likely to depict the Palestinians 
in a more moderate way in the contexts of peace, equality and friendship, as traditional 
peasants, or as lamenting their dismal reality. The approach to the Palestinians is much 
less negative and shows significantly lesser degrees of hatred and fear. The destructive 
and hostile characteristics, strongly attributed to the Palestinians in the two other groups,
O v e r a l l  i m p r e s s i o n  
o f  t h e  d ra w n  
c h a r a c t e r  
D  positive 
E3 negative 
□  neutral
City Settlement
s o c i a  I g r o u p
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are significantly softened in the Kibbutz drawings where the Palestinian figures tended to 
be less stereotypical, and even when there are indications of warfare and attribution of 
violence, these tended to be less acute. Nevertheless, apart from the ‘dismal reality’ 
category, rather than engaging the Palestinian perspective, the children, just like in the 
terrorist category, are simply projecting their group’s ideology and knowledge onto the 
other.
In sum, the analysis above has shown an organised set of responses about the 
Palestinians underlying the content of the drawings. These responses represent the range 
of voices, or ideologies reverberating within Israeli society in relation to the Palestinians, 
which the children actively reconstruct in their works. We can clearly see the dominance 
of delegitimisation of the other and the tendency to perceive all the Palestinians as suicide 
bombers and terrorists. Yet, there are also alternative voices. For example, the one that 
views the Palestinians as partners for peace. This response is, on the one hand, a 
challenge to the dominant perception as it views the Palestinians as equals and as partners 
for peace. On the other hand it is merely a reproduction of the peace rhetoric embedded 
in the Israeli society. Additionally there are representations of the Palestinians as victims 
of the conflict and as traditional, or simply as ordinary children, all within the range of 
responses available to the children to reconstruct and represent in their drawings.
Clearly, the Israeli self, as reflected in these drawings is not homogeneous but is 
comprised of different approaches to the other. Yet the drawings, by the nature of the task 
as embedded representation, forced the children to work with only one approach, to 
reconstruct only one response to the Palestinians. As will become clear in the following 
chapters, the range of responses to self, other and the conflict is vast and the shift from 
one mode of communication, that is, drawing -  to another mode of communication, that 
is, writing (and role-playing), opens up a enormous space for contradictions, ambiguities 
and competing ideologies.
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Figure 40 Girl -  Kibbutz Figure 41 Boy -  Kibbutz
Figure 42 Boy -  City Figure 43 Boy - Settlement
6. NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE OTHER: SOCIOGENESIS
ANALYSIS
The analysis presented in this chapter builds upon Billig’s insight that the human 
or cultural predicament presumes ideological dilemma. It adopts the view of ideology as 
the ways in which a worldview or value and belief system of a particular group of people 
is reproduced through a particular kind of representational strategy.
According to this thesis “it is because a social group’s stock of commonsensical 
beliefs contains contrary elements that argument and thereby thought, is possible. Here 
the rhetorical approach is not drawing attention to arguments between cultures, or 
between ideologies, but the arguments which occur within cultures or ideologies” (1991, 
p.71 my italics). Given that, the persistence of dilemma confirms that the stability and 
integrity of meaning cannot be comprehensively analysed without direct attention to the 
ways in which it is confronted by alternatives and the possibility of major revision, 
redefinition or even rejection. Ideological representations are embedded in social and 
discursive practices. They ‘live’ in the space of communicative practice. As such they are 
constructed, naturalised, validated, challenged, transformed and legitimised in and 
through language.
In the case of the Israeli victimised-occupier self this suggestion is particularly 
illuminating especially with regards the children’s ambivalent encounter with the other 
and its perspective. In their compositions, the children exhibited an assortment of 
ideological representations, sometimes contradictory and dissonant. I argue that the 
existence of these socio-ideological discrepancies not only reflects the ideological 
ambience of the Israeli self, but also precisely perpetuates the socio-psychological 
conditions of the conflict.
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Analytical procedure
Focusing on the single utterance as the unit of analysis, while paying attention to 
the social milieus, I completely lost sight of individual works in search of patterns of 
meanings and rhetorical tendencies within the texts. An utterance is a linguistic unit that 
is marked off by boundaries designated by the speaker. Unlike conversation between 
two or more people where the boundaries are habitually marked by conversational turns, 
in a monologic text, utterance boundaries include a sense of finalization. Finalization in 
the present case is characterized by the completion of a thought, point of view, or 
rhetorical strategy on a given topic. Utterance then, is usually comprised of one or two 
sentences. Using knowledge of the verbal-ideological contexts surrounding the children’s 
textual productions, as was partly portrayed in the chapter on the Israeli victimized- 
occupier self, I developed an interpretive process that helped me excavate, sort out, and 
analyze many of the voices speaking through their written texts. I was looking for the 
ways in which Israeli children construct the Palestinian story, the underlying socio- 
ideological processes that mediate these constructions and where possible, I tried to 
detect the origin of the symbols and images being used.
Findings
I present four ideological dilemmas, or polemic evaluative dimensions found in 
the texts. The first regards the Palestinian character and actions. Here, two distinct voices 
reverberate. First, there is the dominant voice of delegitimisation. The Palestinian actions 
are portrayed in a completely negative manner and their actions are construed as 
irrational malevolence driven by pure hatred to the Israelis. The symbol of suicide 
bombers considerably dominates this voice. In contrast, there is a counter voice that 
depicts the Palestinians in a different light. According to this voice the Palestinian 
resistance is rightful and is a means to reclaim their occupied land. Additionally there are 
representations of the Palestinians as economically deprived and even as victims of the 
Israeli aggression.
The second polemic arises in the analysis regarding Israeli actions. Here again, I 
found two competing rhetoric. On the one hand, there is a tendency to construe the Israeli
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actions as aggressive and iniquitous. This tendency, which I titled guilt and 
responsibility, clearly views the Israelis as accountable to the tragic reality of conflict. 
On the other hand, there is the opposite tendency that rhetorically justifies the Israeli 
deeds. Here one can see how the notion of ‘no alternative’ embedded in the Israeli self, is 
resonant in the children’s works. The Israeli actions are presented as inevitable self- 
defense against the Palestinian aggression.
Thirdly, found in the narrative additional polemic in relations to the Israelis, and 
is clearly a reflection and reconstruction of two prominent facets of the Israeli 
victimized-occupier self. On the one hand there is the self-perception as victims. Through 
their writing as Palestinians, the Israeli children have conveyed a picture of the Israelis as 
the ultimate victims of the conflict. In contrast, there is a rhetorical tendency that 
maintains the Israeli supremacy, mainly military but morally and economically as well.
The last dilemma, or opposing rhetoric discussed in this chapter regards the notion 
of peace. The Israeli self s yearning for peace is evident in the children’s works. Peace is 
represented as the ultimate opposite to the current situation and regarded as a highly 
desired concept. Simply stated, peace is the greatest wish. Nevertheless, in contrast to the 
comprehensive peace rhetoric, a counter voice resonates in relation to peace that is both 
contradictory and complementary that can be described as a strong disbelief in the 
possibility of peace.
In consequence of the complexity of the compositions and the interpretative 
procedure, the data resisted quantification and frequency counts. Due to the nature of the 
data, almost every utterance embodies both the actual content, and the underlying 
intentions and the presumable effect it intends to elicit in the reader. The narratives 
reverberate with so much latent meaning that to isolate and describe it in its straight 
manner is not only almost impossible but can hardly expected to yield significant results. 
Nevertheless, where possible, I indicate group patterns, and point out categories that are 
exclusive to a group or the volume of different categories across the groups.
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Palestinian actions: aggression or liberation?
The most prevalent polemic that inferred from the children’s narratives regards the 
meaning and purpose of the Palestinian uprising. The Palestinian violence, accredited in 
93% of all narratives generates a variety of responses, which can be explicated in relation 
to two contradictive representational processes. On the one hand there is a strong 
tendency towards de-legitimisation of the Palestinians. This communicative strategy, or 
rhetorical interest, aims to portray the Palestinian uprising in the most absolute negative 
terms, thus condemning the Palestinian actions and demonising their goals and intentions.
On the other hand, there is a contradictive, yet complementary pattern across the 
narratives that shows sympathy and understanding to the Palestinian struggle, a counter- 
rhetorical process that generates the opposite tendency of legitimisation. This is 
achieved through the construction of three different images of the Palestinians. The 
righteous Palestinian protests against the expulsion from the land. The wretched 
Palestinian grieves over the deprived living conditions of the Palestinians. And last, the 
victim Palestinian strongly objects to the misconduct and use of force by the Israeli army.
The theme of terrorism might be the most obvious illustration to Mead’s 
contention that in so far as individuals or groups have built up different responses to the 
world, so they do in fact live in different worlds. First, according to these narratives, 
terrorism is the key object of the conflict. This is surely the case for Israelis but for the 
Palestinians there are certainly different key objects such as occupation and self 
determination. Secondly, whether for or against it, whether reflecting on the advantage or 
disadvantage in such actions, there was no question that terrorism is the main object of 
the conflict and the narratives vary across explanations, justifications or condemnations 
to the described atrocities. The children expend considerable depth debating the extent to 
which the Palestinian terrorism is good or bad, justified or inexcusable, but they never 
debate neither the existence of this category nor it’s meaning, certainly not on a lexical 
level. That is, even those who advocated the Palestinian armed struggle and expressed
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appreciative attitudes still referred to the actions as terrorism and to the perpetrators as 
terrorists rather than freedom fighters or any other more affirmative categories.
Delegitimisation -  reconstructing the savage other
The concept, delegitimisation, is a fundamental process of placing a group or 
groups into extremely negative social categories that are excluded from the realm of 
acceptable norms and values (Bar-Tal, 1989a). Denial of the opponents’ rights, 
demonisation of intentions, condemnation of actions and emphasis on the threat posed, all 
undermine the legitimacy of the opponents. According to Bar-Tal, delegitimisation has 
some distinct features: (a) it uses extremely negative, salient and atypical bases for 
categorisation; (b) it denies the humanity of the delegitimised group; (c) it is 
accompanied by intense, negative emotions of rejection, such as hatred, anger, contempt, 
fear, or disgust; (d) it implies that the delegitimised group has the potential to endanger 
one’s own group; and (e) it implies that the delegitimised group does not deserve human 
treatment and therefore harming it, is justified (1990, p.66).
At the heart of this ideological persuasion is a highly stereotypical 
characterisation of the other consistent with the image of the Palestinian terrorist from the 
drawings. Palestinians are represented as fundamentally evil and aggressive. This is 
manifested in the narratives with an assortment of negative representations, which can be 
explicated along three interrelated evaluative dimensions.
The first emphasises the Palestinians trait characterisation, where the narrator (the 
Palestinian and/or his/her group) is depicted as possessing different negative qualities 
such as murderous, stupid, crazy, bastard, evil etc. The second is delegitimisation by 
stressing the actions and intentions of the narrator or his/her in-group, where the goals 
and means of the Palestinians are represented as bent upon the obliteration of the Israelis. 
The third strategy emphasises the unacceptability of the norms and values upon which the 
Palestinians guide their goals and actions. They are represented as transgressors of such 
pivotal social norms that they become dehumanised.
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All groups demonstrated delegitimisation in their narratives, yet there are 
significant differences in terms of both volume and content. The city and settlement 
children invested significantly more effort in their narratives to delegitimise the 
Palestinians. Their negative characterisation of the Palestinians is, for the most part, 
graphic and as will be demonstrated below contains vivid depictions of ruthless people 
with very little in mind apart from the wish to exterminate the Israeli people. The kibbutz 
children demonstrated much less of a tendency to delegitimise the Palestinians and even 
when they did, it was, for the most part, rather indirect or implicit delegitimisation.
Terrorism and suicide bombing
The most elaborated symbols and images that relate to the delegitimisation 
rhetoric are evidently those of terrorism and the suicide bombers. The Palestinian is 
frequently represented as a bloodthirsty terrorist with an ultimate objective to destroy the 
Israeli people.
“We should kill as many Jews as we can. Our goal is to kill as many Jews as 
we can and the winner is the one who killed the most. When I grow up I 
will break a record -  I will kill more than 20 Jews when I will commit a 
suicide attack” (Boy -  city).
“I will kill as many Jews as I can so they won’t grow up to be stinky Jews 
like their parents. Good Jewish is a dead Jewish” (Boy-city)
“We should kill them all. My Dad told me that we should join the terrorist 
organisations to kill all the Jews. Yes. We need to exterminate them one by 
one” (Boy -  settlement)
“We are willing to sacrifice few suicide bombers so many many of you will 
die because we are Arabs in soul and blood” (Boy -  settlement)
“I have a dream. In my dream I enter Israel and kill Jews.
I think that this conflict is very good since we don’t have dead people apart 
from the suicide bombers, which I adore, and they have a lot of dead and 
wounded” (Boy -  settlement)
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In these narratives the Palestinian violence is reconstructed according to the logic 
of essentialism, namely, it is organised around natures or qualities, which are regarded as 
transcendent, unalterable and historical; the Palestinian violence is depicted as context- 
less carnage for the sake of killing the Jews.
The message from these extracts, which focuses on the actions, intentions and 
aspirations of the Palestinian people, is clear and unambiguous- they appear as essentially 
atrocious and irrational people rejoicing in aggression and deadly deeds and are actually 
only interested in the annihilation of Israel and the Jewish people. This tempestuous 
rhetoric is exclusive to the city and the settlement groups. While more than half of the 
delegitimisation contents in these groups were of this nature, there are no such examples 
in the kibbutz narratives.
A primary explanation to the Palestinian violence is the factor of hatred. According to 
this logic, blind hatred to the Israelis/Jews is a key engine that drives the conflict and the 
Palestinian actions:
“In short, I just hate the Jews. Hate. Hate. Hate”
(Boy -  settlement)
”1 hate them in my blood. I loathe them” (Boy -  settlement)
“I hate the Israelis so when I grow up I want to be a martyr and 
to blow myself up on the Israelis” (Boy -  city)
Martyrdom and heaven
As indicated in the last extract, a prevalent theme that accounts for the phenomena 
of the suicide bombings (and goes beyond mere essentialism) is reconstructed upon 
fundamentalist-religious motives. This image circulates in the mass media, mainly 
through pre-recorded video films released by the militant groups subsequent to a 
successful attack, where the suicide bomber (‘the martyr*) is shown wrapped with 
explosive belt and holding the book of Quran, praying and vowing to the destruction of
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Israel in the name of Allah. This image of the martyr goes along with the well-known 
fable of the 72 virgins waiting in heaven for the sacrifice and the financial reward granted 
to his or her family. The image of the Palestinian martyr seems to assist the children to 
explain the abominable horrors of the suicide bombings by rationalizing the Palestinian 
violence according to these fundamentalist religious motives.
“It is worthy to be a suicide bomber cause that way you will go to heaven 
with 72 virgins and your family gets a lot of money and you’ll be very happy 
in heaven” (Boy- settlement)
“I want to be a martyr because up there in heaven I will have 72 virgins and I 
can enjoy every day. My feelings when I become a martyr will be very good.
I will kill many many Jews which I hate so much and the state of Israel will 
be mourning because many Jews will die” (Boy- city)
“My brother is martyr. He committed a brutal suicide bombing and murdered 
17 Israelis. For us a martyr is a good thing -  a man who killed Israelis is a 
martyr”(Boy- city)
An additional repeated theme that aims to undermine the humanity of the 
Palestinians and which also has its origin in the mass media tells the story of a child that 
is/was driven by his family to become a suicide bomber. This representation originated in 
an interview held with a father of a suicide bomber who killed 21 youngsters in a Tel- 
Aviv dance-club. The father has been quoted as saying: “I’m very happy and proud of 
what my son did and, frankly, am a bit jealous. I wish I had done it. My son has fulfilled 
the Prophet’s (Mohammed's) wishes. He has become a hero! Tell me, what more could a 
father ask?"44
A story of a child sent by his parents to die as a suicide bomber stresses the severe 
violation of such fundamental norms and values, thus associates the Palestinians with 
lack of civilisation, cruelty and barbarianism.
44 Yediot Ahronot (Israel daily) June 3, 2001.
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“My parents sent me to commit a suicide bombing in Israel. They gave me an 
explosive belt. I don’t know how they expect me to come back home if the 
explosive belt will blow up on my body. I don’t know how will it help my 
parents if their son will die. I thought that my life’s important to my parents 
more than anything in the world” (Boy- city)
Israeli defamation
An interesting theme, which combines the notion of hatred to the Jews and the 
process of delegitimisation, is that of harsh condemnation of the Israelis, peppered with a 
bleak defamation. At first, this approach seems to be the product of a certain degree of 
reflexivity and an attempt to authentically reconstruct the Palestinian perspective in that it 
realizes the wrongdoing of the Israelis and the discernible hatred the Palestinians feel 
towards the Israelis. Indeed, as will be demonstrated below, some narratives show this 
reflexivity, however, a closer examination of some of these expressions, such as [“The 
Jews are really bad and they need to be killed, so go on and die you disgusting and ugly 
Jews” (Boy-settlement)] or expressions like ‘shit-heads’, ‘motherfuckers’ ‘filthy and dirty 
race’ attributed to the Israelis, reveals that the underlying rhetorical goal is 
delegitimisation by emphasizing both the irrational, blazing hatred of the Palestinians 
towards the Israelis and the obscene language that is the property of ‘bad‘, uncivilized, 
bawdy people.
Negative association-the war in Iraq
An additional delegitimisation tactic I wish to refer to is one that works on a more 
latent and subconscious level and can be described as ‘negative association’. This tactic 
aims to emphasise the transgression or the bad qualities of the other by comparing or 
associating the Palestinian struggle with a widely recognized bad person, out-group or 
context.
The data collection for this study took place a few months prior to the war in Iraq. 
Although Israel was not involved in the war, recalling the appalling experience Israel had 
in the first gulf war where Saddam Hussein initiated missile attacks on Israeli cities, the 
build-up for the forthcoming war was at its peak. Gas masks were supplied to every
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person in Israel and the people were instructed to prepare for the worst-case scenario, that 
is, a chemical or biological missile attack. The mass media was replete with warring 
messages and the general atmosphere was somewhat tense mixed with fear of the 
unknown. Put differently, Israel has felt and acted yet again as being a nation under 
threat.
And so, the build up for the forthcoming war in Iraq found its expression in the 
children’s narratives (22% of all narratives had some association with the forthcoming 
war) in various ways. Some children had chosen Saddam Hussein as the name for the 
Palestinian they role-played, hence associating the Iraqi tyrant with the Palestinians:
“My name is Saddam Hussein, I am 12 and I hate the Jews. I am a great 
terrorist in the Palestinian army” (Boy- city)
Others associated the Palestinian violence or intentions with the forthcoming war and the 
symbolic production of the sense of threat evidently intertwined with the children’s 
attempt to reconstruct the perspective of the Palestinian as appears in the following 
examples:
“If I had a bomb or grenade I would go and blow up Israel but I have just a 
toy bomb so every day I go with my friend near chemical factory for bombs 
and whatever they throw away I take it and make a bomb or something 
poisoning”. (Boy- city)
“Soon there is an attack and we will send a stinky missile on Israel and they 
will die from the stench” (Boy- city)
Incitement
The last delegitimisation theme I wish to refer to will also lead us to the 
complementary tendency towards legitimization. In recounting the Palestinian terrorism 
and suicide bombings, many children applied the notion of brainwashing or incitement. 
This topic has beeen highly debated for many years now in the Israeli political sphere, 
particularly after the beginning of the Oslo process where Israeli officials occasionally 
argued that the Palestinian Authority engaged in systematic incitement across various
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communication channels and agents of socialisation such as children’s textbooks and the 
local television and radio stations. According to the common argument these 
communication channels contain motifs of poisoning the mind and rejecting Israel's 
existence, and reflect a bitter reality in which the PA effectively legitimatizes acts of 
terrorism and murder. The following examples illustrate how the Israeli children 
reproduce this argument in their narratives:
“My family and teachers very much influence me regarding the Israeli -  
Palestinian conflict. After hearing various different opinions I start feeling 
hostility towards the Jews. They tell me that the Jews should be rejected and 
killed, that they are not-welcome, that’s why I develop feelings of hatred 
towards them -  because of the environment I live in” (Girl-settlement)
“We train al of our children and put into their heads that when they grow up 
they’ll become martyrs” (Boy-settlement)
“We have this social pressure to hate the Israelis and bum their flag and I 
must obey and do the same but this is not leading us to a good solution”(Girl - 
kibbutz)
“Everybody says that the Israelis are shit and I don’t think so. I hate it when 
Arafat brainwashes everybody that the Israelis are bad and than many people 
want to go to Israel to commit suicide with explosives and kill Israelis”(Boy- 
settlement)
The main message conveyed from this representation is that Palestinian society is 
contaminated with hatred, intolerance, and incitement that gives license to terrorism and 
brainwashes children and adolescences into becoming suicide bombers. The 
authoritative figures, those accountable for ‘good’ education, are constantly praising 
terror attacks and vilifying all Israelis, encouraging the children to choose violence and 
cruelty over compromise and reconciliation. Nevertheless, there is also a subsequent, 
latent intendment within this representation- it is open to change. The Palestinian 
violence in this argument is not a result of their murderous nature as seen in the 
essentialism representations, but rather is a result of a deteriorated socialisation system. 
Thus the argument shifts from unalterable essence and is located in exogenous factors 
(“because of the environment I live in”), which can be changed.
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Moreover, some of the children who discussed the subject matter of incitement in 
their narratives, challenged this system, like the girl from the kibbutz or the boy from the 
settlement who positioned themselves outside that tainted culture as they denounced the 
social pressure, arguing “I hate it” or,“it is not leading us to a good solution”.
This approach, which is almost predominantly a kibbutz strategy (in relation to 
delegitimisation), poses a challenge for interpretation. Whereas the city and settlers, 
while role-playing Palestinians, clearly identify with and eulogize the violence, the 
kibbutz children exhibited various strategies for what I regard as indirect or unconscious 
delegitimisation. In these narratives, terrorism, suicide bombings and hatred are present, 
(albeit in a much less graphic manner than seen in the city and settlers) but the narrator 
clearly protests against it.
It can be the narrator’s friends, family or ‘people’ that are either participating or 
supporting the violence against the Israelis but the narrator him/herself is evidently 
detached from these actions. Thus, the Palestinians imagined by the kibbutz children, 
whilst mentioning the terrorism, for the most part protest against it themselves.
“My father asked me to be like my brother when I grow up but I don’t want 
to. I don’t want to kill the Jews because I know how it feels to have one of 
your relatives killed -  it is painful (Girl-kibbutz).
“My friends think that we should bombard the Israelis but I don’t see the 
point. What for? So they will bombard us again? I think that we should make 
peace and everyone will live his life” (Girl-kibbutz).
I have many friends. Most of them disagree with me, they think that the Jews 
deserve these terrorist attacks but I don’t think they really mean that. We, the 
Arabs, do want peace. Not all of us support and like the terrorist attacks that 
kill many people (Boy - kibbutz).
As seen in the above extracts, the narrator has clearly positioned him/herself in 
opposition to the described atrocities. It must be pointed out that although misidentifying
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themselves with that ‘culture of hatred’, or the terrorist actions, and thus presenting a 
different image of the Palestinians, by depicting it in an assertion like “Not all of us 
support and like the terrorist attacks that kill many people”, (thus positioning themselves 
as the ‘good’ or rational voice against the ‘bad’ majority), they all the same, reproduce 
the rhetoric of delegitimisation.
The various positioning strategies will be discussed in more detail in the individual 
analysis, yet the point to be made here is that while there is an extensive rhetoric towards 
dehumanisation of the Palestinians, there is also a different image of the Palestinians, 
much less dehumanised and even as the victim; the image of the Palestinian that fights 
for a just cause.
Legitimisation -constructing a counter image of the Palestinians
Against the overwhelming process of delegitimisation of the Palestinians by 
emphasising their murderous nature and actions, contested images, or counter 
representations were also found in the narratives which aim at depicting the Palestinians 
in a totally different manner.
I identified three distinct counter-depictions of the Palestinians, all in the service 
of legitimisation. The first can be described as the righteous other. In this portrayal, the 
notion of the disputed land is the key object of the conflict and it serves to justify the 
Palestinian cause and, to some extant, even to rationalise the described atrocities.
In the second depiction, which I call the wretched other, the key symbol is 
poverty. In this discourse the emphasis is on the deprived living conditions of the 
Palestinians. The communicative goal is to evoke empathy and compassion to the weak 
and poor, yet it seems like these descriptions are, to a large extent, depicted in a causal 
vacuum.
The third depiction is, maybe, the most contested to the terrorist image and can be 
plainly described as the victim other. Here, the Palestinian sufferings are brought to the
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fore with descriptions of violation of human rights, the burdensome presence and 
excessive use of power of the Israeli army and the sorrow and despair it causes.
The disputed land -  reconstructing the Righteous other
Just as terrorism and the suicide bombers are the key objects in the service of 
delegitimisation, then, the notion of the disputed land is the key symbol in the service of 
legitimising the Palestinian cause, or, in other words, in reconstructing the righteous 
other.
Stemming from the narratives is a symbolic division between the long past and the 
short history of the conflict. The latter regarded descriptions of current affairs in relation 
to the latest uprising, evidently focusing on terrorism and other consequences of the 
conflict for both the Palestinians and the Israelis. When recounting the origins, or the 
long history of the conflict, the children elaborate on the notions of land and Jerusalem 
which are represented as a primary reason for the conflict. They are constructed as key 
religious and political symbols for both the Israelis and the Palestinians. The story of the 
conflict between the Israeli and the Palestinians, as arises from these compositions, is a 
story about two parties fighting for a piece of land and therefore it is represented as both 
the problem and the solution to the dispute. Although the notion of ‘land’ is depicted as 
the key object of the conflict, there are very few elaborations beyond the abstract or 
undifferentiated ‘land’ and additional words such ‘territories’, ‘state’ or ‘country’ are 
used interchangeably. In contrast, the children produce richly textured discourse about 
Jerusalem, represented as a focal and sanctified object in the dispute. In most of the 
narratives the land is represented simply as an asset or property and the dispute is 
predominantly depicted in negative interpersonal interaction terms:
“We want our land back. They say that this is their land and they lived here 
before we came. But in my opinion it’s all lies. They were not here before we 
arrived- they just came and took it from us. This is our land and we will fight 
for it” (Girl-kibbutz)
“This land belongs to us and not to them. They took it from us- they took 
our rights” (Girl-settlement)
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“We, the Arabs think that we have the right on half of this land. You the Jews 
fought us and took our land and you don’t want to give it back. We will keep 
on demanding what’s ours and even take it by force”(Boy-settlement)
There are three different representations of land manifested in the narratives upon 
which the children construct the Palestinian’s legitimate claims. The first regards land as 
property and hence it is the conquered land. Stemming from this depiction, the claim for 
the land represents a claim for historical justice. The Israeli children evidently recognise 
that at some point in history, injustice was inflicted upon the Palestinians due to 
misconduct of the Israelis and this injustice provides the legitimate ground for the 
Palestinian struggle. Befitting the children’s age this dispute is reconstructed in 
interpersonal terms as if they are conversing on an ordinary quarrel. Nonetheless, it is a 
genuine moral discourse about who is wrong and who is right and construal of the 
conflict goes beyond consequences to be portrayed in terms of justice and (property) 
rights.
The second manifestation is that of the sacred land where the children propagate 
the notion of the biblical attachment to the land. It draws on historical-religious 
representations and the arguments revolve around contemporary and past eras. The Bible 
(Tanach in Hebrew) is a tremendous symbolic resource for Israelis and a significant 
number of myths and heroic symbols are derived from that book. As noted in the 
portrayal of the Israeli self, the Zionist movement, although inherently secular, not only 
has a profound reverence for The Bible but also and more importantly, mustered its 
convictions from a complete identification with the history of the people of Israel in their 
land as it is remembered through The Bible. It was the most important tool for political 
recruitment and national mobilisation. The Bible for Israelis is not just a book of religion 
or ancient history. Rather, it is an eminent symbolic reference and it has a great influence 
on the Israeli political culture.
183
“We think that the Israelis took the land and they think that the land is theirs 
because in biblical times the land was given to Abraham from God” (Girl- 
kibbutz)
“I think that Jerusalem belongs to us, the Arabs, cause this is were our fathers 
and ancestors were bom, and we’ll do everything in order to get Jerusalem 
back”(Boy-kibbutz)
“In my opinion we should take the land from the Jews with force. This is our 
land since long time ago. It was promised to us in biblical times. We need to 
have this land not the Jews” (Boy-settlement)
“I read the Quran that Israel and Jerusalem is ours and you occupied it but 
there is nothing we can do. By your religion and by our religion each side 
claim the right for the land so we need to share the land evenly” (Girl- 
settlement)
“I think the Jews are not right. They came to the state of Israel when we were 
here and just wanted to kick us out. In the holly Quran it said that the land is 
ours and they came with their Bible and said that by this book the land is 
theirs” (Girl-settlement)
As described in Chapter Five, the attachment of the Jewish people to the land is 
well grounded in the Israeli narrative. Therefore, it is no wonder why Israeli children 
draw their arguments upon ‘biblical times’. The remarkable feature is that while 
constructing and negotiating the Palestinian claims they occasionally adjust the 
Palestinian demands according to their own convictions. Note that although there is a 
strong affinity between Islam to Jerusalem and the Islamic holy sites, the Palestinian 
claim to the land is not built upon religious grounds, nor is it mentioned in the Quran that 
the land belongs to the Palestinian people. Moreover, as seen in the above extracts they 
reconstruct a more religious characteristic to the dispute- both people holding to their 
respective religious reference to substantiate their demand for the land.
The third representation regarding the notion of land is less frequent and its 
construal in political terms, is mainly as the right for self determination. It goes beyond 
the commonplace arguments of ‘biblical times’ or ‘it was mine-give it back’, to tackle
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substantial political issues. In its less developed version this depiction is expressed in 
more abstract terms such as ‘place to live’ or ‘place to be’:
“We, the Arabs are in conflict with the Israelis because the Israelis took our 
country. They caught all the land and now we don’t have a place to 
live”(Girl-settlement)
In its more comprehensive version the argument embarks upon concrete political 
implications of the conflict for the Palestinian people:
“We don’t have a state, we don’t have a country, and we don’t have land to 
establish government like any other people. I think that you should 
understand us. We don’t have all these things like normal people, like the 
Jewish people” (Girl-settlement)
Deprived living conditions- reconstructing the wretched other
An additional theme in the service of legitimisation regards the poor living 
condition of the Palestinians. Vast descriptions of poverty, hunger, unemployment and 
beggary are found in the narratives, that evidently result in difficulties and distress.
There is not a single day that is peaceful and good; there is always a black 
comer. My parents have no job so we don’t have money to buy food. My 
little brother is dying but there is no money to purchase drugs. (Girl-kibbutz)
My parents are poor; they are staying at home every day without food. My 
sister and me are going to beg for money from other people. (Girl-settlement)
When I grow up I want to be smart and to have normal life. Unlike what we 
have: its cold, we don’t have food, there is no place on the mattress because 
we are 10 brothers plus Mom. (Boy-settlement)
My family and I are living in great poverty. (Girl-city)
We are very very poor. We are refugees that live in Jennin and we don’t 
have any money. My parents need to support 11 people, which is very hard. 
(Boy-city)
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The Israeli children are clearly conscious of a problem regarding the deprived 
conditions of the Palestinians, yet the way they seem to have construed this issue is 
somewhat different from the notion of land. Whereas the discourse of land is a moral 
discourse embodying blame and responsibility, the discourse regarding the Palestinian’s 
deprived lives and socio-economic conditions is somewhat free of cause and effect 
construal and therefore largely remains on a descriptive level.
My contention is that the empathy inferred from these depictions and the 
compassion they meant to evoke, for the most part do not stem from recognition in an 
Israeli responsibility to the Palestinian hardship. Rather, they are described as a by­
product of the broad context of the conflict. The economic and political constraints that 
could explain the poverty and despair are, to a large extent absent from the narratives. 
There is very little evidence to a causal relation between the Israeli occupation and the 
above-described impoverishments. Instead, we have a blame-free depiction that stems, I 
believe, from egalitarian values that engender compassion for the weak- in this case the 
Palestinians.
However, just as the discourse of land is aimed at reconstructing the ‘righteous’ 
other by providing an explanation to the Palestinian uprising, the poverty discourse 
occasionally serves a similar goal, that is to provide some rationalisation to the 
Palestinian violence, especially the phenomena of the suicide bombers. In other words, 
the discourse of poverty is used to convey two different communicative goals. First, it is 
a genuine empathetic description of the poor and the weak, one that positioned the 
Palestinians in the place of the forceless protagonist. Secondly, as seen in the following 
exceipt, it serves as a rationalization to the Palestinian violence:
“I think that some of the suiciders Arabs are doing this because of despair, 
because they have got nothing to loose. They are poor they don’t have food.
Some of them don’t have water at all so anyone who is a suicide bomber, his 
family gets money so they can buy water and food and clothing so they can 
live with”. (Boy-kibbutz)
186
It is a known practice of Palestinian militant organisations to financially reward the 
families of the ‘martyr’ following the sacrificial act of suicide bombing. As with almost 
any key object in the conflict, this practice too has contested interpretations. The possible 
link between the Palestinian terrorism and their deprived living conditions is a frequent 
debate in the Israeli public discourse and it was dealt with in the media from two different 
perspectives. On the one hand, while trying to ‘make sense’ of the rather unexplainable 
phenomena of the suicide bombings, those who avoid the essentialism account will 
evidently search for an external explanation such as the deprived living conditions of the 
Palestinians to argue that poverty and despair propel people to actions or solutions that in 
a different context would have been unthinkable. On the other hand this subject matter 
was pointed out many times as part of the overall discussion on the pathology of 
Palestinian society, their practices of incitement and the contemptibility of recruiting the 
poor and the despondence for such actions.
House demolition and the excessive use of force by the Israeli army -  constructing 
the victimised other.
The last image of the Palestinian that stems from the narratives is clearly a counter 
image to the terrorist Palestinian. This depiction is unique not only due to its paucity but 
also in the sense that it does not aim at legitimising the Palestinian cause by providing an 
alleged justification to the Palestinian armed struggle. Rather, the focus in this discourse 
shifts from rationalization of the violence to the Palestinian sufferings as such.
My life is so bad. I have to be scared all the time that the Israeli army will 
invade our houses or demolish them. There is curfew all the time and you 
can’t go out and my mother cries all the time because my little brothers drive 
her crazy. And my father has depression. I wish God had taken us to a better 
world. (Girl-city)
“Since the beginning of the conflict everything is very bad. Our houses are 
being demolished, there is curfew and other bad things happen”.
(Boy-kibbutz)
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“My name is Mahmud from Gaza. I think that this conflict should end for 
several reasons:
-Every day soldiers are coming and I am scared and my family is scared as 
well.
-Every day tanks pass by.
-Every day our houses are being demolished 
-Every day our people die” (Boy-settlement)
Just as terrorism and suicide bombers are the key symbols regarding the Palestinian 
belligerence, the burdensome presence of the Israeli army and house demolition are 
the comparable key symbols representing the Israeli offences (this will be discussed in 
more details in the ‘guilt & responsibility’ section below). These extracts portray a 
dismal reality of fear and despair that is generated from what can be described as the 
‘practices of occupation’, although the word itself, with one exemption, is absent from 
the narratives.
“In my street there are a lot of Israeli soldiers all the time and they always 
scare me. I’m afraid they will take my father and he won’t come back 
anymore” (Girl-kibbutz).
“The Israeli soldiers are making our life very difficult. My family is very 
poor. We hardly eat anything and they demolish our houses. I am for peace. 
The worst thing is that they killed my father” (Girl-kibbutz)
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The Israeli actions: oppression or self-defence?
The next ideological or moral dilemma that arises from the narratives, regards the 
meaning and purpose of the Israeli military/violent activities in the Palestinian territories. 
In the same manner as the Palestinian violence, the Israeli violent actions (evident in 54% 
of the narratives) generates a mixture of equivocal responses, which can be explicated in 
relation to two contentious rhetorical interests, comparable to the delegitimisation- 
legitimisation polls in relation to the Palestinians.
On the one hand there is a tendency to portray the Israeli policies in a negative 
manner. This intriguing discourse, which I titled guilt & responsibility, is in effect the 
other side of the same process of the Palestinian victim-impression examined in the 
previous section. Accordingly, the expulsion from the land, the excessive use of force, 
killings and house demolition, all generate a fragmentary yet clear voice of blame and 
accountability in relation to both the long past and short history of the conflict.
Conversely, the blame and responsibility voice is hardly unambiguous, and the 
children convey a complementary viewpoint to the Israeli violence in a tendency towards 
justification. Here, the Israeli violence is legitimised mostly as self-defence against the 
Palestinian terrorism. Whether implicit or explicit the Israeli aggression is scrutinised 
through the logic of the right of Israel to defend itself against the Palestinian’s atrocities 
in order to achieve security.
Guilt & responsibility
This discourse, which undoubtedly utters a sense of blame and responsibility, is in 
effect the corresponding facet of the victim discourse in relation to the Palestinians. Put 
differently, victimising the Palestinians and denouncing the Israelis are the two polls of 
the same rhetorical process. Consequently, inasmuch as the symbols of the occupied land 
or house demolition serve to legitimise the Palestinians, they are used to construct blame 
and liability on the part of the Israelis.
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As described above, the construal of the conflict is organised chronologically and 
contextually around two phases. In the first, the notion of the occupied land is constructed 
as the key object and main cause of the conflict. The children recognise that, by some 
means, the Jewish immigration to Palestine and the establishment of the state of Israel 
came about at the expense of the inhabitant Palestinians. This event is considered to be 
the ‘original sin’ of the Israelis and the root of all troubles to come.
“It all started when the Jews came to this land and wanted to live here so all 
the conflicts and fighting begun and last to day.” (Girl-kibbutz)
“They came and settled in our land, established a state and tried to expel us”. 
(Boy-city)
“I think that the Israelis attacked us first and we didn’t do anything. That was 
few decades ago when the state was ours as well as Jerusalem and other 
cities. Now we want them to give us back everything they took from us” 
(Boy-settlement)
The discourse of the occupied land is maybe the least contested object to be found 
in the narratives (after Palestinian terrorism). I cautiously argue that if the same task (i.e. 
the role-playing narrative composition) had been given to my generation when I was at 
these children’s age, the notion of the land would have been contentious to a much larger 
extent 45. The fact that from all the narratives, regardless of their author’s personal 
communicative end, (i.e. whether the child who wrote it meant to depict a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
Palestinian) stems the unequivocal construal of historical injustice is evidence of the 
weakening of the myth of “land without people to a people without land”. Instead, this 
fraction of the Palestinian narrative, the one that conveys the tragedy of expulsion from 
the land seems to have been diffused deep into the Israeli collective psyche.
45 Moreover, the whole notion of the ‘Palestinian problem’ was far less debated in the Israeli society before 
the Palestinian uprising, that is the first Intifada started in 1987.
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Formerly marginalised and even considered ‘enemies from within’, the so-called 
‘new historians’46 and their account of the 1948 events have become, to some extent, 
consensual. Furthermore, one of the consequences of the Oslo agreement was that it 
brought some changes to the education system by initiating programmes of peace 
education in Israel where a more open discussion of less positive events in Israeli history 
were admitted to in the textbooks.
The subsequent construal of the Israeli blameworthiness regards the short past of 
the conflict, that is the recent cycle of violence and the Israeli exercise of power in the 
occupied territories:
“I have to be scared all the time that the Israeli army will invade our houses
or demolish them” (Girl-city)
“Their army bombard our houses all the time” (Girl-settlement)
“The Israeli army broke our house and now we don’t have where to live”
(Boy-city)
“The Israeli soldiers making our life very difficult (Girl-kibbutz)
House demolition, arrests, harassments and killings dominate these exceptional 
voices, which appear primarily, but not exclusively in the kibbutz data. This is a genuine 
portrayal of the Palestinians as victims that locates the Israelis in the place of the 
aggressors. It is a clear voice (albeit minor) of resentment and self-criticism in contrast to 
the dominating Palestinians-delegitimising discourse and rhetoric.
However, a noteworthy distinction is evident when comparing the portrayals of the 
Israeli wrongdoings to that of the Palestinians. Whereas the account to the Palestinian 
violence, to a large extent focuses on negative essences and qualities, construction of the 
Israeli misconduct is restricted to portrayal of actions. It is merely the Israeli forceful
46 See Chapter Four p. 118
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actions, for the most part killings and the practice of house demolition, that is evident in 
the narratives.
“In my opinion if we speak about the Israelis they cause nothing but harm and 
trouble. They demolished our family house and killed my grandfather. I think 
they are murderers although they think that we are. I never heard of terrorists 
but the Israeli army came into our house at 4am in the morning when 
everybody was sleeping. It was very very scary; I have nightmares since that 
night”. (Girl-kibbutz)
I have no intention of underestimating the sincerity of these genuine empathic 
efforts to construct the perspective of the Palestinians and indeed these extracts give the 
impression of self-criticism and courageous portrayals of the Israeli wrongdoings. 
However it is important to note that apart from the fact that the Israeli delegitimisation is 
restricted to actions only; no essence, no destructive intentions, no ‘terrorism’ (as this 
category is exclusive to the Palestinians), when carefully examining these allegations it is 
possible to conclude that these are all actions that are associated with the Israeli army 
fighting against Palestinians terrorists. There are three points to make in relation to that.
First, the Israeli aggression is always re-presented as a response to the Palestinian 
violence. See for example the extract above- purportedly a fine example of denouncing 
the house demolition and killing of a family relative. Yet by proclaiming “I  never heard 
o f terrorists but the Israeli army came into our house at 4am in the morning when 
everybody was sleeping....” the rationalization to this violent activity is latently and 
unconsciously provided. She may not have heard of terrorists but this is still the only 
reason for the army to break into her house in the middle of the night. As will be shown 
in the next section, this tendency towards justification of the Israeli violence is frequently 
articulated even more explicitly.
Consequently, when examining the selected actions, namely, house demolition, 
arrests and killings, these are all allegedly military operations described, yet again, in the 
service of fighting terrorism. Therefore, even when directed at civilian targets they are 
never so described but at most are represented and criticised as “excessive uses of force”.
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When ascribing these actions to the Israeli army (which indeed is the executer of these 
actions) the children unconsciously reproduce the legitimacy of these actions, as after all 
it is the Israeli Defence Army. There is hardly any questioning as to the army being there 
in the first place. Moreover, by restricting the blame to the Israeli army’s actions they 
seem to create a symbolic separation between the Israeli army whom they fiercely 
deplore and the Israeli state or society who are left outside the debate thus reducing the 
sense of blame and responsibility.
This strengthens my contention that entering the perspective of the Palestinians is 
restricted by the ideological comprehensions of the conflict as experienced by the 
Israelis. The ability to construct the Palestinian viewpoint is constrained by the 
boundaries of the Israeli representational field and discourse. Thus, even if the 
communicative end is to legitimise or even victimise the Palestinians along with 
reconstructing blame and responsibility on the part of the Israelis, the Israeli children 
simply cannot think or imagine the world of the conflict ‘through the eyes of the 
Palestinians’ beyond the symbolic field of their group. The more explicit manifestation of 
this condition will now be presented in the opposite re-presentation of the Israeli violent 
activities
Justification -  reconstructing security and ‘no alternative’ ethos
Logic o f events
There are very few compositions that posit the Palestinians as victims against the 
Israeli villain without providing a broader context (evidently the suicide bombers) as a 
backing to the Israeli actions. In other words, although the Israeli abuses are 
acknowledged, it is barely depicted as plain mistreatment or oppression. Rather, in the 
vast majority of cases where the narrator describes the wrongdoing of the Israeli army, it 
will be accompanied with either a hint or a clear explanation to the described offences. 
As seen in the following examples, the logic and sequence of events is obvious- the 
Israeli offences are retaliating against Palestinian terrorism:
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“Many many Jews are being killed and on our side the army demolishes our 
houses and kills our people” (Girl-city)
“Since my uncle blew himself in Tel Aviv the army demolished our house” 
(Boy-city)
“There is a lot of terrorists attacks in Israel so wanted people are being 
arrested” (Girl-kibbutz)
“The Israeli army came to our village with tanks and went into some houses 
because of the terrorist attacks that came from my village” (Girl-city)
These voices can be read as a reconstruction of the notion of security, which, as 
seen in Chapter Five, is a constitutive element in the Israeli collective experience. Apart 
from its communicative goal to delegitimise the Palestinians, the terrorism discourse 
previously discussed is visibly an indirect reconstruction of the immense security 
discourse in Israel. Note the choice of words, such as 4many many Jews are being 
killed...’ or ‘there is a lot of terrorist attack in Israel...’, which aim at emphasising lack 
of personal security and victimisation.
This interpretation goes beyond the apparent reading of these extracts, which 
demonstrate the logic or causality of events; the Israeli army acts in responce to the 
Palestinian suicide bombings, hence these actions are rhetorically (and morally) justified. 
Underlying this scrutiny are two interrelated ideological convictions. First, viewing the 
Palestinians through delegitimising lenses reinforces the adherence to the use of force. 
Consequently, it seems like there is only one aspect of security- one that can be achieved 
by purely military means. Put differently, the parties communicate solely in the language 
of force. These two outlooks play an important role in the legitimisation of Israeli 
military means in the pursuit of security.
Furthermore, security, (or in this case lack of security) when analysed from a 
Meadian perspective is an object whose meaning is derived from its role in the Israeli 
conduct and action. Hence, according to the representation of security, suicide bombings 
against innocent Israeli civilians predated the incursion of Israeli tanks into Palestinian 
towns and villages and the military operations are means to restore justice and security.
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That is to say, according to this logic of events the inferred burdensome presence 
of the Israeli army in the Palestinian villages and towns is not the direct consequence, or 
the essence of the Israeli military occupation but a result of the Palestinian terrorism47.
Self (other) blame- reconstructing ‘no alternative'
In some of the narratives there is more than just the portrayal of the sequence of 
events. Some children, while role-playing Palestinians, explicitly express self-blame in 
common with understanding to the Israeli actions:
“I don’t like this conflict between us and the Jews even though its our fault 
because we are committing terrorist attacks and than the Israeli army 
demolish our houses and kill Arab families of those who commit the 
attacks”(Girl-city).
“The Israeli army doesn’t want to hurt us. They are only after those who 
killed their civilians” (Boy-city)
These tendencies to both blame the Palestinians and to advocate the Israeli actions 
by emphasising that Israel adheres to a strikingly moderate military policy, are the most 
visible illustrations to my contention that the Israeli children approach the world of the 
conflict, or in our specific case -  they approach and construct the story (perspective) of 
the Palestinians from the perspective of the Israeli narrative. Namely, they think, 
perceive, rationalise, form judgments and hence construct the perspective of the 
Palestinians according to the frames of reference of the Israeli self and are therefore 
constrained by the ideological definitions of the paramount social reality as based 
exclusively on the experiences of the Israelis.
This is evident not only in the dehumanising depictions, which are allegedly 
stemmed from highly negative stereotypes circulating in some environments in Israel, but
47 In relation to the recent cycle of violence, it is true that the Israeli army re-occupied Palestinian cities 
and towns it previously evacuated during the interim stages of the Oslo agreement. Yet, the fact is that the 
Israeli occupation has been taking place for 38 years.
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also, and more interesting to my view, in narratives where the communicative aim of the 
narrator is to portray the Palestinian in an entirely positive manner.
“I am scared but I’m sure that the Israelis are scared as well.... I am sorry for 
the Israelis that being scared to go to shopping mall or club or cafe, since 
after all it is their home just like it is ours”. (Girl-kibbutz)48
“I am not happy about the security problems in Israel” (Girl-kibbutz)
“I have one friend who got hurt badly from the Israeli missiles but I don’t 
blame them since we started the whole thing”. (Boy-city)
“A couple of weeks ago my cousin got killed in a shooting incident by the 
Israeli army. But I don’t bear a grudge to the Jews because of that girl who 
told me a lot about the Jewish culture” (Girl-kibbutz).
These extracts can be interpreted as the reconstruction of the ethos of ‘no 
alternative’ and ‘purity of arms’ described in chapter five, according to which the 
Israeli exercise of power is guided by the imperative of “self-defence”. The underlying 
conviction that inferred from this rhetorical pattern is that military force is used merely in 
order to protect a threatened Israeli community from Palestinian terrorists, excluding 
innocent civilians. Based on the reconstructed ethos of self-defence the Israeli children 
demonstrate a tendency to conceive and justify the uses of violence as a (no alternative) 
means of coping with threats to their security.
Furthermore, in the ambivalence appreciation of the Israeli violence and the 
construal or these actions as ‘no alternative’ one can find a latent communicative end that 
cuts across the majority of the narratives. The Israeli children, while constructing the 
perspective of the Palestinians strive to negotiate a better appearance of their real self, i.e. 
the Israeli self. In many cases, it seems like the task of ‘looking through the eyes of a 
Palestinian child’ generates a serious psychological discomfort that has to be resolved. 
By utilizing a variety of symbolic and communicative strategies, the children conciliate 
the negative image they had just constructed of themselves. For example, after
48 See full analysis of this narrative in the next chapter.
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denunciating the Israeli offences and expressed hatred to the Israelis (as a Palestinian) 
one child wrote:
“To be honest the Jews are also a bit good although they are bombarding us 
because at least they give us some place to live. So although I hate them they 
are not so bad”(Boy-settlement).
Another child wrote:
“This is what I think, that the Israelis are good even though they bombard us.
I know they are doing it for self-defence so the Arabs won’t kill them” (Girl- 
settlement)
To sum up, the Israeli violence, evident in just about half of the narratives, (or one should
perhaps say in only half of the narratives) is a problematic topic for the children to re­
present and narrate from the perspective of the Palestinians. Several psycho-ideological 
pressures become noticeable when analysing these voices.
First, there is a conclusive outlook regarding the injustice that came about when 
the Jewish people arrived to Palestine and established the state of Israel at the expense of 
the Palestinians. Yet, it is a point worthy of note that reading these narratives and the 
recurrent theme of the disputed land, it is difficult to recognize any distinction between 
the ‘original’ or initial dispute over land that started with the immigration of the Jews to 
Palestine and the more recent and actual disputed land that is the ‘occupied territories’ a 
dismal consequence of the 1967 war when Israel occupied the Gaza strip and the West 
Bank49. This distinction is significant not from a chronological perspective but, rather on 
a fundamental circumstance level. Regarding the 1967 occupied territories the issue is 
surely the disputed land. However, the more important issue is the occupation-not just the 
occupation of the land, but the occupation of the people.
49 Territories believed to be the land on which the prospective Palestinian state will eventually established.
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Whereas the notion of the occupied land is a very frequent, uncontested theme, the 
notion of the occupied people is fairly hard to notice. That is to say, the reality of some 
3.5 million Palestinians having been under military occupation for 38 years and the 
systematic and deliberate violations of their fundamental rights as defined by 
international humanitarian law, with very minor exemptions, is absent from the 
narratives. There is seemingly an absence of construal regarding the devastating impact 
on all aspects of life under military occupation and even when some children genuinely 
attempt to convey an impression of guilt and responsibility in relation to the Israeli deeds, 
this is limited to specific activities which are all undertaken for the sake of fighting 
terrorism, such as house demolitions and arrests. In other words, even when there is a 
genuine attempt to excoriate the Israelis, the Israeli violence is read as a by-product of 
legitimate reprisal directed at terrorists rather than civilian targets. This interpretation is 
strengthened when considering the contradictive rhetoric, that of justification to the 
Israeli violence. This voice explicitly advocates the Israeli deeds as self-defence and has 
been interpreted as a reconstruction of the ‘no-altemative’ and ‘purity of arms’ ethos, a 
constituent element of the Israeli collective psyche. These two ostensibly contradictive 
outlooks regarding the Israeli violent actions reflect the boundaries of the common 
discourse and debate within Israeli society. That is to say, justified or condemned, 
rationalised or deprecated the Israeli violent activities, even when directed at civilian 
targets are always represented and understood as responses, or retaliation and at most are 
criticised as “excessive force”. As one girl from the kibbutz wrote:
Maybe the Israeli army is too aggressive but I can understand them a little”.
(Girl-kibbutz)
My contention can be dismissed on the ground of the children’s age since they have 
not yet studied in depth the recent history and the wars Israel had fought against the 
Arabs over the years, or the consequences of the 1967 war. Yet I also believe that this 
reflects a deeper denial or repression of the Israeli society in relation to the meaning and 
implications of being an occupier.
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Israelis -  victimisation or supremacy?
Additional intriguing ideological dilemma found in the narratives has to do with 
the Israelis as well, and can be described as victimisation and deep sense of vulnerability 
in contrast to a strong conviction in the Israeli supremacy. In other words the analysis of 
the compositions reveals two somewhat contradictive self-perceptions (as Israelis) while 
role-playing Palestinians. On the one hand the children, through their compositions 
depicted a conclusive, (albeit mainly in an indirect manner since they had been asked to 
write as Palestinians) picture of the Israelis as victims. In contrast to the implied 
victimisation, there is a no less awareness of Israeli superiority over the Palestinians and 
the ability to overcome. Israeli supremacy, both military and morally is implied in 
various ways that range from expressions of fear from the Israeli military might, to 
evaluation of qualities where the Israelis are depicted, for example, as smarter and 
generous.
Israeli victimisation and deep sense of vulnerability
“My feelings when I become a martyr will be very good. I will kill many 
many Jews, which I hate so much and the state of Israel will be mourning 
because many Jews will die.” (Boy-city)
The demonisation of the Palestinians by emphasising their destructive deeds and 
aspirations serves a double communicative end. As previously discussed these depictions 
predominantly aim at delegitimising the Palestinians and represent them as bent on 
Israel’s destruction. All at once, these depictions position the Israelis, being the target of 
these aggressions and cruelties, in the place of the sufferers, thus reproducing one of the 
most enduring features of the Israeli collective identity, that is, self-perception as victims. 
By emphasising the brutal deeds and wickedness of the Palestinians and their aspiration 
to eradicate the Israelis, and by graphically portraying Israeli casualties, the implied 
picture is that of a persistent sense of defencelessness and constant threat to individual 
and collective security and wellbeing.
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As seen in the above extract, the image is of a single Palestinian martyr that is 
going to inflict innumerable casualties and victimise the ‘state of Israel’ to a state of 
bereavement. This depiction implies not only personal grief but rather, collective or 
national. The sense of threat and imminent danger is experienced as a threat both to the 
life of individuals and to the existence of the state of Israel and the Jewish people.
“We want the Jews to be in pain and they should cry all the time and mourn
their dead” (Boy-settlement)
So much for the apparent, the same impression is communicated and reproduced 
not only through ‘celebrating’ the Palestinian cruelty but in a less overt approach by 
uttering (as Palestinians) self-blame and empathy to the Israeli suffering:
“I feel really bad about it because we kill people without consideration to
their families and friends that will be miserable because of us” (Girl-city)
In order to express (as Palestinians) empathy to the Israeli sufferings the children 
must assume the role of the victims (as Israelis) in this conflict and indeed the logic of the 
Israeli victimisation runs across the data. The children have elaborated a strong sense that 
the Israelis are powerless victims at the mercy of all-powerful, evil Palestinians.
Israeli supremacy
“It is clear cut that the Israelis will defeat us”. (Boy-city)
In contrast to the recurring self representation as defenceless victims there is a 
common perception of Israeli superiority and the ability to prevail over Palestinian 
aggression. The most frequent manifestation of Israeli dominance propagates a sense of 
trust in the Israeli military superiority. While role playing Palestinians this notion is 
communicated mainly as an expression of fear from the Israeli army and implicit 
recognition in the imbalance of power:
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“I’m really scared because I know how strong and powerful the Israeli army 
is” (Girl-city)
“Their army is much bigger than ours because we don’t have any army at 
alF’(Boy-settlement)
“We hate the Israelis but they are scary especially when they bombard us” 
(Boy-settlement).
“Eventually the Israelis will decide to fight hard and they will blow up 
houses” (Boy-kibbutz)
These voices contemplate on and reproduce the asymmetry in power relations 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians. These examples that convey the confidence that 
Israel will emerge victorious are based on various assumptions. First, the Palestinians 
have a good reason to be scared because the Israeli army is ‘strong and powerful’. 
Secondly, this is in comparison to the fact that the Palestinians ‘don’t have any army at 
all’. Both statements rhetorically stress the inferiority of the Palestinian armed struggle 
and power against the Israeli military might. Finally, the asymmetry of power is 
communicated in an additional intriguing manner. Not only the comparison between the 
‘strong and powerful army’ in opposition to the lack of military prowess but also, as the 
third extract implies, the Israelis haven’t yet fully exercised their power and if the 
Palestinians will continue with their aggression, ‘eventually’ the Israelis will ‘decide to 
fight hard’. This ‘hold us’ attitude implies that the Palestinians should be very careful not 
to ‘push it’ too much, that is, the weaker party should carefully, consider and calculate its 
actions or will have to face the consequences.
Examining these rhetorical contradictions, it appears that despite the fundamental 
asymmetry of power, the children reconstruct the Israelis as the primary victims in this 
conflict. It seems clear that memory of Jewish persecutions is embedded in the symbolic 
reality of these children and influences their reaction and interpretation to contemporary
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threats50 even when the resulting self-perception as defenceless victims clashes markedly 
with Israel military might.
This ambivalence or contradiction so entrenched in the Israeli collective psyche 
where deep sense of vulnerability cohabits with recognition in, and occasionally even 
arrogance of power can be critically evaluated as the victimisation ideology of the 
military and economic superpower. Yet one has to bear in mind that the wave of the 
suicide bombers, considering the nature of this sort of attack, although it never really 
altered the asymmetry of power between the Israeli and Palestinians, certainly generated 
a new balance of fear. Put differently, the ultimate Israeli military superiority over the 
Palestinians was never really undermined. Nevertheless, it was ineffective in preventing 
the wave of suicide bombers on Israeli civilians which generated an inconceivable sense 
of threat to individual security. With the aid of politicians’ rhetoric and media depictions 
these threats are interpreted and perceived as an existential threat to the state of Israel.
I suggest that despite the deep sense of vulnerability, the children have little doubt 
in the ability of Israel to overcome. They discursively contemplate the possibility that 
Israel may be destroyed, especially in relation to the Palestinian’s ultimate objective or 
aspirations but this seem to have little psychological reality.
While selecting the appropriate extracts from the narratives to illustrate my 
findings, an intriguing observation caught my attention, which later was examined and 
proved right. While articulating the voice of victimisation, whether directly or in the 
form of demonising the Palestinians, the children used the category Jews/Jewish in 
relation to self. Conversely, when discoursing Israeli supremacy, specifically the military 
superiority they used the category Israeli/s.
I suggest that the choice of self-categorisation and the swing between Israeliness 
and Jewishness is not accidental or arbitrary. Rather, it is compatible with, and reflects
50 Few children noticeably draw upon symbolic resources from the Jewish dismal history thus discursively 
generating the link between the Palestinian aspirations and the German Nazis. See for example analysis p. 
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two different aspects of the Israeli self. The Jews category is saturated with the 
psychological baggage of a history of victimisation and oppression and is associated with 
being weak, vulnerable or persecuted.
“The Jews all over the world should be destroyed...” (Boy-city)
Here, the context of the conflict is expanding beyond the evident Israeli-Palestinian 
disagreements to attain a broader meaning with association of genocide attributed to the 
Palestinian inspiration. This overtone is a fine reconstruction of core aspect of the Israeli 
self, one that experiences plain continuity between centuries of Diaspora persecutions and 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, and therefore represents the Palestinian armed struggle as 
lurking danger and a threat to the entire Jewish people.
On the other hand, the Israeli category is associated with advancement and military 
might. It is the modem Israeli category that has the orientation towards power and the 
ability to control and shape the Jewish destiny. Therefore, when describing the Israeli 
supremacy the children, for the most part, favour the Israeli classification as in the ‘Israeli 
army’, ‘Israeli tanks’, ‘Israeli soldiers’ and so forth. The tension and transition between 
the categories can be seen in the following extract:
“I think that the Jews deserve to get hurt, but on the other hand I am also 
scared because the Israeli army is very strong” (Girl-settlement)
I am happy that we kill the Jews like that. They deserve it. But sometimes its 
really sad to hear so many dead people in Israel and it scares me that the 
Israelis will send bombs and bombard us and we won’t have a place to live 
like my neighbour. (Girl-city)
While discussing the prospect of Palestinians victimising the Israelis, it is the Jews 
category that are being victimised. In contrast, there is a good reason to be scared because 
of the military might of the Israeli army that is very strong and can ‘send bombs’. A 
simple word count comparison reveals that whereas in the Kibbutz compositions the
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Jewish-Israeli categories have the same proportion, the Jewish category is double and 
triple in frequency in the city and the settlement respectively.
Before I move on to describe the next and final ideological dilemma, there is an 
additional manifestation to the Israeli supremacy, one that goes beyond the military but 
nonetheless reconstructs and sustains the asymmetry of power relations between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians.
“The Israelis are much smarter” (Boy-city)
“I love the Jews and I want to be Jewish”(Boy-city)
“I would like to have a Jewish family because when I grow up I want to 
be smart and to have normal life. Unlike what we have: its cold, we don’t 
have food, there is no place on the mattress because we are 10 brothers 
plus Mom”. (Boy-settlement)
These examples convey, in different ways the superiority of the Israelis and sustain 
the asymmetry in power between the groups. Some children, while role playing 
Palestinians expressed favouritism towards the Israelis based on their morality, or other 
qualities and trait characterisation. The extreme cases of this tendency as can be seen in 
the last two examples in expressions of repugnance to the Palestinians and a clear 
aspiration to belong to the other group. The girl from the last extract wants to have a 
Jewish family so she can be smart and have normal life. These qualities, or the absence of 
these qualities, is directly associated with the groups (Jewish-smart and normal life, 
Palestinians-deprived living conditions) regardless of the context and conditions that led 
to these differences. This inclination is related to what I previously described as a 
negotiation of a better appearance of self where the children through the process of social 
comparison praise the Israelis and narrate their role played Palestinian as completely dis- 
identifying with her/his people.
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Peace- immensely desired but impossible to achieve
The forth and last ideological dilemma or contradiction considers the meaning 
and prospect of the concept of peace. Peace is definitely one of the most significant 
objects to be found in the narratives and the analysis of the peace related voices reveal a 
psychological ‘tie’, or dilemma in relation to peace.
On the one hand there is extensive peace-yearning rhetoric, which constructs the 
notion of peace as the ultimate opposite to the current conflictual reality. Every imaginary 
Palestinian child that expressed frustration or repugnance regarding the current situation 
articulated the conception of peace as the cure to the Israeli-Palestine mayhem and the 
ultimate desired solution. However, as much as peace rhetoric is extensive, it is usually 
restricted to abstract declarations on the desirability of peace with a few references to 
better interpersonal relations, official treaties and to the avoidance of violence.
On the other hand, there is underlying robust conviction or disbelief in the 
possibility of peace. This is implied from the narratives in three different communicative 
strategies. The first specifically portrays the Palestinians as anti-peace people. Apart from 
the delegitimising depictions which visibly portray the Palestinians as violent and evil, 
there are narratives in which the Palestinian child purposely declares his /her disinterest 
in peace and a wish to persist with the violent means. Additionally, there is a pervasive 
‘fatalism’ attitude that circulates in the narratives, which perceives the conflict as a nature 
given or impossible to overcome, hence peace, although sought-after is not a viable 
option. Thirdly, when discussing the subject matter of peace some children elaborated a 
zero-sum representation of peace that implicitly denotes the impossibility for the two 
people to live peacefully side-by-side.
Yearning for peace
“Eventually there will be peace. Maybe it won’t be me who brought it but it 
will happen. We need faith in peace.” (Girl-kibbutz)
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The ubiquitous peace rhetoric, an identifying mark of Israeli society is markedly 
reflected in the children’s works as they approach the perspective of the Palestinians. It 
is set up as a key object -  a utopian state that stands for and symbolises everything that is 
the opposite of the current relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Simply 
stated, if the conflict stands for what is bad, peace stands for what is good. Given that, 
almost every child that reconstructed and positioned his/her imaginary Palestinian as 
‘good’, built upon this equation and constructed a Palestinian that either firmly objects to 
the conflict or strongly advocates peace, or both. In that sense, the contemplation on 
peace is an additional communicative strategy the children applied to legitimise their 
imaginary Palestinians by portraying them as peace-seekers.
“I truly hope that this conflict will end with peace and both sides will be 
happy”(Girl-city)
“It is so fun to have peace!”(Girl-kibbutz)
“I want peace to come at last, without the attacks all the time. And everyone 
will live peacefully and quietly, and everything will be good.”(Girl-kibbutz)
The common manifestation of peace is to a large extant abstract and contains 
declarations on the positiveness and desirability of peace, which, according to this 
construal symbolises non-war, the avoidance of violence and hope for a better future for 
the Israelis and the Palestinians. It is habitually conceptualised by the children in blurred, 
non-figurative and utopian terms. The children are hardly able to go beyond the wishful 
or dreamful peace and to give substance to the concept. In that sense, although 
volumised, the prevalent peace rhetoric is somewhat hollow. Moreover, in many of the 
peace-related narratives, the concept is both simplified and trivialised. Peace is ‘fun’ and 
is derived from or depends solely on good will. Again, I have no intention of 
undervaluing the sincerity and good intention of these voices, yet my interpretation 
regards them as more of a projection of Israeli peace ideology or mere reproduction of 
peace slogans rather than engagement with the Palestinian perspectives on peace.
“Why not make peace? What’s so difficult about it? Why fighting and 
dying? (Boy-kibbutz)
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“I wish that there will be no wars in the world but peace all over and 
everybody will love everybody even just for one day. And than in this one 
and only special day everybody will realise how good it is to have peace all 
over the world and it will remain forever” (Girl-kibbutz)
A point worthy of note is that the discourse of peace is one of the most visible 
group-specific categories with the kibbutz having significantly more ‘peace-yearning’ 
compositions than the city and settlement together. The opposite tendency can be seen in 
the delegitimising category of the terrorist-Palestinian, which is considerably lower in the 
kibbutz in comparison with the other groups.
When trying to cast some content to the essentially hollow category, one common 
meaning that is attached to the concept of peace is good interpersonal relations. Both the 
means to achieve peace and the consequences of peace: good interpersonal relations and 
communication, i.e. playing together, meeting, talking, were recurring themes.
“My solution is to meet with them and try and talk with them and play with 
them so we’ll see that the other side is not so bad and is doing everything for 
peace” (Girl-kibbutz)
“We need a common school for Jews and Palestinians so we can play 
together” (Boy-settlement)
An additional aspect of peace was found in a few references to official treaties and 
agreements that stress the political element in peace building. In this construal, peace is 
in the hand of the politicians and is dependent on their good will and efforts. According 
to this logic, it is the leaders that are responsible for the conflict and as such they have the 
power to change the current reality by meeting and signing the desired treaties.
“When I grow up I want to be the prime minister of both the Israelis and the 
Palestinians so I could make peace” (Girl-kibbutz)
“If I were prime minister I would have done anything possible for the peace” 
(Boy-kibbutz)
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“I think that there should be peace between Israel and the Palestinians and 
we can write to Arafat, Sharon and also George W. Bush so they will try to 
achieve peace” (Boy-settlement)
Peace discourse raises, once again, the notion of land. As seen before, the notion of 
the occupied land is a fraction from the Palestinian narrative that entered the Israeli 
collective consciousness. While thinking of peace from the perspective of the Palestinians 
some children contemplated the re-partition or the liberation of the land. Since land is a 
key object in the realm of the conflict, it is effectively a key object in the road for peace.
‘Land for peace’ is the most common perception, or social representation of peace in the 
Israeli-Palestinian political sphere. This formula has been fixated in the common 
perception of peace ever since the commencement of the peace process and it is possible 
to identify its reconstruction in the narratives.
“In my opinion we should make a simple agreement. Our prime minister will 
meet the Israeli prime minister to sign an agreement so we’ll have equal parts 
of land” (Boy-city)
“If you will give us back the territories we will have a peace agreement” 
(Boy-kibbutz)
“If we fight over land we can live together. For example we can divide 
Jerusalem so both of us could have it” (Girl-settlement)
Missing from this discourse is the negotiated character of peace. That is, the 
acknowledgment of mutuality and equality of the parties and the need to jointly realise 
future possibilities is completely absent in the construal of peace rhetoric. I regard this as 
another illustration to my contention that the Israeli children approach the world of the 
conflict, and specifically the perspective of the Palestinians, according to the frames of 
reference of the Israeli shared understanding of reality. Analysis of the peace discourse 
in the narratives reveals that the notion of peace is for the most part substantiated in 
relation to the everyday life of the Israelis and is completely thought of in Israeli terms.
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Peace, as inferred from these narratives, is predominantly the end of the Palestinian 
terrorism.
“There are a lot of advantages in peace. If there will be peace there won’t be 
war and bloodshed and no one will throw stones and no terrorist attacks and 
no suicide bombings.” (Girl-kibbutz)
“Both sides tried and still trying to reach an agreement to end up this sorrow 
and bloodshed in Israel” (Girl-kibbutz)
“I prefer that there will be peace. That way nobody will be suicide bomber 
and nobody get killed.” (Boy-kibbutz)
“We need to find a solution to the conflict and than the suicide bombings will 
end and so the demolition of our houses”. (Girl-kibbutz)
“I think that we should make peace because there are terrorist attacks all the 
time, people are dying and houses are being demolished” (Girl-kibbutz)
These examples show that the notion of peace is reconstructed according to the 
logic and aspirations of the Israelis rather than the Palestinians. The list of ‘consequences 
of peace’ adheres to the security problems in Israel and comprises the avoidance of 
terrorism and suicide bombings thus reconstructing peace in Israeli terms. From a 
Meadian perspective, for the Israelis the key object of the conflict is security and, stems 
from that, the meaning of peace is the end of violence. For the Palestinians the key object 
of the conflict is the occupation, hence the meanings of peace are most likely to be 
liberation and self determination.
The children that attributed ‘peace-longings’ to their role played Palestinians 
perceive peace, first and foremost as the end of the suicide bombings and this perception 
is simply projected onto the Palestinians. Since peace is the negation of violence, and 
since violence is for the most part a Palestinian practice, the simple conclusion is that 
peace means the avoidance of Palestinian violence (It also means the end of house 
demolition, but this, according to the logic and sequence of events, comes only after the 
end of the Palestinian terrorism). Since the Palestinian violence is represented as
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aggression rather that act of liberation, the same logic applied to the notion of peace; it 
has come to mean simply the absence of violence. Ideas such as the end of the 
occupation or the establishment of a Palestinian state are completely absent from the data 
(yet, it is not surprising since, as previously discussed the very essence of the occupation 
is absent as well). In this regard, the concept of peace ‘through the eyes of the 
Palestinians’ has been completely divorced from notions offreedom and justice.
“I would have wanted peace and to tell the other Arab children that the Jews 
are not bad and to the Parents that there should not be any more 
bombings”(Girl-settlement)
“I just think that it is better to stop terrorism and make peace.” (Girl- 
settlement)
“The terrorist attacks and hurting innocent people will not lead anywhere -  
only by talking and agreements” (Boy-city)
“Why can’t they make peace? I asked my parents. And why don’t you want 
to end this conflict? I ask the Arab youth that throw stones on the Israelis.” 
(Girl-kibbutz)
The Palestinian peace-advocates, according to these examples, clearly put the 
blame and responsibility on Palestinian shoulders. When talking about peace, it seems 
like the target audience is fellow Palestinians rather than the Israelis. In almost every 
peace-related composition, the Israeli children positioned their imaginary Palestinian 
child as a peace-lover against the rest or the majority of the Palestinians who cannot see 
the benefit of peace or simply don’t want to end the conflict. This is a clear 
reconstruction of the common perception in Israel, especially ever since the outbreak of 
the second Intifada, according to which it is the Palestinians who are solely responsible 
for the collapse of the peace process, and change will come only when they will decide to 
abandon their annihilative aspirations. The following example best epitomises this 
contention:
“We the Arabs do want peace. Not all of us like and support the terrorist 
attacks that killed many people”(Girl-kibbutz)
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Disbelief in the possibility of peace
In parallel with the extensive peace rhetoric, found in the narratives was a firm 
disbelief in the possibility of peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians. One 
common assumption that inferred from the compositions is that the Palestinian people are 
reluctant to change the current situation. As seen in the concluding extract of the last 
section, the child argues that unlike most of the Arabs that evidently “like and support the 
terrorist attacks that killed many people” she does want peace. Her communicative goal 
is to persuade her audience that unlike most of the Palestinians she belongs to a minority 
of peace-advocates. The same message can be seen in the following extract:
“My family and me we all want peace but we can’t persuade all the 
Palestinians. Sometime friends are coming over and start arguing about the 
conflict and I’m getting upset and I want to shout and tell my parents’ 
friends- no! This is not the solution to say bad things about the Israelis and 
they don’t even mention the word solution to the conflict” (Girl-kibbutz).
The interpretation of these voices is that, apart from few exceptional individuals, 
the vast majority of the Palestinians are fundamentally evil, irrational and anti-peace 
people. This assumption is strengthened in those narratives where the Palestinian child 
overtly declares his/her opposition to peace:
“It is a good thing that we are not in peace with the Israelis. We don’t want 
peace with them” (Boy-settlement)
“They want peace and we want to kill them” (Boy-city).
“I hope there won’t be peace- just more and more wars” (Boy-city)
These examples clearly depict the Palestinians as warmongers and propagate the 
impression that peace is impossible. It is a reconstruction of the recent stubborn 
conviction in the Israeli narrative, one that was generated with the collapse of the peace 
talks and the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising, according to which ‘there is no partner 
for peace’. According to the second extract, it is clear that one party, the Israelis, are 
peace-lovers and peace seekers by contrast to the Palestinians whose only wish is to kill
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the Israelis. The depiction of the Israelis is therefore the diametrical opposite to that of 
the Palestinians: they embody the right and the good. The Israeli craving for peace is 
juxtaposed with a diabolical image of the people with whom peace must be made. This 
rhetoric, whether intentionally or not conveys the message that peace is unattainable.
The second communicative strategy that implies the impossibility of peace is the 
fatalistic perception and construal of the conflictual reality as unalterable destiny. The 
two people are forever doomed to remain in this conflict.
“I don’t think that this conflict is justifiable but I start to realise that there are
no alternatives” (Girl-settlement)
“I want us to live together, Jewish and Palestinians in one place, to be unite.
But I know it will never happen. It is a never-ending war and it will never
ends unless there will be a miracle” (Girl-city).
“I think that this conflict will last forever” (Boy-city)
“I want peace but unfortunately it won’t happen” (Girl-kibbutz)
Unlike the previous voices, these are not pointing blame on any of the parties but 
rather express despair and hopelessness. The mode of conflict is perceived as an 
‘everlasting’ order that we have to accept. These voices communicate the belief that they 
cannot do anything that will change the outcome, because events are determined by 
something over which they have no control. A sense of anguish and a lack of sense of 
agency shape this perception and constitute the conclusion that only a ‘miracle’ can alter 
this fate.
The last manifestation of the disbelief in peace can be described as zero-sum 
perception in relation to possible outcomes of the conflict: no middle ground can be 
found. The construal of the goals and aspirations of the Palestinians can be realised only 
at the expense of the Israelis. This perception is not peace-discourse specific but rather 
inferred from various aspects in the narratives:
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“They don’t understand that we won’t give up. Our goal is one: a Palestinian 
state on the lands of the state of Israel” (Boy-city)
“I think that maybe we should reach a peace agreement with them but only if 
they will let us establish a Palestinian state in their state which is originally 
ours” (Boy-city)
“We are going to take over the state of Israel and than Israel will become 
Palestine again”(Boy-city)
These children see the conflict as a zero-sum game, a winner-takes-all situation. 
They see no room for compromise, and construct the Palestinian final aim as the 
liquidation of the Israeli state. The second extract best illustrates this point. The child 
considers the possibility of reaching a peace agreement with the Israelis seemingly as a 
positive shift since peace is decidedly a valued category. But then come into sight of the 
prospect, or the precondition of such an agreement: a Palestinian state that can be realised 
at the expense of the Israeli state.
To sum up this section, the discourse on peace can be read as the reconstruction of 
the contradictory elements of the Israeli society’s peace ideology. By attributing to the 
Palestinians their own yearnings for peace on the one hand, and by conveying the 
message that peace is impossible to achieve, on the other, the result is a sustained status 
quo.
While constructing the peace rhetoric ‘through the eyes of the Palestinians’ the 
Israeli children reproduced the prospect of peace as based strictly on the Israeli 
experience. That is, the meanings attached to the object of peace are solely derived from 
the Israeli craving for security and completely disregard what can be considered as the 
Palestinian vision for peace including issues such as freedom, justice, self determination 
or the end of the occupation.
Furthermore, in the vast majority of the peace-related data, the overall picture that 
is revealed is of a small minority of Palestinians who promote peace (in Israeli terms),
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and stand impotently against the irrational majority that refuse to comprehend the 
benefits of peace and are only interested in the annihilation of the state of Israel. This is 
an apparent reproduction of the well-grounded ideological conviction that the 
Palestinians are not partners for peace.
It has to be said that despite centuries of craving for peace, the fact of the matter is that 
the Israeli sincerity and readiness to bare the real cost of peace - a cost which will 
seriously take into consideration the Palestinians needs and interests, a cost which will 
compel the Israelis to see the Palestinians as equal partners for negotiations and, a cost 
which will force the Israelis to direct their gaze towards the mirror and confront their own 
misconducts - has never been put to a test. Instead we can see an overwhelming peace 
ideology that has its main function as to maintain the positive and moral self-image of the 
Israelis against the diabolical image of the Palestinians.
Summary
In this chapter I presented the range of responses the Israeli children produced in 
their role-playing narratives in relation to themselves, the Palestinians and the key objects 
of the conflict. The interpretation of the narratives suggests an assortment of competing 
voices and ideologies. For almost every object in the field there are contested meanings, 
opposing interpretations and competing outlooks.
The analysis above has augmented and sharpened the ambivalent and polemic 
approach of the Israeli children towards the Palestinians and their perspective as seen in 
the drawings. Whereas the drawings produced five distinct perspectives in relation to the 
Palestinians, the narratives have extended and ramified the categories to show the Israeli 
self in all its complexities and polemics. It reveals the gamut of contested representations 
and symbolic resources circulating in Israeli society, of which the children draw upon 
when constructing the Palestinian perspective. As I was hoping to demonstrate, the 
contested voices arising out of the children’s works reflect and represent the range of 
responses and competing voices of the Israeli self as was described in chapter five.
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For example, it proposes an image of the Palestinians as murderous whose only 
wish is to harm the Israelis as well as being righteous in their struggle to liberate their 
occupied land. There is even a voice, albeit minor, that sees the Palestinians as victims of 
the Israeli burdensome presence in the occupied territories. The reconstruction of the 
children’s (real) self is not less contested. Israelis are depicted in the narratives, to a large 
extent as the victims of the Palestinian atrocities. They are involved in a war that was 
forced upon them, and they are inescapably defending themselves against the intentions 
of the Palestinians to annihilate the state of Israel. In contrast to that, a less compromising 
perspective was communicated. The Israelis are also the aggressors and the occupiers. 
One conclusive outlook arising from the analysis regards the Israeli immigration to 
Palestine as an act that inflicted injustice to the Palestinians. The establishment of the 
state of Israel, according to this voice, was at the expense of the inhabitant Palestinians. 
As much as the children have elaborated a strong sense that the Israelis are powerless 
victims at the mercy of all-powerful, evil Palestinians, they nonetheless reproduced the 
Israeli supremacy and the asymmetry in power relations. Through the eyes of the 
Palestinians they saw the Israelis as the ones who fall prey as well being a significantly 
superior.
Similarly to the drawings, here too social milieu is a strong predictor as to the 
content and tone of the children’s approach to the other. The children from the kibbutz 
have shown a lesser tendency to intentionally and directly delegitimise the Palestinians. 
Accordingly, self-criticism and peace related attitudes were significantly higher in this 
group. In contrast, dehumanisation of the Palestinians and the tendency to perceive the 
Palestinian violence through essentialising lenses are predominantly city and settlement 
strategies. Nevertheless, as I argue throughout the chapter, the content boundaries of the 
narrative compositions, from the harsh to the empathic, are reflections of the boundaries 
of the Israeli self, of which the children through their construction of the Palestinian 
stance strived to protect.
For instance, even when authorising a victimised Palestinian voice that condemns 
the Israelis for their violence, this violence is almost always reconstructed around the
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logic of self-defence and no alternative. Additionally through their works the children 
have reproduced the Israeli peace rhetoric while emphasising the Israeli desire for 
reconciliation in contrast to the Palestinian rejection of peace. Even when constructing a 
‘good’ image of the Palestinian, one that opposes violence and yearns for peace, the 
notion of peace is reconstructed exclusively according to the frame of reference of the 
Israeli experience. Peace, for the (imaginary) Palestinians is first and foremost the 
absence of the Palestinian terrorism.
By emphasising the multifaceted and contested character of the children’s works, I hope 
to have begun to make clear the problems in treating perspective taking as either/or 
cognitive ability. This will become even clearer in the final analysis where I look at 
individual works of perspective taking.
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7. TAKING THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE OTHER: INDIVIDUAL
ANALYSIS
“Indeed any concrete discourse (utterance) finds the object at which it was 
directed already overlain with qualifications, open to dispute, charged with 
value, already enveloped in an obscuring mist -  or, on the contrary by the 
“light” of alien words that have already been spoken about it. It is entangled, 
shot through with shared thoughts, points of view, alien value judgment and 
accents. The word, directed towards its object, enters a dialogically agitated 
and tension filled environment of alien words, value judgments and accents 
weaves in and out of complex interrelationships, merges with some, recoils 
from others, intersects with yet a third group: and all this may crucially shape 
discourse, may leave a trace in all its semantic layers, may complicate its 
expression and influence its entire stylistic profile”. (Bakhtin, 1981, p.276)
It is now time to return to individual works to try to discern the interrelated forces 
of the competing ideologies embedded in the Israeli narrative (the victimized occupier 
self), and how their particular trajectories and strengths mediate the motivation and 
ability to take the perspective of the other.
The question I ask in this chapter is: how are the competing voices discerned both 
in the ethnographic and sociological analysis, being actively orchestrated as the children 
construct an objectified and finalised perspective of the Palestinians? Specifically, I aim 
to address the complexity of individual’s texts (both drawing and narrative), that is, the 
layers of voices and ideologies embedded within the composed Palestinian perspective, to 
identify how particular rhetorical connections are forged and, more importantly to 
understand the investment that have been made in them. I will examine how different, 
sometimes contradictory perspectives and ideologies are being negotiated, challenged,
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resisted, or accepted in the work of single individuals and how they mediate the 
construction of the other’s perspective.
My aim is to show that these narratives, while monologic in their compositional 
form, reflect the polyphony of the social and bear the traces of multiple voices and 
ideologies. These voices are reproduced, anticipated, polemicised with, or simply taken 
into account in a way that has a profound influence on the content and style of a given 
drawing and composition. Discerning these voices and the nature of their 
interrelationships, that is, making visible the multiple, contradictory and partially 
constrained perspectives and the ways they come to play in individual constructions of 
the other are the primary goals of this chapter.
In the previous analysis I lost sight of individual works and focused on single 
utterances drawn deliberately from the narratives in order to discern the content and 
organisation of the representational-rhetorical field, and to expose the ideological 
dilemmas and power interests that mediate the Israeli children’s responses to the 
Palestinians, to themselves, and the conflict. Using the knowledge of the verbal- 
ideological contexts surrounding the children’s figural and textual productions, acquired 
from both the ethnographic and sociogenesis analysis, an in-depth interpretative process 
was developed that is aimed at sorting out and analysing the voices speaking through 
individual works. Here too, the basic unit of analysis is the utterance. The first questions 
were similar to the previous analysis, i.e. from a rhetorical-pragmatic point of view, what 
is the meaning of that utterance? What is this utterance doing in the narrator’s story? 
Why has the author composed this voice in the name of the Palestinian child? Secondly 
and more importantly, looking at the whole narrative, I asked: what are the dominant 
voices that resonate from the text and what is the nature of the relationships between 
these voices? How have these voices been uniquely configured and what is the outcome 
of that configuration? I tried to infer how particular types of voice orchestration 
functioned for Israeli children to establish various kinds of Palestinian perspectives. 
Additionally, I paid careful attention to specific relations between the subjectivity of the 
Israeli author and the subjectivity of the imagined Palestinian narrator. In other words, I
218
was interested in the various subject positions the Israeli authors, deliberately or 
unconsciously, have placed the imaginary Palestinian in relation to the core objects of the 
conflict and the competing ideologies that mediate and constitute the realm of the 
conflict.
Selection of the works to be analysed in this chapter was a difficult task indeed. 
Mead’s assertion that each individual reflects the social whole from a particular and 
unique standpoint, with no individual mirroring the community in the same way, 
reverberated while I had to choose the works presented in this analysis. Due to spatial 
constraints only nine individual analyses were included, three from each group. The 
rationale for the selection was to provide the broadest illustration of unique 
configurations of voices and positions that mediate and constitute the Israeli children’s 
construction of the Palestinian perspective. In that sense, every composition and drawing 
populated with a matchless orchestration of subject positions and voices, with various 
degrees of harmony and discord, functioned to establish a unique Palestinian subjectivity. 
Each work shed different light on the ideological constraints the Israeli children faced 
when trying to make sense of the enemy and his or her actions, goals and aspirations.
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1. Girl - Settlement.
My name is Mahmmuda. I have a bigger brother and my father is a suicide bomber. 
Tonight he and his friend are planning to attack. I am very proud of him.
I think that Jews deserve to get hurt, but on the other hand I am also scared because the 
IDF is very strong and our leaders are planning a war against the US and then two 
powerful states can hurt us and I am still young and I am afraid to be killed.
When I grow up I want to make peace between the Arabs and the Jews, if I would live.
I know a few Jewish children because we used to live in Jerusalem and I have been in a 
Jewish nursery school.
My brother thinks that we should kill all the Jews but I know that deep in his heart he is 
scared and does not want to kill them because before the Intifada started, he had many 
Jewish good friends.
I don’t think that they deserve to die because sometime they help us and feel sorry for us 
unlike my cruel people.
I would like to have a Jewish family because when I grow up I want to be smart and to 
have a normal life. Unlike what we have: its cold, we don’t have food, there is no place 
on the mattress because we are 10 brothers plus mom. If I were a Jewish girl I would 
have explained to my friends that the Arabs are harmless and most of them want peace, 
like myself and all of my friends. But we don’t show it because we are afraid of our 
parent’s anger.
I think that the adults must think before they hurt our future because they should give us a 
good example - not a bad one.
I truly hope that my father will not commit the terror attack today and that the war would 
not start.
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Analysis
The narrator introduces us to her older brother and father whom she describes as a 
(would be) suicide bomber. Since the image of the suicide bomber bears no meaning 
other than death and destruction, it is a key negative-representation aim at de- 
legitimisation. This impression is strengthened with the approval of, and pride she takes 
in the father’s intentions (/ am very proud o f him). The author, thus, establishes 
identification between the Palestinian child and the vicious Palestinians. The idea of a 
child that is contented about her father committing such a brutal deed, such an extreme 
sacrificial act, denotes a grave violation of civilized values. However, the narrative is 
concluded with a wish that the father will not carry out the planned attack. In between, 
there is an intriguing orchestration of various perspectives and voices, internal 
contradictions and a unique manifestation of the polemics described in the previous 
chapters.
In a rather calm, non-tempestuous tone (that is maintained throughout the 
narrative) the narrator clarifies her approval of the father’s aggressive intentions, 
asserting that the Jews deserve to get hurt. No account or elaboration is provided as 
to why the Jews ought to be harmed, therefore making it difficult to determine whether it 
is an underdeveloped utterance of guilt and responsibility or just an additional element in 
the logic of de-legitimisation. Instead, we find a qualification that marks the first 
alteration in the Palestinian girl’s subjectivity. Although the Jews merit harm, the 
Palestinian child is afraid because the IDF is very strong. This, as seen in the 
previous chapter is an utterance in the service of reaffirming the Israeli supremacy. The 
author depicts the Palestinian child as bent on attacking Israel as well as realistically 
acknowledging the asymmetry in power relations.
The following utterance is a unique blend of the author’s personal anxiety from 
the coming war in Iraq into the context of the Palestinian narrative. The narrator tells of 
the Palestinian leaders’ war plans against the US: our leaders are planning a war
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against the US and then two powerful states can hurt us. This attribution is not a 
complete nonentity. Rather, it is a reproduction of the prevalent images in the Israeli 
media at the time these compositions were written. The consistent perceived threat from 
the Palestinians coalesce with the fear of uncertainty from the coming war, brought about 
by the assimilation of the American and Iraqis exchange of blustering rhetoric before the 
war onto the fictional Palestinian child’s expression of feelings and thoughts. Note the 
choice of words two powerful states, reconstructing once more the trust in Israeli 
superiority by stressing the notion of the Israelis and Americans as allies against the weak 
Palestinians. The Palestinian child admits fear and apprehension of the forthcoming 
situation. This gives a more humane impression of a Palestinian child that is still young 
and afraid to be killed. I found it difficult to construe these two instances in the 
narrative where the narrator expresses her anxiety and fear of dying young. On the one 
hand it can be read as an intended depiction based on the awareness of the startling 
number of Palestinian children who died in the recent cycle of violence. Alternatively, 
this may be a projection of the author’s very own anxieties as an Israeli child living in a 
dismal reality of suicide bombings, intermingled with the consequences of the Israeli 
emotional build-up to the forthcoming war in Iraq.
The voice of threat is the strongest voice that resonates from the drawing as well. 
Interestingly, the negative image of the Palestinian is uttered not through the drawn 
image, as the drawing shows two seemingly ordinary girls. One of them is wearing a face 
scarf but the overall impression is fairly ordinary and positive. The threat is uttered 
through the content of the display board attached to the girls. The one in the right reads 
Death to the Jews\ The second reads We will exterminate you! Soon there will 
be a third world war (the girl on the left holds a package that reads Bomb). Unlike 
many drawings there is no graphic negative portrayal embedded in the Palestinian figure. 
There are neither weapons nor twisted images of the drawn Palestinian. Nevertheless the 
unambiguous content of the drawing communicates threat and discloses the ruthless 
intentions of the Palestinians. The reference to a third world war in the drawing befits the 
reference to the war in Iraq in the narrative and can show the logic of fear and victimhood
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that induces the ideological-cognitive process of likening the Palestinians with past and 
future threats to the Jewish people.
The narrative continues with a change in direction and the narrator now utters the 
voice of peace: When I grow up I  want to make peace between the Arabs and 
the Jews. The meaning of peace is apparently embedded in the word itself. Since no 
additional explanation, or backing is provided, the author assumes that the actual or 
imaginary reader knows what peace means and why the narrator wishes to realise the 
vision of peace between the two peoples; Peace is the ultimate negation of the conflict. 
(The qualification -  if  I  would live- is the sequel of the fear of the unknown and the 
coming war)
The polar reconstruction of the symbolic world of peace in contrast to the world 
of conflict is reified in this composition as the author draws on an imaginary dialogue, or 
reported speech, between two different voices: the narrator turned out to be a ‘good’ 
Palestinian whereas her older brother, previously introduced to the reader is positioned as 
a ‘bad’ Palestinian. Following the peace declaration, the narrator tells of her acquaintance 
with Jewish children she used to go to nursery school with, yet no further evaluation is 
provided regarding these children. The threatening rhetoric is now ascribed to the older 
brother who thinks that we should kill all the Jews.
However the narrator questions the sincerity, or the seriousness of this reported 
attitude by allegedly revealing her brother’s ‘real’ feelings: I  know that deep in his 
heart he is scared and does not want to kill them because before the Intifada 
started, he had many Jewish good friends. She reflects on the era prior to the 
outbreak of the second Intifada, stressing that both herself and her brother used to know 
Jewish children and to have Jewish friends. She composes a clash between two value 
stances. On the one hand there is the Palestinian hatred towards the Jews and the 
motivation to hurt them. On the other hand, the author draws on a common-sensical 
representation of a moral code or order, according to which you do not wish to kill
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someone you know or, moreover, someone who used to be your friend. The notions of 
acquaintance and friendship are key symbols comprising the construal of peace as good 
interpersonal relations. From this point onwards, the narrator positions herself in 
complete disidentification with her in-group Palestinians, represented now by her brother, 
parents and adults. Reading the previously mentioned declaration for peace, it appears 
that the rhetorical shift towards peace signalled a positional shift towards the Israeli 
outlook.
Contradicting her previous stance, the narrator, still in a reported dialogue with 
her brother, replies to the assertion regarding the Jews merit of harm: I  don’t think that 
they deserve to die because sometime they help us and feel sorry for us 
unlike my cruel people. In what seems to be a deepening of the split between us and 
them and an apparent ‘them-praise’, the author is evidently negotiating a better self on 
behalf of the Israelis. She progressively composes a pro-Israeli, Palestinian child. She 
draws on an alleged Israeli compassion and occasional aid to the Palestinians, a story, I 
assume, she heard about in the news, probably an Israeli NGO that assisted the 
Palestinians in coping with the Israeli wrongdoings. This utterance accomplishes the 
ideological construction of the Israelis as good and compassionate in opposition to the 
cruel Palestinians.
The difficulty of the Israeli child to enter the perspective of a Palestinian child is 
reflected in the extreme when the narrator utters: I  would like to have a Jewish 
family because when I  grow up I  want to be smart and to have normal life. 
Looking at the conflict through the eyes of a Palestinian child drives the author to a 
conclusion that the ultimate wish of the Palestinian child is to become Israeli. Namely, 
the dismal reality and the deprived living conditions (Unlike what we have: its cold, 
we don ’t have food, there is no place on the mattress because we are 10 
brothers plus mom) is an embedded quality, or a destiny of being Palestinian. The 
author clearly acknowledges and empathises with the disgraceful living conditions of the 
Palestinians, yet she makes no connection between the realm of the conflict (e.g. the
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occupation, the shattered economy) and its consequences on the daily life of the 
Palestinians. The compassion-arousing portrait of the Palestinian wretchedness is blame- 
free and devoid of any intimation to an Israeli responsibility. Instead, she plainly refers to 
these conditions as an integral element of the Palestinian identity. The solution then, is to 
have, or to be part of a Jewish family. That is the only opportunity for the Palestinian to 
be smart and to have normal life. One simply cannot achieve these qualities if one 
is Palestinian. Rather, one has to become Jewish or to have a Jewish family. This is, 
again, a reproduction of the Israeli supremacy against the Palestinian inferiority, now 
realised not on military ground but in terms of quality of life as well as trait 
characterisations.
In a somewhat self-reflective loop, the narrator moves on to depict an altered 
portrait of the Palestinians that contradicts her previous portrayal of my cruel people. 
She asserts: If I  were a Jewish girl I  would have explained to my friends that 
the Arabs are harmless and most o f them want peace, like myself and all o f  
my friends. This is a very common ‘symbolic resolution’ of the Israeli children when 
constructing the image of the Palestinians. When the children are conscious about not 
making negative generalisations, the solution is to make both generalisations and 
particularisation and/or qualifications. According to this resolution there are good 
Palestinians that oppose terrorism and are pro-peace, (like myself and all of my 
friends, admitted by the narrator). Conversely, as represented in this narrative by the 
narrator’s brother, there are the bad Palestinians who think that we should kill all the 
Jews.
The Palestinian child is harmless and is pro-peace but she and her friends are 
prevented from uttering their reconciliatory opinions because they are afraid of their 
parents’ anger. This can be read as an additional example of unique reconstruction of the 
notion of incitement. The peace loving children cannot promote their views due to social 
or parental pressure to oppose any reconciliation outlook with the Israelis.
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The narrative continues with a somewhat preaching utterance that draws upon a 
values system, which is not directly related to the symbolic realm of the conflict: I  think 
that the adults must think before they hurt our future because they should 
give us a good example - not a bad one. Drawing upon the division between adults 
and children, the narrator now blames responsibility on the adults’ shoulders and invites 
them to re-consider their actions. Deliberately, to my view, she doesn’t indicate whether 
they are Israeli or Palestinian adults, thus creating the impression that the adults on both 
sides hold responsibility for the conflictual reality. They are now categorised as a 
problematic group that deserve denunciation for their amoral deeds.
Befitting this reconciliatory voice the child has appropriated as the composition 
develops, the narrative is concluded in rhetorical contrast to it’s opening. Whereas in the 
beginning the child was pleased with here father’s suicide plans she brings her story to a 
close with the hope that the father will not execute his plans to commit a suicide bombing 
and that the war would not start ( /  truly hope that my father will not commit the 
terror attack today and that the war would not start). This concluding utterance 
represents the transformation in the Palestinian child’s subjectivity from one that supports 
terrorism and suicide bombing to that of peace advocator that hopes for a better future.
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2. Boy - Settlement
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My name is Muhammad; I live in Gaza.
I think that this conflict is good for us because finally we will have a state of our own and 
we won’t need to live with these Jews.
The Jews only harm us.
This conflict with the Jews sometimes does good to us since that way we can hurt them 
and kill them but on the other hand our people are getting hurt and die as well so it is not 
so good.
In order to kill them we need to give up on some important things for us, but we’re doing 
it so we could have a state and not for any other reason.
My Mother wants me to hate the Jews but I don’t need her for that since I hate them 
anyway. Sometime it happens that a few of our people are being asked to go to Jewish 
city-centres to blow themselves up but I think that it’s not so helpful because sometimes 
the Jew’s stupid army kills them.
So I say to myself we are totally crazy to kill ourselves for the sake of killing Jews- its a 
totally moron thing to do because we are losing our people.
This conflict is going on for 2 years now and so far we managed to kill a lot of Jews. 
Although this conflict is progress for so long and many Jews are dying these Jews are not 
surrendering. This Sharon thinks that we will surrender but no! Not so easy. We won’t sit 
quiet until we will kill him.
I hate the Jews and want a state like all the Palestinians.
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Analysis
This drawing and composition, produced by a boy from the settlement, 
encompass a unique articulation of competing voices in relation to both the Israelis and 
the Palestinians. The strongest voice that resonates within this work expresses de- 
legitimisation rhetoric. The Palestinian is predominantly presented in a negative manner 
as bent on killing the Jews. Yet occasionally one can find utterances embodying the 
alternative voice that acknowledges the Palestinian right for self determination and 
independence.
Unlike the composition that contains articulation of different perceptions, the 
depiction in the drawing is completely unambiguous. Two interrelated voices resonate 
within this drawing, the voice of the Jewish victim and the voice of the brutal Palestinian. 
To start with the latter, in the Palestinian part of the sheet, that is titled Arabs 
(terrorists) there are two figures, boy and girl standing next to three bombs. A dialogue 
between the two figures is articulated through verbal expressions attached to them that 
read (from right to left): hey, there’s a Jewish boy lets beat him (3); so many 
terrorist attacks its fun many Jews died (1); True. Many Jews died. Its fun (2) 
and wow its fun to beat a Jewish (4). Underneath the titles read: death to the Jews 
and we don’t want Jews in the country. The other side of the sheet portrays the 
complementary picture of the victim Jew. A weeping child is standing near the puddle of 
his tears. The verbal expressions attached read: grandpa, why did they kill you (5); 
you are a human being too (6); and, I  wish I  could do something. I  hate the 
Arabs but they live with us (7). At the bottom there is a replica of a controversial 
sticker distributed in Israel in reaction to the wave of suicide attacks. It reads: No Arabs 
- No terrorism; Arabs = terrorism.
The narrative commences with an evaluative statement regarding the current 
situation between the Israelis and Palestinians. Assuming that the reader knows or 
understands what “this conflict means, the child asserts: this conflict is good for us,
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This contention, as in most of the narrative is uttered from the perspective of the 
group, or even in the name of the group by applying the language of first-person plural. 
By using that plural voice the narrator position himself as a representative of the 
Palestinians. He speaks in the name of the collective and generates affinity and 
identification between his voice and the rest of the Palestinians.
The evaluative comment regarding ‘this conflict’ is reiterated, only now with 
some ambivalence: This conflict with the Jews sometime does good to us since 
that way we can hurt them and kill them. The rationalization to the advantageous 
conflict has now been shifted to a different account. The meaning and purpose of the 
conflict is transformed from the legitimate account of self determination and 
independence to the de-legitimising explanation of ‘hurting and killing the Jews’. Yet, the 
conflict is also ‘bad’: hut on the other hand our people are getting hurt and die 
as well. According to this ethnocentric, or in-group favouritism morality, in a situation 
of conflict it is good to kill your enemy but it is bad to lose your own people.
In the next utterance the legitimising and de-legitimising voices are getting almost 
completely integrated to construct a unique logic or morality. Maintaining the plural 
voice, the narrator contends: In order to kill them we need to give up on some 
important things for us, but we ’re doing it so we could have a state and not 
for any other reason. With the purpose of killing the Jews, which now seem to be a 
key purpose of the conflict the Palestinians have to make some sacrifices. Yet the 
narrator immediately overturns the explanation to assert that killing the Jews is only a 
means to achieve independence and not for any other reason. Hence, the voices of 
the righteous Palestinian who desires autonomy is interwoven with the voice of the 
murderous Palestinian whose only wish is to kill the Jews. This configuration represents 
the most prevalent ideological dilemma the children seem to face when trying to make 
sense of the Palestinians perspective.
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This contention, as in most of the narrative is uttered from the perspective of the 
group, or even in the name of the group by applying the language of first-person plural. 
By using that plural voice the narrator position himself as a representative of the 
Palestinians. He speaks in the name of the collective and generates affinity and 
identification between his voice and the rest of the Palestinians.
The evaluative comment regarding ‘this conflict’ is reiterated, only now with 
some ambivalence: This conflict with the Jews sometime does good to us since 
that way we can hurt them and kill them. The rationalization to the advantageous 
conflict has now been shifted to a different account. The meaning and purpose of the 
conflict is transformed from the legitimate account of self determination and 
independence to the de-legitimising explanation of ‘hurting and killing the Jews’. Yet, the 
conflict is also ‘bad’: but on the other hand our people are getting hurt and die 
as well. According to this ethnocentric, or in-group favouritism morality, in a situation 
of conflict it is good to kill your enemy but it is bad to loose your own people.
In the next utterance the legitimising and de-legitimising voices are getting almost 
completely integrated to construct a unique logic or morality. Maintaining the plural 
voice, the narrator contends: In order to kill them we need to give up on some 
important things for us, but we ’re doing it so we could have a state and not 
for any other reason. With the purpose of killing the Jews, which now seem to be a 
key purpose of the conflict the Palestinians have to make some sacrifices. Yet the 
narrator immediately overturns the explanation to assert that killing the Jews is only a 
means to achieve independence and not for any other reason. Hence, the voices of 
the righteous Palestinian who desires autonomy is interwoven with the voice of the 
murderous Palestinian whose only wish is to kill the Jews. This configuration represents 
the most prevalent ideological dilemma the children seem to face when trying to make 
sense of the Palestinians perspective.
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The narrative continues with the themes of incitement and hatred to inform the 
reader about the Palestinian child’s mother that would like her son to hate the Jews. 
However, the narrator proclaims that his mother’s encouragement to hate the Jews is 
redundant, since I  hate them anyway. This reported speech serves as a damning 
proof to the pemiciousness of the Palestinians and the ways in which they educate their 
children to favour abhorrence and not peace.
The subject of terrorism and suicide bombing is articulated in this narrative in an 
intriguing manner. First the narrator, once more, insinuating incitement and obedience in 
the Palestinian society {Sometime it happens that a few o f our people are being: 
asked to go to Jewish city-centres to blow themselves up) thus simultaneously 
reconstructs the lack of security in Israel and the delegitimising discourse regarding the 
Palestinian deadly deeds. However he criticises these actions as a failed strategy, since 
sometimes the Jews ’ stupid army kills them. Here we can see an implicit tribute to 
the Israeli army (thus sustaining the Israeli superiority) who manages to prevent some of 
the Palestinians intended violent actions against civilian targets. The condemnation of 
these actions continues explicitly in ridicule tone and in-group (Palestinians) derision: 
So I  say to myself we are totally crazy to kill ourselves for the sake o f killing 
Jews- its a totally moron thing to do because we are losing our people. This 
assertion is in contrast to both previous contentions that these actions and the human 
sacrifice are beneficial for the Palestinians either for the sake of killing the Jews or as an 
inevitable consequence in the fight for independence.
The narrator relates only to the short past of the conflict, that is the recent cycle of 
violence. The de-legitimising rhetoric persists with the measurement of the conflict’s 
success according to the Israeli death toll {This conflict is going on for 2 years now 
and so far we managed to kill a lot o f Jews). However, the child, in what seems to 
be an affirmation of the Israeli supremacy and the ability to stand firm and prevail against 
the Palestinian atrocities, states that even though the confrontations between the Israeli
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and Palestinians have persisted for more than two years and the Jews have suffered many 
casualties these Jews are not surrendering. .
Yet he seems to advocate the Palestinian withstand as well. In a direct reference 
to the Israeli Prime Minister Sharon who represents the Israeli hard-line approach to the 
Palestinian uprising the narrator states: This Sharon thinks that we will surrender 
but no! Not so easy. We won't sit quiet until we will kill him. I read this 
utterance as a co-articulation of the two different approaches to the Palestinians. On the 
one hand there is an inferred admiration to the Palestinian spirit and determination. The 
narrator emphasises the Palestinian ability to stand firm despite the overwhelming 
asymmetry of power. On the other hand there is the everlasting perceived threat that is 
reflected in the de-legitimisation rhetoric and the destructive intentions attributed to the 
Palestinians.
The narrative is concluded with a statement: I hate the Jews and want a state 
like all the Palestinians. Once more the ambivalent perception of the other is 
realised in a single utterance. It contains two fundamental elements perceived as 
engraved in the Palestinian identity, the blinding hatred to the Jews and the wish for self 
determination.
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3. Boy - City
I have a dream. In my dream I enter Israel and kill Jews.
I think that this conflict is very good since we don’t have dead people apart from the 
suicide bombers, which I adore, and they have a lot of dead and wounded.
The conflict begun when Israel took our land and half of Jerusalem so we got really angry 
and started the bombings.
The Hezbollah directed and instructed us on bombs and weapons.
I think that all the Arabs who committed suicide bombings from Jenin or any other Arab 
village or town are idols and I adore them very much.
I am also a big fan of Hitler who did evil to the Jews in the holocaust.
We have a secret shield basement in case that the IDF will attack us. In that place we hide 
a lot of weapons, all kind of weapons.
Now I don’t have the time because I’m going to learn how to murder the Jews.
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Analysis
I have selected this work of a child from the city, as an example of extreme de- 
legitimisation of the Palestinians. It is a fine illustration of the interdependence of two 
major processes; the victimisation of self and the de-legitimisation of the other. In this 
relatively univocal narrative I found a unique orchestration of various symbolic 
resources, all in the service of composing a dehumanised Palestinian subjectivity while 
simultaneously maintaining the victimised elements of the Israeli self. However, as will 
be shown below, through the cloak of such a negative depiction of the Palestinian and the 
victimised depiction of the Israelis, one can still find the voice of the righteous other as 
well as unconscious affirmation of Israeli supremacy sprouting in symbolic protestation.
The narrative commences with a distressing declaration: I have a dream. In 
my dream I  enter Israel and kill Jews. This utterance is a manifestation of the lack 
of personal security in Israel in light of the suicide bombers campaign, intertwined with 
the Palestinian child’s aspirations. The Israeli security nightmare, in other words, has 
become the Palestinian child’s desire. In all probability, the author didn’t have Martin 
Luther in mind when he composed this chilling preamble, yet the common 
comprehension is that dreams have a certain meanings attached to them, such as pleasant 
imagining or constructive visions. The choice to compose the ruthless vision into the 
Palestinian child’s ‘dream’ meant to emphasis the inherent evilness of the Palestinian. 
No explanation or reason is provided for that callous wish and the reader is left with the 
impression of essentialised craving for killing the Jews.
The narrator proceeds by contemplating the benefits of the conflict to the 
Palestinians: I  think that this conflict is very good since we don't have dead 
people apart from the suicide bombers, which I  adore, and they have a lot o f  
dead and wounded. This utterance is a fine example of the incapability of the Israeli 
self to step outside of its own sense of victimhood. It illustrates how in a situation of such 
violent inter-group conflict, one is so occupied with its own casualties and suffering that
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one is blinded to the casualties and suffering he inflicts on the enemy. Regarding the dry 
facts, in the course of four years of mutual bleeding, the number of the Palestinian 
casualties is more than three times higher than that of the Israelis. Yet, according to the 
logic of victimisation, the conflict is for the benefit of the Palestinians, since their 
casualties are restricted to the sacrificial bombers whereas the Israelis continue to count 
their dead.
The Palestinian child in this narrative is merely celebrating the Jews suffering. 
Befitting the communicative practice of de-legitimisation the narrator stresses his 
worship of suicide bombers. This message is reiterated soon after, when the narrator 
states: I think that all the Arabs who committed suicide bombings from Jenin 
or any other Arab village or town are idols and I  adore them very much. The 
Israeli author is borrowing the concept of children’s glorification and idolisation of 
heroes who commit courageous deeds, to determine the relations between the child and 
the suicide bombers, by that stressing even more the pathology of the Palestinians.
The nadir point of this impression is revealed when the narrator utters: I  am also 
a big fan of Hitler who did evil to the Jews in the holocaust. As if worshipping 
the suicide bombers, the current symbol of absolute evil and threat, is not enough to 
establish a complete negative Palestinian subjectivity, the Palestinian child is now likened 
to the ultimate symbol of evil. This, as discussed in Chapter Four is the definitive de- 
legitimisation. It attributes devilish characteristics to the Palestinians by associating their 
actions with the Nazis and the past threat to the entire Jewish people in its most 
demonised form. Put differently, the violent conflict with the Palestinians is yet another 
event in the course of the history of the persecuted Jewish people. This kind of depiction 
serves also to completely blur the context of the conflict and the power relations between 
the rival parties.
As part of the common tendency of negative likening the narrator also tells us that 
The Hezbollah directed and instructed us on bombs and weapons. The
235
Hezbollah is a Lebanese guerrilla organisation, (said to be sponsored and supported by 
Iran and Syria) which caused severe casualties to the Israeli army during the times Israel 
occupied a ‘security zone’ in southern Lebanon. Intelligence reports of alleged attempts 
of the Hezbollah to penetrate the occupied territories as well, and to assist the Palestinian 
guerrilla/terror organisations are recurrent in the Israeli news. This utterance should be 
understood as part of the overall tendency to amplify the perceived threat from the Arabs. 
It is a product of the siege mentality of Israeli society that perceived itself as surrounded 
by millions of Arabs awaiting the opportunity to annihilate the Jewish state.
The most interesting element I found in this composition is the sole evidence of a 
different voice that goes beyond the reverberated voice of the evil Palestinian whose 
actions and aspirations are simply a matter of inflicting harm to the Jewish people. 
Accounting for the foundations of the conflict the narrator tells us: The conflict begun 
when Israel took our land and half o f Jerusalem so we got really angry and 
started the bombings. This utterance goes beyond the mere essentialisation of the 
Palestinian actions to provide a context to the conflict. Despite the extreme de- 
legitimisation throughout the narrative and the successful effort to dehumanise the 
Palestinian child, the author provides an account, which might shed a different light on 
the Palestinians motives. Put differently, the voice of the righteous Palestinian, the one 
that carries the message of historical injustice inflicted on the Palestinians find its way to 
resonate even through the heavy cloak of dehumanisation. It is worth noting that this 
utterance is the only occasion the narrator uses the term Israel in relation to the Israelis. 
In all other utterances where the communicative objective is to stress the victimisation of 
the Israelis, the category that used is the Jews. This, as I argued in the previous chapter, is 
not accidental. The Jewish category is habitually used for eliciting a sense of weakness 
and victimisation whereas the category Israeli is habitually used in the context of Israeli 
superiority.
An additional supremacy category is the IDF (the Israeli army). The narrator 
informs us that: We have a secret shield basement in case that the IDF will
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attack us. Two communicative objectives are accomplished in this utterance. First, as 
part of the de-legitimisation objective, we are provided with details of Palestinian 
subversive activities and another glimpse to their scheming. The perceived threat is 
reiterated and amplified: In that place we hide a lot o f weapons, all kind of 
weapons. At the same time, an additional communicative goal is unconsciously 
achieved here as we learn that the Palestinians need to go underground and shield 
themselves in light of the Israeli attacks. This is the voice of the Israeli supremacy and 
the ability to overcome, protruded into the narrative in contrast to the strong sense of 
vulnerability and victimisation that dominates the narrative. The asymmetry in power 
relations communicated previously (we don ’t have dead people apart from the 
suicide bombers, which I  adore, and they have a lot o f dead and wounded) 
has altered in this utterance and it is the Palestinian that need to hide due to the IDF 
threat.
The narrative is concluded with the narrator dismissing the reader (or himself) due 
to important obligations: Now I  don’t have the time because I ’m going to learn 
how to murder the Jews. Reversing back to the voice of threat the Palestinian 
subjectivity is concluded with the final essentialisation and the reader is left with the 
same impression he received in the beginning of the narrative, the impression of a 
Palestinian whose only wish and intention is to impose harm and danger on the Jews.
The sheer aggression and cruelty that was attributed to the Palestinian child, is 
manifested in the drawing as well, only with a unique twist. The extreme violence 
ascribed to the Palestinians in the narrative is inflicted on the Palestinian in the drawing. 
The drawing shows a frightening human head vertically skewered on a sword. The 
attached title is one of the most racist and vicious slogans ever composed in Israeli 
society: Good Arab=Dead Arab. The Israeli child, thus depicted the Palestinian child in a 
wishful portrayal that reveals in the most haunting way the psychological consequences 
of the lifelong violent conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinian.
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4. Girl - Kibbutz
My family and I don’t want to have the war between us.
Yes, yes, I am for the peace.
We dislike wars and I am really scared of the war so why don’t we simply make up? 
Eventually the Israelis will decide to fight hard and they will blow up houses.
I don’t want my home to be blown up.
Once we almost made a peace agreement but somebody killed their Prime Minister.
When I first saw the peace agreement I was very happy but everything collapsed because 
their prime minister was assassinated.
Now they are trying to tell us to stop with the fighting but our people don’t want to.
Why are we fighting them anyway, just because the territories are ours?
They already have a very small country, why can’t we be satisfied with what we have? It 
is so fun to have peace!
There are even Arab children who live in Israel and they have Jewish friends and I think 
its great fun to have friend from another country.
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Analysis
This work has been selected as an additional example for my contention that the 
Israeli children, while establishing the Palestinian subjectivity are in effect sustaining the 
Israeli narrative. The underlying story that is crystallised from this work holds the 
Palestinians responsible for the continuation of the conflict due to their pettiness and 
inability to realise the benefits of peace. Like many of the works that come from the 
Kibbutz, the de-legitimisation of the Palestinians is channelled through the dis- 
identification of the imaginary Palestinian subject and the rest of the Palestinian people. 
The author composed a positive Palestinian subjectivity, which is positioned in contrast 
to the rest of the Palestinians.
This construal is revealed from the drawing as well. The Palestinian girl is 
standing on the right side of the drawing, her hands interlaced. Her overall appearance 
seems somewhat pensive and gloomy. To her left stands a significantly bigger male 
figure with an unfriendly gaze, throwing stones in the direction of an Israeli flag which 
seems alight. The story of a Palestinian girl as a bystander that refuses to take part in the 
Palestinian aggression is the one that is told in the narrative as well.
The narrative begins with the narrator declaring her attitude toward the conflict: 
My family and I  don't want to have the war between us. This attitude evidently 
presents the Palestinian child in a positive manner. The author, apparently assuming that 
this attitude will surprise the reader, made the narrator reiterate and emphasise her stance: 
Yes, yes, I  am for the peace. The fact that the narrator had to re-accentuate her 
attitude illustrates that the author, while taking the decision to compose her Palestinian 
child as a peace advocate, ‘knows’ that it is rather unnatural for a Palestinian to have this 
attitude. The underlying message is that the Palestinians are not peace seekers, but I, 
unlike what you expected, or unlike my people, am for peace. She than provides further 
elaboration by stating: We dislike wars and I  am really scared o f the war so why 
don *t we simply make up? It is not clear at this point to whom the query refers to -
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Israelis or Palestinians? Reading further, it becomes clear that the narrator poses this 
question to her fellow Palestinians. This utterance is also the first in a chain of utterances 
that exposes what I call the unbearable lightness of the Israeli peace rhetoric. The 
underlying assumption behind why don’t we simply make up? is that peace is only a 
matter of good will, and hence, the absence of peace is predominantly due to the 
unwillingness of the Palestinians.
Later in the narrative this assumption is strengthened as the narrator states: Now 
they [the Israelis] are trying to tell us to stop with the fighting but our people 
don’t want to. The picture is now clear; the Israelis want peace but the Palestinians 
refuse; they want to continue with the fighting. This is one of the most persuasive 
convictions prevailing in the Israeli society: Peace is a matter of good will; we [the 
Israelis] are craving for peace. Now, if we want peace that much and yet peace is 
hindered, it must be due to the Palestinian reluctance.
The reproval continues: Why are we fighting them anyway, just because 
the territories are ours? It becomes clear now that the Israeli child does not really 
engage with the Palestinian perspective but actually utilizes the voice of the imaginary 
Palestinian girl to present the Palestinians with her remonstrance as an Israeli child. Put 
differently, through the voice of the Palestinian girl, she, in effect, reconstructs and 
sustains the Israeli perspective. She finds it hard to comprehend the Palestinians’ 
pettiness and their insistence on fighting for their rights. The values’ system inferred from 
her approach is that peace and compromise are supreme values. She expects the 
Palestinians to show good will and abandon their demands. Note that she by no means 
questions the Palestinian proprietary of the land, yet, she expects them to make 
concessions. I argue that uttering such a demand is only possible with a specific, 
predisposed perception of reality and the balance of power between the Israeli and the 
Palestinians. Additionally, it reveals a hollow representation of peace that is filled with 
abstract, ideal contents at the expense of substantial issues such as justice and reciprocity.
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This predisposition is farther disclosed when the narrator adds: They already 
have a very small country- why can’t we be satisfied with what we have? It 
is so fun to have peace! These utterances echo the prevailing perception of Israel as a 
tiny country surrounded by a sea of Arabs. It also bears the traces of a more recent myth, 
the one that evolved following the collapse of the Camp David talks, according to which 
the Palestinians rejected (were not satisfied with) the very generous offers the Israelis 
made. Yet, the main reason for the Palestinian to overcome their pettiness and make these 
concessions is that, in her words, It is so fun to have peace!
It is noteworthy that despite the absence of direct negative stereotyping or any 
manifestation of perceived threat one can still find underlying assumptions that constitute 
such a worldview. The self-perception as the weak (They already have a very small 
country) is combined with other-perception as the not-weak (why can’t we be 
satisfied with what we have?). This self-other configuration is blended with 
reproduction of positive values (be satisfied with little), and above all, the reproduction of 
the Israeli peace rhetoric: It is so fun to have peace!
As part of the peace rhetoric that dominates this narrative, the author appropriates 
the traumatic event of the assassination of Rabin, the Israeli Prime Minister to reflect on 
alleged peace opportunity that was missed: Once we almost made a peace 
agreement but somebody killed their Prime Minister. When I  first saw the 
peace agreement I  was very happy but everything collapsed because their 
Prime Minister was assassinated. Accounting for the accuracy (or inaccuracy) of 
the suggested political interpretation is beyond the scope of the current analysis. What is 
important here is the excessive preoccupation with, and the abstractness of, the notion of 
peace that is projected onto the Palestinian child, (When I  first saw the peace 
agreement I  was very happy) with no reference whatsoever to the consequences of 
peace to the Palestinian child or society. Moreover, the narrator leaves the identity of 
the assassin (right-wing religious Jew) completely blurred (somebody). I do not suggest
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that it was intentionally excluded; yet it might be the cause of unconscious selectivity in 
order to maintain the rhetorical coherence of the narrative that holds the Palestinians 
responsible for the absence of peace.
Despite the author’s inferred self-perception as weak, the narrator previously 
warned her fellow Palestinians: Eventually the Israelis will decide to fight hard 
and they will blow up houses. I  don’t want my home to be blown up. This 
utterance, in relation to the previous one, warns the Palestinians of the consequences of 
their refusal to see the benefits of peace and continue the conflict. That is to say, so far 
the Israelis haven’t been ‘fighting hard’, they have been restrained with their exercise of 
power, but if the Palestinians persist with their behaviour the Israelis will be ‘forced’ to 
use their power. In contrast to the somewhat blurred construal of the balance of power 
between the Israeli and the Palestinians this utterance clearly implies the asymmetry in 
power relations and reassurance of the Israeli superiority.
Accentuating the pleasurable nature of peace, the narrator, in her concluding 
remarks, provides evidence of the possibility of better relations: There are even Arab 
children who live in Israel and they have Jewish friends and I  think its great 
fun to have friend from another country. Peace, as we know by now, is better 
interpersonal relations. It is perhaps the only concrete representation of the consequences 
of peace (beyond simply the negation of violence). Hence, in accord with the ubiquity of 
the peace rhetoric, the narrator provides substantiation to her previous proclamation {It is 
so fun to have peace!).
In sum, in the above analysis I tried to show how the subjectivity of the Israeli 
author intertwined with the subjectivity of the imaginary Palestinian girl and to a large 
extent, the latter being completely subdued by the former. Rather than involvement with 
the perspective of the other as different from self, or as opposed to self, we find here 
projection of self onto the other. The overall picture that is implied from the narrative 
describes the Palestinian as peace dissenters in contrast to the Israeli peace seekers. The
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Israeli girl composed a Palestinian girl that finds it extremely difficult to convince her 
fellow Palestinians to abandon the violent means and to realise the gratification of peace. 
The Palestinian girl surpasses herself by demanding her people to omit their demands and 
to make concessions for the sake of peace. What we have here, in fact, is a Palestinian 
storyteller, telling the Israeli story of the conflict.
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The truth is that I don’t know much about this conflict.
All I know is that the Jews are shit and should be destroyed.
They sit in a land that should be ours.
They just refuse to give us back the land, which is ours, and they just don’t get it.
The Jews all over the world should be destroyed and to be kicked out of Israel which is 
ours.
You know what? We can compromise- we should ask only for Jerusalem. It is very 
sacred for them but it is more sacred for us.
I also think that they should give back the Arabs all the land and territories they have 
occupied. These are our territories.
But it is their problem -  until they give us the state of Israel we will continue our suicide 
bombings and we will continue to kill more and more people. They don’t understand that 
we won’t give up. Our goal is one: a Palestinian state on the lands of the state of Israel.
I think that maybe we should reach a peace agreement with them but only if they will let 
us establish a Palestinian state in their state which is originally ours.
They have a problem -  we want this place and until they will compromise with us we 
will never give up.
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Analysis
I chose this composition for its absorbing amalgamation of seemingly 
contradictory voices that illuminate the complications in making sense of one’s enemy. 
Both the narrative and the drawing comprise a continuous tension between the voices of 
the savage Palestinian to that of the righteous Palestinian; between the one who utters just 
and legitimate claims to the one that conveys harsh and instigating messages. Almost 
every sentence in this composition, uttering the voice of the Palestinian, is fraught with 
the words of others and repeatedly contradicts the previous or the subsequent. It is a fine 
demonstration of the voices of de-legitimisation entwined with those of legitimisation 
and conciliation.
The ambivalent construal of the Palestinians is luminously demonstrated in the 
drawing. It shows a somewhat ridiculous image of the Palestinian as a hairy suicide 
bomber wearing an explosive belt. He also wears three earrings (in each ear) and waves 
with a knife he holds in his left hand. This is unmistakably a negative portrayal, yet the 
first hint of ambivalence is perceived when reading the words the Palestinian figure 
utters: I  don’t have a life, denoting anguish and despair. This sense is fortified when 
we read the spontaneous elucidation written in the bottom of the drawing: “Cruel and 
ugly man that wants our country to himself but also poor man and on the 
other hand I  feel sorry for him cause just like any other ordinary human 
being he deserves something in his life”. This work vividly captures the most 
prevalent ideological dilemma of the Israeli self in relation to the Palestinians. The 
palpable hostility and fear that lifetime brutal conflict has engraved on the Israeli psyche 
is interwoven with egalitarian values and compassion, which are not less ascribed to the 
Israeli mentality. So the Palestinian is an imminent threat at the same time that he is an
object that deserves our compassion. He wishes to cause destruction and take our country
/
and he is also a deprived human being with rights. As I will try to demonstrate below, thei
reconstructed Palestinian perspective is filled with this tension between the voice of the 
righteous and the voice of the pernicious.
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Throughout the narrative the narrator is in complete identification with his in­
group Palestinians. The frequent use of indiscriminate plural form and of intergroup 
language (we, us, they, them etc.) indicates an effective identification between the 
individual and the group. Additionally, as seen in many narrative compositions, it reveals 
a difficulty in considering the individuality of the Palestinians and to engage with their 
perspective simply as children rather than indiscriminate enemies.
The narrator commences with a qualification. He admits to have a limited or lack 
of knowledge regarding the conflict, and claims that All I  know is that the Jews are 
shit and should be destroyed. The choice of words (e.g. should be destroyed), 
discloses a connotation to a dreary time in Jewish history, the voice of the Jewish victim, 
a suggestion that only strengthens as the narrative develops. The backing, or explanation 
provided for that harsh assertion is uttered from a slightly different outlook: They sit in 
a land that should be ours. This, as seen in the previous chapter is the most common 
contention in the service of legitimising the Palestinian cause. The narrator elaborates: 
They just refuse to give us back the land, which is ours, and they just don’t 
get it. He emphasises twice the Palestinian rights over the disputed land. No evidence is 
provided to support the claim so the narrator must assume that his accusation is 
axiomatic. It is argued according to the fundamental logic of property rights and 
historical justice. It is a noteworthy that in other compositions that uttered such harsh 
words, there has usually been essentialisation of the Palestinian hatred. That is, the 
Palestinian detestation and urge to harm the Jews is embedded in their subjectivity and is 
thus transcendent and fixed. This narrative, on the contrary is filled with tension 
between the demonisation of the Palestinian on the one hand and the legitimacy of his 
claims on the other.
The likening of the Palestinian uprising with the persecuted history of the Jews 
reaches a new height when the narrator claims: The Jews all over the world should 
be destroyed and to be kicked out of Israel which is ours. This utterance is
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going far beyond the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the disputed 
territories, to ask for the extermination of the Jews. The voice of suspicion, insecurity and 
victimisation stirs a clear association between the Palestinian demands and the long 
history of Jewish torments. The utterance than shifts back to the context of the conflict 
and the disputed land where the narrator reiterates the Palestinian demand to have their 
land returned to them. Note the beginning of the zero-sum, all-or-nothing approach the 
narrator adopts; he is not arguing over the occupied territories but rather over Israel, 
which is ours. Namely, the Palestinians want the state of Israel.
The narrator than engages in a dialogue with an unspecified interlocutor, perhaps 
the reader, to communicate a completely different voice, the voice of negotiations and 
finding the middle ground: You know what? We can compromise- we should ask 
only for Jerusalem. His initial demand to expel the Jews from the state of Israel is 
now abridged and he seems to be satisfied only with the most disputed object. This 
suggestion seems to stem from the representation of Jerusalem as a key religious and 
political symbol for both the Israelis and the Palestinians, or as he puts it: It is very 
sacred for them but it is more sacred for us.
The territorial demands gain another interesting change in direction: I  also think 
that they should give back the Arabs all the land and territories they have 
occupied. These are our territories. Once more we read about purportedly 
legitimate demands, which now refer to a broader context. By using the words the Arabs 
rather than us (the literal translation was to all the Arabs, all the territories), the narrator 
points not only to the occupied territories but wish to include additional disputed 
territories, perhaps the Golan Heights51. This utterance appropriates the voice of the far- 
left in Israel that calls to withdraw from all the occupied territories of the 1967 war and to
51 An area in the north of Israel, occupied from the Syrians in the 1967 war.
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revert to 1967 borders. This stylisation of leftist ideology gives evidence to the author’s 
knowledge of the broader territorial controversies in the Middle East.
Subsequently, a clear threat is uttered: until they give us the state o f Israel 
we will continue our suicide bombings and we will continue to kill more and 
more people. Once more, the author reproduces the voice of the savage Palestinian that 
is willing to proceed by any means to achieve its goals. Following the calling to the 
obliteration of the Jews wherever they are, the proposal to settle for Jerusalem and after 
demanding in the name of all the Arabs the liberation of all occupied lands, the narrator 
once more reformulates the Palestinian demand- they want the state of Israel. They 
don’t understand that we won’t give up. Our goal is one: a Palestinian state 
on the lands o f the state o f Israel. Here we can see the zero-sum representation in 
practice. The Palestinians want to take over the state of Israel in order to establish a 
Palestinian state. No compromise, no partition, no negotiation, and they won’t give up 
until they realise their goals. Put differently, the Palestinians can acquire their 
independence and self determination only at the expense of the Israeli’s national rights; 
either we have a state or they have it.
The last paragraph luminously illustrates the working of competing 
representations and the contradictory elements in the Israeli discernment of the 
Palestinians perspective. The narrator concludes with a call for compromise and 
contemplating the notion of peace agreement with the Israelis. Once more the meaning of 
peace is obscure, without concrete elucidation. Instead, we have the Palestinian 
precondition: only if  they will let us establish a Palestinian state in their state, 
which is originally ours. They have a problem — we want this place and 
until they will compromise with us we will never give up. Again we find the 
legitimised demands (Palestinian independence and self determination) rhetorically 
intertwined with perceptions of threat and suspicion. According to this logic the 
Palestinians can only realise their national and political aspirations at the expense of the 
Israelis; one party gain is the other’s loss. Although the narrator linguistically utters a
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conciliatory approach as he ponders about peace and compromise, the prospect he offers 
in the name of the Palestinians completely contradicts the meaning of reconciliation.
The multiple and contradictory voices within this narrative are responsible both 
for its rhetorical power and its rhetorical incoherence and luminously capture the Israeli 
inherent ambivalence in relation to the Palestinians. The unambiguous acknowledgment 
in the Palestinian’s national rights coincides both with the perception of sheer threat 
embedded in these rights and a deep rooted negative perception of the Palestinian as bent 
on Israel’s destruction. It shows the constraints and bewilderment the Israeli narrative 
compels on the Israeli children in their construal of the Palestinian narrative. It reveals 
how strong the self-serving ideological convictions are embedded in the Israeli narrative 
and the difficulties they generate for the children to make sense of the enemy and his 
goals.
249
6. Boy -Settlement
The Jews are bad. They are killing us and they don’t let us live. They shoot missiles on 
us.
They are really evil and they need to be killed (No No No). May they go to hell! (God 
forbid!)
We don’t need them! We have to kill them.
I am a child and I am going to commit a suicide bombing.
My life is miserable because of those Jews.
I am a Muslim, and I want all the Jews, every one of them to become Muslim.
And than, there will be no wars.
But meanwhile we need to murder the Jews.
So go on and die! You disgusting and ugly Jews!
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Analysis
The three opening utterances embody a palpable discernment of the Israeli 
wrongdoing and clearly posit the Palestinians as victims in relation to the violent Israelis. 
This prologue unequivocally adopts a Palestinian perspective that perceives the Israeli as 
essentially immoral [The Jews are bad] that victimises the Palestinians with their 
brutal conduct [They are killing us and they don’t let us live. They shoot 
missiles on us]. Unlike many other narratives, there is no backing or justification 
(neither explicit nor implicit) to the described Israeli deeds. Rather, there is a clear, 
unidirectional accusation of the Israeli transgressions.
However, the narrative proceeds with an absorbing rhetorical shift. The voice of 
the victim Palestinian has shifted to the fiery voice of the savage Palestinian. Reiterating 
the wickedness of the Israelis, the seemingly frustrated voice altered to reach a grim 
conclusion: They are really evil and they need to be killed. May they go to 
hell! We don’t need them! We have to kill them. It is difficult to determine the 
logical process behind these boisterous utterances. On the one hand it can correspond to 
the logic of frustration-aggression. That is, the Palestinian is beaten and desperate, hence 
the tempestuous utterances. On the other hand, reading along the narrative convinced me 
that in addition to the internal coherence of the logic of frustration -  aggression, what we 
have here is indeed a shift of voice, a shift in subjectivity, if you will, from the victim 
Palestinian to the irrational, menacing Palestinian, a shift that occurs more than once in 
this narrative.
This voice of the fiery Palestinian uttering death wishes to the Jews (May they 
go to hell!) seems to arouse a sense of embarrassment in the author who wrote them. He 
seems to feel fairly anxious with the meaning of his own words, perhaps sensing that the 
power of the words somewhat blurred the boundaries between self and other. Feeling 
discomfort in this role playing that made him utter such a harsh wishes onto his ‘real’ in­
group, he therefore adds the qualification, or refutation of these words in brackets after
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the harsh utterance: (No No No) and (God forbid!). Note that it was not the
objectification of the Jews as ‘bad’ and the Palestinian as victims that arouse this unease. 
Rather it was the objectification of the Palestinian antagonistic imperatives (they need 
to be killed, may they go to hell!) that generated the fascinating internal ‘rebuff- 
dialogue’ between the imagined incensed Palestinian and the Israeli author.
The next utterance sustains the ambiguity of the Palestinian child’s subjectivity. 
He declares: I  am a child and I  am going to commit a suicide bombing. Reading 
it in relation to the previous utterance (We have to kill them) preserve the voice of the 
savage Palestinian in the service of de-legitimisation. The accentuation of being a child 
terrorist (suicide bomber) emphasises the breakdown of moral values. As seen in the 
previous chapter, it stresses the pathology of the Palestinians since children are not 
supposed to take active part of the ugly realm of fighting. For the most, they should be 
throwing stones on the Israeli army.
The image of the martyr-child is communicated through the drawing as well. The 
Palestinian figure shows a boy with a furious facial expression wearing an explosive belt 
(a recurring depiction symbolising the suicide bomber). He holds a bleeding knife in one 
hand and a stone in the other. A verbal expression is attached to the figure reading: /  
want to be a martyr.
Back to the narrative, if we consider this depiction of the martyr-child in relation 
to the following utterance, there is a space for an alternative reading. Subsequent to the 
militant declaration of being a suicide bomber child, there is retrieval to the voice of the 
victim: My life is miserable because o f those Jews. This utterance, just as are the 
initial remarks, is unambiguous. It is a voice of anguish and despair and the responsibility 
is plainly laid on the Jews. Now, reading again the previous utterance, (I am a child 
and I am going to commit a suicide bombing) it might have been uttered as part of 
the same logic. That is to say, rather than the logic of pathology, it is the logic of despair.
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A child who wishes to become a suicide bomber must be so hopeless and desperate to be 
able to perpetrate such an irrational, inconceivable act.
The narrative obtains an interesting change in direction as the child declares: I  
am a Muslim, and I  want all the Jews, every one of them to become Muslim. 
This is a slight change in context or an added dimension to the conflict, the religious one, 
and the narrator aspires to convert the Jews (every one o f them) to Islam. The rationale 
for that wish is provided in the following utterance: And than, there will be no wars. 
He thus seems to find the cure, or rather to pinpoint the cause of the conflict. The conflict 
for this child is not about land or any other dispute over scarce resources. Rather, the 
essence of the conflict is embedded in the differences, ethnic or religious between the two 
peoples. If only we were all the same (Muslims in this case) there would have been no 
wars. Diversity causes harm and troubles and eradication of the differences is the 
remedy.
It is important to note that the underlying conviction is that war is a bad thing. 
The idea of eradicating the religious differences is based on the moral axiom that conflict 
and wars are a bad thing but soon after comes the qualification utterance: But 
meanwhile we need to murder the Jews. Namely, if you cannot convert them, kill 
them. The Palestinian voice, or subjectivity is shifting back to the frantic, bloodthirsty 
Palestinian. Following a short contemplation on the ways to put an end to the conflict the 
author perhaps realised the impracticality of his proposal, which lead him back to the 
language of violence and force.
The narrative is concluded with inflamed utterances: So go on and die! You 
disgusting and ugly Jews! This ‘coda’ leaves the reader with a negative impression 
of the Palestinian child. It stresses the irrational, blazing hatred of the Palestinian to the 
Israelis and leaves no space for alternatives, relations or resolution.
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This narrative stresses, once more, the difficulty the Israeli children face when 
entering the perspective of the other. It reveals the internal conflict between the 
awareness of the Palestinians as victims whose sufferings are attributable to the Israelis to 
the ever more tangible awareness to the Palestinians as threat and evil. They are poor and 
miserable and at the same time they are hateful and barbarians and their aim is to 
disseminate death and destruction.
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7. Girl-City
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I think that this conflict is pointless.
I don’t think that violence and killing people on both sides will contribute.
They just need to sit and talk.
But our leader Arafat thinks he knows what the people want.
He is lying when he tells our people that only by killing the Jews we will get our state. 
Maybe we could share the state with the Israelis or we could find another state some 
place else. There are so many Arab countries that can accept us, what is there problem?
It is hard for me to buy nice clothes and go outside to play because we are under threat. 
The Israeli army doesn’t want to hurt us.
They are only after those who killed their civilians.
I truly hope that this conflict will end with peace and both sides will be happy.
Maybe we could find a country that will be willing to accept us and we could leave the 
country to the Jews. They don’t have their own state and the Arabs have many countries.
I want us to stop the suicide bombings against the Israelis and stop fighting.
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Analysis
Looking at the drawing, the first thing that conies to mind is the absence of any 
negative stereotypes. It comprises two ordinary looking figures, a girl and a boy, 
standing, surrounded by pleasant scenery of flowered hills, a house and shining animated 
sun. The overall impression is undoubtedly buoyant. The sense of ambivalence is 
disclosed only through the verbal expressions attached to the figures. The girl says: Vm  
Mary and this is my village. We want peace and our houses but there are 
also bad people among us. The boy says: Vm David and I ’m willing to die in 
order to win the conflict. The communicated content is therefore twofold. Judging 
by the graphic depiction alone, one cannot find perceived threat or any form of intended 
de-legitimisation. Even the names selected for the drawn characters are not typical Arab 
names. The girl, at the outset, admits that she wants peace. It is only in the girl’s implicit 
warning or qualification {but there are also bad people among us) that the pastoral 
feeling is diluted with concern. This feeling is intensified with the boy’s sacrificial 
declaration {I’m willing to die in order to win the conflict). That kind of 
construction, which can be labelled ‘good Palestinians-bad Palestinians’, is a recurrent 
coping strategy inferred from the children’s works. It is a direct manifestation of the deep 
ambivalence they feel toward the Palestinians. That is, the experience of the Palestinian 
terrorism and hatred that inevitably generates fear and suspicion cohabit with the 
awareness of differing facets of the Palestinians. Interestingly, all children who 
appropriated this strategy always positioned themselves as the good Palestinians and 
indicated in various ways the existence of the bad ones. In the present work, the girl in 
the drawing is ‘good’. She admits to favour peace (the most prevalent characterisation of 
a good Palestinian) yet she qualifies with the insinuation of the bad Palestinians. This 
positioning is maintained throughout the narrative.
Taking a rather distant positioning, the narrator opens her narrative with an 
evaluative observation. The conflict, she argues, is futile. By now, her disapproval is not
256
directed to either side but to both: I  don’t think that violence and killing people on 
both sides will contribute. They just need to sit and talk. From this prologue we 
learn that the author chose to portray her Palestinian girl in an affirmative, appeasing 
manner. This impression is maintained throughout the narrative, yet underneath the 
empathic, conciliatory style, found in this narrative are some of the most powerful 
ideological representations in Israeli society.
Following the reproach that was aimed at both Israeli and Palestinian, and the 
suggested resolution (They just need to sit and talk) the narrator progresses to 
expound the barriers preventing the rivals to bring to a halt the cycle of violence: But 
our leader Arafat thinks he know what the people want. He is lying when he 
tells our people that only by killing the Jews we will get our state. This 
utterance is an appropriation of the strong Anti-Arafat conviction embedded in the Israeli 
narrative, in relation to both past and present of the conflict. Ever since his refusal to 
accept the so called ‘generous offers’ of Prime Minister Barak in the Camp David summit 
and the outbreak of the second Intifada, the Israelis have instigated an intensive campaign 
of Arafat demonisation, calling him “the obstacle to peace” and the ‘master of terror’. 
According to this rhetoric, Arafat is the head of a terrorist network of suicide bombers, 
runs a uniquely corrupt regime, and is incapable of being Israel's negotiating partner. So 
effective has this de-legitimisation been that it is now commonplace for ordinary 
observers to reiterate the same allegations. The children, as seen in the present 
composition, also produce detailed allegations in relation to the Palestinian leader. He is 
portrayed as a near-omnipotent, but untrustworthy and ill-intended leader. Much of the 
conflict is attributed to his lack of personal and political will to reach a peaceful 
settlement. Hence the utterance appropriates this conviction of Arafat as the obstacle to 
peace as well as establishing the rationale for the Palestinian uprising. Asserting that He 
is lying when he tells our people that only by killing the Jews we will get our 
state, the narrator accomplishes two interrelated communicative goals, which together 
forge a unified moral stance in relation to the conflict. On the one hand she introduces 
and legitimises the Palestinian purpose, that is, the founding of a Palestinian state. On the
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other hand she clearly negates the means to realise that (killing the Jews). By that she 
appropriates a core ambivalence construal of the Palestinians in the Israeli society: 
supporting their cause; opposing their means.
Following the portrayal of the obstacles, the narrator proceeds to suggest practical 
steps towards reconciliations: Maybe we could share the state with the Israelis or 
we could find another state some place else. This single utterance naively 
accommodates two completely contradictory ideological perspectives. The narrator 
contemplates on two optional solutions. The first promotes the notions of compromise, 
coexistence and partitioning of the land. The second is a reproduction of one of the most 
immovable representations in Israeli society, once legitimate and prevalent, today 
completely outside the boundaries of political correctness, namely, the inability or refusal 
to acknowledge the Palestinians as a people and as a nation. This process is seemingly 
more moderate than the negative stereotyping and dehumanisation described in the 
previous chapter but nonetheless in denies the Palestinians as a people and their right for 
self determination and nationhood. Three main factors seem to underpin this process and 
to give credence to the representations which it produces: (a) the fact that the Palestinian 
state has not yet been established; (b) the fact that Israel is surrounded by Arab countries; 
and (c) the demographic circumstances of the occupation which has located the 
Palestinians within the borders of the state of Israel. These factors, in addition to a 
socialisation, which to a large extant ignores or denies the Palestinian narrative generates 
the difficulties in perceiving the Palestinians as a separate national category and not just 
part of an indiscriminate Arab community. The perspective, according to which the 
Palestinians are not a distinct national group, is today solely the property of the extreme 
right in Israel and is immediately condemned whenever it is uttered. Yet the fact that after 
more than ten years of the peace process and negotiations, it outspokenly found its place 
in this and other compositions evinces the stubbornness of this conviction and hence the 
puzzled utterance: There are so many Arab countries that can accept us, what 
is there problem? This voice is reiterated towards the end of the narrative: Maybe 
we could find a country that will be willing to accept us and we could leave
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the country to the Jews. The fact that the author of the composition meant to portray 
her Palestinian girl in an entirely positive light only strengthens the contention that when 
striving to appropriate the Palestinian narrative, the Israeli children are constrained by the 
ideological definitions of the social reality as based exclusively on the Israeli narrative. 
The elements of victimisation and the ‘few against many’ embedded in the Israeli 
narrative produce a unique logic according to which the Jews don *t have their own 
state and the Arabs have many countries, making it thus a common sense 
conclusion for the Palestinians to act on good will and abandon their national aspirations.
In a more personal comment the narrator tells of her difficulties in maintaining an 
ordinary life under the circumstances of the conflict: It is hard for me to buy nice 
clothes and go outside to play because we are under threat. The author 
acknowledges the abnormality of the Palestinians’ living conditions and the restrictions 
on their freedom of movement, yet the explanation as to why, or what is the cause of that 
threat remains obscured. Although she pinpoints the Israeli army as responsible for the 
described hardship she hurries to advocate the presence of the army in the Palestinian 
territories and justify its actions: The Israeli army doesn’t want to hurt us. They 
are only after those who killed their civilians. This, as seen in previous chapters is 
the stylisation of the voices of ‘no-altemative’ and ‘purity of arms’. The deep conviction 
is that the Israeli exercise of power is consistent with the ethos of “self-defence”. 
According to this military force is used merely in order to protect a threatened society 
fighting in self-defence for its survival and only against Palestinian saboteurs, excluding 
innocent civilians.
Consistent with the overall positive impression the narrator leaves on the reader, 
the Palestinian girl is a peace advocator: I  truly hope that this conflict will end with 
peace and both sides will be happy. Here, again, the concept of peace is abstract, 
underdeveloped and is placed as an ultimate desire representing the negation of the 
conflict. All we learn is that it will bring about happiness to both Palestinians and Israelis. 
Since peace is perceived mostly as the avoidance of violence, and since violence is
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perceived as predominately Palestinian, the conditions for peace or the necessary means 
to realise this desired state is articulated by the narrator in her concluding remark: I  want 
us to stop the suicide bombings against the Israelis and stop fighting.
In sum, this composition is a fine example of an empathic approach to the other, 
exclusive of negative stereotypes, essentialism or other methods of overt de- 
legitimisation. Due to the unique, appeasing tone of this composition, the orchestration 
and integration of multiple, sometimes radical voices into the other’s narrative do not 
affect its rhetorical coherence. Nevertheless, a close examination reveals that a ‘good’ 
Palestinian is in fact a Palestinian that adopts every aspect of the Israeli narrative. It is a 
Palestinian that is willing to abandon her national aspirations for the sake of peace. It is 
a Palestinian that, despite violations of her human rights, not only does she condone but 
also advocates the Israeli army for its actions. It is precisely the lack of negative portrayal 
of the Palestinian girl and the appeasing rhetoric that allow us to fully understand the 
meaning of being behind the narrative bars.
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8. Girl - Kibbutz
I think that the Israeli Palestinian conflict is pointless.
People from both sides are getting hurt and gain nothing from it.
The Israeli soldiers are making our life very difficult.
My family is very poor. We hardly eat anything and they demolish our houses.
I am for peace.
The worst thing is that they killed my father. And now they want peace?
When one Palestinian commits a suicide attack they destroy our life.
I have six brothers and my mother is in pain. I want peace already. My brother is three 
months old. He is very skinny and he is dying.
I don’t want to live in fear all my life. I want to live in a house, to have a proper job and 
to live peacefully. We don’t have anywhere to go to and we can’t go anywhere.
I live in fear and sorrow.
I would like to know how is it that the Israelis have good life and do they really want 
peace?
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Analysis
This narrative is a rare example of composing a victimised Palestinian subject 
without reservations, a subjectivity that is maintained throughout. As I will try to 
demonstrate, very few traces of the Israeli master narrative are evident in this work. 
Surely the voices uttered in this narrative, voices that encompass guilt and responsibility 
on behalf of the Israelis and posit the Palestinians as victims, are all part of the Israeli 
narrative or, put differently, of the Israeli self. Yet these voices are rare and occasionally 
muted, particularly considering the time these compositions were written.
The narrative begins with an evaluative utterance regarding the conflict: I  think 
that the Israeli Palestinian conflict is pointless. People from both sides are 
getting hurt and gain nothing from it. Taking a critical position, the narrator 
disapproves the conflict as futile. She adopts a humanistic stance in criticising both 
parties for failing to see the mutual casualties and ineffectiveness of the current affairs. 
Sacrifices, in other words, are useless52.
The Israeli soldiers are making our life very difficult. This, as seen in the 
previous chapter is the voice of awareness to the Israeli faults and misdeeds. That is, the 
burdensome presence of the Israeli army in the Palestinian territories affects the life of 
ordinary Palestinians. The narrator goes on to tell us that: My family is very poor. 
We hardly eat anything and they demolish our houses. Two counter-images of 
the Palestinian are explicitly uttered and interwoven here. First we have the deprived 
Palestinian that suffers hunger and poverty. Then, the voice of blame is strengthened as 
the child emphasises the insensitiveness and even cruelty of the Israeli army that 
demolishes the homes of the wretched Palestinians. What’s rare in this narrative is neither 
the construction of a victimised Palestinian’s subjectivity nor the acknowledgment in the 
Israeli misdeeds. Rather, it is the absence of either covert or overt justification to these
52 See individual analysis 4. Both narratives begin with a very similar utterance but develop in different 
directions.
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deeds that differentiate it from other compositions. Put differently, unlike other 
compositions, the author, once posits the Israelis in the place of the aggressors, doesn’t 
find it necessary to rationalise or defend this aggression in order to create a better 
appearance for the Israelis.
The narrator then tells us: I  am for peace. Here, as in many other compositions 
the notion of peace is left in the abstract and is uttered as yearning for an alternative 
reality that contradicts the current situation. The notion of peace has this magical quality 
in that it stands in contrast to everything that is bad. In the current narrative, the narrator 
emphasises twice her wish for peace and this is uttered in relation to the deprived living 
conditions of her family and herself creating the impression that peace is the remedy to 
all the described problems. This is strengthened when she emphasises her eagerness for 
peace in between two associated utterances. When she reiterates the description of 
unbearable living conditions, and this time with more details ( /  have six brothers and 
my mother is in pain. I  want peace already. My brother is three months old. 
He is very skinny and he is dying) note that the location of the peace utterance 
somewhat breaks the flow of her descriptions and it communicates a sense of exigency 
and the belief that when peace comes, this misery will fade away.
The notion of peace has a distinctive presence in this narrative. The two ‘peace’ 
utterances previously discussed can be read as both a means to compose legitimacy to the 
Palestinian subjectivity and as stemming from the Israeli obsession with peace projected 
onto the Palestinian girl in accord with the logic of ‘opposing the conflict - yearning for 
peace’. Yet, the notion of peace gains a distinctive slant that seems to challenge this 
Israeli peace ideology exactly. Corresponding to the Israeli blame communicated all 
through the narrative, following the description of house demolition, the narrator tells us 
of the most terrible thing that can happen: The worst thing is that they killed my 
father. Once more, no qualifications or justification are presented. (In all narratives of 
that kind there would usually be direct or inferred explanation regarding the Israeli 
fighting against the Palestinian terrorism.) Instead, we have a challenge to the Israeli
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peace rhetoric. The narrator asks: And now they want peace? The first impression 
seems to be on a personal level where the child perhaps asks: you killed my father and 
you expect me to forgive? Yet at the same time she seems to question the sincerity or 
seriousness of the Israelis peace aspirations. Your actions, she says (i.e. killing and house 
demolitions) are in contrast to your peace rhetoric. This construal is reinforced by an 
additional utterance towards the end of the narrative.
An additional atypical element found in this narrative can be seen in the following 
utterance: When one Palestinian commits a suicide attack they destroy our 
life. It is the sole indication of Palestinian violence but rather than a means to excuse the 
Israeli actions, it serves the exact opposite communicative purpose. It is the sole narrative 
that critically reflects upon the Israeli actions and challenges the ‘no-altemative’ and 
‘self-defence’ ethos. The narrator, in fact, expresses disapproval of the policy of 
collective punishment as part of the Israeli war on Palestinian terrorism, and the 
transgressions that take place in the name of that war.
This narrative is distinctive in its personal tone throughout and the unconditional 
empathy in it is intended to arouse in the reader. I  don't want to live in fear all my 
life. I  want to live in a house, to have a proper job and to live peacefully. 
The girl protests against the dismal reality she lives in, a reality of dread and anguish and 
she goes on revealing her aspirations. She is neither revengeful, nor is she embittered. If 
anything she is fearful and despairing (she later also uttered: I  live in fear and 
sorrow). The Israeli author composed a Palestinian child that is utterly humane and her 
aspirations are neither national nor political. Rather, the depiction of the Palestinian girl’s 
dreams and aspirations are private and modest and seem to be taken from a more 
universal symbolic world. All she wants is to live a normal, peaceful life, with a house 
and a decent job. In a rather realistic and pragmatic voice that is relevant and applied to 
both sides she contends: We don’t have anywhere to go to and we can’t go 
anywhere, aiming perhaps to dismiss the dream of the other’s disappearance.
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The narrative is concluded with an intriguing query: I would like to know how 
is it that the Israelis have good life and do they really want peace? In contrast 
to the majority of the compositions, the author reflects on the substantial asymmetries not 
as a means to sustain the Israeli supremacy. On the contrary, she questions this sharp 
asymmetry in power relations that is embedded in the living conditions and once more 
questions the sincerity of the Israeli longing for peace. The awareness and 
acknowledgment of the sharp inequality between the Israelis and the Palestinians is the 
story told from the drawing as well. The page is divided by a black winding barrier, a 
divider between Israel and Palestine. In Israel there is happy looking girl, standing under 
the sun on a vivid bed of flowers and greens. In Palestine the depiction is the complete 
opposite. In a greyish background, a sad looking boy is standing in the rain, surrounded 
with guns, bombs and withered black flowers befitting the gloomy mood of the 
Palestinian girl’s life.
Most of the narratives and drawings chosen for this phase of analysis highlight the 
symbolic constraints the Israeli children experience in their construction of the 
Palestinian perspective. Moreover, they were selected to best illustrate the orchestration 
of different voices circulating in and constitutive of the Israeli self. This drawing and 
narrative stand solitary in their fairly univocal stance, uttering the voice of a poor 
Palestinian child whose reality comprises of hunger, poverty, loss of a dear one, and 
violation of her basic needs by the Israeli army. Nevertheless, she doesn’t seek 
vengeance. She is fearful and distressed and simply asks to end the conflict and live a 
quite ordinary life.
265
9. Girl - kibbutz
P^ fc jp  jcfo
I am scared but I’m sure that the Israelis are scared as well.
If I were the prime minister I would have done anything possible for the peace.
I would have given up on land and territories because with so many people getting killed 
we won’t need territories...
I am afraid that something might happen to someone I know or one of my friends or 
relatives.
These Israelis, they probably hate us when they see the suicide bombings and the killings 
that the Palestinians did. But not all of us are bad and heartless.
I wish we were in peace with them.
When I grow up I want to be the prime minister of both the Israelis and the Palestinians 
so I could make peace.
With all the killings and the terrorist attacks I am still on my people’s side.
I do not support the suicide bombers at all but I support the Palestinian pride.
I wish I had an Israeli friend who will defend me from the Israelis and I will keep him 
from the Palestinians. I wish all this will end soon.
The Israeli people look at us as if we were monsters or alike.
I feel different from everybody although I have the same body and face.
I am sorry for the Israelis that are scared to go to shopping mall or club or cafd, since 
after all it is their home just like it is ours.
Even if eventually there will be peace and the wars and bombings will end, it won’t be a 
real peace since there always be hatred between us the Palestinians and the Israelis.
We have this social pressure to hate the Israelis and bum their flag and I must obey and 
do the same but this is not leading us to a good solution.
I can imagine myself as a grandmother telling my grandchildren the story of the conflict. 
I will try to tell them about the conflict in a way that won’t make them hate the Israelis 
but to preserve the Palestinian pride.
After all we are all human.
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Analysis
From the very first utterance we can learn about the conflict this girl from the 
kibbutz faced, while trying to cast meaning to the Palestinian perspective and to compose 
a meaningful and positive Palestinian girl’s subjectivity. It is a conflict embedded in the 
contradictory elements of the Israeli self, especially within its leftist or pro-peace milieu. 
It regards the difficulties to maintain a humanistic, reconciliatory attitude toward the 
Palestinians in light of the Palestinian terror campaign. The result is an intriguing struggle 
as the girl produced a narrative that appropriately confines these contradictions.
Through the task of taking the perspective of the other (Palestinians) the Israeli 
girl composed a Palestinian girl with a highly developed ability to take the perspective of 
the other (Israelis). Put differently, she composed a Palestinian girl with a copious 
awareness and concern to the Israelis: I  am scared but Vm sure that the Israelis 
are scared as well. The tendency to ‘understand’ or empathised with the Israelis 
reiterates throughout the narrative: I  am sorry for the Israelis that are scared to 
go to shopping mall or club or cafe, since after all it is their home just like 
its ours. As seen on different occasions, a ‘good’ Palestinian is one that is for peace, 
strictly against terrorism and suicide bombings and, if possible, empathises with the 
Israeli sufferings. The girl in the current narrative, by all parameters, qualifies as a good 
Palestinian.
The Israeli girl seems to be confronted with the task of recognising her own set of 
multiple and contradictory subject positions and to draw upon these positions in various 
ways and to varying degrees when she construct the Palestinian girl’s perspective. The 
subjectivity of the author and that of the narrator are occasionally completely merged: 
These Israelis, they probably hate us when they see the suicide bombings 
and the killings that the Palestinians did. In an alleged moment of reflection the 
author in fact reflects upon her own feelings towards the Palestinians. Through the
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Palestinian girl’s eyes she admits to the fear and hatred of the Israelis towards the 
Palestinians in light of the Palestinian terrorism. But, (role)playing a Palestinian girl, she 
is also eager to defend the Palestinians or to correct this inevitable negative impression by 
immediately proclaiming: But not all of us are bad and heartless. This
qualification as seen on different occasions, stems from the ‘good Palestinians-bad 
Palestinians’ construction, a compromised, accessible representation that allows the 
children (and adults) to maintain a certain amount of empathy to the Palestinians despite 
the devastation of Palestinian terrorism.
The Palestinian girl’s propensity to take the perspective of the Israelis reaches a 
captivating height when she utters: The Israeli people look at us as if  we were 
monsters or alike. I suggest reading this utterance as rare evidence of the internal 
struggle of being outwardly committed to values of equality and respect to the 
Palestinians but nonetheless experiencing an unmediated affect, with bodily symptoms of 
anxiety and aversion in the presence (real or imagined) of the Palestinians. This girl is 
coming from an immediate environment of certain political and ideological norms and 
attitudes in relation to the Palestinians. She unintentionally offers the reader a glimpse of 
patterns of habitualised dislike, which are a consequence of decades of hostile 
relationships. It is the emotional, or visceral qualities, if you will, of the Israelis 
experience in relation to the Palestinians. She ‘knows’ that the Palestinians are human 
and that all human beings are equal, yet she admits to a feeling which is located at a level 
much deeper than that of discursive judgment, hence the utterance: I feel different 
from everybody although I have the same body and face. In this particular 
moment, the visceral overpowered the discursive and the Palestinian girl is coerced to 
admit to be different although she has ‘the same body and face’.
An additional dominant voice that resonates within this narrative is the voice of 
peace and reconciliation. Utterances directly embodying the voice of peace include: If I  
were the prime minister I  would have done anything possible for the peace; 
When I grow up I  want to be the prime minister o f both the Israelis and the
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Palestinians so I  could make peace; and I  wish we were in peace with them. 
In vein with the previous discussion I regard these utterances as a reproduction of the 
Israeli peace ideology projected onto the Palestinian girl’s subjectivity as part of the 
effort to present her in a positive manner. The prospect of peace, according to this social 
representation of peace, lies in the hand of political leaders. It is a matter of their good 
will and effort that peace can be achieved. Toying with the idea of being a Prime Minister 
and working towards peace, the girl, in a rather cynical remark says: I  would have 
given up on land and territories because with so many people getting killed 
we won’t need territories ...the territorial compromise thus, has to come from the 
Palestinians.
Furthermore, the ideological dilemma of yearning for peace on the one hand, 
cohabit with a strong disbelief in the possibility of peace (usually because the other is not 
willing to compromise, or is unalterable) on the other hand, is realised here in the whole 
when the narrator utters: Even if  eventually there will be peace and the wars and 
bombings will end, it won’t be a real peace since there always be hatred 
between us the Palestinians and the Israelis. Whereas previously we learnt about 
the Israeli hatred to the Palestinians being the result of the Palestinian terror campaign 
(These Israelis, they probably hate us when they see the suicide bombings 
and the killings that the Palestinians did) we later learnt that the Palestinian hatred 
to the Israelis is a consequence of the Palestinian incitement and ‘hate’ education: We 
have this social pressure to hate the Israelis and bum their flag and I  must 
obey and do the same but this is not leading us to a good solution. According 
to this account, the Palestinian hatred to the Israelis is not a result of the Israeli 
wrongdoings but rather the outcome of a Palestinian vituperation and institutionalised 
propagation of hatred.
The narrative is concluded with a self-reflection through a glance to the future: I  
can imagine myself as a grandmother telling my grandchildren the story o f
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the conflict. I  will try to tell them about the conflict in a way that won’t make 
them hate the Israelis but to preserve the Palestinian pride. At first reading I 
interpreted this utterance in the following manner: The author unconsciously reflects 
upon her own dilemma as she strived to construct the Palestinian perspective. Throughout 
the narrative she made every effort to understand and defend her ‘real’ self. She achieved 
it by showing empathy to the Israeli sufferings, by repeatedly condemning the Palestinian 
terrorism, and, looking at the notion of absence, she achieved it also by not referring to 
any Israeli offences or contraventions. In other words, throughout the narrative the 
narrator’s subjectivity was mostly conscript to sustain and defend the author’s 
subjectivity. Still, twice in her story she refers to the notion of the Palestinian pride. 
Previously she wrote: With all the killings and the terrorist attacks I  am still on 
my people’s side. I  do not support the suicide bombers at all but I  support 
the Palestinian pride. I believe that the term Palestinian pride embodies her 
recognition and sympathy to the Palestinian struggle for independence and self 
determination. So at first I thought that the author identified a potential dilemma- telling 
the story of the conflict while maintaining the Palestinian national aspirations and 
struggle, embodies the account of the Israeli wrongdoings, thus presents the Israelis in a 
negative manner, a consequence she wishes to avoid. Yet reading this narrative as a 
whole, and looking at the utterance (I will try to tell them about the conflict in a 
way that won’t make them hate the Israelis but to preserve the Palestinian 
pride) in relation to the preceding one (We have this social pressure to hate the 
Israelis and burn their flag...) I realised that the author actually meant that she 
wishes to the find the formula to avoid the incitement and education to hatred she herself 
experiences while marinating the story of the Palestinian liberation, by emphasising again 
both her sympathy to the Palestinian struggle for liberation and condemning the 
Palestinian incitement.
After all, we are all human. The concluding utterance is also the title of her 
drawing. The sheet is divided in two; in each part there is a faceless girl, presumably one
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Palestinian and one Israeli. To make that point stronger, that is, to emphasis the message 
of equality, there is no indication as to who is the Palestinian and who is the Israeli.
To sum up, this is yet more evidence of an Israeli child being behind the narrative 
bars when attempting to enter the perspective of the Palestinians. Writing the story of the 
conflict through the eyes of a Palestinian girl, the Israeli child composed a story that is, in 
fact, a reconstruction of the Israeli narrative. The main objects of her story are the 
Palestinian terrorism and peace. The Palestinian girl not only objected to the Palestinian 
violence and is yearning for peace, but she also has a profound ability to identify with the 
Israelis in their justified fear from the Palestinians.
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8. DISCUSSION: BEHIND THE NARRATIVE BARS
“The word in language is half someone else’s...It exists in other people’s 
mouths, in other people’s contexts, serving other people’s intentions: it is 
from there that one must take the words, and make it one’s own” (Bakhtin,
1981, pp293-294).
The aim of this thesis was twofold. First, to elaborate a more societal explanation to 
the concept of perspective taking. Secondly, to investigate the difficulties of Israeli 
children in taking the perspective of the Palestinians. In this concluding chapter, I first 
wish to strengthen my contention that taking the perspective of the other is not merely a 
one-dimensional cognitive ability but rather a symbolically mediated social- 
communicative practice. Secondly, while integrating the empirical evidence with the 
theoretical propositions, I aim to farther elucidate the limited power of Israeli children in 
comprehending the Palestinian perspective or narrative.
Meadian role taking
From a Meadian perspective, role taking is the underpinning for the emergence of 
the self and indeed all of human social life. It is the spine of all communication practices 
between individuals and groups and the mechanism that enables the existence of the 
human social fabric. As a cornerstone concept, Meadian ‘role taking’, if articulated and 
applied properly, is a potent idea that has the power to explain m/rapersonal, 
mterpersonal and intergroup relations and interactions.
(i) The emergence o f mind and the social self
To understand perspective taking as a social phenomenon, we must first 
appreciate the fundamentally social nature of human cognition. That is, the study of 
individual selves should be approached in terms of relations rather than dichotomies. 
Drawing upon Mead, this thesis espoused an ontology of the social as opposed to the
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atomistic subject, asserting that there can be no self prior to relations with others. It 
emphasises the social-communicative foundations of human cognition - thought, mind 
and indeed role taking- and defends the view that mindedness and selfhood are predicated 
on symbolic exchange in interaction. Self-conscious individuals can emerge only through 
ongoing interactions with other people and in response to other selves in a symbolic 
world of intersubjective relations. In short, human individuality is grounded in human 
sociality
Symbolic exchange, when it occurs intrapsychologically, generates thought or 
inner speech. I hear and respond to myself just as another would hear and reply to me, 
and this is precisely what allows me to become an object to myself and indeed to be a 
self. In order to be an object to myself, I must adopt the perspective of the other towards 
myself. I must have internalised the social-communicative process. In short, individual 
self, as a coherent pattern of reflective behaviour is generated, sustained and transformed 
by the mechanism of role taking.
(ii) Human social relations and the social process
On a different level of assessment, taking the perspective of the other enables 
individuals to participate effectively in the social process. Our self-awareness and the 
ability to function as self-regulating members of a community are both grounded in the 
process of role taking. Without the ability to role take, individuals would not be able to 
coordinate their actions in the real or imaginary presence of others who might be affected 
by their actions.
Society, as a whole organism, is, according to Mead, a cooperative enterprise that 
is dependent on mutual role taking. In his words, “the very organisation of the self 
conscious community is dependant upon individuals taking the attitudes of the other 
individuals”(Mead 1934, p.256). The social aim of interactive communication is 
cooperative activity of some shared social end. Shared meanings are the enabling 
foundation of cooperative, socially beneficial activity, and for the coordination of 
community’s goals.
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Common experience is the bedrock upon which meaning and perspectives are 
predicated, and it is within the social-communicative act that meaning arises. For Mead, 
dialogue is premised on the shared perspective horizon of self and other. The 
intersubjectivity achieved through sharing a common outlook is both the result of, and the 
enabling ground for perspective taking.
This system of common meaning is embodied in the generalised other, an abstract 
formulation of the community’s ethos reconstructed by individuals, by abstracting the 
attitudes and responses common to the group. The generalised other, in other words, 
functions as the internalised perspective of the community. It represents the organised 
attitudes or responses of all members of the group to which the individual belongs. By 
taking the attitude of the generalised other, the reality and ethos of the group or the 
community is internalised in the individual consciousness. Therefore, by taking the role 
of the generalised other there emerges the affinity of the individuals to the community’s 
venture and, sequentially, the responsibility and commitment they sense towards the 
community’s goals. Hence, the organisation of subjective life reflects the organisation of 
the sociocultural world one inhabits.
(iii) Role taking in conflict
From the above formulation that views perspective taking as the constitutive of 
shared meanings and dialogue, we realise that taking the perspective of the other is, by 
and large, an unconscious, effortless and inevitable consequence of living in a shared 
social world. To take the role of the other is to experience the world as the other 
experiences it. ‘Seeing’ things as the other ‘sees’ them means sharing a perceptual 
symbolic field and the values that are attached to objects in that symbolic field. This 
means that the objects in that perceptual symbolic field evoke, or call forth the same 
responses for both self and other.
This implies that in a situation of conflict, the parties, whether individuals or 
groups, occupy different interpretive horizons - they have developed different responses
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in relation to objects of high importance to their lives. Conflicts must imply important 
consequences for the individual or for the group. Whether intrapersonal, interpersonal or 
intergroup, conflicts involve competing tendencies of opposing values that by the very 
nature of social life are arising within and between individuals and groups.
Groups in conflict have built up different responses to the world, and in effect, 
they live in different, even opposing, socially constructed worlds. Both interpersonal and 
intergroup conflicts are problems of adjustment and adaptation between opposing 
interests and conducts of social actors. Put differently, conflicts are disruptions in 
dialogue and communication; hence, they are disruptions in what we have called 
unconscious or effortless perspective taking. The very context of conflict directly implies 
divergence of perspectives, discrepancy of outlooks and different horizons of meanings. 
As long as the social process progresses with no disruptions, there is no need for 
reconsideration (reflexivity) since action is based on what Mead has described as ‘habits’. 
It is only when habits are insufficient for the completion of the act that we are required to 
reflect and assess various optional amendments and courses of action.
Solving moral problems therefore requires active-reflexive role taking. It requires 
consideration of significantly different perspective than one’s own. This, as has stemmed 
from the previous postulations, is a matter of communication. Namely, the problem of 
appreciating all of the diverse perspectives involved in a moral situation is not a mere 
cognitive one but rather, it is a problem of communication. Whether interpersonal, 
intercultural or intergroup encounters, solving moral problems requires negotiation, 
struggle and active understanding of the other. In short, it requires communication about 
social realties. Pursuing this line of analysis makes it possible to go beyond narrow 
cognitivist views of perspective taking and to show how ‘taking the perspective of the 
other’ is both enabled and constrained by particular forms and organisation of social 
relations.
Due to the conciliatory ethos of Mead’s writings, and the harmonious flair of his 
approach to society, it seems that he overlooks serious inter-individual and inter-group
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differences and misunderstandings. His emphasis on solidarity, cohesion and 
inclusiveness fails to adequately acknowledge diversity and tangible ideological 
struggles. When he writes that “we are indefinitely different from each other but our 
difference makes interaction possible. Society is unity in diversity” (1934 p. 359), he by 
and large downplays irreducible conflicts that are an organic part of human social life.
Conflict and contradiction in perspectives seem to be everywhere. It is an 
ineradicable part of human affairs. I have shown how taking the perspective of the 
generalised other, or, as we called it organised other, can be also the very source of 
perpetuating conflicts, as the group’s generalised other embodies the group’s outlook, 
marks the boundaries of its moral principles and demarcating members and non 
members. Every self is always a reflection of specific social relations and is consequently 
restricted to the social group whose role of the generalised or organised other it assumes. 
In the context of intergroup conflict perception of self and other is habitually ethnocentric 
and oriented towards group custom since every self is a moral self determined by the 
organised set of values and norms of the immediate group to which it belongs.
It is only when self is able to decentre from, and thereby to question, one’s own 
long-learned and established values and relationships, that self can therefore reflect upon 
and change those values. This is what Mead meant by ‘self-enlargement’. Each act in 
which moral reconstruction occurs is composed of co-growth and co-enlargement of self 
and society. On the one hand there is an expansion and modification of the moral self in 
each participant individual. On the other hand, there is an expansion and modification of 
the symbolised and institutionalised values of the community (Broyer, 1973). Since self 
and society are dialectical poles of a single process, change in one pole results in change 
in the other.
Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, my contention is that Israeli and 
Palestinian children live in completely different worlds in relation to the conflict, or as I 
articulated in Chapter Three, they are living in opposing and contradictory narratives. 
For the Palestinians, the conflict is about historical injustice, expulsion from the land and
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the devastating life under military occupation. For the Israelis, the conflict is about 
enduring hostility from its Arab neighbours and national and personal lack of security 
that is experienced as a threat to its existence.
Israelis and Palestinians are trapped in hostile and violent communication 
patterns. They commonly participate in disconnected communication channels and hence 
live in two different social worlds reflected in their narratives. Each world has a boundary 
created not only by territory or formal membership but also by the limits of effective 
communication. From a Meadian perspective, the problem then is not how Israelis or 
Palestinians take or don’t take the perspective of the other, but rather how these opposing 
realities of the conflict are sustained? What social processes reproduce and therefore 
maintain these colliding narratives?
In the current analysis I hope I was able to answer these questions but before I 
discuss the findings I wish first to reinforce the departure from the narrow cognitivist 
view of perspective taking as the property of an autonomous, rational entity based on 
purely mental structures, and to further elaborate theoretical accounts of perspective 
taking as an internally diversified, socially and linguistically constituted, communicative 
process.
Towards a dialogical understanding of perspective taking
Perspective taking is predicated on social experience
While not disputing the relevance of emergent cognitive skills to the child’s 
ability to role take, the view put forward in this thesis proposes that taking the perspective 
of the other is something whose nature is social and whose origin lies, in some good 
measure, in the interpersonal and social-ideological matrix of which the child is a part. 
Since taking the perspective of the other means realising the meanings that are attached to 
objects in the other’s world, understanding people’s capacity (both children and adults) to
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role take requires an understanding of the social sources of the people’s knowledge about 
themselves, others and the world.
As we take the concept of perspective taking out of the psychology laboratory and 
start looking at social actors not in isolation from the socio-historical contexts in which 
they live, we appreciate that role taking competence and performance are anchored in 
social relations and social experiences. This is so because the process of constructing the 
worldview of an other in a real life context, especially when that other is a lifelong 
enemy, cannot be merely cognitive or intrapsychological, but rather social, ideological 
and historical in nature. Perspective taking is mediated by social representations, power 
interests and ideologies, by minds shaped by particular socio-historical circumstances, to 
either reproduce or challenge, sustain or resist the diverse realities of the conflict. In 
short, it is social experience that determines the form and content of moral selves and 
what their capacities for perspective taking will be.
Unlike the traditional structural-developmental approach, the current approach 
strongly recognises the role played by children’s enculturation into particular cultural- 
ideological communities in their emergent self and other understandings. In this thesis I 
have shown the constitutive significance of the different ‘voices’ that the children have 
heard, internalised, reconstructed and transformed in the course of their communicative 
encounters with others -  their family, teachers, friends, the mass media and through 
school curricula to name a few. While constructing the Palestinian perspective, the 
children have cast their stories (whether verbal or figurative) within particular 
socioculturally specific representational and rhetorical genres that offer particular ways of 
perceiving the Palestinians, the Israelis and the conflict. The analysis has shown that 
social milieu is a strong predictor of the content (form and style) of the children’s 
approach to, and understanding of the other. For example, dehumanisation of the 
Palestinians and tendency to perceive the Palestinian violence through essentialising 
lenses are predominantly city and settlement strategies. In contrast, the children from the 
kibbutz have shown a lesser tendency to intentionally and directly delegitimise the
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Palestinians. Accordingly, self-criticism and peace related attitudes were significantly 
higher in this group.
This is perhaps the time to be specific about what is the social. By asserting that 
perspective taking is predicated on social experience my intention was not to show how 
and in what ways the social influences the individual. As I hope I was able to 
demonstrate, from a Meadian perspective this is a somewhat inappropriate and 
misleading formulation. Although the analysis of the drawings and compositions have 
shown that social milieu can be a strong predictor to the form and content of a child’s 
work, the conclusion is not a one-way ‘social exerting pressure on the individual’ as if the 
social is an independent variable or something external to the individuals. From a 
dialogical perspective, I argued that in order to better understand Israeli children’s 
‘abilities’ to take the perspective of the Palestinians, we have to look at the dialectical 
relations, or communicative patterns within Israeli society, and how history and culture 
shape different styles of thinking and knowing about self, other and the key objects of the 
conflict. The social provides the perceptual frames and the normative judgement 
boundaries around situations and events within which thinking, arguing and rationalising 
take place. The social therefore both enables and constrains understanding of the other. It 
sets the boundaries, yet at the same time, the social provides the space for breaking or 
expanding these boundaries.
Both the Meadian and the dialogical epistemology approaches put forward in the 
present study deny the dichotomy of self and society and see an ontological and 
epistemological continuity and mutual interdependence between the individual and the 
social. This formulation is reflected in the research design and the analysis of the data. A 
strategic and operational, rather than ontological distinction was made between the 
collective (Israeli victimised-occupier self), the sub-collective (city, kibbutz and 
settlement) and the individuals. And indeed the analyses reveal the mutual 
interdependence between these levels, or categories, as co-authors of the social reality. I 
have shown the different and contesting voices comprising the Israeli (collective) self in 
relation to the conflict and the children’s affiliations - both as individuals and as
279
community members - with different perceptual, representational and rhetorical patterns 
embedded in these voices. Put differently, I have shown how these particular affiliations 
generate particular ways of seeing and evaluating the conflict and the Palestinian 
perspective, and how these both enable and restrict, enhance or undermine the children’s 
comprehension of the Palestinian narrative.
My contention is that the origin of both the group’s and individual’s variations in 
taking the perspective of the Palestinians lies in the experiences associated with the 
children’s location in the large-scale patterns of social knowledge and behaviour in 
relation to the Palestinians and the conflict in Israeli society. As will be discussed below, 
all children from all three groups are to a large extent ‘behind the narrative bars’ when it 
comes to the construction of the Palestinian perspective. Yet, keeping with this 
metaphor, I hope I was able to show that first, these bars are not cognitive but rather 
symbolic and as such, they are communicative. Secondly, they are social, ideological and 
historical in nature and therefore are predicated on the children’s social experience and 
different socialisation genres in relation to the Palestinians and the conflict. In that sense, 
different experiences generate different symbolic bars.
Grounding our ways of perceiving the world and making sense of self and other in 
the context of particular human communities is a fundamental step in the direction of 
showing how perspective taking is an inherently knowledge-based, social-communicative 
phenomena. As I hope I was able to show, the children’s works reverberate with cultural 
and ideological overtones (Bakhtin 1986). The Meadian approach recognises that 
whatever individuals express in language contains at least two voices: the voice of the 
narrator and the voice of society since words and meaning are always socially charged. 
As Skinner et al (2001) note “[T]he author’s words arise out of dialogue that has gone on 
before in situations that have left residues of meanings in the words, but her words are 
not entirely relics of the past.. ..she injects the words she chooses -  words that come from 
her social environment -  with her own intentions, her own perspective from a particular 
social position... “ (Paragraph 10). Under such use, individual utterances simultaneously 
reflect their own antecedent social, cultural, and political histories, as well as the
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superimposed intentions of the individuals who appropriate, transform, challenge, 
reproduce or resist them.
This idea brings us closer to the second interrelated contention put forward in this 
thesis, that rather than looking at perspective taking as a cognitive ability we should 
understand it to be a socio-communicative activity.
From cognitive ability to socio-communicative activity
The idea that perspective taking is predicated on social experience gains 
redoubled force when we conceptualise perspective taking beyond cognitive ability, and 
shift the attention to social-communicative activity. As we accommodate a shift from 
cognitive structures to actual contents (or, from ability to performance), we are bound to 
look at notions like culture, discourse, knowledge, ideology and power relations. 
Perspective taking simply cannot be based solely on intra-cognition developmental 
stages, or information processed internally by individual minds. Rather, it is a 
communicative action that involves knowledge and affection. When Israeli children 
construct the perspective of the Palestinians they are not isolated, private, centric subjects 
activating internal structures. They are active-reflexive agents who embody repertoires of 
social, cultural and ideological meanings and practices, which they take up, reconstruct, 
and transform for particular goals and purposes.
Moreover, to take the perspective of the other does not mean to enter the other’s 
head, to ‘decode’ the other and make inferences about his subjective state as previous 
formulations had suggested. Rather, it means communicating and negotiating with the 
other about truths and versions of social realities. It cannot simply be a cognitive ability 
since it involves human beings who know and believe and feel; human beings who have 
different motives and goals, who wish to maintain and defend their identities.
By shifting the attention from cognitive ability to communicative activity, I have 
located the problem at the communicative interdependency between self and community 
within Israeli society. The focus was on the ‘voices’ that exist within Israeli society in
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the form of social representations, ideologies and myths embedded in the Israeli 
narrative(s), and on how these narratives play out both on the collective and on the 
individual levels. These narratives, these voices, I argue, live in social and cultural 
communicative practices, thus bridging, or mediating between the inner (individual, 
private) and the outer (social-ideological, public).
Moving from cognitive ability to communicative activity, it is perhaps the time to 
re-introduce Bakhtin to this concluding discussion; I find his ideas particularly 
compatible with Mead’s and his approach is of great aid to distilling my arguments. 
Bakhtin shifts the attention to the speech act, i.e. to individuals producing utterances in 
dialogue. For him, there is no consciousness, or no awareness outside language. 
Language plays a constitutive role in the delineation of human cognition and experience 
and therefore, by implication, in the demarcation and constitution of self and other. He 
asserts that “no distinct or clear consciousness of the world is possible outside the word” 
(Bakhtin and Medvedev, 1978, p. 133). For Bakhtin, in parallel with Mead, there is 
simply no raw, direct experience of the world, no meaningful thought about the world 
that precedes its embodiment in some discursive material, or representational form. 
Rather, it is the symbolic field we live in, articulated and expressed in language that both 
enables and constrains the way we understand, and thereby experience, the world. 
Language thus underlies all relations between self and other and constitutes the means 
through which human beings understand the world they live in.
In light of the constitutive and generative value that Bakhtin attaches to language 
and dialogue, the individual subject can hardly be presented as the ultimate source and 
origin of meaning, since meaning only exists in the space of communicative practice. 
When people go about making sense of themselves, of others and indeed of the world, or, 
specific to the current study, when Israeli children make sense or construct the 
perspective of the Palestinians, they actively appropriate concrete ‘voices’ which they 
encounter in the course of their lives. Perspective taking as a communicative practice is 
therefore a socially and linguistically constituted process, subject to sociocultural and 
historical influence. It is knowledge-based activity, and the knowledge of the world is for
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Bakhtin something “bom between people collectively searching for the truth, in the 
process of their dialogic interaction” (1984, p.l 10).
When a child (or adult for that matter) tells the story of the conflict, whether his 
own, or through a Palestinian eyes, he enters into an arena that reverberates with ‘voices’, 
perspectives, opinions and ideologies. The child’s words, as Bakhtin would say, are 
intertwined with polyphony of other’s perspectives, nuances, contexts and intentions and 
it is by reconstructing, appropriating, challenging, transforming or orchestrating these 
voices that the child makes sense of the Palestinian perspective. In other words, when an 
Israeli child is striving to make sense of the Palestinian perspective, and he or she are 
trying to construct the Palestinian narrative of the conflict, they enter a polemic symbolic 
field already fraught with contesting voices and ideologies. This arena of constant 
debates was described as the multifaceted nature of the Israeli victimised-occupier self. 
These voices, these social representations of and in the conflict circulate in Israeli society; 
they both mediate the construction of the Palestinian’s narrative and set the boundaries of 
that construction. Following Bakhtin we can view perspective taking as a process of 
‘juggling’ with both personal and public voices and of orchestrating these voices that 
speak both within and outside our own contexts - the orchestration of and struggle among 
diverse and contradictory voices.
Perspective taking as a communicative practice is a process in which the 
individual constructions in the form of utterances, dialogically implicate the words and 
voices of others. As Bakhtin argues “any utterance is a link in a very complexly 
organised chain of other utterances” (1986, p.69). The children’s works, both drawings 
and narrative compositions, are thus inhabited and interlaced by the voices of others, 
concrete, or generalised, who have spoken or written about the conflict, sometimes in the 
past. Our speech always takes place in what Bakhtin calls a “tension filled environment” 
comprised of other4 s words and value judgments. It is in this highly agitated arena that 
the children have to make sense of the Palestinian narrative of the conflict.
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This leads us to the third and last interrelated contention that perspective taking is 
not either-or, one-dimensional ability and accuracy cannot be its single acknowledged 
dimension.
Perspective taking is not either-or, all-or-nothing ability.
Perhaps the major problem of thinking of perspective taking as a one-dimensional 
cognitive ability, is the derived evaluation of perspective taking as either-or, all-or- 
nothing ability with accuracy as its only acknowledged variable. The very term - 
perspective taking is in itself misleading, as it implies either-or, or achievement-failure 
outcome, which is why I offered to think about perspective negotiating instead; 
negotiating social realties. In this thesis I hope I was able to show how thinking and 
communication, and hence perspective taking is multivoiced, multifaceted and 
polyphasic.
The social world is a fragmented ensemble of diverse elements. Conflicts are 
multifaceted, multivoiced and complex -  hence, for Israeli children, to imaginarily 
construct the Palestinian narrative of the conflict cannot be but multivoiced and complex. 
Unlike previous theorising and research that limited itself to narrow, face-to-face 
situational dilemmas comprising a single object, thus expecting the individual to achieve 
the constancy and accuracy of a single perspective of the other, the approach put forward 
in the current study aimed at exploring the social-communicative processes that mediate 
the perpetuation of the two opposing realities of the conflict. As I hope I was able to 
demonstrate, there simply is no single, coherent and unified ‘Palestinian perspective’ of 
which the children can or cannot ‘take’. On both the collective and the individual levels, 
there are multiple objects, responses, voices, interpretations, opinions, perspectives and 
stories that comprise the Israeli and Palestinian conflictual realities. Accordingly, this 
presented the children with almost infinite possibilities of ‘entering’ the Palestinian world 
of the conflict, and to illuminate various components of the Palestinian narrative from 
multiple points of view. And since these stories and meanings are bom in dialogue and 
shaped through interaction with other voices, the child construction is never a single
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voice but various, of which he attempts to manoeuvre towards accomplishing his 
communicative goals.
This multiplicity, as we have seen, makes the notion of accuracy and the all-or- 
nothing formulation inadequate for the present study and indeed for any other enquiry of 
perspective taking and communication in real life encounters. This inadequacy was 
immediately reflected in the data: How can one determine whether a Palestinian child 
truly wishes to join a terrorist organisation and become a suicide bomber or whether he is 
a peace advocate that actually wishes to become a prime minister and to do everything 
possible for peace? Is a child from the kibbutz who constructs a ‘good’ Palestinian who 
wishes to be friend with the Israelis more accurate than a child from the city who 
constructed a fiery Palestinian filled with hatred to the Israelis and wishes to blow 
himself up in a Jewish city centre? And what about a child that cast his Palestinian as 
both potential suicide bomber and as eager for peace? Or perhaps the girl who 
empathically wrote about being prevented from going to shopping and buying new 
clothes is a ‘better role taker’ than the previous two?
The analysis suggests that perspective taking or intersubjectivity significantly 
vary according to content and context. For example, the vast majority of the children 
seemed to acknowledge the significance of the occupied land in the Palestinian narrative. 
On the other hand very few children have discussed the notion of the occupied people or 
the Palestinian request for self-determination. The variations in the ‘ability’ to take the 
perspective of the Palestinians according to content and context strengthen my contention 
that that there is no cognitive magic in perspective taking. Rather, the explanation is that 
regarding the notion of the occupied land, this fraction of the Palestinian narrative has 
penetrated or diffused into the Israeli narrative (or self) and we can say that in relation to 
land, there is an overlap in perspectives. The explanation from a Meadian perspective is 
that regarding the notion of land, Israeli and Palestinian children have a shared 
interpretative horizon, namely, to some extent, they share the meaning of the notion of 
land. In contrast, the meaning of leaving under military occupation is something which, 
to a large extent lies outside the boundaries of the Israeli children’s world.
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The shift from cognitive ability to socio-communicative activity has led to a 
different formulation altogether. Rather than trying to determine whether Israeli children 
can or cannot take the perspective of the Palestinians this thesis was looking at the socio- 
rhetorical processes, power interests and ideologies that mediate the reconstruction and 
reproduction of the different and contesting realities of the conflict. Rather than treating 
perspective taking as either-or ability, this thesis espoused a view that perspective taking 
is a communicative practice of refuting, affirming, challenging, negotiating, defending or 
reproducing particular ways of knowing the world, or versions of reality. From the 
children’s point of view it means reconstructing, appropriating, challenging, transforming 
and indeed ‘juggling’ between these versions (voices) in order to makes sense of their 
own and the Palestinian perspectives. The complexity and plurality of voices and 
meanings that comprise the social reality of the conflict undermines the prospect of a 
unified all-or-nothing construction of the Palestinian perspective. Instead, as the 
children’s works demonstrate we have a constant interplay between differing, often 
conflicting perspectives and responses.
The analysis has clearly shown how difficult and ambivalent the construction of 
the Palestinian narrative is for Israeli children, for almost every object in the field there 
are contested meanings and competing outlooks. From the ethnographic data, through the 
sociogenesis analysis of the children’s works to the individual analysis of a single 
drawing and composition, the revealed picture is of an assortment of both consensual 
and contesting systems of ideas and meanings that organise the Israeli children’s 
construction of the Palestinian perspective. For example, the Palestinians are mostly 
villains but also victims. They are murderers whose only wish is to harm the Israelis as 
well as being righteous in their struggle to liberate their occupied land. Therefore, 
instead of looking at levels of accuracy in the children’s works, or to rate the children’s 
performance as either-or, this study emphasises the multiple and multifaceted nature of 
the Israeli representational field that mediates the construction of the Palestinian 
perspective in the minds of the Israeli children and how these constructions maintain or 
challenge the contested narratives of the conflict.
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The different versions of reality that circulate within Israeli society in relation to 
the conflict, or as Mead would have it, the multiplicity of generalised (organised) others, 
generates the moral contradictions of the Israeli self, contradictions that have been 
reflected in all phases of the analysis. The Israeli self is characterised by an intense 
struggle among coexisting voices and the corresponding views of the conflict. In the 
remains of this chapter I will discuss these contradictions in trying to account for the 
difficulties of Israeli children to comprehend the Palestinian perspective of the conflict.
The limited power of comprehension: behind the narrative bars
The other aspect of my thesis was concerned with the difficulties of Israeli 
children to take the perspective of the Palestinians or, better phrased, to construct and 
acknowledge the Palestinian narrative. To understand that these are social- 
communicative difficulties rather than mere cognitive difficulties was one side of the 
question; the other interrelated problem was to explore and understand these socio- 
ideological-communicative restrictions Israeli children face when they attempt to make 
sense of their neighbours-enemies, their motives, intentions and aspirations. Put 
differently, whereas the first aspect of the thesis was to establish a theory of perspective 
taking as a socio-communicative practice mediated by social and ideological 
representations, the other side was to explore and unravel these ‘mediational means’ in 
order to better understand the dynamics of knowledge and affect, and by doing so, 
perhaps to find ways to facilitate better understanding and therefore influence these 
concepts toward more inclusive and peaceful orientations.
This study has shown that ‘entering’ the perspective of the Palestinians is 
impeded by the ideological comprehensions of the conflict as experienced by the Israelis. 
That is to say, the ability to construct the Palestinian viewpoint is constrained by the 
boundaries of the Israeli representational field and discourse in relation to the conflict, 
and the dynamics of knowledge, affect and practices that maintain them. These socio-
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historical-ideological factors generate a socially shared imperceptiveness, namely, 
narrowing the moral self of the Israelis in relation to the Palestinians.
It is possible to divide these obstacles into three interrelated clusters: perversive, 
reflective and communicative. The first regards the perception o f the other and the 
working of extremely negative stereotypes of the other, which lead to the devaluation, 
and even dehumanisation of the Palestinians. The second relates to the perception o f self 
the problem of missing self-reflection, suppression of divergent thinking and dissent, and 
diminished sense of responsibility for the effects of one’s actions on others. The third 
cluster regards the (lack of) interaction between self and other. It reflects the 
institutionally rooted segregation and the lack of opportunities for encountering with the 
other and his national and historical narrative. These three clusters are obviously 
interconnected. They mingle and coalesce, therefore feeding and maintaining each other 
in a negative feedback to perpetuate the different realities of the conflict.
Perversive obstacles: “they understand only force”
The most apparent obstacle identified in this thesis is the delegitimisation of the 
Palestinians. Simply and straightforwardly stated, racist and dehumanised perceptions 
that ignore the humanity of the other or present it as inferior, savage and dangerous, 
hinder the ability and motivation to take the perspective of the other. It simply leaves no 
space for considering alternative outlooks. In other words, when the other is perceived as 
the embodiment of evil or when the humanity of the other is denied, the voice of the other 
is neglected, muted and denied.
This tendency, I argue, is historically rooted. From the early days to the present 
the Palestinians were perceived as either a threat that needed to be overcome or as 
inferiors that do not deserve human treatment. From the massive expulsion of 1948, 
through the occupation and settlements enterprises of 1967, through the massive use of 
force against the Palestinian uprisings of 1987 and 2000, to the current unilateral, dictated 
initiatives - the Israeli self was never ready to respond to the Palestinians as equal 
partners in communication, but rather, as either objects whose resistance must be
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overcome or as subordinates that can be subjugated to a dictated order. Recent examples 
of this tendency can be seen in the construction of a system of separation walls that 
fragment the Palestinian territories and cut off the Palestinian people from their cultivated 
lands. Another example is the common mantra of the Israelis regarding the recent cycle 
of violence, as was coined by the current chief of staff, that the Palestinian consciousness 
needs to be ‘burned’ (i.e. to be re-written), by means of force, so they forever understand 
that terror does not pay.
Representations of Arabs and Palestinians in Israeli society are to a large extent 
utterly negative. They are commonly depicted as brutal, primitive and uncivilised people 
that ‘only understand the language of force’. For decades, and not without the help of the 
Arab aggression and antagonism, the Israeli self has created a unidimensional negative 
image of the Palestinians. From the early days of the Jewish immigration to Palestine to 
the current uprising, the Arab resistance has been perceived as the consequence of their 
murderous nature and blind hatred of the Jews. The Palestinian resistance in all its forms, 
from the extremists’ vile terrorism to the popular struggle for liberation, has been 
portrayed as a lurking danger and as a threat to the entire Jewish people. These dynamics 
of moral exclusion, and particularly in light of the wave of the Palestinian suicide attacks, 
devalue the Palestinians to the extent that they become less than human and thus make 
extreme violence against them acceptable.
This attitude is strongly reflected in the children’s works. Indeed the words and 
images in the children’s works reveal a deep abyss of hostility, hatred, alienation and 
despair. For the majority of the children, the Palestinians are cruel people who think 
about only one thing - slaughtering Israelis. The Palestinian violence is seen as a basic 
and immutable characteristic; they are cruel, irrational and violent people, impelled by a 
blind hatred of Israel. The Palestinians, as depicted by the Israeli children are 
predominantly live ticking bombs. Whether the fantastic, beast-like drawings of a 
Palestinian child, or the essentialising descriptions found in the narrative compositions of 
which a Palestinian child’s ultimate wish is to become a suicide bomber, the revealed 
picture is that of intense feelings of fear, contempt and disgust.
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In the public atmosphere generated in Israel as a consequence of the wave of 
suicide attacks, Palestinian terrorism was perceived as a strategic and existential threat. 
The fear of individuals is obvious and understandable. The fact that this fear was fuelled 
and nourished from ignorance, deliberate estrangement and repression of the violence of 
the Israeli occupation, does not undermine its genuineness and tangibility. From an Israeli 
perspective, it takes immense mental strength in order to resist the extreme negative 
feelings that arise in oneself in the face of such desperate, barbaric actions. Moreover, it 
requires extraordinary humanistic resources to contemplate that the Palestinians consign 
themselves to Allah and blow themselves up in the centres of Israeli places of recreation 
because their own lives are torture.
Within this reality the Palestinians are by and large seen as deserving no attention 
and understanding because they present an existential threat to the Israeli state and 
society. Instead of a war to end the military occupation the children see it as simply an 
outburst of hatred and the frenetic, murderous nature of the Palestinians and Islam. The 
Palestinians therefore, are not seen as subjects whose thoughts and feelings are of equal 
value to the Israelis. As I previously argued, this attitude was not generated during the 
recent cycle of violence or particularly in reaction to Palestinian terrorism. Rather it is the 
product of historically persistent and widespread profound animosity towards the 
Palestinians that has only strengthened and reached alarming heights in the recent cycle 
of violence.
While analysing the children’s works, it became clear to me that the Israeli 
children’s response to the Palestinians cannot be grasped simply as negative symbolic 
formation. Recall the individual analysis of the girl from the kibbutz where one could 
find an example of the tension between the mediated values of equality and the 
unmediated aversion in the presence (real or imagined) of a Palestinian (see page 266). 
Moreover, the range of responses I witnessed during the fieldwork when I asked the 
children to role play Palestinians occasionally comprised of revolt, embarrassment, 
disgust and revulsion. These responses convinced me that we deal here with a
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phenomenon that has another dimension, which is beyond the ‘socially constructed’. The 
negative representation of the Palestinians is affective as it is discursive; it is visceral as it 
is ideological. I found possible direction for understanding my observation in recent 
psychoanalytical approaches to racism, all of which share the view that we cannot explain 
prejudice and bigotry as merely sets of representational content. Hook (2004) perhaps 
best epitomises the gap: “I have in mind here a form of racism not primarily 
representational or institutional in form, that is often less than conscious or intentional in 
nature; a racism of immediate response, of raw aggressivity and apparently unmediated 
affect. This is a racism that need not take verbal form that is realised in impulses, played 
out in aversions and reactions of the body; a racism, in short, that appears to remain as of 
yet unconditioned by discourse” (p.679).
This thesis has convinced me that the negative perception (of whatever kind - 
cruel, inferior, ugly, or stupid) of the Palestinians is perhaps not even a social 
representation in the Moscovician sense but rather a collective representation in the 
Durkheimian sense. It is so deeply and stubbornly grounded in the Israeli collective 
psyche that it is as much the property of individuals who outwardly despise the 
Palestinians, as it is the property of individuals who are consciously and outwardly 
committed to change. The word ‘Arab’ in the Israeli discourse carries such a deeply 
rooted and commonly manifested negative meaning, that it comes to represent everything 
that is bad, tasteless, substandard or simply not us. It is the consequence of one hundred 
years of conflict and since it is fundamentally related to the historical and socioeconomic 
contexts in which it is rooted, it will take a long time and enormous change to the 
material and structural conditions of Israeli society for this collective representation to be 
uprooted.
In sum, mistrust and fear coupled with a highly negative perception of the other, 
and that denies the humanity of the other, impedes any possible engagement with the 
other as equal. When the other is an existential threat whose leader was coined ‘Hitler’s 
successor’ and whose actions are presented as yet another pogrom and potential new 
Holocaust, there is simply no room for the perspective of the other. Fear, hate,
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repugnance and contempt simply cannot cohabit with empathy or mutual understanding- 
this is the dreary reality of protracted intergroup conflict.
Reflective obstacles: "forever victims, forever moral”
In addition to the vastly negative perception of the Palestinians there is a whole 
set of ideas that organises the Israeli children’s responses to self that hinders the 
possibility of engagement with, and acknowledgment of the Palestinian perspective. This 
thesis has shown that the Israeli victimised-occupier self is neurotically dependent for its 
survival on gratuitous levels of self-victimisation that cohabit with a strong sense of 
moral and military supremacy. What I have tried to show is how living in a victimised- 
occupier society undermines individual selves ability and motivation to take the 
perspective of the Palestinians. In such a society, the children are socialised to assume the 
role of the victims in the conflict, to see the Palestinian pain and suffering as less 
important than their own, to deny responsibility for it, and to refuse to see it as 
demanding for its alleviation any radical change on the part of the Israelis. Too occupied 
with their own, in past and present, Israelis have grown accustomed to ignoring the 
Palestinian suffering.
I have shown how the Israeli society has developed a collective mentality in 
which constant states of defensiveness and self-victimisation are fundamental 
determinants. The long-lasting conflict with its neighbours constituted an experience 
which unites the Israelis around the campfire of self-victimisation. Israelis experience 
themselves as being bom out of long history of anti-Semitism, pogroms and persecutions, 
only to begin a never-ending battle for survival against irrational Arab forces bent on 
Israel’s annihilation. The analysis has shown how, while role playing Palestinians many 
children have conversed about the Israeli sufferings and bereavement. These depictions 
emphasise personal and collective grief and defencelessness.
The state of self-victimisation is so powerful that it impedes any serious effort and 
propensity for self-reflection. It generates a collective suspension of critical thinking and
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very little tolerance for self-criticism and alternative views that undermine the dominant 
victimised outlook. Alternative, critical and uncompromising voices are trampled and the 
people or groups that utter these ‘submissive’ outlooks are labelled traitors, 
somnambulists and ‘self-hating Jews’. Simply stated, when one thinks of oneself as a 
victim, and that the conflict was imposed by a savage adversary whose only wish is to 
inflict pain and sorrow upon oneself, there is hardly any possibility for one to engage in 
self-reflection, self-criticism and an alternative perspective of the other or to connect with 
socially outcast narratives.
Indeed, one of the most difficult challenges for a person or a group is the ability to 
admit the wrongdoing and injustices they commit. The recognition and acknowledgment 
that you hurt someone is a very difficult psychological burden to handle. In order to 
reduce moral difficulties and dilemma, humans have the tendency to repress or deny the 
unpleasant facts. More often than not, this is done unconsciously. My contention is that 
the unreflexive efforts to sustain the Israeli narrative, or the Israeli definitions of the 
reality of the conflict hinder the engagement with, and openness to, the Palestinian 
narrative. The Israeli self is so fixated in its self-victimisation that it has grown 
accustomed to being indifferent to the consequences of its actions and the pain it inflicts 
upon the Palestinians. It has great difficulties in considering different versions of reality 
that do not maintain the Israeli victimisation and moral supremacy.
Moreover, the analysis has shown that the Israeli children are to a large extent 
unable to consider moral and just reasoning that undermines their moral supremacy. The 
strong sense of victimisation and vulnerability maintains an illusion of a just war of self- 
defence. Their works show that they have nourished a defensive outlook, which 
conceives and justifies the use of extreme violence against the Palestinians as a ‘no 
alternative’ means to defend their existence against the Palestinian terrorism. Put 
differently, the self-image of a humane society coupled with eternal self-victimisation, 
unreflexive with an excessive preoccupation with security, and with dehumanised 
perception of the other, justifies the harshest military means against the other. As Bar-On 
(2001 in press) eloquently observes, “though we are convinced, and also others tell us
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that we are military and economic superpower compared to all the Arab states together, 
we feel ourselves at the same time as vulnerable minority that soon will be attacked and 
may even be annihilated. This ambivalence also accounts for the fact that when we cause 
pain to our neighbours we do not feel it. We only feel what they do to us, and no rational 
reasoning seems to help in this respect”. Over time, the Israeli self has anesthetised itself 
to the Palestinian suffering. It simply repressed and internalised the contradictions 
between its self-image and moral values and its actual behaviour and actions.
Based on the ethos of self-defence and supreme morality, the Israeli children have 
the tendency to conceive and justify the uses of violence as a means of coping with 
existential threats to their independence and security. The actual effect of force and its 
consequences for the victims are usually seen as necessary, inevitable results of pursuing 
these survival goals. In short, unreflexive victimised stagnation, diminished sense of 
responsibility for the effect of one’s actions on others, no openness to different versions 
or perspectives, underdeveloped ability and motivation to engage in self-critical thought -  
these are the characteristics of what Mead calls a narrow moral self.
Communicative obstacles: “Behind the narrative bars”
Whereas the two former clusters could be regarded as obstacles to considering the 
other as human and partner in dialogue and the propensity to get engaged with the 
perspective of the other, those I call communicative obstacles are beyond motivation, and 
reflect the consequences of lack of communication, interaction and encounters between 
the Israeli and the Palestinian narratives and realities. I argued that Israeli and Palestinian 
children live in different, dissociate realities in relation to the conflict, they do not 
participate in shared communication channels, they have developed different responses to 
the world, and hence are principally restricted from taking the perspective of each other. 
The analysis has shown that it takes more than an empathic approach to the other in order 
to apprehend the other’s perspective. It has shown that even if you have the motivation, 
even if you are not crippled by hatred, fear and aversion, even if you empathise with the
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other, you are still behind the narrative bars, because the realities of the conflict for 
Israelis and Palestinians are so immensely different and disconnected.
This thesis has shown how the Israeli children approach the world of the conflict 
in general, and the perspective of the Palestinians in particular, from the perspective of 
the Israeli self, or Israeli narrative. While thinking about the Palestinian perspective, and 
while role playing Palestinians they think, perceive, rationalise and form judgements 
according to the frame of reference of the Israeli self, an object endowed with meanings 
that the children as actors in this conflict strive to protect. Thus, entering the perspective 
of the Palestinians is restricted (but also enabled) by the ideological comprehensions of 
the conflict as experienced by the Israelis. As seen in this thesis, the perspective of the 
Palestinians is both opposed to, and excluded from, the experience, shared understanding 
and definitions of the conflict of Israeli society. The key objects of the conflict, to the 
Israeli children are the Palestinian terrorism and peace, and these objects brought to the 
fore and appropriated in the construction of the Palestinian story of the conflict. 
Furthermore, the reality of which some 3.5 million Palestinians are under military 
occupation for 38 years and the systematic and deliberate violations of their fundamental 
rights is to a large extent outside the boundaries of the Israeli representational field. More 
accurately, it might be inside these boundaries but for years, it has been muted, repressed 
and marginalised.
By stating that Israelis and Palestinians are living in different realities in relation 
to the conflict I mean that the average Israeli, adult and child, does not know about the 
darkness of the occupation and the settlements. No one bothers to tell him and he is not 
especially keen to hear about it. He has no idea what the separation fence looks like and 
what it is inflicting on the Palestinians. The average Israeli hardly ever hears that the 
settlements enterprise plundered and exploited land, or that the settlers abused their 
neighbours. He is not aware of the fact that apartheid roads are paved for Jews only and 
that the Palestinians are imprisoned in their communities for the sake of securing the lives 
of the settlers and the Israeli soldiers. Furthermore, the average Israeli does not know 
how Israeli soldiers treat innocent Palestinian people. He does not know about the cruel
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acts being perpetrated in his name - actions that have long ceased to be exceptions - and 
why and how much they destroy. I cautiously argue that in recent years, all television 
viewers in Europe have seen more about what is happening in the occupied territories 
than their Israeli counterparts. The Israelis are largely unaware to the sheer devastation of 
the occupation because the reality of the conflict has shaped a unique collaboration 
between broadcasters who did not wish to show, an audience who did not wish to see, 
and the government and Israel Defense Forces, who did not want them to see. This has 
resulted in moral and psychological numbing and as seen in the analysis, has a profound 
impact on the Israeli children’s ‘ability’ to construct the Palestinian perspective. Simply 
asked, how can they construct the Palestinian narrative if this is excluded from almost 
every communication channel available to them? If they do not learn it in school (how 
can you teach the occupation?), if their parents do not tell them about it, and if the news 
on TV skip over the details of the human suffering on the other side while giving a 
reckoning of its victims alone, if all they see on TV is a raging Palestinian mob that 
swears to eliminate the Israelis, how can they know about the reality of the Palestinians?
Therefore, when Israeli children face the task of constructing the Palestinian 
subjectivity and narrative, they are left to work with the range of meanings embedded in 
the Israeli narrative. Now, since there are very few, if any opportunities for encounter 
with the Palestinian national and historical narrative, the children have no choice but to 
project their own meanings and understandings onto the Palestinians. I have in mind here 
a notion of projection which is slightly different from the original Freudian one. While 
constructing the Palestinian story, the children have used the symbolic and ideological 
resources available to them from their immediate surroundings as Israeli children in 
general, and as belonging to a certain milieu (i.e. kibbutz, city or settlement), and cast 
them onto the Palestinian subjects they have drawn and authored. Indeed, two very 
different types of projections were found in the analysis which represent two very 
different approaches to self, other and the conflict. The first as seen mainly in the city and 
settlements works, is a negative or antagonistic projection. The children seem to have 
thrown all possible negative beliefs and stereotypes they have about the other onto the 
other’s subjectivity. Consequently the Palestinian was presented as fundamentally evil
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rejoicing in aggression and deadly deeds. As uncle Freud would have said, it is often the 
children’s own hatred, frustration, anger, fear and hostility that are projected onto the 
Palestinians.
The second type of projection which was seen predominantly in the kibbutz works 
can be described as positive or empathic projection. Here, the children have projected 
their hopes for a better future and yearnings for peace onto the Palestinian. They have 
projected their own group’s reconciliatory ideology onto the Palestinian child they drew 
and authored. Consequently, the Palestinian child was depicted as peace advocator, 
willing for compromises and completely rejecting the prospect of violence. Yet, this 
empathic approach was typically restricted to the Palestinian subject who was positioned 
in opposition to the rest of the Palestinians. As I argued throughout the analysis, these 
depictions vividly illustrate the limited power of comprehension or the meaning of being 
behind the narrative bars. Both types of projections are unconscious strategies for 
psychological avoidance and filling some gap of knowledge about the other due to very 
limited access to the world of the other. Now, since the children have no access to the life 
of Palestinian children and very little, if any, encounters with them, they are left with the 
knowledge of the other they have acquired and reconstructed within the boundaries of 
their own world. In short, rather then reflexively engaging with the perspective of the 
other the kibbutz children they depicted the Palestinian as their best friends and the city 
and settlement as their worst enemy.
Since the children in Israel are inhibited from learning about, encountering with, 
truly listening, questioning and understanding the Palestinian narrative of the conflict, 
they are left with the stock of images and conventions embedded in the Israeli narrative. 
For that reason as seen in many of the children’s works, through the voice and 
subjectivity of the Palestinian child, they in effect, reconstructed the Israeli narrative. 
This tendency was particularly evident when the children discussed the Israeli exercise of 
power (from the perspective of the Palestinians) and the notion of peace. In the vast 
majority of cases where the narrator was positioned as a victim of the wrongdoing of the 
Israeli army these actions were always put in the context of the security problem in Israel
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and the war against terrorism. The Israeli violence, even when condemned is always 
depicted as retaliation to the Palestinian deeds. Peace as well was perceived and 
discussed through an Israeli prism. This is seen both in the occasional fatalistic 
perceptions (according to which the conflict is the Israeli and Palestinian destiny and 
peace is unachievable) that were, once again, projected onto the Palestinians, and in the 
whole construction of peace and the vision for peace, which was - from the perspective of 
the Palestinian child - substantiated in relation to the everyday lives of the Israelis. Peace 
for the imaginary Palestinians was for the most part the end of Palestinian violence. 
When making the effort to reconstruct a viable solution from the perspective of the 
Palestinians, the outcome is usually a zero-sum outlook. That is, the goals and aspirations 
of the Palestinian can be realised only at the expense of the Israelis.
The meaning of being behind the narrative bars is unfolded exactly here. The 
Israeli children are kept from wholly abandoning the ideologies and social practices of 
the communities into which they were bom. Even if they come to recognise certain 
ideologies as wrong or oppressive and therefore reject them, it may be extremely difficult 
to transform the selves that were shaped by their inception by those ideologies and 
practices.
Points of convergence
So far in this discussion I have focused predominantly on the restrictions and 
difficulties of Israeli children to apprehend the Palestinian narrative. These restrictions, I 
argued, are embedded in the Israeli collective self or, interchangeably, in the Israeli 
narrative. Yet, it must be acknowledged that apprehension of the Palestinian narrative is 
both restricted and enabled by the boundaries of the Israeli narrative, and, as I have 
/  shown in this thesis, within these boundaries points of convergence are also found with 
the Palestinian narrative. Both the ethnographic data and the analysis of the children’s 
works have shown that the worlds of Israeli and Palestinians are not totally disconnected 
and some alternative images and voices of the Palestinians, albeit minor, are evident.
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The most evident example for that is the notion of land. The decisive and 
unanimous discourse of land demonstrates that above and beyond the cloak of fear, 
hostility and mistrust the Palestinian demand for land has deeply penetrated the Israeli 
self. The Palestinian rightful claim for land is the single most prevalent legitimising voice 
found in the children’s works. Evidently, the fraction of the Palestinian narrative 
regarding the expulsion from the land and the historical injustices inflicted on the 
Palestinians is now an integral fraction in the Israeli narrative. This penetration should be 
seen in historical perspective. The incorporation of the Palestinian legitimate demand for 
land is a relatively recent development. It was only after the outbreak of the Palestinian 
uprising in 1987 that the Israeli self was forced to reconsider the Palestinian claims and to 
re-examine its self-image and narrative. The acknowledgment that the Israeli state was 
established and flourished at the expense of the Palestinians, or that the Israelis have a 
share in the historical injustice imposed upon the Palestinians, and that any viable 
solution will have to take these into consideration are now fairly consensual in Israeli 
society. The Israeli self has gradually acknowledged that the Jewish historical revival 
was the Palestinian historical calamity. The early myths of ‘land without people to a 
people without land’ and the ‘few against many’ are slowly transforming. The history 
that was naturally written by the victor is in a slow process of revision. Heroic memories 
and the glorification of war (which can be understood to be the ways of the victors to 
cope with the traumatic experience of war), are being revised and replaced, not without 
immense resistance, with less epic appeal and more realistic, mature descriptions. This 
change was indeed reflected in the children’s works.
Less consensual voices (but nevertheless evident in the analysis) that demonstrate 
some level of overlap in the narratives regard the disgraceful living conditions of the 
Palestinians and a complementary view on the Israeli exercise of power, which 
positioned the Palestinians as victims. That is to say, in contrast to the dominant hostile, 
delegitimised depiction of the Palestinians and victimised perception of self, a clear, 
albeit minor, image of the poor and hungry and victim Palestinian was evident in the 
analysis. It is interesting to note, for example, the prevalence of the notion of house 
demolition in the children’s works. This was the single most widespread symbol
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regarding the Palestinians being victimised by the Israelis, uttered in the service of 
legitimising the Palestinians and assigning blame and responsibility to the Israeli actions. 
The fact that this was uttered not only in inclusive or empathic narratives but also in the 
more dehumanising works, demonstrate that this notion has, to some extent, diffused into 
the Israeli psyche as a problematic aggressive practice.
Thus, as seen both in the ethnographic data and the children’s works, within the 
boundaries of the Israeli self there exist alternatives, less compromising and more self- 
criticised voices. From a Meadian perspective it is possible to assume that the Palestinian 
and Israeli worlds have points of convergence, that is, the same objects elicit the same 
response for both Israelis and Palestinians. Although less inclusive than the object of 
land, the Palestinian claims of Israeli aggression and abuse converge with alternative 
voices within the Israeli narrative that resent the Israeli occupation, expansionism and 
domination. I believe that the range of voices comprising the Israeli self in relation to the 
conflict were comparatively represented in the children’s works, in terms of both content 
and volume. The hegemony of the hostile approach to the other and the victimised 
perception of self against the minor and marginalised voices of self-criticism and guilt 
and responsibility as found in the children’s works, properly reflects the relations 
between these voices in the Israeli society.
In sum, although this thesis has mainly focused on the restrictions and difficulties 
of Israeli children to take the perspective of the Palestinians, restrictions embedded 
within the Israeli narrative, it must also be acknowledged that the very same 
representational field creates the opportunities to critically and reflexively engage with 
the Palestinian narrative. Everything the children wrote or drew, from the harshest 
depictions to the most empathic, these together represent the range of responses and 
voices that are available to the children to appropriate, reconstruct and configure when 
they face the task of constructing the Palestinian perspective.
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Ambivalence
Indeed, the most interesting findings of this thesis, to my view, are the ambivalent 
responses of the Israeli children towards themselves, the Palestinians and the conflict 
(this ambivalence as previously argued hinders the formulation of perspective taking as 
either-or ability). Just as the Israeli victimised-occupier self comprises of contradictory 
elements, the children’s works are imbued with internal contradictions and ideological 
dilemmas. The analysis has produced configural maps, if you will, of the interrelated 
forces of social representations and ideologies, each with their own trajectories and 
strengths, which determine their ability to constitute prevailing themes within new 
articulations of discourse, or specifically to our case, within the constructed Palestinian 
perspective. These analyses result in descriptions of how discursive and social practices 
(and their effects) are woven together, where their borders lie, and where their fault lines 
are located. From the ethnographic analysis through the sociogenesis to the individual 
analysis of single works, from the collective to the last individual, the revealed picture is 
that of a bipolar approach and contradictions regarding the key objects of the conflict, 
that although seem irreconcilable, are nonetheless intertwined to represent the 
ambivalence, bewilderment and moral contradictions Israeli society is trapped in 
regarding the conflict.
So the Palestinians are an imminent threat at the same time that they deserve our 
compassion. They have the right for land and self-determination, but they want to kill us 
all. They are victims under an occupation regime but also brutal terrorists disregarding 
their own lives. They are both savage and righteous and we are both victims and brutal 
occupiers. We are both aware of the pain we inflict on them at the same time that we are 
blinded by the suffering they inflict on us. We know that all people are equal but still 
strongly feel that we are the ‘chosen people’ and they are inferiors. We are morally and 
militarily superior at the same time that we are weak and vulnerable. We hate the 
Palestinians but we also pity them. These apprehensions are hard to match and therefore 
lead to a very complex mixture of feelings that form an overall ambivalence in the 
children’s minds. This ambivalence is perhaps best epitomised in the words of the child 
who wrote under his drawing of a creepy Palestinian: Cruel and ugly man that wants
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our country to himself but also poor man and on the other hand I feel sorry 
fo r him because just like any other ordinary human being he deserves to 
have something in his life....
Within this ambivalence I find hope. The conclusion that we must draw from 
these ambiguous, bewildered and ambivalent depictions of self, other and the conflict, is 
that we have to find creative ideas for interventions in order to weaken the voices of 
negation, fear and dehumanisation, and strengthen and reinforce self-reflection and the 
voices of mutual respect and recognition. The Israeli moral self is not completely narrow 
in relation to the Palestinians. In fact, although fairly marginalised, especially in days of 
intense violence, it nonetheless has a substantial alternative voice. This voice is embodied 
predominantly in NGO’s, but also in the mass media, academia and the parliament. 
Against the dominant voices of mistrust, hostility and self-victimisation, these parts of the 
Israeli self strongly propagate the end of the occupation, equality, mutual respect and the 
striving for maximum cooperation.
The analysis has shown that even in the harshest depictions one can still find the 
ambivalence and a faint affirmative voice- a hint of empathy, a sense of acknowledgment 
of the other’s rights and even a hint of admiration to the Palestinian tenacious struggle for 
liberation. The voice of the righteous Palestinian, the one that holds the message of 
historical injustice and the struggle for self-determination resonated even through the 
heaviest cloak of dehumanisation. These voices should be identified and strengthened. 
They are already there, in the social environment and in individual minds. They should be 
harboured and fortified in order to turn them into major, dominant voices. At the same 
time, as discussed above, even in the most empathic portrayals, one could still find the 
traces of some immovable representations such as the hope (or fantasy), that the 
Palestinians will disappear and leave the place to the Jews. These also should be 
identified and uprooted. Finally, beyond the abyss of hostility, hatred, alienation and 
despair there is still a colossal yearning for peace and reconciliation. We must find the 
ways to increase the opportunities for encountering with the other, and to help the 
children to see the human face of the other. It is only through increased communication
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that the two different, confronting and seemingly irreconcilable realities of the Israelis 
and the Palestinians can draw nearer.
Prospect for further research
In the meantime we have no other choice but to continue our effort to change. The 
challenge of changing negative stereotypes and prejudice has been on the agenda of 
social psychology for many years and I will not review these efforts in full . The most 
renown is Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis, according to which the best way to reduce 
tension and hostility between groups is to bring them into systematic contact with each 
other in various ways. However as many years of research has proved, contact in itself, 
and for itself is not a sufficient condition. There has to be social and institutional 
endorsement and support, frequent systematic meetings to facilitate the acquisition of 
new information about the other, opportunities for cooperation and joint ventures (Sherif 
et al, 1966), and lastly, equal status of all participants.
It is the last one I wish to refer to now as I find it the most problematic. It has a 
significant impact on the notion of taking the perspective of the other as it brings to the 
fore a highly important issue that has been neglected in previous research on perspective 
taking and indeed was dealt with only implicitly in the current thesis. What I have in 
mind is the relation between perspective taking and power relations. I previously argued 
that perspective taking is predicated on social experience and relations. This cuts across 
contents and contexts. Gender relations, inter-generation relations, ethnic relations, class 
relations, work relations, parent-children relations, peer relations, international relations, 
intimate relations - taking the perspective of the other is always embedded in social 
experience and power relations. As we have made the leap forward from cognitive 
ability to communicative activity we realise that not only have different individuals have 
different ‘abilities’, i.e. not all children and adults are equally competent role takers, but
53 For a thorough review on peace education and research see Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005
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also, the same individual can ‘perform’ differently across different contexts and in 
relation to different others.
This implies a strong contextual approach and special attention to the notion of 
power relations. Whether interpersonal or intergroup, if we are serious about getting a 
better grasp on people’s ability to take the perspective of the other in real life contexts of 
high importance, we first have to ask- what other? And, which context? As this thesis 
has shown, perspective taking is mediated by social representations and ideologies, by 
minds shaped by particular socio-historical circumstances, to either reproduce or 
challenge, sustain or resist different versions of reality and history. What the children 
have expressed in their works is already the outcome of the battle of voices and symbols 
within the Israeli self, which implicates the larger struggle embedded in the 100 years 
long Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The ambivalence and contradictions in the children’s 
role-playing narratives reflect the battle for dominance of one or other version of reality. 
The Meadian formulation has a tendency towards the inclusive and reconciliatory and 
thus downplays asymmetrical relations of power. It is insufficient to simply note that 
Israeli and Palestinian children are living in different worlds. We have to bear in mind 
that the stronger always has better access and opportunities to write history and to define 
reality than the weaker. The questions that arise are manifold: does power weaken the 
ability and propensity to take the perspective of the other, or is it merely the context of 
conflict? Does it diminish understanding of, and feeling for the reality of the weak and 
oppressed? Who has more access to the other’s world -  the powerful or the powerless? 
The minority or the majority? Men or women? Still, what if the powerful, actually and 
genuinely feel weak and vulnerable? These questions need to be addressed in further 
theorising and research. The natural and most called for sequel to this thesis is, to my 
view, a complementary study conducted with Palestinian children.
Second, and related to the above, although it could not be accounted for in this 
thesis, is that I have found very interesting gender differences that are generally 
consistent with findings from feminist moral and justice reasoning theories and research. 
Indeed the stronger predictor to the content of children’s works was the social milieu.
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The analysis has shown that while the kibbutz children had a tendency to 
empathise with the other and present the Palestinians in a more positive, humane manner, 
the children from the city and settlement had a much stronger tendency to delegitimise 
the Palestinians. Nevertheless, the opposite tendencies within the groups reveal that the 
minority of delegitimising works from the kibbutz were produced predominantly by boys 
and the minority of affirmative, empathic works from the city and settlement produced by 
girls. Moreover, looking at the children as a whole it is possible to identify significant 
gender-based approaches to the other where the boys are much more inclined to 
appropriate the voice of belligerence, violence and dehumanisation and the girls are more 
inclined to appropriate the voice of reconciliation and despair. Due to the research 
objectives, its character and scope, gender was not considered a factor in analysis 
pertaining to measures or dependent variables. Nevertheless, these differences cannot be 
ignored. They somewhat undermine previous suggestions that gender differences in 
intergroup perception and attitudes are overshadowed in the context of an intractable 
conflict (Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005). A whole line of research can be taken in this 
direction. My intuitive observations are compatible with Gilligan’s (1982) and Nodding’s 
(1985) notion of feminine and masculine ‘moral voices’. They proposed that women and 
girls engage in moral judgments according to a different set of imperatives-a “different 
voice”-from that which men and boys follow. Their theories suggest that whereas the 
male moral voice comprised of justice and rights, application of rules impartially to 
everyone, and responsibility towards abstract codes of conduct, female’s moral voice 
comprised of care, responsibility, caring about everyone’s suffering, and reserve 
emotional connectedness and responsibility towards real individuals. This “care” theme 
focuses morality on skills of relationship—on supporting, nurturing, and being helpful, 
not on demanding, defending, requiring and compelling. I believe that further research in 
this direction in relation to perspective taking in the context of intergroup conflict has 
promising potential.
And finally, this thesis was aimed at exploring the socio-ideological-historical 
factors that both enable and restrict Israeli children to take the perspective of the 
Palestinians. I hope I was able to demonstrate how perspective taking and the
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achievement of mutual understanding depends not only on the cognitive developments of 
individuals but also on the political structure of the context or the situation. To conclude 
and suggest further direction for research, I draw on (1988) the highly relevant 
formulation of Raviv et al regarding the acquisition of beliefs about war, conflict and 
peace. They suggested considering beliefs about war, conflict and peace as part of a 
larger body of social knowledge. Within this, they elaborated a very useful theoretical 
framework for the analysis of factors which have a determinative influence on the 
formation of social knowledge, that is, developmental, cultural and situational factors. 
My strategy is to reframe their argument in terms of perspective taking.
Developmental factors deal with growth and improvement in cognitive capacities, 
which among other things afford individuals an understanding of the social world. These 
principles of cognitive development also apply to children’s ability to take the 
perspective of the other. As mentioned in the introduction, mainstream cognitive- 
developmental research has focused on these principles (for example, Feffer, 19xx, 
Selman, 1980).
Cultural factors, the main focus of my thesis are the shared concepts, values and 
beliefs, in a given community that mediate perspective taking. Members of a particular 
community tend to shape their views of the world on the basis of their society’s culture 
and history. Subject to history, social conditions and experiences, they form a unique way 
to apprehend the social reality. The social knowledge of a community encompasses a 
wide scope of concepts and beliefs about self, other and the conflict and, as I hope I was 
able to demonstrate, have a profound impact on the ability and propensity to take the 
perspective of the other.
Situational factors refer to particular situations or events that directly influence 
the ability and propensity to take the perspective of the other. The most obvious example 
for such a situational factor in the context of the current thesis is the fluctuating 
frequency and intensity of violent relations. The concrete situational experiences of war 
or violence on the one hand and peace treaties and successful negotiations on the other,
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must have an effect on those who experienced it and hence on perspective taking. For 
example, Spielmann (1986) investigated the effect of the historic visit of Egyptian 
president Sadat to Jerusalem in 1977. She asked Jewish-Israeli and Israeli-Arab children 
and adolescents to write an essay titled “Thoughts about Peace” immediately prior to, and 
following the historic visit. The results clearly showed the effect of this dramatic event on 
the children’s views. Whereas their responses prior to the visit were utopian and 
optimistic, and peace was conceptualised in terms of justice and brotherhood, following 
the visit, the essays contain more realistic expressions such as ‘high price’ and the 
children tended to question the value of peace. I am certain that situational factors have 
an influence on the ability and motivation to take the perspective of the other. The 
prominence of the image of a Palestinian child who wishes to be a suicide bomber is the 
most obvious evidence to the influence of the recent cycle of violence, and the wave of 
suicide attacks on the children’s works. The dismay and despair uttered by the children is 
a direct consequence of the intense violence in the region in the time of the fieldwork. 
Additionally, the resonance of the build-up to the Iraq war in the children’s works also 
strengthens the proposition that situational factors affect perspective taking performance. 
The fact that many children have cast their their anxieties from the coming war in Iraq to 
their images and words and hence to the Palestinian subjectivity strongly support the 
influence of situational factors. I am certain that in more calm and peaceful times, the 
content of the children’s works will be less negative and more inclusive. I suspect that if 
a similar study had been conducted immediately after signing of a peace treaty between 
the Israelis and the Palestinians, the content of the children’s works would be 
significantly different mainly in their approach to the other. Further research in this 
direction should look at this thesis as a baseline for comparison.
Final words
As this thesis reaches its end, on a more personal note, I would add that 
unfortunately, there is no cognitive magic in taking the perspective of the other. I believe 
that a fundamental and structural change has to occur to the Israeli self for that to happen. 
It has to get rid of the dormant racist and ethnocentric attitudes held by the vast majority
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of Jews, which have been nurtured over the years by Israel’s political educational and 
cultural systems in a wounded society that has lived in a conflictual and confrontational 
reality since the day it was established. The Israeli self will have to first acknowledge, 
then reconcile with, the crimes committed from the massive expulsion of 1948 to the 
evils of the occupation, looting the land, uprooting, demolishing, killing and expelling. 
The Israeli self will have to, sooner rather than later, break the mirror that reflects a face 
of eternal victim, foppish self-righteousness and superior moral body. It will have to 
realise that it cannot pride itself as the only democracy in the Middle East while keeping 
under its boot millions of Palestinians deprived of basic human rights. It will have to 
acknowledge that occupation and terrorism are like twin brothers. Both are illegitimate, 
barbaric, murderous and pervasive. Maybe in the future, when the Israelis and 
Palestinians will establish their own Committee of Truth and Reconciliation, they will be 
able to revise their narratives and perhaps create a united version of the two historical 
narratives, an inclusive version of history and a reality free from historical deceptions and 
competition of sufferings.
Regrettably, we live in a conservative, despairing and languished era. The Israeli 
Palestinian conflict cries for solution and reconciliation, and that solution is bloody 
obvious in the double sense of the word. The Israelis and Palestinians have never been so 
close to a solution yet they have never been so far away. A just, fair, practical and viable 
solution exists, but it seems like both sides are held captive by fear and suspicion, 
impotent leaders and the power of old stubborn convictions. Perhaps the two peoples are 
not yet tired enough of bleeding each other. Peace will happen in a year or two, or ten or 
a hundred. But it will happen only when the two people realise that the price of non­
peace is higher than the price of peace. When they will, I hope they will find out that 
there is still an opportunity to create two independent entities with maximum cooperation 
that will bring prosperity and success for both people.
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APPENDIX I
Ethical procedure of data collection:
Prior to data collection I obtained consent for conducting research from head-teachers 
and teachers. Additionally, I submitted my research proposal to the Research Ethics 
Committee of the Israeli department of education. It was approved conditioned to 
obtaining written consent each participating child’s parents.
Once through these formal procedures, approached the children in the classroom about a 
week before data collection, explained my research objectives and asked for their 
participation. Each child took home a letter explaining in detail the planned research and 
asking for their consent. Only those children who had the written consent (82% of all 
children I approached) participated in the drawing and writing activities.
325
